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IN IRAQ, 1958-1976.

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ELITES, ADMINISTRATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REPUBLICAN REGIMES  
IN IRAQ, 1958-1976

by

MWAFAQ HADED TIKRITI, B.A., M.A.

DISSERTATION

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December 1976

ELITES, ADMINISTRATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REPUBLICAN REGIMES  
IN IRAQ, 1958-1976

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To my beloved daughter

Reyam Angela Al-Tikriti

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Two major factors have influenced the evolution of this study. The first concerns my own personal interest and fascination in the patterns of political leadership that have dominated my native country, Iraq, and that have shaped the recent destiny of the Iraqi people. Questions related to the role and influence of the political elite in Iraq are considered, in my opinion, to be an important area of inquiry since they better enable one to understand the nature and dynamics of Iraqi politics.

The second factor concerns the attempt to achieve a more analytic and comprehensive understanding of Iraqi politics in particular and political leadership in general. Investigators have sometimes conveyed a negative image in describing and interpreting the political reality of Iraq. This problem has stemmed partially from biases and preconceived stereotypes and partly from the writers' lack of understanding of Iraqi society in its own distinctive terms. Thus, in defense of Iraq, and in terms of presenting an objective portrayal of the endeavors of the various Iraqi political elites to realize better living conditions, resources, benefits, and rewards for their people, this study hopes to have successfully avoided much of the subjectivity prevalent in the other works on Iraqi politics.

I would like to offer special thanks to a number of prominent Iraqi statesmen who contributed much to the completion of this work. Among them, I recognize: Mr. Saddam Husain, vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and Deputy-Secretary of the Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party for his kind invitation to his office; Mr. Adnan al-Hamdani, member of the Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and, since May 12, 1976, Minister of Planning; Mr. Adnan Ayyoub Sabri, Secretary of the Office of the vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council; Mr. Hikmat al-Azawi, Minister of Economics; Mr. Tariq Aziz, Minister of Information; Mr. Ghanim Abd al-Jalil, Minister of Higher Education; Dr. Sadun Hammadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Mundhir al-Shawi, Minister of Justice; Dr. Mukaram al-Talabani, Minister of Irrigation; Dr. Hasan Fahmi Jimah, Minister of Agriculture; staff of Jaridat Al-Thawra--The Revolution Newspaper; and staff of Wakalat al-Anba al-Iraqiyya--The Iraqi News Agency.

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Lebanon to give me the opportunity to finish this study.

Finally, Arabic proper names and places are transliterated according to a format used by the Library of Congress but without the diacritical marks. However, occasional inconsistencies may appear in quotations of writers who follow different Arabic transliteration.

M. H. T.

September 1976

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Chapter I  
INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Problem

There has been a great deal of confusion, both inside and outside Iraq, about the nature of the republican regimes which came to power as a result of the revolution<sup>1</sup> of July 14, 1958. The various descriptions of regimes ranged from pro-Communist to Islamic nationalist, from a military dictatorship to a 'democratic' multi-party regime, and from a bourgeois reformist to a revolutionary mass-movement regime. This confusion has arisen not only from what official spokesmen have said about the regimes' nature and intentions but also because the policies they have actually pursued have often been inconsistent and contradictory.

Iraq, like most other Middle Eastern countries, still experiences internal social unrest, which manifests itself in economic, political, and social dimensions. The country continues to be described as having a relative absence of legitimate leadership, recurrence of power struggles and violence, short-lived cabinets, unpredictable national policies, and fragile national unity.<sup>2</sup>

Yet one of the most significant facts of the political history of republican Iraq has been the complete replacement of the social, economic, and political power of the traditional elites of the monarchical era (1932-1958) and the evolution of a new elite. This situation does not necessarily involve a corresponding development of political, economic, social, and administrative institutions which promote increased participation in the political process and more responsive government. More likely, the challenge of modernization and political development\* has caused repeated upheavals in leadership and policies, as well as problems of legitimacy resulting from the incapacity of the system to absorb demands resulting from rapid social and economic development.

Furthermore, it has become common during the last twenty years in the West, as well as in the Middle East, to label a country by its leader, such as Nasir's and later Sadaat's Egypt, Qasim's Iraq, and Qadhafi's Libya.<sup>3</sup> This indicates that the deliberate and conscious methodology of change is, to a large extent, the responsibility and concern of the national political leader. The leader's strategies, in this regard, are bound to have far-reaching consequences for the political system and for the society. In support of this, a recent study states:

---

\*These concepts are defined below.

The authority invested in the person of the leader along with the special position he maintains vis-a-vis the instruments of coercion and persuasion in society, provides a degree of strength and control necessary to propel or thwart the process of change.<sup>4</sup>

It is important not only to focus on the role of the leader in the course of modernization and political development, but also it is necessary to include the individuals or group of individuals who facilitate the leader's rise to power and consequently share governing responsibilities with him. These individuals or group(s) of individuals are called the 'political elite,' who determine the basic decisions and policies which shape the outcome of modernization and political development.

Since 1958, the political leadership of Iraq proclaimed, on several occasions, a transitional stage which required the introduction and management of new and better societal conditions. But the course of each transitional stage has been marred by extensive disruption and turbulence. The frequent and, sometimes, violent changes of governments and of heads of state reflected the nature of the social and economic structure of the society. Despite the fact that change in heads of state, cabinet ministers, and even government organizational layout represented a complete breakdown from one regime to another, there has been less impressive and less tangible development in providing appropriate institutions and relevant procedures to fulfil the regimes' promises and to meet the new demands and expectations of the

citizens.

However, the type, quality, and direction of policies of modernization and political development are basically the responsibility of the political elite. Similarly, the degree of success or failure of attaining national goals and implementing public policies determines the continuity or collapse of the regime. This reciprocal relationship between type of regime and type of public policy is, therefore, significant to the stability of the regime and to the regularity of public policy. The following chapters represent an attempt to describe, analyze, and evaluate systematically and comparatively the nature and dynamics of elite formation and circulation as well as specific public policy issues as they relate to modernization and political development in each of the republican regimes.

## 1.2. Review of Literature

Numerous studies have focused on elites as their unit of analysis to understand the structure and performance of political systems.<sup>5</sup> The term 'elite' was first used in the seventeenth century to describe commodities of particular excellence, and was later applied to refer to superior social groups such as higher military units or ranks of the nobility.<sup>6</sup> Since the nineteenth century, the elite approach has become prominent in political and sociological analysis. Views of different scholars on the general relationship between the elite and society

have resulted in conceptual, ideological, and methodological controversy.<sup>7</sup>

In terms of the conceptual treatment of elites, a fairly clear consensus emerged by representative writers on the subject who generally recognize that the concept 'elite' refers to those who hold the highest positions in the social, political, and economic organization of society. Beyond this point, according to Suzanne Keller, representative writers fall into two main groups:

Those selecting a single elite—usually the political elite—as socially decisive, and here Aristotle, Pareto, and Mosca come to mind; and those who insist that a number of elites coexist, sharing power, responsibilities, and rewards. Here belong such writers as Saint-Simon, Karl Mannheim, and Raymond Aron. Despite the variety, not to say the confusion, in the terms and concepts used, each of these writers has added something to the general understanding of the phenomenon, though none has painted the entire canvas.<sup>8</sup>

The ideological controversy stems from the Marxist and elitist views of society. For example, Marx and Michels agrees on the basic division of society into ruling and non-ruling groups, but they differ in their conclusions. Marx believed that the eventual withering away of the state would end minority rule over the masses. In contrast, Michels contended that any organization, regardless of its commitment to egalitarian values, would develop a smaller inner group which would amass and sustain political power for itself.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the opposing nature of Marxism and elitism, attempts have been made, notably by Burnham and, to a lesser extent, Mills, to synthesize Marx, Mosca, and Pareto. The intent has been to place leadership in both the political and economic context instead of stressing either the individual or the group. The result is what has been widely called the 'ruling elite model' which allegedly integrates Marxist and elitist elements. Singularly, the two theories are clearly incompatible. Marx basically responded to modern industrial society, while elitism addressed modern political development. Neither approach was effectively able to get economic and political factors into a balanced perspective.<sup>10</sup>

The methodological approaches to the study of elites are no less divisive and problematic among writers than the conceptual and ideological issues. Any method employed in determining who qualifies for membership in the political elite category poses advantages as well as disadvantages.<sup>11</sup> The predominant approaches include historical, positional or institutional, reputational, decisional or empirical, observational or intuitive, or a combination of one or more of these. The choice of approach depends on the writer's means and limitations--both substantive or procedural.

The historical method was employed by Mosca and Pareto. The positional method--involving only the occupants of crucial institutional positions as members of the elite--was used in studies including Ministers of Modernization by Bernard Silberman

(1964), The Turkish Political Elite by Frederick Frey (1965), Leadership in A New Nation by Lester Seligman (1962), The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon by Marshall Singer (1964), U. S. Senators and Their World by Donald Matthews (1960), Six Allies and A Neutral: A Study of the International Outlooks of Political Leaders in The United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and India by Lloyd Free (1959), and Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 by William Quandt (1969). The reputational approach which establishes who the elites are, basically relies on informants who nominate those considered to have most influence, power and who can get things done. This approach is mainly associated with Floyd Hunter's study of Community Power Structure (1953) and Marvin Zonis' study The Political Elite of Iran (1971). The decision-making approach is represented by Robert Dahl's work Who Governs? (1961) in which he selected three issue areas to test the range of elite influence. Since the works of Hunter and Dahl, other more recent works analyzing elites have combined rival methodologies--positional, reputational, and decisional--to provide a more comprehensive description and identification of a political community's elite. A typical format for using this approach would be the case study of one or more issues of public policy.<sup>12</sup>

In spite of the difficulties encountered in identifying members of the elite, according to Merritt, the facts remain that:

Scholars have produced interesting and fruitful

results from elite studies using each of the approaches....It nonetheless seems clear that, like the use of multiple indicators to test political propositions, combined means to identify elites are the most satisfactory in securing representative samples.<sup>13</sup>

Further encouragement is offered by Lenczowski who contends that whatever imperfect data are available, inferences--even intuitive ones--must be drawn about an elite's attitudes from its social background and certain policy issues.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, serious shortage of genuine comparative, empirical studies of leaders--as individuals or as in groups--remain in the political literature.<sup>15</sup>

### 1.3. The Conceptual Framework

It is important to provide operational definitions of key concepts used in this study since they are used in widely divergent ways by many writers. Other concepts will be defined in the text when they arise.

Political Elite. For some scholars, "elites are the 'decision-makers' of the society whose power is not subject to control by any other body in the society."<sup>16</sup> For other scholars, "elites are the sole source of values in the society or constitute the integrating force in the community without which it may fall apart."<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, contemporary research on elites reflects conceptual diversity. For example, Lasswell defines elite as the influential. "The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get."<sup>18</sup> C. Wright Mills writes on the power elite



as "those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them."<sup>19</sup> Keller refers to elite as "a minority of individuals designated to serve a collectivity in a socially valued way."<sup>20</sup> T. B. Bottomore views elites as "functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society."<sup>21</sup> Robert Dahl identifies the "ruling elite" as "a controlling group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences in preferences on key political issues."<sup>22</sup> Referring to the American middle class, G. W. Domhoff views power elite as "those who have a superior amount of power due to the institutional hierarchies they command."<sup>23</sup> William Quandt writes that "the simplest and most useful way to define a political elite is to say that it consists of those individuals in a society who exercise a disproportionately large amount of influence within the political system."<sup>24</sup>

In light of the foregoing definitions the following operational definition of elites will be used because it best fits the Iraqi context. The elite is that collectivity of individuals who occupy the highest national posts and who, at any time, determine the major public policies and how they will be implemented. As we will see, these individuals include cabinet members, the

Prime Minister, the President of the Republic, and the members of the Revolutionary Command Council.

Public Policy. The term 'public policy' has been defined as "whatever governments choose to do or not to do."<sup>25</sup> David Easton views public policy as "the authoritative allocation of values [by the government] for the whole society."<sup>26</sup> Lasswell and Kaplan define policy as "a projected program of goal values and practices."<sup>27</sup> As used in this study, public policy refers to all actions of government--including stated intentions of government or government officials--directed towards the achievement of certain goals in specific issue areas having national impact. A policy is sometimes the outcome of political compromises among decision-makers, while at other times it springs from new opportunities--not from problems at all. Furthermore, public policy may be viewed as a dependent variable which is a consequence, effect, or indicator of elite background in shaping its content. Public policy can also be viewed as an independent variable which has an impact on elite survival and continuity. Two policy areas have been selected for analysis in this study: national integration and economic policy.

Administration. 'Administration' is used in this study to refer to public bureaucracy. The term bureaucracy was used by Max Weber to "denote the most rational method for conducting the affairs of state and particularly for exercising public authority."<sup>28</sup> Other social scientists have defined bureaucracy in

different ways.<sup>29</sup> Riggs views bureaucracy as "a hierarchy of all offices under the formal authority of the head of state in any polity."<sup>30</sup> In this study, we shall use the term administration or bureaucracy interchangeably to refer to all those activities by government agencies and their employees pertaining to the formulation and implementation of national plans and public policies.

Power. Power in itself is the mere capacity to influence or control the actions of others. It refers to "everything from institutional position to decision-making abilities."<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the exercise of power becomes the central focus and substance of political behavior. Here, politics is measured by the ability to get what one wants either by having one's interests prevail, or by preventing others from counteracting such interests. Harold Lasswell refers to politics as the study of "influence and the influential."<sup>32</sup> Therefore, politics may be understood to refer to the act of control. If politics is defined in terms of power, its main concern becomes those who hold power--the political elite. Politics is, therefore, focused around the political functioning of elites, their interactions with one another, and the effect of such interactions on non-elites. The political process is dominated by their efforts to gain support for their programs (or for their opposition to government programs) as they seek alliances with other groups and attempt to build national institutions. Low level of institutionalized power in developing countries adds importance to the crucial role of political elites in taking decisions and

shaping the patterns of modernization and political development which ultimately determine the future of the government and its survival.

Modernization. The term 'modernization' may be defined as "the process by which man increasingly gains control over his environment."<sup>33</sup> Eight indices are used to measure modernization. They include four basic physical and technological indicators (per capita consumption, per capita energy production, automobiles, per 1,000 inhabitants, and per capita percentage of daily protein) and four social indicators (school enrollment, education expenditures, physicians and hospital beds).<sup>34</sup> All these factors that comprise the modernization syndrome are mutually reinforcing.

Political Development. Numerous definitions of political development have been provided by political and social scientists. The most acceptable to us in this context is the one provided by the Social Science Research Committee which states that political development:

...is a capacity not only to overcome the divisions and manage the tensions created by increased differentiation, but to respond to or contain the participatory and distributive demands generated by the imperatives of equality. It is also a capacity to innovate and to manage continuous change.<sup>35</sup>

In the Iraqi context, political development involves the capacity of the Iraqi political system to initiate, absorb, and sustain continuous transformation. Accordingly, the capacity of the political system will involve: providing more individuals with the

power to improve their position in society on the basis of personal merit rather than personal connections; admitting all groups and interests, including newly recognized interests and new generations, into full political participation without disrupting the efficient working of the political system; allocating and reallocating the rewards and priorities of the society in a way that permits all to expect and receive rationally based treatment; and establishing integrative symbols. Political development is concerned not so much with initiating change (which is inevitable) as with "managing change,"<sup>36</sup> with directing it and its consequences.

Political Participation. The term 'political participation' has been defined, according to Bill and Leiden, as "a process whereby individuals engage in activity that impinges directly upon the national power and authority structure of society."<sup>37</sup> This activity can be system-challenging or system supporting. Within the Middle Eastern context, the instruments of participation--such as parliament and political parties--remain at a rudimentary level in terms of under-representation, pseudo-representation, and misrepresentation. The system-supportive participation exists in the sense that large numbers of individuals come to support an authority structure that represents their interests and provides them with meaningful success.<sup>38</sup> Participation is broadened where more people are continually brought into the decision-making process. Indicators of political participation may take the form of

overthrowing traditional semi-feudal regimes. Other patterns may include activities such as selection of rulers by members of the society, enrollment in parties, management of bureaucracies, transformation of class structure, demonstrations and riots, and staging revolutions.<sup>39</sup>

Nationalism. The term nationalism may be defined as "an ideological commitment to the pursuit of the unity, independence, and interests of a people who conceive of themselves as forming a community."<sup>40</sup> Therefore, nationalism, in one of its manifestations, can take the form of an assertion of a people's right--however distinguished--to determine its political destiny autonomously.<sup>41</sup>

National Integration. National integration may be defined as the process which brings together "culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity which overshadows--or eliminates--subordinate parochial loyalties."<sup>42</sup> National integration in this study is used to refer to the linkage between elites and mass or the government and the governed. In contrast, disintegration means that the people of disparate parts of a nation--or small societies existing within a nation--base their real loyalties and sense of oneness not within the nation as a whole, but within their special small regional, ethnic, linguistic, or religious group.<sup>43</sup>

#### 1.4. The Theoretical Argument

Emerging nations with rigid social structures, limited

political participation, and rising human demands face the difficult challenge of modernization.<sup>44</sup> Modernization signifies planned and purposeful change, and especially in rapidly modernizing countries, there is a particular need for strong and unified political leadership to manage the process of social and economic change.<sup>45</sup> Elites usually delineate a priority of desired goals for their society. They have to make decisions concerning the distribution of limited material and human resources connected with various developmental policies. Differences in priorities among elites may result in radical policy shifts and intense political conflict.

There is continuous interaction between political elites and the forces of modernization in the sense that elites initiate or manipulate change<sup>46</sup> as well as respond to the dynamics of change. However, the quality of change, rapid and radical (transforming), or slow and nominal (modifying) has an impact on elite status and power in the social and political systems. This impact determines, among other things, the policies which elite adopt as well as inducing changes among elites and society.

It is widely recognized that the primary problem facing developing countries is that of transition: transition from a colonized country to a nationally-independent one; from a traditional society (ascriptive status, diffuse roles, particularistic values, collectivity orientation, and affectivity) to modern society (achievement status, specific roles, universalistic values,

self orientation, and affective neutrality)<sup>47</sup>; from an agricultural and extractive economy to an industrial one; and from a traditional administration to a dynamic and rational one.

The process of transition to modernity is accompanied by problems and crises which are expressed by Leonard Binder in the following terms:

The political path to modernity involves critical changes of identity from the religious to the ethnic and from the parochial to the societal. It involves critical changes in legitimacy from transcendental to immanent sources. It involves critical changes in political participation from elite to mass and from family to group. It involves critical changes of distribution from status and privilege to ability, achievement, and the control and management of capital. And it involves critical changes in the degree of administrative and legal penetration into social structure and out to the remote regions of the country.<sup>48</sup>

The political elites in a country occupy the top power positions which determine policy and resolve issues at the national level. In order to acquire public support and stability, political elites need to create organizations and procedures (parties, leaders, bureaucracies, associations, voting procedures, policies, etc.) capable of managing crises and absorbing new demands.<sup>49</sup> The new social and political institutions, created and directed by these elites "will mobilize the nation, link all the people together into a national communications network, provide the symbols of national integration, and assure a tolerant, if not wholesome, environment for the entrepreneur."<sup>50</sup> It is widely



recognized that developing nations often face a shortage of "professional modernizing politicians, skilled military leaders, risk-taking businessmen, and efficient administrators."<sup>51</sup> In these situations, government leaders often lack experience and are forced to acquire the skills while at the same time working to build the required institutions.

In the Middle East, the power base from which societal decisions are made is quite distinct from the masses. Political elites have more control than any group in society because of their "authority and its relation to the instruments of coercion and persuasion in society....The direction and guidance of modernizing programs requires strength and control"<sup>52</sup> According to Bill and Leiden:

The political elites of the various Middle Eastern societies make the basic decisions that shape modernizing strategies and guide modernizing programs. Much of the responsibility for the success and failure of policies of modernization resides in the political arena. Modernization in turn affects the capacity of the political system to respond to political challenges. For reasons such as these, the important issue of political development is closely interwoven with the problem of modernization.<sup>53</sup>

Not only does the success and failure of development policies depend upon the political leadership and the power they possess, but much of their power and leadership in turn depends upon these policies. By this, we mean that policy becomes a means by which rival leaders attempt to maximize their support for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining power, which allows them to

continue. As we shall see within the context of power struggle among political elites in Iraq, specific policy choices helped determine the winner in the contest. Throughout the developmental process--from goal formulation to program execution--the public bureaucracy plays the role of a mediator linking both the political leadership's aspirations and the administrators' capacity to realize them. Hence, the performance of the public bureaucracy contributes to the success of policy implementation and elite continuation.

#### 1.5. Hypotheses

In general, this study focuses on the background characteristics of those who have reached the highest positions in the country, and how such people have used the bureaucracy to influence the outcome of public policies. It answers such questions as: What persons reached the highest level of formal power in Iraq? What kind of men became cabinet ministers, members of the Revolutionary Command Councils, and Presidents? Did political elites from divergent social and political backgrounds exhibit significantly different types of policies? Was there any clear association between the political style of the various republican regimes and the social characteristics of the formal political elite? To what extent was the public bureaucracy able to adapt itself to the new social environment in order to realize the revolutionary aims and to implement the required changes?

Specifically, the following hypotheses will be treated in light of the collected and analyzed data:

- A. The 'younger' and less secure a regime is, the higher the percentage of its supporters in the cabinet, and the lower the number of ministers selected according to merit and qualifications.
- B. The higher the degree of personalism and factionalism existing in a cabinet, the less energy devoted to modernization and political development and the more devoted to problems internal to the group. The more reshuffling of cabinet members and programs, the weaker the government, the less satisfaction of popular demands and the increased probability of military intervention.
- C. A homogeneous and cohesive elite that attains power is more capable of orienting the society to its values than is a heterogeneous elite torn by inner dissension.
- D. The greater the degree of commitment and professionalism among cabinet members, the smaller will be the disruption of the planning and developmental process.
- E. With the decline of the key recruitment group (e.g. Free Officers in Iraq), the more likely the importance of the military as a recruitment source will decrease, while the influence of technocrats increases.
- F. The more violent and revolutionary systematic changes,

the more complete and rapid displacement of elites. However, abrupt replacement of one elite by another does not necessarily produce subsequent changes. The new elite may, though committed to social revolution or reforms, fail to achieve successfully such commitment. Instead, they entrench themselves in the monopoly of power, producing little change beyond their rise to power and promises of implementing ambitious programs.

- G. The more fragmented and weak the political system, the more significant the role of bureaucracy becomes in determining public policy. Conversely, the more cohesive the political elite, the more subordinate is the bureaucracy.
- H. The administrative system generates change as well as reacts to change in the social environment. The ruling elite will rely more exclusively on public bureaucracy to maintain links between government and society as well as to implement national programs. Therefore, given the economic and technological conditions of the country, the quantity and quality of change which can be introduced will depend on the interaction between the political system and the public bureaucracy.

#### 1.6. Methodology

For research on political behavior, focusing on elites is

a sound research strategy for a number of important reasons.

First, in terms of access to data, there has been much written on national leaders and far less data on groups, classes, or the masses.<sup>54</sup> This is because, out of the many variables that affect stability in developing countries, the behavior of the political elite is important to the problems of legitimacy and control and is often more politically significant than mass behavior.<sup>55</sup>

Second, there is a greater need for such individuals in time of transition and decision making.<sup>56</sup> Finally, influence and behavior of political elites "constitute the primary component of the process of governing"<sup>57</sup> so that focusing analysis on their behavior exposes larger, more general aspects of political systems.

Iraqi politics have been characterized by severe conflicts among members of the political elite and by a series of crises of authority since 1958. It is our assumption that there is neither the established political processes which can accommodate intra-elite dissension, nor the political structures to sustain order and effective policy-making. Therefore, the delineation and explanation of political and social changes and their consequences may be traced primarily to the composition, functions, and behavior patterns of political leaders.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, analysis of changing social backgrounds, educational and professional distribution, political orientations and aspirations, and elite behavior can be useful for examining the relationship between the "socio-economic changes characteristic of modernization on the one hand

and policy changes on the other."<sup>59</sup> Political elites, therefore, act as well as react, and may be viewed as both independent as well as dependent variables.

Most developing countries aspire to modernize. "Dynamism, change, industrialization, independence, influence, power, internal unity: these are some of the attributes of modern societies sought by the political elites of the recently independent states."<sup>60</sup> The degree of success or failure of political elites in achieving such national goals is determined by their composition and beliefs as well as by their command over human, organizational (e.g., bureaucracy, military, party) and material resources.

#### 1.6.1. Approach and Procedure

This study sets out to analyze systematically the political elites in Iraq since 1958 in terms of their identity, positions, skills, values, and behavioral patterns. It also examines interactions among elites. We seek not only to study elite characteristics (social backgrounds, careers, orientation) but also to investigate their effect on certain institutions and policy preferences. In other words, we shall examine both causes and consequences in elites' structure, the changes in its composition with the transfer of power and authority from one regime to the next and the subsequent effect on modernization policies. The dimensions examined involve the scope, duration, mechanisms and participants in changes of political elites, and how this may introduce

different policy preferences and how, in turn, policies affect the interaction of elites and the support generated for them.

Rather than the mere notation of the sequence of successive changes of elites, this study examines their velocity, amplitude, and ramifications. Furthermore, the scarcity of recognized procedures in policy-making and the intolerance of institutional checks on the exercise of power have personalized politics, and have made the backgrounds and outlooks of individual leaders critically significant to the understanding of governing the country and facing the challenge of modernization and political development.

Another basic issue of the study involves the politics of personal power: what it is, how to acquire it, how to keep it, how to use it, and how to lose it. Our interest is in what a leader or a group of individuals do to make their own will felt within the political arena, i.e., what they can do as a minority among many in carrying out their own choices through the maze of personalities and institutions that make up the Iraqi political system.

This is not a study about Iraqi leadership as an organization, as a legal unit, or as a formal government; rather it is an exploration of the power patterns that characterize the political elite members who occupy the highest national positions. It is to be observed that even if a political party or a military junta assumes power, within such bodies are found divisions that run

much deeper than the left-right wing, or civilian-military splits usually discussed. Behind these fissures are personal rivalries and jealousies among the top leadership which take the appearance of ideological struggles accompanied by outbidding the rivals, rapprochement with enemies, and cooperation and/or cooptation with the rivals' enemies and allies respectively. These struggles provide a classic problem that faces contemporary Iraqi leadership and continues to shake the political system from time to time.

For the purpose of this study, members of the Iraqi political elites have been selected to include the President, Vice-President, members of the Revolutionary Councils, and cabinet ministers for the following reasons. First, politically powerful people, civil or military, are found in the cabinet in addition to other institutions. This fact may be attributed to such people's desire for visibility, prestige, and the legitimacy of their power. Second, national policies are initiated and decided in the cabinet, a procedure which brands the cabinet as the most important institutional power collectivity, after the Revolutionary Council. Third, cabinet structure is, to a certain extent, representative of the social structure of the country. Fourth, the socio-economic data is available on cabinet ministers. Fifth, there is a strong congruence between the actual power structure of the society and the institutions of the Revolutionary Council and the cabinet.

There are two major public policy areas selected for



detailed analysis: first, national integration policy with special emphasis on the Arab-Kurd integration policy; and second, economic policy with emphasis on general trends and on oil nationalization policy in particular.

An eclectic methodology is followed which combines historical-institutional-decisional approaches. The historical method will study the Iraqi political elites during the republican era. It will compare and contrast the formation and circulation of elites within and between each of the three regimes. The institutional technique will consider the structural changes which have taken place as a result of changes in the positions and relationships among Presidents, Revolutionary Councils, and cabinets. The decisional method will analyze major decisions in specific policy issues in an attempt to establish an inference to where the real power-holders are. This technique will also illustrate how decision-making channels have been reorganized around personalities rather than institutions in a way to accommodate the regime's survival. In addition, policies can also influence the structure of the political system in the sense that the political elites will concentrate or broaden the power structure according to the magnitude of the problem and the resources available in realizing the desired goals. Furthermore, the empirical orientation of the study hopefully will provide a modicum of precision which will contribute to inductive analysis and the generation of hypotheses.

During the last eighteen years there have been twenty-two cabinets<sup>61</sup> comprising some 512 ministerial positions to be distributed among 219 Iraqi personalities. These ministerial positions were divided into political (or strategic) positions which are of key importance, and secondary positions which are less critical than the first category. The first category possesses superior power and consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Information and Culture, and Education.<sup>62</sup> The second category which is greater in number but possesses less power includes all other ministers including Agriculture, Economy, Agrarian Reform, Planning, Labor, Housing, Municipalities, Oil, Communications, Justice, Youth, North Construction, and Union Affairs.<sup>63</sup> Members of the Revolutionary Councils and cabinet ministers who, on the one hand, possess power to direct and reshape the country and, on the other hand, presumably reflect the social structure of the society are examined along seven dimensions: age, place of birth, ethnic, sectarian, educational, occupational, and ideological backgrounds.

The dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The introductory chapter covers the conceptual and methodological aspects of the study. The second chapter describes the prevailing conditions before the revolution of 1958. The third chapter analyzes the background characteristics and power struggles of the political elites during the 'pro-leftist' Qasim regime (1958-1963),

the 'nationalist' regime of Abd al-Salam Arif and Abd al-Rahman Arif (1963-1968), and the 'socialist' regime of al-Bakr (1968-1976). It discusses the interpersonal relations among members of the political elite. The fourth chapter portrays the impact and consequences of elite characteristics upon the two major public policy areas of national integration and economic policy. This chapter also accounts for shifts in policy views, and discusses the impact of regime changes on the structure of decision and policy making in Iraq. The fifth chapter assesses the extent to which bureaucracy responds and adapts itself to shifts in power and the extent to which elites use bureaucracy as an instrument for change. The sixth chapter summarizes and puts into comparative perspective the major aspects (general patterns of elite recruitment and circulation, and decision-making channels) of the three republican regimes and evaluates their policies in the processes of modernization and political development. The final chapter adopts, rejects, or modifies some of the stated hypotheses and draws general as well as specific conclusions. The contribution of this study will be to indicate more clearly what political behavior is adopted and what policy-making procedure is followed, if certain leadership characteristics prevail, in dealing with public policies at both the local and national levels.

#### 1.6.2. Sources of Data and Encountered Problems

The data in this study were derived from several types of materials and in several ways. A basic method was to gather

information on elite members' social backgrounds and careers (age, place of birth, ethnicity, religion, education, profession, and political orientation). Data were drawn from documentary sources, newspapers, and other studies of Iraqi politics. Although data were found concerning most members of the political elite, there is a lack of information about a few members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This has only slightly hampered the construction of hypotheses.

Another source of data was unstructured interviews which, during the summer of 1975, were conducted with the office of the Deputy Chairman of the RCC and six ministers. During the same period, a short and general questionnaire was administered to twenty director-generals of various departments in the public bureaucracy. Except for the office of the Deputy Chairman of the RCC and the Minister of Information, the other ministers answered in terms of the ruling party's official policies.<sup>64</sup> Most of the directors general reluctantly checked a few answers in the questionnaire, claiming they do not interfere in politics. Some of the gaps here were filled, however, by in-depth informal discussions with several members of the Iraqi political elite in 1975.

Other sources such as Arab documents and books, speeches of Arab leaders, and commentators' analyses, Arabis newspapers, knowledgeable individuals, and Western literature have been utilized to make this study possible.

It must be emphasized that the process of data gathering in the Middle East, and especially in Iraq, is not the same task as in Europe or the United States. Leaving aside time and financial resources, the sensitive nature of the research rendered collection practically impossible because of the regulations against collecting data on 'revolutionaries'.<sup>65</sup> Suspicion and apprehension were displayed at all levels of the data-collection process. In addition, the bureaucratic procedures involved in arranging and conducting interviews with ministers were enormously time-consuming and frustrating. The interviewees often refused to talk about the subject; they were constantly interrupted by telephone calls, various visits, and urgent meetings; and the informants implicitly and explicitly indicated some mistrust of both the research and the researcher. Nevertheless, the writer carried out the research to the best of his ability and in the process gained much invaluable material that will be used in this study only with care and discrimination. Finally, some of the interviews had to be written and left with the ministers with the promise that they would be returned later. Despite follow-up letters, most of the simply did not reply.

In spite of the difficulties encountered in amassing the data, the writer was still able to interpret and analyze the materials available in a comprehensive fashion to serve the purposes of the study. The diversity of the research methods-- interviews, questionnaires, biographical information, local and

foreign newspapers, and documentary sources--has strengthened the validity of the research. In so doing, the study has thus sought to substantiate the projected hypotheses and draw conclusions on the characteristics and dynamics of the emergence of the Iraqi political elites, their directives to the administrative machinery, and their impact on policy performance within the context of republican Iraq.

## Chapter I

## INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup>The term "revolution" is used here with reservation. According to Leiden and Schmitt, "the concept of revolution covers a whole range of acts in defiance of constituted authority, from palace revolts and coups d'etat, to full-scale civil wars and mass uprisings." Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 55; also, see pp. 3-9. However, it is our opinion that the acts of changing the head of a state or overthrowing a government are not enough to qualify as revolution unless the entire fabric of society (political, social, economic) is radically changed.

<sup>2</sup>For examples, see Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969); John Galvani, The Baathi Revolution in Iraq, Middle East Research and Information Project, No. 12 (Boston, Mass.: September-October 1972); George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, Vol. 2 (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971), p. 93; Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals 1958-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Lorenzo Kimball, The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971 (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1972); Peter Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); Phebe A. Marr, "The Political Elite in Iraq," in George Lenczowski, ed., Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 109-150; and Dankwart A. Rustow, Middle Eastern Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 45, p. 58.

<sup>3</sup>For specific details of the importance of leadership personalities, see James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, The Middle East:

Politics and Power (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), pp. 124-156; Christopher Birdwood, Nuri As-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell and Company, 1959); Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958 (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964); Majid Khadduri, Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Anees Sāyigh, Fi Mafhoom al-Za'ma al-Siyasiyya: Min Faisal al-Awwal Ela Gamal Abd al-Nasir -- The Concept of Political Leadership: From Faisal I to Gamal Abd al-Nasir (Beirut: Manshuraat Jaridat al-Muharrir Wa al-Maktabah al-Asriyya, 1965).

<sup>4</sup>Bill and Leiden, Middle East, p. 124.

<sup>5</sup>Among the various studies on elites, we may mention such works as, David Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Carlos Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969); Carl Beck, et al., Comparative Communist Political Leadership (New York: McKay Co., 1973); Bill and Leiden, Middle East; R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser: A Study of Political Dynamics (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1971); R. H. Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership: Lebanon, Israel, Egypt (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1975); Yuval Elizur and E. Salpeter, Who Rules Israel? (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973); Elbaki Hermassi, Leadership and National Development in North Africa: A Comparative Study (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972); Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Stratetic Elites in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1963); Thom Kersteins, The New Elite in Asia and Africa: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Ghana (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966); Victor LeVine, Political Leadership in Africa (Stanford University: Hoover Institution, 1967); Lenczowski, ed., Political Elites; Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969); Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou Roos, Managers of Modernization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Bernard S. Silberman, Ministers of Modernization: Elite Mobility in the Meiji Restoration 1868-1873 (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1964); Frank Tachau, ed., Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East (New York: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1975); Rupert Wilkinson, Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton



University Press, 1971).

<sup>6</sup>T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 7.

<sup>7</sup>For full details, see James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 144-159.

<sup>8</sup>Keller, Strategic Elites, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup>Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, pp. 153-157.

<sup>10</sup>Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 28-29.

<sup>11</sup>For full details of the advantages and disadvantages of each method, see Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, pp. 165-167; Joseph La Palombara, Politics Within Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 468-471; Richard L. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971), pp. 113-118; and Parry, Political Elites, pp. 106-119.

<sup>12</sup>For examples, Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950); David E. Price, Who Makes the Laws? Creativity and Power in Senate Committees (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972); R. Agger, D. Goldrich and B. Swanson, The Rulers and The Ruled (New York: Wiley, 1964); Arnold Rose, The Power Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and many other writers.

<sup>13</sup>Merritt, Systematic Approaches, p. 118.

<sup>14</sup>Lenczowski, Political Elites, p. 8.

<sup>15</sup>Dekmejian, Political Leadership, pp. 1-2.

<sup>16</sup>Parry, Political Elites, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, When, How (New York: The Meridian Press, 1971), p. 13.

<sup>19</sup>C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 18.

<sup>20</sup>Keller, Strategic Elites, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup>Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 14.

<sup>22</sup>Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review 52 (June 1958), p. 464.

<sup>23</sup>G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 8.

<sup>24</sup>Quandt, Algeria, p. 21.

<sup>25</sup>Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 129.

<sup>27</sup>Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 71.

<sup>28</sup>La Palombara (1974), Politics Within Nations, p. 242.

<sup>29</sup>For full details, see Ferrell Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 16-20.

<sup>30</sup>Fred Riggs, "The Context of Development Administration," in Fred Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1971), p. 78. Also, see Saul M. Katz, "Exploring A Systems Approach to Development Administration," in Ibid., pp. 123-124.

<sup>31</sup>Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, p. 164.

<sup>32</sup>Lasswell, Politics, p. 13.

<sup>33</sup>Bill and Leiden, Middle East, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-21.

<sup>35</sup>James Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity," in Leonard Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 78-79.

<sup>36</sup>This is claimed in the writings of Almond and Powell, Eisenstadt, and Huntington.

<sup>37</sup>Bill and Leiden, Middle East, pp. 20-21.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 45. For more information, see Herbert McCloskey, "Political Participation," in David Skills, ed., The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 252. Also, see Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 2.

<sup>40</sup>Lloyd A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971), p. 141. For full discussion of nationalism, see Kenneth R. Minogue, Nationalism (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1967).

<sup>41</sup>David Wilson, "National Building and Revolutionary War," in Karl W. Deutsch and William Foltz, Nation-Building (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 85.

<sup>42</sup>Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Welch, ed., Political Modernization, pp. 180-181.

<sup>43</sup>Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," in Welch, Political Modernization, pp. 200-203.

<sup>44</sup>Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, p. 171.

<sup>45</sup>David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 138-139.

<sup>46</sup>Change is of two kinds--modifying and transforming. Also, change may be initiated from above as well as below. For details, see Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, pp. 81; 171-173.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>48</sup>Binder, "Crises of Political Development," in Binder, et al., Political Development, p. 53. For full details, see the same article, pp. 3-72.

<sup>49</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New York: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12, 21, 34-35, 78-80. Also see, Binder, et al., Political Development,

pp. 55-66, p. 218; Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, pp. 80-81; and Bill and Leiden, Middle East, pp. 7-9.

<sup>50</sup>Jason L. Finkel and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 234.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, p. 171.

<sup>53</sup>Bill and Leiden, Middle East, p. 5.

<sup>54</sup>Dekmejian, Egypt, p. 2.

<sup>55</sup>Bill and Hardgrave, Comparative Politics, p. 171.

<sup>56</sup>Wendell Bell, "Social Change and Elites in An Emergent Nation," in Herbert Barringer, George Blackstein and Raymond Mack, eds., Social Change in Developing Areas: A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 155-156.

<sup>57</sup>William Welsh, "Introduction: The Comparative Study of Political Leadership in Communist Systems," in Beck, et al., Communist Political Leadership, p. 1.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid. Also see Tachau, ed., Political Elites, p. 304.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>60</sup>Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization," in Welch, ed., Political Modernization, p. 2.

<sup>61</sup>Since there was some confusion in the available data as to the exact number of cabinets during the republican era, the author developed a system in order to determine such number. The first criterion is that a cabinet is regarded anew if it is formed after its predecessor's resignation. The second criterion is the occurrence of a mass-dismissal or mass-resignation of five ministers or more and even if such ministers are replaced individually and without declaring officially the formation of a new cabinet.

<sup>62</sup>According to the writer, attachment of importance to these ministries include justifications such as, Defense is the ultimate source and the arbitor of power; Interior is to perform intelligence and house-cleaning activities as well as to license political parties; Finance has control over the national purse

which affects other ministries' plans and programs; Foreign Affairs is to conduct the diplomatic business with other countries, and to give the foreigner the best image of the regime; Information and Culture controls the radio and television programs and grants publication-licenses to newspapers; and Education prepares a new generation to accept and identify itself with the regime and its leadership.

<sup>63</sup>The importance of certain ministries may become strategic when certain crises arise such as construction of the North and the rise or fall of the Kurdish rebellion, oil and the issue of its nationalization, and planning and a socialist regime.

<sup>64</sup>For full details, see the Political Report of the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, Baghdad, January (1974).

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 78. The Political Report stated:

The Revolution was careful to emphasize also another very important point, very much related to the safeguarding of our political Independence. That point was security consciousness especially in military and economic fields. Irresponsibility in this respect which was prevalent in the past had exposed the country to foreigners who gathered what information they needed to weaken the independence of the country and hinder its progressive and free development.

However, in an interview with the Minister of Higher Education, Mr. Ghanim Abd al-Jalil on July 12, 1975, he stated that the above attitude has changed recently to one that encourages students to conduct their research on Iraqi problems rather than on other countries.

Chapter II  
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAQ: ECONOMIC,  
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS  
BEFORE 1958

Between the Second World War and 1958, the government of Iraq attempted slowly to introduce various economic and social reforms. Such reforms, however, did not satisfy the demands and expectations of the population. They either benefited very small sectors of the society or were initiated and forgotten due to governmental involvement in domestic upheavals which siphoned political activity away from such programs. Government performance was further hampered both by lack of qualified personnel and by the development of material resources. In order to understand the nature of the Iraqi revolution in 1958 and the conditions which contributed to the downfall of the monarchical regime, it is important to provide a brief description of the economic, administrative, and political conditions which existed before 1958.

2.1. The Economy

Iraq, as compared to other Middle Eastern countries, was always regarded as a country in possession of abundant fertile land and natural resources necessary for economic growth and prosperity.<sup>1</sup> Such development became more feasible due to the fact

that the population was small in relation to its natural wealth. However, expectations of prosperity throughout the 1950s were not realized in Iraq as several surveys and investigations have evidenced. For example, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported in 1952 that,

The standard of living of the people is extremely low. Income per capita is probably at most ID 30 [\$84.00]. Almost 90 percent of the population are illiterate and many are subject to debilitating diseases.... Housing and sanitation are for the most part primitive.... Most of the manpower on the land is underemployed for a large part of the year, and considerable unemployment exists in the major cities.... Agricultural techniques are primitive.... Industry is little developed.<sup>2</sup>

In examining the government economic policy during the period between the Second World War and 1958, one can detect the bias in favor of agriculture.<sup>3</sup> Such primary emphasis on agriculture originated from the fact that over 60 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture, and that both industry and commerce in turn depended largely upon farming and animal husbandry.<sup>4</sup> The stress laid on agriculture further resulted in skewing the distribution of development funds among various sectors of the economy. The land tenure system was such that the majority of landholdings were in the possession of landlords and sheikhs,<sup>5</sup> thereby allowing these people to become the main beneficiaries of the programs and consequently the chief supporters of the regime.

The inefficient agricultural policy was not offset by a better industrial policy. Few light industries were built and

there was heavy reliance on imports from abroad. Industry was largely confined to the processing of agricultural products and consumer goods. Skilled manpower was very limited; there was little technical know-how, and much accumulated capital from agriculture was invested in urban or rural property rather than industry.<sup>6</sup> Oil, then becoming the main industry in Iraq, was essentially an enterprise financed and developed by foreign capital. The general economic policy was heavily committed to large and expensive agricultural projects, such as irrigation schemes and dams, rather than to industrialization. Specifically, other available figures show that in 1953, sectors of agriculture, oil, and industry contributed 32.6 percent, 20.7 percent, and 7.5 percent, respectively to the country's net national product;<sup>7</sup> while in 1956, the same three sectors contributed 24 percent, 27 percent and 12 percent, respectively.<sup>8</sup> In spite of the progress achieved in the various sectors, symptoms of a mismanaged economy and inefficient planning were manifested in the continued requests for foreign assistance and expertise.

At the request of the Iraqi government, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development presented a study in 1951 which recommended a coherent plan covering the whole economic and social field in a well balanced government investment program. Furthermore, the report preferred that "investment outlays in dams and irrigation works, transport facilities and industrial plants must be complemented by increased expenditures of a recurrent



nature on agriculture, health, education...."<sup>9</sup>

In addition, a Danish financial and economic mission under the chairmanship of Professor Carl Iversen recommended in 1954 a reform of the monetary system and suggested that the economic goal of Iraq's monetary policy be to achieve the maximum rate of well-balanced, relatively stable economic development, and to expand at a rate of real growth greater than the inflationary rate and to maintain adequate foreign exchange reserve.<sup>10</sup>

A year later, Lord Salter produced a report which emphasized the utilization of Iraq's land and water resources. He also recommended coordination among projects and modifications in the government machinery.<sup>11</sup> In addition, he questioned who was to benefit from the projects on which development funds were spent.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, a major inquiry was carried out by Doreen Warriner who discussed the unfavorable conditions which existed in Iraq. According to her, landowners calculated their possessions in pumps or peasants rather than in acres. Furthermore, the land tenure system and the projects of dams, reservoirs, irrigation, and drainage--wholly constructed from public revenues--mainly served the few landowners (see Table I) by increasing their incomes. Yet such a class opposed social progress and contributed little to development. Thus, the real obstacle to development in Iraq was not technical nor financial; rather, it was social. The problem was the lack of the town middle class and the peasants to emerge as a social and political force to challenge the power of the sheikhs

and to introduce changes in the social structure of the country. According to Warriner, development in Iraq depended on the seriousness of the gap which existed between the opposition to social reforms and the potentiality for economic development. She concluded that as long as the landowners exercised great influence in the government, there was small hope for improving the conditions of the masses.<sup>13</sup>

Table I

Distribution of Holdings by Size  
in Iraq, 1952-1953

Acres	Number
Under 2.5	24,270
2.5 - 12	25,845
12 - 60	41,905
60 - 360	27,555
360 - 600	1,847
600 - 1200	1,702
1200 - 3000	1,221
3000 - 6000	424
6000 - 12000	168
12000 and over	104
Total	125,045

Source: Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 140.

The prevailing conditions as described in the above detailed reports showed the need and urgency for large-scale

reforms. None of the studies, unfortunately, were taken seriously by the rulers, and thus the obvious weaknesses of the economy and its inefficient administration persisted.

## 2.2. The Administration

The recent administrative structure in Iraq is the outcome of various historical experiences. It originated in the previous century when Iraq was under Ottoman rule and during the British Mandate following World War I. With the establishment of a national government, successive regimes struggled to implement new and modern ideas.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Iraq had been controlled for almost four hundred years by the Ottomans. This rule was dominated more by religious and imperial motives than by the economic exploitation that was often characteristic of Western colonialism.<sup>14</sup> The period was characterized by a marked lack of political, social, and economic development. Political decay and bureaucratic corruption worsened as the empire continued to disintegrate.

The administration was the core of the political system but it was an administration dominated by personalism, corruption, and careless conduct of governmental and public business. Longrigg and Stoakes observed that:

The long-drawn Turkish regime in Iraq suffered at all times from the weakness, distraction and poverty of that Power from its lack of a tolerable system...of government...the bestowal of office was

capricious, venal and entirely blind to the public interest, while local candidates for power, and flagrant abuses of authority, were rarely absent. The civil service was archaic, or scarcely existed.<sup>15</sup>

This legacy of the Ottoman civil service has survived, at least partially, in Iraq despite the lapse of more than half a century of European and, later, national rule.<sup>16</sup>

With the defeat of Turkey in the First World War, Iraq was occupied by British forces and remained under British Mandate until 1930. The British introduced a parliamentary system of government with elected legislatures, ministerial departments, and a modern judiciary. The civil service was completely reshuffled and a large number of European officers were appointed to positions of control over the most important and most sensitive governmental positions.<sup>17</sup> Great Britain sought to transplant Western institutions into Iraq rather than attempting to make ruling practices more concurrent with the indigenous culture. The result was the creation of government machinery which was impractical for the country's need at that time. The British introduced a number of Western procedures imposed on the Old Ottoman system in indirect voting. Professor Grassmuck described the electoral process in Iraq during the 1950s as:

The electoral system prescribed universal male suffrage, registration lists, secret ballots, representation of minorities, electoral districts in which local committees supervised the voting and apportionment of representation according to male population.<sup>18</sup>

Further, Manfred Halpern affirms the above point by stating that:

Constitutions were too new and too often imposed from outside to express or create consensus among peoples who either still believed that law could be based only on the word of God, or had long put all laws in question through casuistry and tyranny, or else were not yet agreed on the methods and objective of government.<sup>19</sup>

At the beginning, these modernizing efforts were hampered by the low educational and scientific level prevailing among the elite because of the scarcity of personnel specialized in the various branches of knowledge. Therefore, the organization of civil service in Iraq was delayed until the issuance of Public Service Law No. 103 of 1931, effective on December 31, 1931,<sup>20</sup> which was the first civil service law in Iraq. With the gradual increase in education and specialization and the return of students from abroad, the general situation improved to an extent permitting developmental action in the administrative system. In 1939, Law No. 64 was issued, introducing rules and regulations for recruitment and job evaluation. When development reached a stage calling for adequate laws, this was done by issuing a public service law in 1956.

Several investigations have emphasized the relationship between the development of the economic sector and the development administration. As a developing country, Iraq suffered from the lack of qualified and trained personnel to undertake the newly added functions and responsibilities of the government. Several studies revealed the shortage of professional managers and skilled

personnel as well as the feebleness of the administration. A report in 1952 on Iraq stated that:

...Many government offices appear to be overstaffed, while others cannot obtain extra personnel for essential increases in services. Officials are frequently shifted from one position to another without regard for their qualifications and experience. Often government officials both in the provinces and in the capital do not enjoy sufficient continuity in office to enable them to become really useful. Promotion appears to be based almost entirely on seniority and other considerations rather than on merit. Morale among government servants is generally low [and] many civil servants are compelled to supplement their salaries by engaging in business or accepting other employment with resulting neglect of their official duties.<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, a study carried out by Ferrel Heady pointed out that:

It is impossible to generalize about 'normal' selection practices in the Middle East, except to say that no country (with the possible exceptions of Israel and Turkey) has a comprehensive program for competitive selection which would be considered satisfactory by Western standards. Although language about merit as the basis of choice may be set forth in constitution or statute, the ministry concerned is usually free to apply this criterion as it sees fit. ...Where there is no well-established merit tradition, this often means that the actual basis of choice may have little relation to competence.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the above enquiries, the Iraqi government in 1957 requested the cooperation of the United Nations Development Programs to participate in solving the administrative problems facing the country--mainly to enhance the preparation and training of administrative leadership.

A manifestation of irresponsible and unaccountable administration was widespread corruption. It seems that corruption

started with the royal family<sup>23</sup> and gradually spread downwards and outwards to include ministers and their sons, a few businessmen of exceptional wealth, members of parliament and a number of "lesser parasites and hangers on".<sup>24</sup> For example, servants of ministers were on the pay-roll; large numbers of police worked as guards and gardeners for important private houses; wives and sisters of the notables received a number of appointments; and children still at school were registered as shadow employees.<sup>25</sup>

Administrative inefficiency and especially corruption became so pronounced and notorious that they were officially exposed in December, 1956, through a parliamentary speech by the monarch who stated that,

The Government is aware of the weak machinery of government due to the presence of inefficient individuals and persons of ill-repute in the government service. It has therefore resolved to reform this machinery, making it reliable and effective, so that it can care for the interests of the country and fulfill its duty in the best possible manner. The Government, therefore, is seeking enactment of legislation which will guarantee the public interest and a full measure of justice.<sup>26</sup>

Before 1956, various ministries made appointments and promotions in accordance with the Civil Service Laws of 1931 and 1939. In addition, other employment codes also existed which added to the confusion, discrimination, and even abuse of the selection and payment processes in the public service. These included the Foreign Service Law Number 41 of 1940, the Police Service Law Number 43 of 1943, the Judicial Service Law Number 47 of 1945, the Medical

Service Law Number 48 of 1947, the Teaching Service Law Number 21 of 1951, the Engineering Service Law Number 2 of 1952, and the Railway Service Law Number 62 of 1952.

The above situation made it difficult for the government to control its employees and, as a result, a general desire prevailed for the unification of most of the laws and the issuance of a new civil service law that would apply to all government departments. Thus, the process of public employment in Iraq passed through two phases: the first was that preceding the Civil Service Law of 1956, during which recruitment and selection were decentralized and the authority for such functions was left to the executive heads in each ministry. Each ministry had a special committee which undertook recruitment and selection processes. The second phase followed the passage of Law Number 55 of 1956 (later became Law Number 24 of 1960) which assigned the responsibility of recruitment to the Civil Service Commission for all employees receiving salaries from the national budget or local administration with the exception of the military forces.

Inefficiency and corruption in the government machinery were recognized as late as 1955 by Lord Salter who reported that the chief limiting factor to efficient administration of government and execution of policy resided in the limitation of qualified and trained civil service corps rather than lack of money or raw materials.<sup>27</sup> One can, therefore, observe that an inefficient bureaucracy--overridden by bribery, nepotism, favoritism, opportunism, and



abuse of authority--breeds weak economic policies. Such conditions promoted both instability and dissatisfaction with the political system.

### 2.3. The Political Environment

From 1921 until 1958, Iraq was ruled by a monarchical regime. The reigns of the Iraqi kings were: Faisal I (1921-33), Ghazi (1933-39), the Crown Prince, Abd al-Ilah, acted as Prince Regent during the minority of Faisal II (1939-53), and Faisal II (1953-1958). The four monarchs were descendents of the Hashimite family.<sup>28</sup> The monarchical regime drew its support from small groups of landed aristocrats, army officers, and a few wealthy and influential families. One scholar observed that thirteen feudal families on the eve of the new land reform in 1958 possessed 1,476,921 acres or 23.9 percent of the total cultivated land. These families were al-Jaf, al-Yasin, al-Farhan, al-Amir, al-Chalabi, al-Qassab, al-Yawir, al-Khudairi, al-Merjan, al-Jaryan, al-Suhayl, Sheikh Mahmud and the Royal Family. Furthermore, ninety families owned 44 percent of the land.<sup>29</sup>

Other families who became politically powerful before acquiring land included such Sunnite families as those of General Nuri al-Said, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, Rauf al-Chadarchi, Hikmat Suleiman, Najji al-Suwaydi, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Taha al-Hashimi, Najji Showkat, Rustom Haydar, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Jamil al-Medfai, Arshad al-Umari; and such Shiite families as Abd al-Husain al-

Chalabi, Muhammad al-Sadir, Muhammad Riza al-Shabibi, and Salih Jabur.<sup>30</sup>

The representatives of these families also occupied posts of prime importance in the cabinet, the civil service, and the legislative bodies.<sup>31</sup> Their major concern was the perpetuation of their own political power and personal wealth.

During the period from October 25, 1920 (the establishment of the Interim Government headed by Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib) until July 14, 1958 (the end of the monarchical regime), there were a total of fifty-nine cabinets. Such cabinets can be subdivided into five categories based on the political conditions which prevailed in Iraq. First, during the British Mandate (October 25, 1920 - October 27, 1932) there were fourteen cabinets which included sixty personalities. Second, during independence (November 3, 1932 - April 29, 1941) there were sixteen cabinets. Third, during the 'second British occupation' (June 2, 1941 - January 1946) there were six cabinets. Fourth, during Prince Abd al-Ilah's regency (February 23, 1946 - April 5, 1953) there were thirteen cabinets. Fifth, during King Faisal II's reign (April 7, 1953 - July 14, 1958) there were thirteen cabinets.<sup>32</sup> During the whole period October 1920 - July 14, 1958 there were a total number of fifty-nine cabinets composed of 175 ministers who occupied 780 positions.

The frequency of a political appointee holding a cabinet post was approximately 4.7 times.<sup>33</sup> As seen from Appendices

III, IV it does not mean that all members of the ruling class equally shared control and influence over the politico-administrative apparatus. Rather, a small segment herein termed the 'power elite', monopolized power within the ruling class.<sup>34</sup> In their formal capacity as position holders in the regime, members of this power elite controlled the essential decision-making mechanisms. One observer stated that fifty cabinets were formed by sixteen Arab Sunnites, while only five cabinets were headed by four Arab Shiites. As to the major ministries, fifty Arab Sunnites rotated in 257 positions, while only fifteen Arab Shiites rotated in fifty-two positions.<sup>35</sup> Specifically, certain individuals assumed many positions of prime importance and consequently reflected the exercise of considerable influence in the formal as well as informal power structure. For examples, Nuri al-Said<sup>36</sup> held forty-seven positions; Umar Nazmi held twenty-one; Tawfiq al-Suwaydi held nineteen; Ali Mumtaz al-Daftari held eighteen; Jamil al-Medfa'i held fourteen; and Rashid Ali al-Gailani held ten.<sup>37</sup>

As to the frequency of holding the office of Prime Minister, it is calculated that fourteen cabinets were headed by Nuri al-Said; seven cabinets by Jamil al-Medfa'i; four cabinets by Abd al-Muhsin al-Sadun and Rashid Ali al-Gailani respectively; three cabinets by Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, and Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi respectively; two cabinets by Ja'fer al-Askari, Yasin al-Hashimi, Hamdi al-Pachachi, Arshad al-Umari, and Fadil al-Jamali respectively; and one cabinet by Najji al-Suwaydi, Najji

Showkat, Hikmat Suleiman, Taha al-Hashimi, Salih Jabur, Muhammad al-Sadir, Muzahim al-Pachachi, Nur al-Din Mahmud, Mustafa al-Umari, Abd al-Wahhab Merjan, and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.<sup>38</sup>

Ministerial groups who dominated their control over the country's fortunes (through cabinet, parliamentary, and personal systems of patronage) were themselves dominated informally by elder statesmen who were in turn influenced by Nuri al-Said and the Palace.<sup>39</sup> Between them they maintained a closely-knit conservative hegemony that left no room for the representation of the more liberal trends within the ruling class.<sup>40</sup> The regime enjoyed the support of the landholders and a large section of the urban upper and upper-middle class which consisted of industrialists, businessmen, senior officials, and some successful professionals. Naturally, the regime was also supported by the mass of uneducated illiterate poor who blindly followed their tribal landlords. The ruling class believed that progress and stability could be achieved by firm government political maneuvering, and, above all, by gradual economic development.

A good example to show the desire of the political elite to maintain the status quo is the case given by Manfred Halpern. He showed that in spite of the existence of wide economic opportunities in Iraq (six million empty acres, a surplus of water, adequate oil revenues, and a small population) political timidity restricted economic planning. Had Nuri al-Said distributed the six million new acres to the 300 or so families who then dominated Iraq, he

would have asked for revolution; had he distributed it among the thousands of sharecropping families to convert them into economically independent owners, he would have led his country through a revolution, peacefully and constructively. Instead, his procrastination of economic and social reforms to benefit the masses provided an incentive to the military and lower class social forces to stage a revolt against the monarchy and its supportive elite.<sup>41</sup>

No single background variable (ethnic, sectarian, educational, occupational, and political) determined the selection and appointment of elite into the monarchical cabinets--though some variables were more important than others. In terms of ethnic and religious considerations, Appendix III shows that the composition of cabinets during 1920-58 consisted of Arab-Moslem domination who represented their strength by occupying 321 major positions (89 percent) over other minorities of Kurds, Turkomans, and Christians who held only 40 major positions (11 percent). As to the distribution of cabinet premierships among the political elite, Appendix IV indicates that 95 percent of the cabinets were headed by Arab Moslems.

Other important background variables which influenced the composition of elite membership included an overlap of prestige, wealth, education, and occupation. Prestige included those personalities who belonged to tribal origin, and/or religious leadership supported by wealth such as landownership.

However, educational and occupational variables seemed to

be most important of all. This category included military officers and bureaucrats with university level degrees in military affairs and law respectively. It must be pointed out here that such people were reinforced by an increase in their wealth and connections.

Political elite members with military qualifications occupied 42 percent of the major positions in the cabinets, followed by lawyers and civil servants who occupied 36 and 12 percent of cabinet positions respectively (Appendix III). The predominance of military personalities in holding major cabinet positions was not an indication of frequent military coups, but rather was due to the fact that many of the civilian leaders who held ministerial jobs had military backgrounds. Such personalities included Nuri al-Said, Abd al-Muhsin al-Sadun, Jamil al-Medfa'i, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, and Mustafa al-Umari who among them held cabinet positions 100 times.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, Nuri al-Said alone had, by the summer of 1968, led fourteen out of fifty eight cabinets. The latter was followed by Jamil al-Medfa'i who headed seven cabinets, succeeded by al-Sadun with four cabinets. Then came al-Askari, al-Hashimi, and al-Umari who headed two cabinets each.<sup>43</sup>

Beyond the ruling class, sociopolitical forces exerted pressures which necessitated and enforced a ministerial reorganization at various times. When a government fell under the pressure of tribal revolts, certain individuals who maintained personal tribal connections were given ministerial posts to quiet such forces. However, during the late 1940s, the pressure on the ruling

elite shifted from tribal alienation to growing political movements organized by such groups as students, workers, and intellectuals in the country's largest cities.<sup>44</sup> The ruling elite sought to alleviate this tension by changing cabinets and coopting a carefully selected number of the disaffected into the ruling institutions. The repetitive movement of individuals in and out of ministerial offices invested the country with considerable political instability. Such political unrest left the cabinets with very short life-spans.

The reasons for the frequency of cabinet changes in Iraq, as explained by Majid Khadduri, were:

...the lack of solidarity among the members of almost every Cabinet, the acute competition among politicians, the absence of political parties which could have offered legal channels for political strife, and the interference of the army in politics.<sup>45</sup>

These frequent changes in government did not involve the rise to power of new forces or the institution of new political programs. The majority of those who formed the new cabinets still came from the body of 'ministrables', bringing very little change into the political process.<sup>46</sup> A close source to the Royal palace and the last Prime Minister in the monarchical regime stated that the process of cabinet formation and ministerial appointments was carried out arbitrarily.<sup>47</sup> The new minister usually had no goals or objectives. He accepted most issues introduced in the cabinet without any discussion. The Prime Minister's opinion was always dominant, while the minister regarded himself as 'administrator' rather than 'politician'. Such behavior was attributed, according

to this observer, to the absence of political parties which resulted in weak governments, short lived cabinets, and irresponsible ministers.<sup>48</sup>

One force that threatened the survival of the monarchical regime was the army, which included a growing number of talented, ambitious, and politically-conscious officers. These officers were of lower and middle class background, and they constituted a serious potential challenge to the ruling elite. Because the aristocracy, the landowners, and the merchants who could have furnished leadership for the armed forces were too busy enjoying their wealth to be bothered with military services, the officer corps was largely drawn from primary and secondary-school teachers and lawyers who were either dissatisfied with their professions or believed that their ambitions could better be attained in the army. The other source of recruitment for the officer corps was the sons of civil servants, soldiers and even peasants. The officers were able to observe the political system's inefficiency, corruption, nepotism, inertia, and cooperation with non-Arab powers. They noted this contrast with the military's higher efficiency and technological competence. The army was used by the ruling elite as an instrument to maintain domestic order and national security. Since they were the closest group to the ruling elite and most aware of its faults, any army which failed to act would appear to implicate itself in the misdeeds of the elite. The failure of the ruling elite to establish organized and responsive relationships with the rest of



the population, the exploitation of the politically inarticulate majority, and the disaffection of the loyalties of the new generation of the politically conscious, all of these signified the failure of the regime to bring about social and political modernization.

The regime's refusal to correct the conditions of the status quo, as well as its close relations with a former imperial power (Great Britain), placed, in the officers' eyes, the ruling elite's loyalty in doubt. Furthermore, the military coups of Bakr Sidqi in 1936, Rashid Ali al-Gailani in 1941-42, and the Suez war in 1956, helped turn the middle class military officers against the ruling elite.

Throughout the monarchical period, there was a conflict between the forms of parliamentary democracy (in contrast with the substance which was evidently lacking) and personal autocracy.

Khadduri has written that:

Control of the elections and frequent dissolution of parliament rendered parliament completely at the mercy of the cabinet and incapable of passing a vote of no confidence in any of the fifty-nine cabinets.<sup>49</sup>

This conflict created constant fermentation and ruled out any possibility of political stability or long-term economic development. The ruling groups were preoccupied with furthering their own personal interests. The monarchical regime did not believe in disturbing the socio-economic inequalities of the society by 'radical' redistribution of income, but preferred a planned

development administered by non-political boards which included many foreign advisors.

Power struggles among elite members occasioned by personalistic interests to maintain power as well as through identity with policy issues such as foreign or domestic issues determined the rise and fall of cabinets. Foreign policy was among the obvious reasons which accounted for the differences which existed among members of the political elite. The close association with Great Britain, for example, fostered the suspicion of political activists, and the nationalists accused the monarchy of not supporting the Arab movement.<sup>50</sup> The consequence of such attitudinal differences created, on the one hand, individuals who were sympathetic to the establishment of close ties with the British such as Nuri al-Said, Jafer al-Askari, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Salih Jabur, and Umar Nazmi. On the other hand, other personalities who held nationalistic views and opposed the establishment of mutual military treaties with Great Britain included Rashid Ali al-Gailani, Kamil al-Chaderchi, Yasin al-Hashimi, Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi, Hikmat Suleiman, and Jafer Abu al-Timman. An expression of such differences could be seen in the various anti-monarchical movements against which the government had to use strict security forces to suppress such large-scale national movements such as the Bakr Sidqi coup of 1936 supported by the Ahali group, the revolt of 1941 headed by Rashid Ali al-Gailani and his associates, the riots against Portsmouth Treaty of 1948, the anti-government bloody

demonstrations of 1952, and the violent popular reactions to the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Suez aggression in 1956.

These upheavals restricted the exercise of freedom for organized groups. Thus after 1954, political parties could operate only as underground or clandestine organizations unless they received ministerial approval. The "experiment in parliamentarianism in Iraq came to a fateful halt."<sup>51</sup>

Furthermore, the dramatic development in the Middle East during the period 1956-1958 put the Iraqi rulers at odds with Egypt and Arab States hostile to the Baghdad Pact and pan-Arab supporters at home. These States were rallying in favor of Nasir as a result of the invasion of the Suez canal in 1956. Nasir at that time became the champion of Arab nationalism and the symbol of anti-Western imperialism. This weakened Nuri's position while it strengthened his opposition. Nuri was described as a statesman who ruled the country through a partnership of military commanders and feudal landowners. Their cohesion established them a strong grip over parliament in particular and government in general.<sup>52</sup>

Pan-Arab movements in Iraq grew to reject both personal and emotional attachment to the ruling house and were deeply impressed by the events of Arab nationalism as well as by the developing influence of a socialist-oriented ideology. They had two enemies, Western imperialism and domestic feudalism which were considered the main obstacles to achieving economic, social, and political modernization in Iraq.

The first reaction to the spread of Nasirism in the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular was a federation formed between the monarchial regimes of Iraq and Jordan on February 14, 1958. The second was the boycott of the Chamber of Deputies' election of May 5, 1958, by the current opposition leaders and their parties. In fact, by that time "a good number of the leaders of the Independence and National Democratic Parties were either in prison or under close surveillance."<sup>53</sup> All political parties were banned, the press was censored, and many of the thousands of political detainees were under torture. Government expenditure on police reached several times that on public education.<sup>54</sup>

The formal roles and functions of the political elite were not only influenced by their attitudinal differences on policy issues, but were also divided along personal rivalries.<sup>55</sup> Examples to illustrate such personal feuds may be seen from the shifting relationships between al-Said and Jabur, between al-Said and al-Jamali,<sup>56</sup> and between al-Said and Baban.<sup>57</sup> In all occasions, the personal conflicts resulted in the resignation of al-Said's opposition.

The ruling elite as a whole was composed of conservative elements that resisted any program of economic or social reforms which might threaten their position. This opposition to change posed a serious obstacle to the country's modernization plans. Such traditional leadership monopolistically governed the country and followed a traditional policy which discouraged any

opportunities for a younger, more nationalistic, and enlightened generation. Their concern appeared to be with what was politically feasible in the society than with what was most desirable for it. The political situation increasingly deteriorated and became a fertile ground for revolutionary spirit to brew and ferment. The regime's unresponsiveness to the demands and expectations of the younger and under-privileged masses contributed to its downfall in 1958.

#### 2.4. The Conception and Execution of the 1958 Revolution

The revolution of 1958 was not the first attempt of its kind to occur in Iraq. From the time the country obtained its independence in 1932, serious military attempts were staged to change the monarchical rule. Such coups included those of Bakr Sidqi on October 29, 1936; Yamulki on August 11, 1937; the Seven Officers on December 24, 1938; the Golden Square on February 21, 1940 and February 1, 1941 consecutively; the Golden Square in collaboration with Rashid al-Gailani on April 3, 1941<sup>58</sup>; and other significant uprisings in 1948, 1952, and 1956.<sup>59</sup> Although some of them had temporary success in achieving certain demands, none was capable of replacing the monarchy or traditional political system.

While some analysts maintain that the 1958 Revolution was a mere military coup that took place by sheer coincidence and was supported by unorganized mobs<sup>60</sup>, others argue that it stemmed from a "generation gap" represented by a conflict between the young

revolutionaries against the older conservative generation.<sup>61</sup> Still a third viewpoint reduces the causes of the revolution to the Arab's defeat in the Palestine War of 1948.<sup>62</sup> Other opinions concerning the causes of the revolution have been manifold. They include views such as the following: (1) the Iraqi populace was alienated from the series of governments led or engineered by Nuri al-Said, (2) the people mistrusted other unworthy leaders, (3) Iraqi society was debilitated by Western intervention, (4) the Baghdad Pact led to the deliberate estrangement of Iraq from Cairo, and (5) Marxist arguments focusing on class conflict.<sup>63</sup>

No single factor can be considered as the determinant of the success of the 1958 coup. In fact, more than anything else, it was chance coupled with favorable circumstances which were crucial to the success. Certainly, there was a general dissatisfaction among the masses and, to a certain extent, in the lower ranks of the army. Also the regime was at odds with the radical as well as the nationalist political parties. But no matter how bad the circumstances could develop to be, still the actuality of a popular and violent revolt could not be conceived. Even if such a revolt took place, it would only amount, as seven of its predecessors did, to demands that certain measures should be taken to widen and speed up political and social reforms.

However, the assumption remains questionable that a colonel and a brigadier successfully overthrew an established monarchical regime without effective and grassroot support in the

armed forces. What seemed a plausible assumption was that there were contacts between the Free Officers Movement (Table II), the anti-monarchical political parties, and independent civilian sympathizers. All these forces agreed upon a movement but never specified either the goals or the methods of carrying it out. Supporting conditions played key roles in the success of the movement which included such factors as first, the confusion which resulted from the new merger between Jordan and Iraq in a Hashimite Federation, which necessitated reorganization of the administration and the military, and second, the overconfidence of the leaders in the support of army chiefs to the royal regime. Even among middle-ranking officers such as Qasim and Arif, the royalty as well as its strongman al-Said insured their loyalties by constant testing and surveillance. According to Haddad, "Kassem was the protégé of Nuri, Arif was under the wing of the chief of staff, and Najji Talib, another conspirator, was close to the [Royal] court."<sup>64</sup> Nuri's orders to the army to move to the Jordanian borders to influence the course of events in Syria and Lebanon and the issuance of live ammunition to Qasim's brigade and Arif's regiment encouraged the couple to have an excuse to pass through Baghdad and attack the Royal figures and the leading political personalities. The regime's overconfidence in the army and the rulers' ignorance of the trends of public opinion provided a smooth and non-suspicious procedure for executing the movement. Furthermore, the swift and violent outcomes took domestic forces as well as

Table II

## Background Characteristics of Members of the Central Organization of Free Officers

Membership of the Central Organization of Free Officers	Date & Place of Birth and Ethnic Origin		Rank before 1958	Religion	Family Background	Military & Other Education	Positions After 1958
	Date	Place & Origin					
1 Mahdi al-Din Abd al-Hamid	-	-	Brigadier	Sunni	Son of Army Officer	Military College, Iraq; Staff College, Iraq	Minister of Education 1959-1960; Minister of Industry 1960-1963
2 Najib Talib	1917	Basra, South	Colonel	Shiite	Great Land Owner	Military College, Iraq, 1936; Staff College, England, 1940-1941	Minister 1958-1959, 1961, 1966; Prime Minister 1966
3 Abd al-Wahhab Amin	-	-	Colonel	Sunni	Small Land Owner	Military College, Iraq; Staff College, Iraq	Minister 1959-1961
4 Abd al-Karim Jasim	1914	Baghdad, Middle	Brigadier	Sunni	Poor Middle Class	Military College, Iraq, 1934; Staff College, England, 1940	Prime Minister & Minister of Defense 1963-1964
5 Abd al-Jalil Arif	1915	Baghdad, Northwest	Colonel	Sunni	Poor Middle Class	Military College, Iraq, 1939; Staff College, Iraq	Deputy Premier & Minister of Interior 1958; President 1961-1966
6 Abd al-Rahman Arif	1915	Baghdad, Northwest	Colonel	Sunni	Poor Middle Class	Military College, Iraq, 1937	Acting Chief of Staff, Premier 1963; President 1966-1968
7 Tahir Yanya	1911	Tikrit, North	Colonel	Sunni	Poor Middle Class	Military College, Iraq, 1939	Premier 1961, 1964, 1965, 1968; Vice President 1967
8 Najib Abd al-Majid	1921	Ara, Northwest	Lt. Colonel	Sunni	Poor Middle Class	Military College, Iraq, England, 1947-1951	Minister of Housing 1963; Interior 1968
9 Wasfi Tahir	-	-	Colonel	Sunni	Son of Army Officer	Military College	Secretary to Kasim 1958-1963
10 Saib Ali Khalil	-	-	Major	Sunni	Poor	Military College, Iraq; Staff College	Officer in Ministry of Defense during part of Kasim regime
11 Mahdi Husain al-Rabi	1918	Basra, South	Colonel	Shiite	Poor	Staff College, U.S.A.	Minister of Communication 1964; Minister of Defense 1965
12 Muhammad al-Jabir	-	-	Air Major	Sunni	Small Businessman	Military College, Iraq, 1937; Staff College, 1947	Retired after Revolution of 1958
13 Abd al-Wahhab al-Shawar	-	Mosul, North	Colonel	Sunni	Small Businessman	Military College, Iraq; Staff College	Killed as leader of coup in 1959
14 Abd al-Karim Farhan	1922	Kut, South	Lt. Colonel	Shiite	Poor	Military College, Iraq, 1941; Staff College, 1951	Minister 1961, 1964, 1967
15 Hafez al-Hajj Sirri	-	-	Colonel	Sunni	Small Businessman	Military College, Iraq; Staff College	Executed in 1959

Sources: Saib Ali Khalil, Qisas Thawrat Al-Iraq (Baghdad: Dar al-Falakh, 1946), pp. 18-19.

Majid Khadduri, Republics of Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 17-23.



foreign powers by surprise. Although the leaders of the revolution were criticized for the extermination of the Royal Family and a few of the leading political figures, one could say that it was the only alternative available to them, otherwise the movement would be in danger from the threat of counter-revolutionary forces to reinstitute the monarchy.

A more comprehensive examination as to the causes of the revolution shows that the general social and economic conditions which existed in pre-revolutionary Iraq provided a wide popular base for any movement which sought reforms and improvement in the country's economic and social structure. The new middle-class generation failed to achieve power during the monarchical period despite repeated attempts to carry out popular coups. This prompted young officers, supported by civilian leaders, to overthrow the ruling oligarchy later by force. The latter was accused of corruption and charged with failure to bring about reforms that might improve the conditions of the poor masses.<sup>65</sup> According to Khadduri, the number of officers who took an active part in underground activities is estimated to be 172 members, while another source gives an estimate of 200-250 officers.<sup>66</sup> However, the core of the movement was the Central Organization whose membership did not exceed fourteen officers. As Table II indicates, most of the officers had similar political ambitions and social backgrounds. There were no Kurds and only two Shiites in the Central Organization. As

soon as Qasim\* joined the Central Organization in 1956, he asked Abd al-Salam Arif\*\* to join, who was admitted in 1957. Qasim began to chair meetings of the Organization because he held the highest military rank among the Free Officers.

During meetings of the Central Organization, it was stated that there was no indication of any deliberate effort on the part of the members to develop a set of goals for a revolution. They sought only to "replace the monarchy by a republic", and to "establish a genuine form of parliamentary democracy, based on a truly representative government".<sup>67</sup> However, this assumption is rebutted because of another view which claims the existence of a revolutionary plan consisting of nine specific goals.<sup>68</sup>

Some of the measures taken by the new leaders indicated that they developed some of the plans for the actual coup at this time. In this connection, Khadduri states that,

Some of their [Qasim and Arif] arrangements, like the Sovereignty Council, were derived from the National Pact or from suggestions made by some of their fellow officers; but they seem to have ignored several other proposals made by the Free Officers, such as the Revolutionary Council, and after the July Revolution proclaimed the structure of a Government not previously known to most of the fourteen officers, let alone the other Free Officers.<sup>69</sup>

Coincidence played a catalytic role in disguising the march on Baghdad and in preparing the right environment for a well-

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\*For Qasim's biography, see Appendix XXIV.

\*\*For Arif's biography, see Appendix XXV.

equipped military force when the Royal orders were issued to a Brigade headed by Qasim and Arif to proceed to Jordan on July 14, 1958. It is important to mention here that the Royal regime was always cautious enough not to provide military units with live ammunition, except in this case. On July 4, Qasim met with members of the Central Organization in Baghdad to obtain their approval and informed them of the plan to occupy Baghdad instead of moving to Jordan. On July 14, 1958, both men usurped supreme civil and military power. Qasim became Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces with Arif as his deputy. He also headed the cabinet and became Minister of Defense, while Arif became Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Interior. At the same time, the two leaders ignored the previously agreed upon plans to form a Revolutionary Command Council which would have consisted of the same members as those indicated in Table II.

In its early stages, the 1958 revolution channelled social and political forces to express their support for it. At the same time, it raised the hopes of the masses for comprehensive and speedy political, economic, administrative, and social reforms. But, as soon as the leaders of the revolution and other political forces started to probe the ways and means of remodeling the political structure and carry out the reform programs, major difficulties in administering such a transition began to appear. Different attitudes among the revolutionary forces turned to a struggle

for power which resulted in the emergence of military authoritarianism.

In the following chapter, we will analyze the basic characteristics which influenced the political elites' attitudes and behavior in managing the affairs of the country and how such background characteristics shaped the course of events in revolutionary Iraq.

## Chapter II

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAQ: ECONOMIC,  
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS  
BEFORE 1958

<sup>1</sup>For examples, see Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role of Oil in A Middle Eastern Economy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 1; Stephen H. Longrigg and Frank Stoakes, Iraq (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 13; Muhammad Salman Hasan, Dirasat fi al-Iqtisad al-Iraqi--Studies in the Iraqi Economy (Beirut: Manshoorat al-Talee'a, 1966), p. 22; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), The Economic Development of Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 1; Hisham Mutualli, Iqtisadiyat al-Qutr al-Iraqi--The Economy of Iraq (Damascus: Markaz al-Dirasaat al-Iqtisadiya, n.d.), p. 5; Fahim I. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p.17.

<sup>2</sup>I.B.R.D., Iraq, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ferhang Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, 1950-1965 (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1972), p. 33; pp. 66-67. Also, see Appendix XIV.

<sup>4</sup>I.B.R.D., Iraq, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Hasan, Dirasat, p. 24. Where he mentions that in 1952-53 there was 29 percent of the farming population who owned 85 percent of the land, while 68 percent owned only 8 percent of the agricultural land. Also see Ibid., p. 48 where the main feudal families are shown in terms of land possession and location.

<sup>6</sup>I.B.R.D., Iraq, p. 33.

<sup>7</sup>Alnasrawi, Economic Development, p. 26.

<sup>8</sup>Kathleen M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq, 1950-1965 (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1972), p. 18.

- <sup>9</sup>I.B.R.D., Iraq, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>10</sup>Langley, Industrialization, p. 83.
- <sup>11</sup>Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, p. 144. Also, Langley, Iraq, p. 84.
- <sup>12</sup>Khaldun al-Husri, "The Iraqi Revolution of July 14, 1958," in Irene L. Gendzier, ed., A Middle East Reader (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 207.
- <sup>13</sup>Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of Egypt, Syria and Iraq (2nd edition; London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 134, 142, 172, 183.
- <sup>14</sup>Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, pp. 69-72.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 72.
- <sup>16</sup>"Administrative Problems and Their Remedy in Iraq," a paper submitted by the Iraqi Delegation to the Third Conference for Administrative Sciences of the Arab League, (Cairo, October 23, 1965), p. 1.
- <sup>17</sup>Caractacus (pseud.), Revolution in Iraq: An Essay in Comparative Public Opinion (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1959), pp. 38-39.
- <sup>18</sup>Geroge Grassmuck, "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958," The Middle East Journal 14 (Autumn, 1960), 397-398.
- <sup>19</sup>Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 260.
- <sup>20</sup>The Civil Service Commission, First Annual Report of 1957 (Baghdad: Government Press, 1958), p. 2.
- <sup>21</sup>I.B.R.D., Iraq, p. 78.
- <sup>22</sup>Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration in the Middle East," Public Personnel Review, 20 (January, 1959), 51.
- <sup>23</sup>al-Husri, Iraqi Revolution, p. 207.
- <sup>24</sup>Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, p. 29.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

- <sup>26</sup> Qubain, Reconstruction of Iraq, pp. 23-24.
- <sup>27</sup> Lord Salter, The Development of Iraq: A Plan of Action: A Report Submitted to the Iraqi Development Board (London: The Caxton Press, 1955), p. 96.
- <sup>28</sup> For details of the Hashimite Family, see Birdwood, Nuri as-Said, pp. 286-87;
- <sup>29</sup> Hasan, Dirasat, pp. 44-47.
- <sup>30</sup> Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, p. 88.
- <sup>31</sup> Husain Jamil, Iraq Before and After the Revolution (Baghdad: Government Press, 1959), pp. 3-8.
- <sup>32</sup> Abd al-Razzak al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat al-Iraqiya--History of the Iraqi Cabinets (Vol. IX; Beirut: Dar al-Kutub, 1974), pp. 315-318.
- <sup>33</sup> Nazar al-Hasso, "Administrative Politics in the Middle East: The Case of Monarchical Iraq, 1920-1958" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas, 1976), p. 116.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 128-129.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 125.
- <sup>36</sup> For full discussions of the life and leadership of Nuri al-Said, see Birdwood, Nuri As-Said; and Gallman, Iraq Under Nuri.
- <sup>37</sup> Al-Hasso, "Monarchical Iraq," p. 116.
- <sup>38</sup> Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat, p. 321.
- <sup>39</sup> Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, pp. 232-233.
- <sup>40</sup> Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi in al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat, p. 9.
- <sup>41</sup> Halpern, Middle East and North Africa, p. 359.
- <sup>42</sup> Al-Hasso, Monarchical Iraq, pp. 309-313.
- <sup>43</sup> Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, pp. 251-252. Also see al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat, p. 321.

- <sup>44</sup> Caractacus, Revolution in Iraq, pp. 36-46.
- <sup>45</sup> Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932-1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 28.
- <sup>46</sup> For full details, see Grassmuck, "Electoral Process in Iraq," pp. 397-416.
- <sup>47</sup> Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat, p. 299.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>49</sup> Khadduri, Independent Iraq, pp. 28-29.
- <sup>50</sup> Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, pp. 224-226.
- <sup>51</sup> Grassmuck, "Electoral Process in Iraq," p. 414.
- <sup>52</sup> "Politics in Iraq," New Statesman, July 19, 1958, p. 74.
- <sup>53</sup> Grassmuck, "Electoral Process in Iraq," p. 414.
- <sup>54</sup> Nidal al-Baath: al-Qutr al-Iraqi--The Baath Struggle in Iraq 1953-1958. Vol. V (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1964), pp. 219-222. Also, see Suad Khayri, Min Tarikh al-Haraka al-Thawriyya al Mua'sira Fi al-Iraq--From the History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, Vol. I. 1920-1958 (Baghdad: al-Adib, 1974), p. 15, pp. 342-43; al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat, p. 362.
- <sup>55</sup> Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, p. 233.
- <sup>56</sup> Gallman, Iraq, p. 2.
- <sup>57</sup> Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wazarat, p. 298.
- <sup>58</sup> Khadduri, Independent Iraq, pp. 69-211.
- <sup>59</sup> Muhammad Husain al-Nuri, Jumhuriyat al-Iraq al-Fatiya wa Asrat al-Inqilab al-Iraqi--The Young Republic of Iraq and the Secrets of the Iraqi Coup, July 14, 1958 (Baghdad: Matbaat al-Nuri, 1958), p. 44.
- <sup>60</sup> Gallman, Iraq Under Nuri, p. 205.
- <sup>61</sup> Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 5-7.
- <sup>62</sup> Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Baath--On the Baath's Path (14th ed., Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1975), p. 267; Michel Aflaq,



Nuqtat al-Bidaya--The Starting Point (5th ed., Beirut: Matbat al-Mukallis, 1975), pp. 5-8, pp. 65-70; Abdallah al-Urawi, Al-Arab wa al-Fikr al-Tarikhy--The Arabs and the Historical Thought (Beirut: Dar al-Haqiqa, 1973), p. 201.

<sup>63</sup>Khayri, Min Tarikh al-Haraka, pp. 7-354.

<sup>64</sup>Haddad, Revolutions, p. 93.

<sup>65</sup>Ghaib Toma Farman, Al-Hukm al-Aswad Fi al-Iraq--The Black Rule in Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1957), pp. 108-117. Also, al-Hasani, Iraqi Cabinets, pp. 358-360.

<sup>66</sup>See Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 17; and compare with Ghalib, Qassat Thawrat, p. 36.

<sup>67</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 27-30.

<sup>68</sup>For details on the specific goals of the 1958 revolution, see Ghalib, Qissat Thawrat, p. 46. Also see, Jasim Mukhlis, Mudhakkerat al-Tabaqchali--Memoir of al-Tabaqchali (Beirut: Manshurat al-Mektaba al-Asriya, 1969), pp. 346-349. The author mentions nine categories which are: General, Internal and Development, Educationa, Social Security, Defense, Administrative, Foreign, National, and Transitional policies.

<sup>69</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 47.

### Chapter III

#### ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL ELITES AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE POWER STRUGGLE IN POST-1958 IRAQ

It was pointed out previously that the need for prominent leaders and competent elites is most intense in countries where political, social, and economic transformation is in progress. The analysis of elite background becomes, therefore, a useful method to study the evolution of the political system. Those background characteristics (age, ethnic origin, religious affiliations, social status, educational qualifications, professional career, and political orientation) of the political elite in post-revolutionary Iraq constitute the primary focus of our analysis in this chapter.

In analyzing the interpersonal relations of cliques, factions, and groups within and between the political elites in their capacity as decision makers, it becomes easier--as evidenced by later events--to account for alteration in policy and changes in individual orientations. Such personal interactions are informal and do not follow a recognized structured pattern. Therefore, they become crucial in understanding the governing process of the

country. The cohesion or disunity of elite interests and relations influences their success or failure in governing the country. In this chapter we deal with the historical development of the formation of elites as well as the events and interactions which accompanied their recruitment, circulation, and continuity during their struggle to seek control of each of the republican regimes of Qasim, 1958-1963, Arif I, 1963-1966, Arif II, 1966-1968, and al-Bakr, 1968-1976. The background characteristics of the political elite will be examined to find out, later, how much of an impact such variables have on the rise and fall of elites as well as the extent of change they cause in the realm of public policy. The political elite in this study, as pointed out earlier, consists of the President, Vice-President, the Council of Sovereignty (known later as the National Council of the Revolutionary Command), the National Defense Council, the Revolutionary Command Council the Prime Minister, and cabinet ministers.

Several reasons contribute to the significance of background characteristics such as regional, religious, and ethnic representation (genuine or symbolic) in the political system. One reason is due to the fact that in a highly centralized political and administrative system, political positions become more conspicuous. Another reason is that the social structure and values encourage such regional, ethnic, and religious identification. This is manifested in the way which Iraqi names and identities are derived from tribal, geographical or religious origins. A third

reason is the fact that the Iraqi population suffers from ethnic-sectarian fragmentation where the Arab Sunnites form about 30 percent, the Arab Shiites around 45 percent, and the Kurds about 20 percent of the population. Added to these are other minorities such as Christians of various denominations, Turkomans, Assyrians, Iranians, Yezidis, Sabaeans, and Jews. Some of these religious and racial affiliations have been historically reinforced by geographical location of such communities. For example, with the exception of Baghdad, which contains a cross-sectoral profile of the population, one finds the Sunnites concentrate in the North and Northwest of the country, the Kurds are mainly located in the Northeast, and the Shiites reside in the South. Historical and political factors have contributed to such patterns of communal concentration. In addition to original religious reasons, the Shiites in the south felt closer to the Persian Empire and, later, more distant from Ottoman control, while the Sunnites preferred their contiguity to both the Umayyad dynasty of Damascus and, later, the Ottomans. A fourth, and perhaps the most important reason, is that the absence of political activities renders elite representation as the only alternative to popularly-elected delegates whose tasks would involve a ramified process of aggregation, articulation, and accomodation of citizens' needs and expectations.

It becomes necessary, therefore, for the Iraqi political elites to realize that in order to increase leadership legitimacy and to promote an Iraqi identity they must strive to achieve

a workable formula to embrace various national forces in cabinets. This integration aims to reduce the tensions which can be created as a result of neglecting or, in some cases, denying various ethnic, regional, religious, and political groups political representation. It also eliminates the disenchantment of one or more groups which might provide a motive for rebelling and challenging the central authority. As the country moves along the continuum of secularism and modernization, the criteria for elite recruitment shift from personal considerations to more universalistic and achievement-oriented standards. The significance and consequences of elite background characteristics and their repercussions on the political system are examined throughout the remainder of this chapter.

### 3.1. The Qasim Regime, 1958-1963

Twelve days after the overthrow of the monarchy, a provisional constitution was proclaimed to replace the monarchical constitution which was described as politically corrupt, repressive, and antiquated. The republican constitution abolished the monarch as the head of state and the two houses of parliament as the legislature. Instead, a Council of Sovereignty was established to exercise presidential authority, and a cabinet was formed to exercise both executive and legislative powers. The constitution was to remain in force until a new one would be enacted by a National

Assembly to be elected later by the people to mark the end of the transitional period. Members of the new political elites, who were also the new rulers and decision-makers of the young Iraqi Republic, occupied commanding positions in the Council of Sovereignty and cabinet.

### 3.1.1. The Council of Sovereignty

The Council of Sovereignty replaced the original plan of forming a Revolutionary Command Council whose members would have been recruited from the Central Organization of Free Officers.<sup>1</sup> The appointment of three persons to the Council of Sovereignty was regarded as fair representation of the three major communities which make up the Iraqi nation. Lt. Gen. Najib al-Rubay'i was a Sunnite; Muhammad Mehdi Kubbah, a Shiite; and Khalid al-Nagshabandi, a Kurd. This membership continued until December 1, 1961, when the Council lost two of its members. Consequently, Qasim restored the ethnic and religious composition of the Council which continued until the end of his regime.

The composition of the Council seemed to have been determined by Qasim.<sup>2</sup> Evidence of such influence on the decisions of the Council was clear from the fact that republican decrees were issued bearing the names and signatures of the Council's members before the arrival of its president.<sup>3</sup> Although the selection of the members of the Sovereignty Council seemed wise and fair, it left both the Sunnites and the army dissatisfied. These two groups felt that they had played a leading role and sacrificed more than the other

communities throughout the revolutionary struggle and so should enjoy disproportionate representation. Neither did the political parties appreciate their exclusion from the Council. The three members of the Council were politically neutral and only one of them had any affiliation at all, and that to the moderately conservative Istiqlal, or Independence, party.

Three aims were served by the establishment of the Sovereignty Council. First, the formation of a Revolutionary Command Council of much larger and stronger membership would have given Qasim less power. Also, he would have felt, with his Iraqi-centered feelings, outnumbered amidst a majority of pan-Arab nationalists. Second, Qasim solicited an initial popular support of the majority of Iraqis especially the Shiites and Kurds who felt that, after the monarchical Sunnite rule, they were now beginning to enjoy an equal share in the 'highest' national office. Finally, Qasim brought in the neutral and civilian elements in order to impose his views in the political management of the country and to use the Council as a rubber stamp to increase the legitimacy of his decisions.

A significant change took place in the Council of Sovereignty as a consequence of a cabinet reshuffle of February 7, 1959. The change was interpreted as a shift to strengthen the Left and consequently to undermine the pan-Arab nationalists. In protest against such power shifts, the Council's prominent civilian member, Muhammad Mehdi Kubbah, resigned.<sup>4</sup> Qasim soon appointed two

members who were less known than their predecessors. They were Abd al-Majid Kammuna and Rashad Arif whose membership continued until the overthrow of Qasim. The Council continued to function as a rubber stamp, and its president continued to perform routine and ceremonial duties until the collapse of the regime in February 1963.

### 3.1.2. The Cabinets

Proclamation No. 1 of the July 1958 Revolution<sup>5</sup> did not make reference to a parliamentary system because, according to the proclamation, all executive and legislative powers were to be entrusted temporarily to the cabinet. Such concentration of power within the cabinet and the absence of electoral methods make the selection and appointment of cabinet ministers very important to different groups, political parties, and communities in Iraq. The participation or exclusion of one or more of the above groups expresses the fluctuating balance of political forces. Ingredients of such political forces are made up of various ethnic, religious, ideological, social, professional, and educational characteristics which determine the weakness or strength and the continuity or dissolution of cabinets.

#### 3.1.2.1. Composition and Trends

A comparative analysis of ethnic, religious, and social characteristics of cabinet occupants reveals some interesting insights into Iraqi politics. The data presented in Table III show that Arab Sunnites maintained a substantially larger share of cabinet posts than their Shiite or Kurdish partners. The Sunnite presence



Table III  
Analysis of Cabinet Membership According to Background Characteristics During the Qasbi Regime, 1958-1963

Background Variables	Cabinet 1 7/58-9/58		Cabinet 2 9/58-2/59		Cabinet 3 2/59-7/59		Cabinet 4 7/59-3/60		Cabinet 5 3/60-2/63	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
1. Religion, Sect., & Ethnicity:										
Arab Sunni	7	100	7	47	5	36	7	71	5	36
Arab Shiite	4	28	3	33	1	14	3	33	1	14
Kurds	3	21	3	20	0	0	3	20	3	14
Christians	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
2. Occupation:										
Military	4	28	3	43	4	27	4	37	3	18
Lawyers	3	21	1	14	4	27	2	29	3	19
Professors	3	14	1	14	0	0	3	20	1	14
Engineers	3	14	0	0	3	20	1	14	2	10
B. Semantics	1	7	1	14	1	14	1	14	1	14
Businessmen	1	7	1	14	1	14	1	14	1	14
Medical Drs.	1	7	0	0	1	14	2	20	2	10
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
3. Place of Education:										
Bahy Iraq	4	28	3	33	3	20	3	37	2	29
Iraq and/or abroad	10	72	7	100	3	33	4	37	5	33
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
4. Social Origin:										
Urban	9	64	7	100	10	66	5	71	6	36
Provincial	5	36	0	0	5	34	2	29	1	14
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
5. Political Orientations:										
A.S.S.P. (a)	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pan-Arab (b)	3	21	3	43	3	20	0	0	0	0
K.N.D.P. (c)	3	21	0	0	3	20	3	33	3	19
Army (no ideology) (d)	4	28	3	43	3	20	4	37	3	19
Communists (e)	1	7	0	0	1	14	1	14	1	14
N.D.P. (f)	2	14	1	14	4	27	2	29	2	19
Unknown (g)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7

a. Total number of cabinet members which varies according to cabinet size

b. Political ministers which are always seven

c. Arab Baath Socialist Party

d. Arab Nationalists who believed in immediate Arab union under Nasir's leadership. They include Baathites.

e. Kurdish National Democratic Party

f. Pre-fect or supporters to distinguish them from party members

g. National Democratic Party

h. Individuals whom could not be identified or data was not available

i. These figures represent Non-Partisan ministers

throughout Qasim's cabinets maintained an overall average of 50 percent of cabinet posts as compared with their 30 percent of the total population. The Kurds maintained a close ratio to their population and fluctuated slightly according to their relations with the central government. The dominance of Sunnites--justified by their involvement in politics and their profuseness among top army ranks--was achieved at the expense of the Shiites who held an average of 30 percent of cabinet posts as compared with their 45 percent ratio of the population. The other losers in cabinet representation were the small minorities of Christians, Turkomans, and Assyrians.

However, one should not be misled by the numerical presence of representatives of certain parties or communities in cabinets in general, because the real power actually lies in the hands of occupants of the strategic posts shown in Table III. Thus, even though a cabinet is called civilian, if there is a numerical superiority of civilians over military, this may become misleading. In fact, it is the strategic posts that really determine where the real base of power and the actual control of government falls. That is why the most influential person, faction, or party always occupies as many of such strategic cabinet positions as possible. Using this assumption as an indication of real power, Table III shows a dominant control of government by the Sunnites due to their superiority in occupying strategic positions which ranged from 72 percent to a complete monopoly of 100 percent of the posts. In contrast, the Shiite share ranged from a complete absence to a maximum of 28

percent or two strategic posts.

As for the social origin and place of education of the elite members, the data indicate that half of the ministers were exposed to educational training abroad which ranged from short-term training courses to long-term highly-specialized programs. Another distinct feature of Qasim's choice of ministers which, as we shall see later, differs from his successors, is that urban ministers exceeded provincial<sup>6</sup> ministers in a ratio of 64 to 36 percent respectively. This rises to an even higher ratio of 86 to 14 percent respectively for strategic cabinet appointments. Such aggregate analysis of elite educational and geographic background enables us, to a certain extent, to establish the degree of cosmopolitanism or localism of the political elites. It may be safe to assume that--unlike his successors who came from provincial areas--Qasim's urbanized outlook, his contacts with Iraqi political and military personalities, and exposure to short training in England before the revolution had partially influenced his criteria of selection and appointment of cabinet members.

In terms of occupational and political orientations the same Table III indicates clearly that the new rulers of Iraq were a mixed lot of military officers and politicians who had previously found unity only in their opposition to the policies of Nuri al-Said. The revolution in its initial stage appeared, as anticipated, to legitimize the activities of various political groups that had long been suppressed. The most militant groups were the Communists,

the Baathists, and the less-organized but intensely committed Nasirites. Furthermore, two long-standing opposition groups re-emerged: the Istiqlal Party (nationalist and broadly conservative) and the National Democratic Party (socialist).<sup>7</sup> None of these groups took part in the planning or execution of the revolution, but their previous anti-Hashimite activities influenced the attitudes of the military officers. Representatives of all the above-mentioned groups found a place in Qasim's first cabinet and were joined by some army officers.

The first cabinet chosen by Qasim was a coalition cabinet consisting of most political groupings that had been opposed to the Royal regime. The cabinet was ideologically balanced but had no positive outlined program. The Free Officers were represented by three members who controlled the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Affairs. Three Kurds were in control of the Ministries of Communications, Health, and Justice. Two members of the National Democratic Party headed the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture, while two nationalists headed the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education. The Communist party was represented by one minister, and similarly the Istiqlal party.

Such a cabinet might convey the impression that Qasim genuinely desired the restoration of the democratic process. Thus the question becomes, to what extent was the distribution or sharing of power among these various political groups apparent or real? It is true that only four out of fourteen portfolios in the

cabinet were held by officers Qasim, Arif, and Talib. On close examination, one observes that the three officers occupied the most important positions, i.e., the Premiership and the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Affairs. Yet, on the basis of the available data, one can conclude that the cabinet as a whole was composed of a relatively fair ethnic, religious, and ideological distribution with a slight bias towards Arab Sunnites and the military. With regard to the distribution of the key ministerial posts, however, it is seen that 100 percent fell to the Sunnites of whom 43 percent were of military background.

#### 3.1.2.2. Events and Interactions

Qasim's first cabinet seemed to be a strong body of dedicated men, most of whom had been nationally known for their strong beliefs in favor of reform and in opposition to the monarchy. Leadership, however, resided in the two personalities of Qasim and Arif. For the Revolution to be successful, these two leaders had to cooperate and collaborate. Much depended on the degree of harmony that the two men could maintain. This harmony was to exist for a short time, but as the various pressures, both internally and externally, became manifest, the alliance began to crumble.

While the revolution was supported by the majority of Iraqis, not all of them agreed to the eventual aims of the movement.

Even less consensus existed concerning the policies and procedures to realize its goals. Differences of opinion gradually began to surface. The Baath, of whom Colonel Arif was the leading spokesman, favored a quick if not immediate union with the United Arab Republic. To balance the Baath power, Brig. Qasim began to lean on the Communists who in turn distrusted a government which banned all political parties. Furthermore, the National Democrats also wanted a restoration of party politics in contrast to Qasim's view which sought to strengthen his grip on the country by restricting and postponing political activities. Factionalism in the army began to follow similar patterns.

A power struggle emerged in the very early stages of the revolution. One contributing factor to such a struggle was the absence of a strong leader and the apparent independence of Arif and Qasim in their beliefs and preferences. Qasim began to promote officers loyal to himself to key positions and to demote the partisans of Arif to subordinate positions. In September 1958, Qasim relieved Arif of all his posts.<sup>8</sup> From that time on, Qasim attempted to concentrate more and more power for himself. This aim was attainable because of the intense rivalries among the existing political factions. Each sought power by appealing to Qasim for support. In short, Qasim's victory over Arif appears to have encouraged him to eliminate other rivals. He pushed to assert his control in the cabinet. This move was accompanied by the formation of the pro-left popular militia, the establishment of the Revolution's Court to

punish opposition to the new regime, the pan-Arab attempt to overthrow Qasim in favor of Arif, the arrest of Arif, and the rallying of the Communist party in favor of Qasim.<sup>9</sup>

An examination of the third cabinet reveals that in February 1959, Qasim dropped all members (six ministers in addition to Arif) who were identified as Baathist or pan-Arab nationalist or who had failed to become subservient to him. In the same cabinet, Qasim recruited three new army officers, all of whom were known to have been his supporters. This raised the overall representation of military men in the third cabinet to six or increased the military grip on strategic ministries to four positions as compared with three in the previous cabinet. Two of the new army officers, Muhyi al-Hamid and Abd al-Wahhab al-Amin, were pro-Qasim as well as prominent members of the Central Organization of the Free Officers Movement. Among the five new civilian ministers were two members of the National Democratic party, Husain Jamil and Hasan al-Talabani. Three had no party affiliation: Talat al-Shaybani, Hashim Jawad, and Abd al-Malik al-Shawwaf. The Minister of Finance in the previous cabinet (Muhammad Hadid, a member of the National Democratic party) remained in position.

The ideological orientation of the cabinet started to change from non-partisan to a cabinet which included ministers sympathetic to left-wing groups. This shift was instituted to counterbalance the growing influence of the pan-Arabists. The reshuffle represented a sudden decline, if not disappearance, of pan-Arab influence in

Qasim's government and a parallel growth of Communists, technocrats, and officers known for their loyalty to Qasim. In the cabinet, Qasim directed the meetings with ease and made decisions independently. Though this cabinet worked more harmoniously than its predecessors, it was replaced with even more subservient men on July 13, 1959. In this new fourth cabinet, "Qassem was too much preoccupied with larger political questions to pay attention to regular cabinet decisions, and he often issued orders to subordinate officials over the heads of departments."<sup>10</sup> Some ministers submitted their resignations over such matters, while the remaining ones carried out Qasim's orders blindly.

Two important events took place which made Qasim more apprehensive of the intentions of his opponents (pan-Arabists), and encouraged him later to become more dependent on the support of the Communists. The first of these was the abortive coup of Rashid Ali on 9-10th of December 1959. The second was the attempted coup of Abd al-Wahhab al-Shawwaf on March 8, 1960.

The al-Shawwf revolt began a fierce cold war between Cairo and Baghdad. The revolt represented a reprisal by pan-Arab forces against Qasim's beliefs which favored an independent Iraq from the rest of the Arab countries (especially Cairo), and his recent measures which stripped the pan-Arabists from any, even symbolic, representation in the government. Qasim foresaw the potential threat to his existence, internally through pan-Arab forces and externally through the engulfing popularity of Nasir's leadership.



As a result, Qasim had to lean on the Communists who strongly opposed Nasirism, and who would provide a counter-balancing force to suppress pan-Arab elements in Iraq. Soon after this, the press in Iraq became more rigidly controlled than it ever was in the days of the monarchy. Arab nationalism became more dangerous to General Qasim than Communism was to General Nuri. This division sparked a struggle between Nasir and Qasim that was more intense than any in the days of Nuri al-Said and the Baghdad Pact.<sup>11</sup> The ensuing events showed that the harder Nasir attacked Qasim, the more Qasim looked to the Communists for support. This gave the Communists a freer hand to attack and intimidate the Nasirites and Baathists in Iraq. Reliance on Communist organizations and mob-power opened the way for serious Communist infiltration into the government, schools, unions, professional associations, radio, and the Popular Resistance Forces.<sup>12</sup>

A breach of understanding developed between the Communists who controlled the streets and the National Democrats who controlled little beyond a few newspapers and sections of the bureaucracy.<sup>13</sup> This conflict was recognized by Qasim who immediately started playing one force off against the other. His actions from July 1959, to May 1960, and from July 1959, to February 1963, clearly represented a pattern of "Qasimite" policy designed not to establish a balance of forces but rather to check the growth of all forces. The only factions he supported were those who were unconditionally allied with him. This seems to be the only reasonable explanation

for some apparently contradictory actions which Qasim took. For instance, he stood firm against the Communist demand for the immediate resumption of political activity, yet he set a date for licensing all parties. Also, while he condemned the manifesto of the Communist-inspired United National Front, he, simultaneously, admitted three of its signatories into his fourth cabinet.<sup>14</sup> As indicated in Table III at least one of them was a Communist, namely, Dr. Naziha al-Dulaymi, a minister for Municipalities and the first Arab woman ever to hold ministerial rank. However, the admission of Communist supporters into the government could not be interpreted as a Communist victory; it appeared more to be a subterfuge, since these supporters held little power within the party.

The leading Communists, such as Abd al-Qadir al-Bustani and Adel Salam, were overlooked, and posts were awarded to their comrades of lesser importance. The important ministries of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, and Guidance were still held by Qasim or men unconditionally loyal to him. Table III indicates that the fifth cabinet registered an increase in the number of military personnel to eight (38 percent) as compared with the previous cabinet. This increase at the expense of the Communists who were reduced from six (32 percent) to five (24 percent) and National Democrats from six (32 percent) to four (19 percent).

This fluctuating pattern of personal policies provided Qasim's opponents the opportunity to accuse him of failing to pursue a

coherent and consistent line in the management of Iraqi domestic and foreign policies. He was also accused of deviating from the goals of the revolution by neglecting the economic, social, and political modernization and concentrating on regime survival instead. His systematic reluctance to take clear sides in the ideological struggle among parties had three consequences. First, there was a sharp deterioration in public control and personal security in the country; second, most organized groups, from extreme left to extreme right, were fragmented by inter-party strife and viewed Qasim with deep suspicion, considering him as the man responsible for their dilemma; and third, Qasim's Iraq fell under severe criticism from both Cairo and Moscow<sup>15</sup> who sponsored their Iraqi followers, pan-Arabs and Communists respectively.

The weakness of Qasim's political position was that although he lost the support of the Communists, he could not gain the confidence of the nationalists. Nor was he likely to gain such confidence as long as the nationalists put Arab unity first and Iraqi national identity second. The National Democrats later split into factions: a pro-Qasim group led by the Minister of Finance, Dr. Muhammad Hadi<sup>15</sup> who left the party and formed the National Progressive party, and an anti-Qasim faction led by Kamil al-Chaderchi and Husain Jamil.<sup>16</sup> The Communists became in active danger of persecution from the nationalists. At the same time, the nationalists (Baath, Istiqlal, and Nasirites) had that tide running strongly in their favor. Although they lacked a leader to weld together their disparate

elements, they were nevertheless united in their anti-Communist stand and their devotion to the slogan of Arab unity. To make the situation worse, Qasim's regime was confronted in the autumn of 1961 by a fierce challenge in the form of a Kurdish rebellion in the North.<sup>17</sup> Neither the military action of his army, nor the alternating threats and promises of amnesty and limited autonomy succeeded in settling the conflict. The Kurdish problem eroded profoundly the regime's strength until its collapse.

Qasim's relationship with the political forces in general and the Communists in particular contributed to his survival as well as his downfall. Even a cursory glimpse of cabinet reshuffles in Table III indicates that much of the power struggle centered upon Qasim's relationship with the Communist party. This relationship underwent five consecutive stages.<sup>18</sup> The first stage extends from July 14, 1958 to March 9, 1959. This period witnessed an open struggle among political parties as well as personalities over the issue of unity with the United Arab Republic. The nationalists and Nasirites were denouncing Qasim as the betrayer of the Arab cause and urged the Iraqis to revolt. To counter the increasing strength of the anti-Qasim nationalists and Nasirites, Qasim began to lean heavily on the well-organized Communist party. At the same time, the Communist party threw its weight behind Qasim.

The second stage covers four months from March 9, 1959 and until July 19, 1959. The al-Shawwaf Revolt in Northern Iraq and the failure within three days forced Qasim to give the green light to

the Communists. It is well known that the latter conducted arbitrarily mass-executions of military and civilians in various Iraqi cities such as Mosul, Kirkuk, al-Musayyab, Arbil, and Basra.<sup>19</sup> The Communists struck these cities, especially Mosul, with savage attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the inhabitants. Their atrocities in Mosul involved hundreds of civilians and military men publicly murdered.<sup>20</sup> By doing this, the Communists planned to grasp national power through participation in the cabinet which they openly demanded from Qasim on May 1, 1959. As Qasim came to realize the potential threat of the Communist demand for membership in the cabinet, he deduced that they would eventually end up sharing his own authority and even replacing him. Qasim evaded the Communist demand and attacked them verbally, labelling them as 'anarchists'.<sup>21</sup>

The third stage was a four month period of estrangement between Qasim and the Communists. Its beginning was demarcated by Qasim's public criticisms of the Communist party on August 3, 1959, and ended with Qasim's refusal to license the Communist party on January 9, 1960. However, Qasim granted the license to a cessionist group of Communists headed by Dawud al-Sayegh. Thus, during this stage, Qasim was working to split the Communist party, and he encouraged a split of the party in an obvious effort to weaken it.

The fourth stage represented a six month period (January 9, 1960 - June 15, 1960) of Communist underground activities to create pressures which could be exerted on Qasim to obtain concessions from

him. The reputation and status of the Iraqi Communist party suffered heavily as a result of a criticism levelled against it by Moscow.

The fifth stage represents an offensive instigated by Qasim and the Iraqi anti-Communist forces. During this two-year period, several Communist leaders were imprisoned, the Communist newspaper Ittihad al-Shaab was shut down for a while, and many of those taking part in past Communist atrocities were tried and sentenced to death.

From the frequent shifts in behavior, it may be deduced that Qasim's identity was neither nationalist nor Communist, neither was he a democrat or a socialist. His pragmatic behavior could only be explained by the fact that his main concern was his own political authority and survival. He can be best described as "Qasimite". Personal interest took clear precedence over political ideology.

Against the above confused picture of civilian politics, Qasim opted to reorganize and strengthen the army. It appeared that any move against Qasim based on the state of the parties alone could be crushed immediately by military force. To guarantee its loyalty, Qasim had not only expanded, equipped, and improved its material well being, but he made sure that no senior officer would appear as a potential rival. It was stated that during the Qasim regime, 2000 officers and more public officials were forced to retire.<sup>22</sup> Qasim might have realized that his policy of divide and rule increasingly absorbed all his time. At the same time, Qasim

strove to preserve himself as Iraq's most faithful leader. But at this point the question in Iraq became, who would support him?

Beyond the dimensions of the military, secret police, and personal security arrangements, Qasim started to push for policies which were designed to appeal to the public. One worthwhile endeavor was to request the international oil companies in Iraq to increase production and revenues.<sup>23</sup> Another ambitious venture to divert the attention of a divided nation from internal to foreign affairs was Iraq's claim over the sovereignty of Kuwait.<sup>24</sup> But although most Iraqis supported the goals behind Qasim's latest policies, they felt no enthusiasm for his methods. The lack of trust in his ability had become well established among them. This chain of domestic instability, oil, Kurdistan, and Kuwait did not help Qasim, and isolated him externally as well as internally.

The deliberate and desperate attempts to shift the public attention from domestic to foreign affairs, did not halt the disintegration of Qasim's personal rule. Both the army and police began to tighten control over elements suspected of disloyalty to the regime. The last six weeks of Qasim's regime were dominated by a strike of the students of secondary schools and of the University of Baghdad. Although the strike had no direct bearing on the February 8, 1963, coup, it did expose the decay of the regime.<sup>25</sup> The cold war with the U.A.R. also resumed. The reactions of the general public clearly demonstrated Qasim's unpopularity. His weakening position was obvious. The Communists were no longer strong, while

the nationalists were gathering strength and confidence. It was recognized that to overthrow a military dictatorship by civil resistance was impossible, even if there was widespread public dissatisfaction. In such circumstances, there was no alternative for civilian groups but to support a faction of young officers opposed to Qasim's rule. The Baathists and Nationalists took the lead in this. Orders were issued by the Baath leaders to the military officers on February 8, 1963, to strike against Qasim. The staging of the coup was successful but resulted in much more bloodshed than the 1958 Revolution.<sup>26</sup>

### 3.2. The Arif Regimes 1963-1968

In terms of organization, participation, and importance, one may state that the coup of February 8, 1963, was more popularly supported than any of its predecessors or successors. The coup was planned and executed by the Baathists in cooperation with sympathetic Free Officers and reinforced by mass action organized by the Party.

After several failures to overthrow Qasim by party members only, the Baath regulars realized the necessity of cooperating with Baath sympathizers as well. A joint Baath-Free Officers committee was formed by the end of 1961,<sup>27</sup> which came to be known as the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) whose membership remained the same throughout the next two years and until their successful overthrow of the Qasim regime.



The committee was unofficially composed of two categories: Baathist civilian and military officers on the one hand and pro-Baathists on the other. The Baath members were comprised of Ali Salih al-Saadi, Talib Shabib, Hazim Jawad, Msari al-Rawi, Hamdi Abd al-Majid, and the retired officers Abd al-Sattar Abd al-Latif, Abd al-Karim Mustafa Nasrat, and Salih Mehdi Ammash.<sup>28</sup> On the army side, they were Lieutenant Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif, Colonel Tahir Yahya, and Colonel Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Other closely associated officers included Brigadier Rashid Muslih, Colonel Abd al-Hadi al-Rawi, Colonel Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi, Colonel Khalid Makki al-Hashimi, Colonel Arif Abd al-Razzaq as Commander of Habaniyya air base, Lieutenant Colonel Hardan al-Tikriti as Commander of Kirkuk air base, and Captain Mundhir al-Windawi as a pilot.<sup>29</sup> Al-Bakr was a member of the National Command of the Baath party, and Ammash held the same position at the same time.<sup>30</sup> Among the closely-associated officers, Hardan Tikriti and Mundhir al-Windawi were Baath members. The rest of the officers cooperated with the Baath on the objectives of ousting Qasim, eliminating the Communists, and developing closer relations with Nasir.

When Qasim initiated a crackdown on the military and civilians who planned to participate in the abortive coup of January 19, 1963, the leadership of the NCRC decided to stage a rebellion against Qasim before he could destroy their momentary strength and cohesion. The decision of the coup was taken by the Baath Regional Command--thus leaving the Nationalists, the

Kurds, the U.A.R. government, and even the National Command of the Arab Baath Socialist party unaware but prepared for the zero hour.<sup>31</sup>

The coup was activated on Friday, the 8th of February, 1963, in which al-Bakr and Arif and the Baath militia (or the National Guard) of 2000 armed men also participated.<sup>32</sup> The Communists took a firm counter-coup stand and issued a circular calling on citizens to defend the revolution and the Qasim regime.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, an ambitious pro-leftist rebellion was declared near Baghdad by some soldiers but it soon found itself under heavy attack from anti-Qasim forces. As a result the rebellious soldiers were captured of whom twenty four, in addition to one civiian, were executed.<sup>34</sup>

Later in the day, Qasim's resistance weakened and his headquarters of the Ministry of Defense fell into the hands of the new leaders. Qasim and his close military associates (al-Mehdawi, Taka al-Sheik Ahmad, Qasim al-Janabi, Kenan Khalil Haddad, Wasfi Tahir, Majid Amin, and al-Awqati) were executed immediately.

### 3.2.1. The National Command of the Revolutionary Council (NCRC)

A National Council of Revolutionary Command was set up on February 8, 1963. This Command was composed of fourteen members, and was later enlarged to twenty members. The membership of the Council was never disclosed publicly until after the Baath lost power. The Council's membership, (see Appendices IX and X) reveals that fourteen members or 70 percent were Sunnites with only six members or 30 percent Shiites and no Kurds. The majority of them were born in provincial towns with only four members or 20 percent,

born in Baghdad.

All of the members of the NCRC were appointed by the Baath party Regional Command. The NCRC was a self-appointed body which derived its authority from the de facto control of authority by the military. The Baath government coopted Colonel Abdul Salam Arif as its ally, and entrusted him with the presidency. Arif presided over the meetings of the NCRC whose duties were confined to legislation and general policy matters. General Ahmad al-Bakr, a Baathist, became the prime minister. Soon a problem arose concerning the process of decision-making, namely, whether the cabinet would merely implement decisions taken by the NCRC or whether it had the power to make decisions independently. Decisions of the NCRC were communicated to the cabinet. At the same time basic decision-making regarding state affairs was done in inner-party councils. As a result, Iraq's political process were characterized by a dualism of the official government structure and a parallel party organization.

The collapse of the Baath regime and the advent of the military to power changed the structure of the NCRC to include positions rather than personalities. Thus on November 18, 1963, the new National Command of the Revolutionary Council included the President of the Republic who is also the president of the NCRC, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Vice-President of the Republic, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chief of General Staff and his Assistants, Commanders of Divisions, Commander of the Air Force, the Military Governor General, and such

offices as were appointed by the Council.<sup>35</sup> This formation resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of the President and his close appointees on the one hand, while giving the military superior control on the other hand. Also, it may be stated that the new formation was a reaction by the military men against the civilian politicians who for the previous nine months had plunged the country into political chaos. The new Council continued to serve until the end of the regime.

### 3.2.2. The Cabinets

The new political leadership expressed an abrupt and wholesale replacement of individuals and groups in positions of power by those who formerly were outside the structure of national decision-making. None of the elite members of the previous regime carried his ministerial post into the new regime. Such elite change first, represented a process of major and extended conflict between pro-Qasim and anti-Qasim elements, and second, resulted in a violent transfer of the positions of authority.

#### 3.2.2.1. Composition and Trends

Table IV reveals a steady increase in the participation of the military, except for the short interlude of the two cabinets of Prime Minister al-Bazzaz for the period September 21, 1965 - August 9, 1966. Furthermore, analysis of ethnic and religious distribution of cabinet positions among the three major communities provides insight into Iraqi politics. Table IV indicates that the Sunnites had substantially higher representation than their Shiite



Table IV continues.

Background Variables	Cabinet 1 Abdel-Razek 2/22/56-5/15/56	Cabinet 2 Abdel-Razek 5/15/56-5/27/56	Cabinet 3 Khalil Kilani 5/27/56-5/31/56	Cabinet 4 Abdel-Razek 5/31/56-6/1/56	Cabinet 5 Abdel-Razek 6/1/56-6/2/56	Cabinet 6 Abdel-Razek 6/2/56-6/3/56	Cabinet 7 Abdel-Razek 6/3/56-6/4/56
D. Religion, Sect, & Ethnicity:	A. Suni	1	1	1	1	1	1
	B. Shi	1	1	1	1	1	1
	C. Arab Sunnite	1	1	1	1	1	1
E. Occupation:	Military	6	6	6	6	6	6
	Lawyers	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Professors	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Engineers	1	1	1	1	1	1
F. Place of Education:	Iraq Only	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Iraq & Abroad	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Abroad	1	1	1	1	1	1
G. Social Origin:	Urban	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Provincial	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Peasants	1	1	1	1	1	1
H. Political Orientation:	Islamic	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Pro-Arab	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Pro-West	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Neutral	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Non-Factional	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Non-Communist	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Pro-Arab	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Pro-West	1	1	1	1	1	1

(a) Total members of cabinet which varies according to the size of the cabinet.  
 (b) Total members of political minorities which remains constant at seven for each cabinet.  
 (c) Nationalists are those who believe in gradual Arab unity but are more concerned with internal Iraqi problems especially the Kurdish problem and improving the economy.  
 (d) Breakdown of ideological/non-ideological military in cabinet positions is included for illustration only.  
 These figures are not a part of the general total.

or Kurdish partners. The Sunnites maintained an average of above 60 percent throughout the regime except during a thirteen-month interval of the only civilian Premier al-Bazzaz, and the only Shiite Premier Colonel Talib. The Sunnites' numerical superiority in cabinets is further revealed in the fact that they held an average of over 70 percent of the strategic cabinet positions (Table IV) with the exception of the above-mentioned thirteen-month interval. The domineering control of the Sunnites was achieved at the expense of their Shiite and Kurdish counterparts. During the al-Bazzaz period, there was a record low of Iraqi ministers educated in Iraqi institutions only. Conversely, there was the highest number of ministers of urban origin and professional orientation.

If the president of the republic is the center of gravity in Iraqi politics, the prime minister also shares this power, though to a lesser degree, by placing ministers of his own choice into the cabinet over which he presides. The prime minister and such ministers represent disparate centers of power and, consequently, their cooperation is required to promote governmental stability as well as to reduce rivalries and conspiracies among elite personalities. This phenomenon, as will be seen later in this section, is well documented throughout the cabinet politics of the Arif period.

In terms of occupational accomplishment, political orientation, and geographical origin of cabinet members, one observes certain emphasis which is explained by the personality

characteristics of the president and his choice of the prime minister. Therefore, when examining the data presented in Table IV above, one may be able to see that Arif's regime could be broadly divided into four basic stages which correspond to the reshuffles in premiers. The first stage comprises two cabinets under the nine-month old premiership of al-Bakr; the second stage has three cabinets which lasted twenty-two months under Yahya; the third stage is the al-Bazzaz two cabinets which lasted eleven months; and the fourth stage is a two-year period of three cabinets under the premiership of Talib, Arif, and Yahya. Nevertheless, a more detailed account of each cabinet is necessary to explain the dynamics of Iraqi politics and the interaction of presidential and prime ministerial power and the shifting balance of elite coalitions. The whole period during which Arif I ruled can also be divided into two stages: (a) consolidation of his personal rule within the first eighteen months, and (b) a shift toward civilian politics and the establishment of a one-party regime. These trends are well observed in his cabinets.

The cabinet of February 1963 - November 1963 was composed of a mixture of Baathists numbering ten (48 percent) and included six ministers (29 percent) from the military leaders. There were more Shiite ministers than in the previous cabinet, but the same number of Kurds. The composition of the cabinet during the following months was not important compared with the superior authority of the NCRC where Baathists prevailed. All of them received



instructions from their party's Regional Command. After Arif ousted his Baathist partners, as Table IV and Appendix XII indicate, the position holders of the third cabinet (November 1963 - June 1964) were headed by Tahir Yahya and displayed very different characteristics from their predecessors. In this cabinet there were no Baathists. Moreover, in keeping with the personal nature of the regime, the cabinet was composed mainly of close military followers of Arif. Six officers holding dominant positions in the regime under Arif's leadership were the Premier, Gen. Yahya; the Minister of Defense, Gen. Hardan al-Tikriti, both formerly associated with the Baath; the Minister of Interior and Military Governor, Gen. Rashid Muslih; the Minister of Guidance, Brig. Abd al-Karim Farhan; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brig. Subhi Abd al-Hamid. The last two ministers were, like Arif, strong admirers of Nasir.

The three cabinets under the premiership of Yahya from November 1963 to September 1965 went through several changes. As indicated in Table IV, one of such changes was that Prime Minister Yahya increased the Nasirite elements in his first cabinet in order to cement relations with Egypt. Arif was continuously making assurances that the union with Egypt was progressing and merely lacked the formalities of a constitution, but events proved these to be mere promises and led to the restlessness of the pro-Nasir personalities and their criticism of the regime. Yahya was constantly reshuffling ministerial positions in his second and third cabinets at the direction of Arif, which eventually caused pro-Nasir ministers

either to resign voluntarily or to be removed from office by presidential orders. In this endeavor, Arif sought to reduce factionalism in the army.

Arif seemed to be preparing to reduce the military conflict within the cabinet and to pave the way for a civilian regime. The new cabinet headed by al-Razzaq lasted only nine days (September 6, 1965 - September 21, 1965) and displayed some different characteristics from previous cabinets. The power of the Shiites and Kurds fell significantly but was offset by the rise of Sunnites and pro-Nasir groups. Most of the ministers were new and only five of them had held previous cabinet posts. The number of Shiite ministers dropped from seven in the previous cabinet to six or from 33 to 27 percent. Later, Arif seemed to be concerned about the improvement of domestic conditions. As a result, he called for changes in the al-Bazzaz cabinet which indicated the beginning of the second stage. Under the same Prime Minister, the new cabinet was enlarged by four new members, but it remained primarily pro-Arif (indicated in Table IV). The most interesting change in this cabinet, compared with its predecessors, was the fact that the military and rural elements were reduced to their lowest share of seats during the republican regime to date; there were six ministers with military background or 26 percent and eight with rural background or 35 percent.

As Tables IV and Appendix VI indicate, Premier al-Bazzaz maintained, after Arif I's death, the same personalities that were in Arif's last cabinet with the exception of five ministers who were

lost with Arif I in the plane crash. Al-Bazzaz replaced them with members from the professional and urban elite; this again reduced the number of military ministers. In the same cabinet, the Ministry of Interior was occupied by a civilian for the first time in the history of the republic. Thus, only one cabinet minister was from the military. There was a higher percentage of 59 percent in favor of urban compared with provincial ministers, the number of ministers educated abroad much exceeded those educated in Iraq only, and the percentage of professors was 27 percent.

From the fall of al-Bazzaz's civilian cabinet in August 1966 until July 1968, there were three cabinets which, if compared with their predecessors, showed the continued rise of military control over cabinet positions and an increasing trend to rural elements in ministerial power. The military share of the cabinet positions rose from four percent to 32 percent, and similarly, ministers of rural origin increased from 35 percent to 63 percent.

Throughout the Arif regimes, it is clear to observe the superiority of the military officers over their civilian counterparts with the exception of the two cabinets under al-Bazzaz. This seemed to suggest strongly that much of the conflicts was due to personality struggles and civilian-military rivalries rather than ideological pursuits. Ethnic and sectarian attributes also covertly affected the regime accordingly.

#### 3.2.2.2. Events and Interactions

After the successful overthrow of Qasim's regime, the new Iraqi leaders in power sought rapprochement with the U.A.R. in order to strengthen their hold on the basis of Arab unity before they introduced socialist measures. From then on, political rather than economic or social considerations dominated the thinking and policies of the party's leadership.

The Baathist rise to power in Syria through a coup (only one month after that of their comrades in Iraq) proved of tremendous importance in bolstering Baath morale. They suddenly found themselves masters of two adjoining countries, while Nasir was president in Egypt. The Baath had long advocated Arab unity and it became necessary for the three governments to negotiate its realization.

Soon the Baath in Iraq and Syria found themselves in rhetorical battle with Nasir over three issues:<sup>36</sup> (1) equality versus inequality of the three partners in the contemplated United Arab States; (2) personal versus collective leadership; and (3) the control of the Syrian Baath through a broader coalition in Syria which would include the Nasirites. This disagreement led to mutual counter-accusations between the Baath and Nasir. The outcome was to drive the Iraqi Baath into closer cooperation with the Syrian Baath and to add a new group to their enemies, namely, the Nasirites. Fearful of a pro-Nasir takeover, the Baath declared an agreement on September 2, 1963, to establish unity between Syria and Iraq--leaving Nasir on his own.<sup>37</sup> Adding to their encountered difficulties, the

Baath declared war on the "secessionist" Kurds.

Gradually, internal dissention within the Iraqi Baath party began to surface. A "left-wing" group led by the civilian Deputy Premier and Minister of Interior, Ali al-Saadi, advocated ruthless destruction of the Kurds. This group also promoted a specific anti-Nasir party line and headed the National Guard, created by the Baath party as a force, independent of the army, in charge of internal security.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the same group urged the immediate and complete implementation of socialism on the grounds that socialism would secure the support of the masses. Opposing them was the "right-wing" faction led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talib Shabib, Minister of State, Hazim Jawad, Commander of the Air Force, Hardan al-Tikriti, Chief of the General Staff, Tahir Yahya, and Minister of Communications, Abd al-Sattar Abd al-Latif. The "right" advocated cooperation with other nationalist elements, especially those in the army. Between these two groups were the moderates led by Prime Minister Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Minister of Defense Salih Mehdi Ammash.

As the struggle among the Baath leaders intensified, each camp sought to reduce the other's influence rather than to win supporters for their own position. The left did not stop at ideological advocacy but attempted to build a structure of power resting on the National Guard. This only served to remind the people of the Guard's atrocities as well as the misdeeds of wide-scale violence committed by the Communist Popular Forces. This militia or the

civilian army antagonized not only broad segments of the Iraqi population but the army as well, who considered them a competitor.<sup>39</sup> In addition, the "left" was opposed by religious elements in Iraq who decried "atheism". Furthermore, political groups in Iraq were embittered by the Baath party's monopoly of power and administrative appointments.<sup>40</sup> The rift between the Baath and President Nasir also alarmed some nationalists as it threatened to plunge Iraq back into isolationism. The fierce clash between the extremists and moderates of the Baath party led the moderate military elements (al-Bakr, Ammash, al-Tikriti) to expel and deport on November 13, 1963, five left-wing members of both the ten-member Baath Party Regional Command and the twenty-member National Council of the Revolutionary Command. Two days later, two members of the "right wing" were forced to resign and were deported to Beirut.<sup>41</sup>

The arrests and deportation of the Baath radicals provoked the National Guard to declare a "rebellion" and soon air attacks hit the Republican Palace and the main air base near Baghdad. Street battles ensued and inter-party rivalries widened. The Regional Command of the Baath Party was dissolved and replaced by the National Command in Damascus. The new Command was equally represented by Iraqis (al-Bakr, Ammash, Abd al-Latif) and Syrians (Aflaq, Hafiz and Jadid).<sup>42</sup> It was assumed that Aflaq advised the moderate Iraqi military group to cooperate with the non-Baath military members of the NCRC--since the party, then purged of extreme leftists and rightists, had become acceptable to moderates in civil

and military ranks.<sup>43</sup> But the extremists continued to attack the Baath National and Regional Commands. This chaotic situation, accentuated by inter-party leadership strife, weakened the party and opened the opportunity for the military who had little or no sympathy toward the Baath party.<sup>44</sup>

Only four days before the collapse of the Baath rule, a communique was issued by the National Command on November 14, 1963, recognizing the need to patch up the differences between the military and civilian factions. There was no mention of left or right wings or factions, though one could detect this division from accusations included in the Baath party circulars.<sup>45</sup>

In reevaluating the Baath rule of 1963, the Arab Baath Eighth Regional Congress reported that the Baath party leadership had two views rather than two wings, left and right. The first view was that the failure of the Baath government was "due to the kind of alliances, existence of rightist elements in leadership, and hesitation in embarking upon radical and revolutionary social transformation which would win the support of the masses."<sup>46</sup> The second view represented a more evolutionary approach to implement the goals and policies of the party. They were characterized by "negligence and haste [hesitance]" in taking political, economic, and social decisions, clashes with allies and conflict with other political forces."<sup>47</sup> The same report stated that the group who held the first view perhaps exaggerated the second group's fear and hesitation in "declaring the revolution, purging sensitive government machinery

of corrupt and bad elements and making the necessary political, economic and social changes."<sup>48</sup> The report continued to explain that the failure of the Baath experiment was not due to too much "left" or too much "right", but it was the...

...leadership's failure in achieving a balance between the ideal and the possible and consequent inability to make accurate calculations of stages and possibilities and a graduated practical program to achieve the essential targets.<sup>49</sup>

Furthermore, the report explained the failure of the Baath regime and stated that:

The party machine was left without precise and comprehensive central guidance. The party, consequently was unable to act as a vanguard revolutionary institution leading the revolution as it should, regardless of the prevailing circumstances and the risks. It lost the initiative and thus regression became simple and possible.<sup>50</sup>

Arif, in collaboration with Tahir Yahya and Hardan al-Tikriti placed the regional and national commands of the Baath party under arrest and seized the government, ending the second regime after only nine months of the Baath party leadership. The fall of the Baath resulted from a power struggle among the strong personalities and not from a battle over ideology.<sup>51</sup>

Arif dissolved the NCRC and formed a new National Revolutionary Council and cabinet which marked the disappearance of the Baath and the emergence of the Arab nationalists as the new influentials in politics.

Arif's regime had a definite pro-Egyptian orientation, and advocated an early Arab unity. Qasim's regime and the Baath party



rule were denounced for preventing and sabotaging the pan-Arab goal. Furthermore, from May 1964 until his death in April 1966, Arif attempted: (1) to provide the country with a new constitution (declared in May 1964); (2) to form a party modelled after the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union in July 1964; (3) to effect rapprochement with the U.A.R.; and (4) to formulate plans for economic reform.<sup>52</sup>

The Nasirite block in the cabinet resisted Arif's desire to control the army on the ground that he talked much about Arab unity but was not interested in implementing it. On several occasions differences between Nasirites and Arif reached a breaking point on personal as well as ideological matters. These were clearly manifested in the resignation of six pro-Nasir ministers on July 10, 1965. They were replaced in the next cabinet by pro-Arif ministers. This demonstrated the disarray of groups in the cabinet and the decline of the premier's popularity, so the president thought of replacing him by coopting a new popular figure in the army who was also a member of the Nasirite group, Brig. Arif Abd al-Razzaq. Al-Razzaq accepted the premiership on the condition that he remain Commander of the Air Force as well as the Minister of Defense. As for the remaining ministers, the pattern in their social, political, and occupational characteristics, makes it appear that the process of their selection and appointment was largely determined by Arif.

When Arif left to attend the Arab Summit meeting in Morocco on September 12, 1965, Premier al-Razzaq mobilized his supporters of

young officers as well as the six pro-Nasir ministers who had resigned the previous month to carry out a coup, to replace Arif and to achieve an immediate union with the U.A.R. The coup failed because Arif's supporters (including his brother as Chief-of-Staff) were in control of most of the military units.

After Arif returned from abroad, he took two steps to deal with the situation and to reassert his civil and military authority. First he demoted officers who held radical ideologies (such as Baathist, Communist, and Nasirites) and rallied behind him a group of moderate nationalists who were willing to support him to establish a civilian regime. Second, in order to stimulate economic development, Arif assured people that no further socialistic measures would be introduced. The civilian Deputy Premier, Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, was invited to form a new government more civilian in nature and more concerned about the improvement of internal conditions.

The al-Bazzaz cabinet faced the same issues which confronted previous regimes: the Kurdish war, oil negotiations, Arab union, and domestic prosperity. Only three months after al-Bazzaz became a prime minister there were encouraging signs of improvement in the economy, increases in oil revenues, new prospects for negotiation with the Kurds to halt hostilities, and a new relationship with Arab neighboring countries.<sup>53</sup> The situation continued to improve until the accidental death of Arif on April 13, 1966, which created a vacuum in national leadership, and, as would be expected, a power struggle among rival groups and personalities.

This time the conflict was between civilian and military factions.

According to Articles 55 and 56 of the provisional constitution, the election of a president requires a two-thirds majority of the members of the NCRC, the cabinet and the National Defense Council (NDC) to be held under the chairmanship of the premier.<sup>54</sup> But the NCRC was abolished by Arif a few months before his death in an attempt to allow consultative council to replace the NCRC.<sup>55</sup> The remaining participants were the NDC consisting of twenty members (twelve officers and eight cabinet ministers of whom three were military officers and occupied the Defense, Interior, and Finance ministries). Before Arif's death the council was comprised of five civilians and fifteen military personalities. After his death the number of military membership was reduced to thirteen, since two of them died with Arif in the crash. Later, when the cabinet met with the NDC to elect a president, the number of civilians jumped from five to fifteen.<sup>56</sup> It was obvious that a civilian president would be selected if a free election was conducted. However, the final word resided with the army officers since their demands had to be met. To satisfy this implicit stipulation, a military candidate, Abd al-Rahman Arif, was selected.<sup>57</sup>

The civilian-dominated regime of al-Bazzaz represented a challenge as well as an alternative to the military. The military had been brought under control during Arif's I regime, but began to reassert its strength and influence under Arif II. The Nasirites and other pan-Arab groups found out that al-Bazzaz was more

independent in his politics than they expected. His socialism was more relaxed than the Egyptian style, his efforts to reestablish relations with Iraq's non-Arab neighbors conflicted with pan-Arab views, his approach to Egypt was slow, and his announcement of a Kurdish settlement program disagreed with their solution by force. So the Nasirite group under the leadership of the ex-premier, Brigadier Abd al-Razzaq, for the second time staged an unsuccessful coup against the civilian regime on June 30, 1966. The military, who supported Arif to put down the coup, began to put pressure on him for cabinet changes and encouraged the president to take decisions without cabinet consideration.<sup>58</sup> Practice of such behavior increased conflicts between the president and his prime minister. Although differences were often ironed out for a short while, deadlocks recurred.

Soon the army officers seemed to have fully renewed their struggle for power after the disappearance of Arif's I strong hand. Two opposite groups emerged: the first called themselves "Unionists" who stressed Arab unity, and the second were named "Provincialists" who stressed Iraqi unity before Arab unity, and called for friendly relations with the West. The Unionists were further subdivided. They were: (a) extreme unionists (Nasirites) who demanded immediate union with Egypt under Nasir's leadership. They included people like Arif Abd al-Razzaq, Abd al-Sattar Abd al-Latif, Subhi abd al-Hamid, Abd al-Karim Farhan, Faud al-Rikabi, Khayri Hasib, and al-Jadir, and (b) Baath officers who advocated Arab unity but opposed

Nasir's leadership. They included people like Ahmad al-Bakr, Salih Ammash, and al-Tikriti, (c) a third group, were moderates who supported a step-by-step Arab unity, and included such people as Najji Talib, and Rijab Abd al-Majid. The second faction, the "Provincialists" was also divided into: (a) the extremists led by al-Uqayli and supported by Rashid Muslih and Ismail Mustafa who called for an independent Iraqi role in inter-Arab politics and expressed a desire for representative government and a multiple party system; (b) the moderates consisting of various army officers each supported by a few other military officers and civilians. This group was further divided into cliques such as (1) Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi and Abd al-Wahhab Amin who emphasized Iraqi interests, (2) Said Slaybi and Abd al-Hamid Qadir, both supported President Arif who defended Iraqi interests as well as kept friendly ties to pan-Arab groups, and (3) Tahir Yahya who shared the views of Iraqi and pan-Arab groups and kept a balance between them.

The struggle for power between the Iraqi nationalist factions and the pan-Arabs culminated in the selection of Maj. Gen. Najji Talib as the head of the new cabinet. He was known as a moderate and maintained friendly relations with many rival groups.<sup>59</sup> He was also regarded as a supporter of the Arab union. Furthermore, his religious affiliation, as Shiite, enhanced his prestige among pan-Arabs who wanted to enlist the support of young Shiites (known to be antagonistic to pan-Arabism) for the cause of Arab unity. Despite his pan-Arab pronouncements, Talib's government did not

accomplish any major step toward Arab unity much to the annoyance of the pro-Nasir groups. Also, Talib faced three more crises: a financial crisis created by the Iraqi Petroleum Company's reduction in production,<sup>60</sup> the Kurdish rebellion, and the Shatt al-Arab dispute with Iran. Pressure was put on the president by various groups to discuss the composition of the cabinet. There was an attempt to reshuffle the cabinet but because of Talib's reluctance to accept such changes he submitted his resignation.

Owing to intense rivalry among the various groups of Unionists and Provincialists, none of these factions could mobilize enough support to form a new government, nor could the leaders agree on a single candidate to head a coalition government. Hence, the circumstances forced Arif to assume the duties of premiership in addition to the presidency.

The new government (May 1967 - July 1967) was based on a national coalition which included officers and civilians representing moderate elements as well as representatives of ethnic and religious communities in the country (Table IV). But this government was soon caught by the June war of 1967, and Arif realized that he could not combine both the presidency and the premiership. He eventually passed the premiership to Tahir Yahya who reduced the size of his new cabinet by seven members.

Yahya, as head of the tenth cabinet in Arif's regime, was faced by several problems which included the Kurds, oil disputes, an Iraqi communist uprising in the south of the country, and economic

deterioration. Differences among members in this cabinet continued and one squabble led to the resignation of three ministers (two of whom were Kurds) which shattered Yahya's hope to reestablish a permanent regime. Divisions and sub-divisions resulted in a cabinet which proved to be too weak to take major decisions. Finally, these conditions contributed to the collapse of his regime on July 17, 1968.

### 3.3. The al-Bakr Regime, 1968-1975

The Baath's failure and consequent loss of power in 1963 did not inhibit the party from engineering further attempts to seize power through the ensuing years until they succeeded in 1968. Much maneuvering and planning took place, some of which is seen by several attempted coups (Table VI) during the period when they were out of office.

There were several favorable conditions to facilitate the Baath return to power: first, the deteriorating conditions of Arif's regime, second, the alienation of the political parties from participation in the governing process, third, the fragmented nature of cabinet politics and its legitimacy, and fourth, the defeat of the Arabs in the June 1967 war. Two alternatives became available to the Baath party: to waive the idea of seizing power in any country in the Arab world and of fostering a long-term popular struggle, or to win the political power in Iraq.<sup>61</sup> It was only logical, given the current circumstances, to select the second

alternative which seemed quicker and less costly.

The party realized that it was not enough to rely on the party apparatus and the masses to overthrow a military-dominated regime. It became necessary to search for alliance from within the establishment and at the same time not run the risk of uncovering the revolution. This step was achieved by cooperation between the Baath and Lt.-Col. Ibrahim al-Dawud, the commander of the presidential guard forces despite his political leaning and personal ambitions. On the day before executing the 1968 takeover, a high ranking military officer holding the position of deputy chief of military intelligence and liaison officer between President Arif and the army, Lt. Colonel Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, approached the organizers of the coup and offered his cooperative participation in exchange for the premiership. Here, the Baath party was faced with no choice but to accept him on the grounds that if he were rejected, all their plans and party personnel would be put in jeopardy. Thus, the Baath coopted him initially, though they suspected him as well as his colleague, Ibrahim al-Dawud.<sup>62</sup> However, these two assured the success of the coup by securing the occupation of the Republican Palace which was the center of power at that time. The Baath also took countermeasures in case the two collaborators failed them at the final hour and turned up to be informers as the Party had experienced more than once before. Other measures were taken, such as mobilizing the Tenth Armoured Brigade to occupy Baghdad, preparing the party militia on the day of the coup to hinder any counter force



in the capital and arresting certain key military and civilian personnel who were not thought to be sympathetic with the Baath. Despite all this military preparation, the coup could be regarded as a presidential palace takeover.

According to the plan,<sup>63</sup> the operations involved the control of the republican guard forces and the forceful surrender of President Arif. The participants in the coup included all active and retired Baath comrades, officers and civilians. The main reason for this full participation<sup>64</sup> was that the party leadership should not only be one of ideological orientation and planning but also one of operational and executing level. This would eliminate the probability of forming two extreme wings, one of political or ideological leadership and another of professional and technical quality. In addition, one may also add the maximum utilization of human resources since the party had limited membership and was plunging itself into a desperate bid for power. This heroic attempt was strengthened by the presence of many related military personnel who occupied key positions in the army and air force, and can be easily detected from the background characteristics of cabinet members in 1968. As a result, the coup was carried out successfully on July 17, 1968, and Arif was arrested and deported immediately. A complete control of all the nation's military and civilian establishment was achieved without casualties. The Prime Minister, Tahir Yahya, and his leading supporters were arrested as well as a large number of Nasirites, secessionist Baathists, and other suspected politicians

and officers. The property of twenty six prominent public figures was also confiscated on July 18, 1968.<sup>65</sup>

### 3.3.1. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)

In regards to the present political leadership and the location and interaction of power centers, only broad outlines and general trends will be discussed to provide a basis for comparison. The analysis of the composition and dynamics of the RCC, and the membership of the ABSP Regional Command will be impressionistic because of the concern over disclosing any information which could become a liability. Evidence and information considered public knowledge will be utilized. While this limitation may offer the interpretation that political elites have more power than what is ascribed to them, such secrecy stems from the fact that power here is more vested in persons rather than in institutions. Thus, it requires concealment and even subterfuge to remain unknown.

The new takeover went smoothly and resulted in a victory for the Baath and the emergence of al-Bakr as President of the republic, Premier and head of the Revolutionary Command Council. General Hardan al-Tikriti became Deputy-Premier and Minister of Defense in addition to his other positions as Chief-of-Staff and Commander of the Air Force. The new government showed a sharp increase in Baathist influence as its sympathizers included nineteen ministers or 73 percent, of whom six were military men.

Al-Bakr's regime introduced a provisional constitution which affirmed the existence of the RCC and considered it as the highest

authority in the country. The RCC was empowered to elect the president of the republic, command the armed forces, declare war, appoint the prime minister and ministers, and to supervise all national affairs. Therefore, political control at the top level of government remained within the hands of the Baath party--since most of its officials were in the party's top membership.

The membership of the RCC since 1968 has changed several times in terms of size and orientation.<sup>66</sup> The composition of the RCC in July 1968 consisted of a total of seven members.<sup>67</sup> Among them were three Baath Generals (Gen. al-Bakr, Lt. Gen. Hardan al-Tikriti, and Lt. Gen. Salih Mehdi Ammash), and four Colonels (Lt. Col. Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Dawud, Col. Hammad Shihab, and Col. Sadun Ghaidan). Such a group did not remain close because it was an odd mixture of Baath and non-Baath elements in which the civilian wing of the party did not have any share at all. The forthcoming change could be anticipated as an undeclared battle between the civilian and military elements of the Baath to dominate the most important center of power which would wield the highest authority.

The struggle culminated in the cooperation of both military and civilian wings of the Baath to oust the non-Baath elements in the RCC. This was achieved within thirteen days by dismissing both al-Nayif and al-Dawud and later replacing al-Tikriti and Ammash. The new membership of the RCC was enlarged to thirteen members.<sup>68</sup> This result can be interpreted as a victory for the civilian wing of

the party and a blow to the military. In addition, it is important to observe that all members of the RCC have held the dual position of being in the RCC as well as holding a cabinet post. This observation applied to the RCC since 1968 except for two persons. They were Saddam Husain and Abd al-Khaliq al Samarrai. In 1974 there was a shake-up in the RCC when membership of five strong personalities was terminated. They were al-Shaikhly, Abdallah S. al-Samarrai, al-Kamali, Abd al-Khaliq al-Samarrai, and Salah al-Ali. Since July 1974, the only change which took place within the RCC was the termination of al-Hadithi's membership which left six members only.

### 3.3.2. Cabinets

The Baath loss of power in 1963 was due to internal struggle within their ranks which motivated dissatisfied groups, headed by Arif, to seize control of the country. However, their return to power in 1968, though not decisive, encouraged them to avoid past failures by refusing to share power with other forces until they established their strength and popularity. Therefore, the first thing they did was to consolidate their power base by ousting non-Baath elements from key political and military positions. These measures cleared the way for the Baath to pursue its policies. Inquiry into the ethnic, religious, geographic, and professional characteristics of political elites during the al-Bakr regime reveals useful clues about the leadership's direction of socio-political change.

### 3.3.2.1. Composition and Trends

The data presented in Table V reveals that, in terms of ethnic and religious distribution among cabinet positions, Arab Sunnites maintained throughout the al-Bakr regime an observable dominance of an average of 62 percent as compared with 21 and 16 percent for the Shiites and Kurds respectively. In terms of strategic positions in the cabinet, the same dominance becomes more pronounced as it averages 86 percent Sunnites, 12 percent Shiites and a complete absence of Kurdish presence. Usually, at least 25 percent of the cabinet is military, 75 percent of the ministers were borne and raised in non-urban places, over half the ministers studied in Iraq only. Such similar background characteristics influenced the cohesion and conflict among elites. More precisely, the personal characteristics of those in government or those articulating ideas greatly determined their acceptance and rejection.

The first cabinet represented a mixture of Baath and independent personalities, the latter of whom were unknown to the public before. However, the overall composition of the cabinet represented a mixture of 31 percent military while the rest were civilian. In terms of ideological composition, there were ten members or 38 percent Baathist, 12 members or 45 percent Iraqi nationalists (either uncommitted or unknown), and no pan-Arabists.

A closer examination of al-Bakr's first cabinet of July 17, 1968, and the trends that followed until his latest cabinet of May,

Table V  
Analysis of Cabinet Membership According to Background Characteristics During the al-Baath Regime, 1968-1976

Background Variables	Cabinet 1 7/17/68-7/30/68		Cabinet 2 7/68-12/69		Cabinet 3 12/69-1/70		Cabinet 4 3/70-5/72		Cabinet 5 5/72-12/75		Cabinet 6 12/75-Nov	
	a	b %	a	b %	a	b %	a	b %	a	b %	a	b %
1. Religion, Sect. & Ethnicity:												
Arab Sunni	14	34	13	69	7	100	20	71	6	36	17	59
Arab Shiite	3	31	5	29	0	0	5	21	1	14	5	17
Kurd	4	19	0	0	3	12	0	0	4	13	0	0
Christian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Occupation:												
Military	3	31	3	43	4	42	6	21	3	41	7	24
Lawyers	2	11	0	0	1	4	1	3	3	10	3	0
Professors	4	24	1	14	3	21	1	14	6	21	2	24
Engineers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T. Serwants	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medical Drs.	2	9	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scientists	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self-employed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Teachers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3. Place of Education:												
Iraq Only	10	38	1	14	13	50	3	42	17	61	9	72
Iraq and/or Abroad	16	62	9	36	13	50	4	54	11	39	2	24
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Social Origin:												
Urban	4	15	3	14	3	35	7	100	5	17	1	14
Provincial	22	38	5	36	17	55	3	42	24	33	6	36
5. Political Orientation:												
Baath	10	38	2	28	19	71	7	100	13	52	6	36
Fan-Arab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K.R.P. (Kurdish Revolutionary Party)	4	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	13	0	0
Army	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ideology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No Ideology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nationalist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non Partisan	4	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K.R.P.**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

a. \* Total number of cabinet members which vary according to cabinet size  
 b. \* Political ministers whose number remains constant at seven  
 \*\*\* K.R.P. - Kurdish Revolutionary Party, established in 1975  
 (c) Breakdown of ideological/non-ideological military in cabinet positions is included for illustration only. These figures are not a part of the general total.

1976 (Table V and Appendices VII, XIII), reveals the emergence of four significant patterns. The first observation is that there has been an increase in Sunnite ministers from fourteen members or 54 percent in 1968 to twenty ministers or 61 percent in 1974. Second, there has been a significant reduction in the military control of cabinet posts. Third, as Table V indicates, there has been an accommodation with the Communists who have been given two ministerial posts in all cabinets since March 1970. Fourth, when examining Appendix XIII, it is observed that virtually all personnel holding strategic positions are at the same time members of the Baath Party.

During al-Bakr's fifth cabinet of May 1972 - November 1974, the Kurdish ministers held five posts or 16 percent of the cabinet; the Communists had two ministers or 7 percent, while the pan-Arabs were given one post or 3.5 percent. The Baath occupied about two-thirds of cabinet seats with 86 percent control over the politically strategic ministries, thus leaving the other power-sharing groups with unimportant positions, yet gaining their cooperation--or at least avoiding their opposition.

#### 3.3.2.2. Events and Interactions

The success of the new takeover was mainly attributed to the collaboration of the "unknown" officers. These were entrusted with such sensitive posts during Arif II's regime as the directorship of the military intelligence, the republican palace guard, and chief of military operations, all of whom cooperated with the Baath officers who desperately sought a return to power. These unknown officers

could have aborted the coup anytime; hence, they dictated their conditions to the Baath and reserved for themselves the important posts of the prime minister and the ministry of defense. In this way, they would possess the necessary civil and military authority to remain in power.

As al-Nayif became the Prime Minister and his co-conspirator al-Dawud occupied the Ministry of Defense, al-Nayif also had supporters among the Republican Guards and inside the Palace where the headquarters of the Secretary General of the Baath party was located.<sup>69</sup> Therefore it becomes highly probable that any action which raised the suspicion of al-Nayif and al-Dawud and their supporters would result in the physical destruction of the Party Regional Command. However, the Baath leaders realized at that early stage that those unknown, yet important, officers had had too short a time to build support for themselves among the people or the military.

The appropriate circumstance for liquidating both men availed itself when al-Dawud, minister of Defense, left Iraq on July 30, 1968, for Jordan. Al-Nayif was arrested in his office and was "deported" abroad as an ambassador to Morocco. Similar treatment was given to al-Dawud who was also appointed ambassador abroad. From that moment on, the Baath seemed to be in control of the country without any effective opposition.

The takeover was a relatively easy task because both al-Nayif



and al-Dawud were outnumbered in popularity by al-Bakr, who was supported by his Baath party as well as by the closely-related officers. They included such officers as Hardan al-Tikriti, Hamad Shihab, Husain Hayyawi, Hamid Jassam, Dhiab el-Algawi, and civilian comrades such as Saddam Husain and Salah al-Ali. Most of them occupied sensitive positions in the cabinet or the army.

Until 1970 the members of the regime were involved in revolutionary rhetoric and mass-trials and executions of agents of foreign powers.<sup>70</sup> Then they realized that they had not achieved much progress domestically. The Kurdish war was draining their resources, and their isolation from the rest of the Arab world, because of their anti-Nasir attitudes, alarmed the regime. Thus the first thing they did was to arrive at a peaceful settlement with the Kurds in March 1970.<sup>71</sup> This problem had always been a prime source of weakness to all republican regimes. The settlement gave them opportunity to pay more attention to the economic problems of Iraq. However, internal conflicts were always a phenomenon of power struggle between the military and civilians, among ideological groups or personalities, or even within the same party. This had always been an obstacle diverting energies away from developmental issues.

Intensive internal political struggle has also been characteristic of the Baath regime. The outcome of the first crisis was the removal of Gen. Hardan al-Tikriti from his post as Vice-President and Minister of Defense in October 1970. By stripping Hardan of his powers, the Baath removed a major threat. Hardan was very popular

among the moderate factions in the army and thus had become their champion in the ruling circle. Furthermore, Hardan had outmaneuvered the Baath in November 1963. To strengthen its foothold further, the Baath also ousted its extremist civilian members represented by the Minister of Culture and Guidance Salah Umar al-Ali, Shafiq al-Kamali, and Abdalla Sallum al-Samarrai. This move was interpreted as a reaction to the regime's failure to honor its pledges to the Palestinians in Jordan.<sup>72</sup> The dismissals were apparently a victory for the party secretary, Saddam Husain, who emerged as the strong man of the regime.<sup>73</sup> Yet Hardan out of office would pose an even greater threat to the regime than when he was in office, for the armed forces had since become more restless without his influence in Baghdad.

The second struggle was manifested in the party's attempt to remove other potential rivals such as the Minister of Interior Col. Salih Ammash, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abd al-Karim al-Shaikhly. Both were members of the RCC and were instrumental to the success of the 1968 coup. This move seemed to be more than the usual struggle for personal power that periodically afflicts the leadership of the Baath party. This shift of power made Husain the most likely successor to President al-Bakr. The pattern of such moves was the reverse of what happened in the 1963 coup whereby the more moderate military Baath leaders ousted the more militant civilian politicians. In this case, the civilian Husain eliminated his two most powerful military rivals. It is interesting to note in this connection that Husain was alert to past political experience. For he learned that it

Table VI  
Coups and Attempted Coups in Republican Iraq, 1948-1979

Date	Leaders	Qualifications of the Leaders	Adversary	Method
7/14/58	Qasbi and Arif	Brigadier & Colonel Respectively	Constitutional Monarchy	Military Take Over
3/9/59	al-Shawaf	Colonel; Commander of the Fifth Brigade Garrisoning Mosul District	Rule of Qasbi & Pro-left Associates	Military Revolt Aided by U.A.R.
10/7/59	Baath	Civilian Wing of Baath Party	Qasbi	Assassination
3/28/61	Baath	Civilian Wing of Baath & Anti-Qasbi Elements	Qasbi	Car Drivers Strike Joined by Students
1/19/63	Baath & Pro-Baath (Baath, Amsh, Yahya, al-Tikriti, Sadi)	Military Officers and Militia	Qasbi	Military Action
2/3/63	Nationalists, Baath & Anti-Communist Leaders, al-Baqr, Arif, Yahya, al-Tikriti	Active and Retired Field Officers (Nationalists & Baath)	Military Dictatorship of Qasbi	Violent Military Action
11/11/63	Left-wing Baath Leaders: Sadi, al-Hinawi	Civilian Baath Leaders Supported by the National Guards	Military Leadership	Military Revolt and Demonstrations
11/13/63	Anti-Baath Military Officers, Arif, Yahya, al-Tikriti	Top Military Officers	Baath Party and National Guard	Violent Military Action
7/13/64	Baath	Army Officers, Police & National Guard	Arif	Military Take Over
3/4/64	Baath Under Baqr Leadership	Six Air Force Officers & a Tank Battalion Under Command of Lieut. Colonel Ahmed al-Jabouri	Arif	Military Action
3/15/65	Abd al-Razzaq	Prime Minister & Some Baathite Officers	Abd al-Salam Arif (Military Rule)	Military Action
6/10/66	Abd al-Razzaq	Officer in Exile & Low-Ranking Baathite Officers	Abd al-Razzaq Arif	Air Force Action
7/17/68	A. Baqr & Baath Assisted by al-Nayif	Retired Field Officers & Baath Party Cadres	Abd al-Razzaq Arif	Peaceful Takeover
7/20/68	Al-Baqr, Hussein & Other Baath Officers	Military & Civil Wings of the Baath Party	Non-Baath Elements	Military Takeover
1969-72	Various Groups	Military Personnel Groups Supported by Certain Political Parties or Movements	Baath Party Rule	Military Action
5/30/73	Colonel Nasir Kiar	Chief of Security Forces and Baathist	Leadership of Baath Party	Seizure of Two Ministers

continued.

Date	Public Reaction	Result	Aims and Outcome
7/14/58	Wide Popular Support and Riot Demonstrations	Success	Republic & Fundamental Changes in Many Spheres. 37 People were Killed Including Royal Family, 3 Jordanian Ministers, 3 Westerners & 4 Other Iraqis
3/15/59	Beating Normal by Air Force Massive Attacks on Civilians	Failure	Elimination of Qasbi's Rule & Union with U.A.P. Outcome was Tighter Control by Leftist Elements
10/7/59	Pro-Qasbi Demonstrations	Failure	Ousting Qasbi. Outcome Stronger Pro-Qasbi Elements
3/26/60	Wide Popular Support by Nationalist Elements, Some Support from Left	Failure	Elimination of Qasbi's Rule. Outcome: Army & Police Repelled Demonstrators & 19 Rebels were Killed
1/15/60	Not Expressed Because the Plot was Betrayed & Foiled at Once	Failure	Overthrow of Qasbi. Outcome: the Plot was Passed to Qasbi at the Last Minute and Failed. Outcome: Retirement or Arrest of 50 Officers.
1/5/60	Violent Riots Heavy Casualties among Military Personnel from Both Sides	Success	Cooperation of the Officers & Baath. Outcome: Massacre of Communists, Alignment with Egypt & Purge of Nationalists
11/13/60	Demonstrations	Failure	Rule of Radical Wing of Baath Party. Outcome: Loss of Power by Baath. Few Casualties
11/25/60	Baath Militia Resistance & Clash with Pro-Arif Army Units	Success	Elimination of Political Parties Including Baath & the Establishment of Military Rule. Many Casualties.
7/28/60	Neutral	Failure	Ousting Arif. Outcome: Conspiracy was Discovered & Many were Arrested.
5/4/60	Passive	Failure	Ousting Arif. Outcome: One Air Force Pilot leaked information of the Plot. Five Air Force Pilots were Executed & Many Arrests of Baath Personalities
5/26/59	Passive	Failure	Overthrow of Arif & Union with Egypt. Outcome: Foiled by Pro-Arif Officers. No Casualties.
4/30/60	Passive	Failure	Repetition of Attempted Coup of 9/59. Outcome: Eight Died, 10 wounded & 50 Arrested.
7/17/60	Wide Popular Support	Success	Reestablishment of Baath Party Rule. No Casualties.
7/30/60	Wide Popular Support	Success	Trial Takeover by Baath & Purge Opposition. No Casualties.
1960-72	Passive	Failure	Overthrow of Baath Regime. Outcome: Many Executions.
6/30/71	Pro-Baath Mass-Mobilization and Popular Support Against the Plotters	Failure	Restructure & Purge of Baath Party Machine. Several Executions.

was too dangerous for the civilian faction to stay too far removed from their officers. Therefore, he turned to such men as the Chief-of-Staff Col. Hammad Shihab, to head the Defense Ministry, and Col. Husain Hayyawi to head the Air Force. Both men were more attentive and less challenging to al-Bakr and Husain than retired Air Marshal Hardan al-Tikriti.

The third struggle came unexpectedly and was different from the previous two in the sense that it was a struggle within the civilian wing of the Baath party. It was the Security Chief, Maj. Gen. N. Kzar,<sup>74</sup> who was directly involved with two other top Baath leaders, to overthrow the Iraqi government on June 30, 1973. The rebel was supported by units from Baghdad's main garrison. He kidnapped the ministers of Defense and Interior and fled with them to the Iranian border.<sup>75</sup> The rebels were captured and in the fight the Defense Minister was shot to death. The Baath militia immediately carried out a major purge in the army and security forces. Within two weeks, the purge resulted in the execution of thirty-six members from the ranks of the Baath party.<sup>76</sup> Two explanations were provided for the internal coup. The first was that the Chief of Security Forces was a Shiite and might have become dissatisfied with the Sunnite style of government and, with the help of the Shah of Iran, undertook the mission. That is why, when the coup collapsed, he took two Baath ministers as captives and escaped to the Iranian border. The second explanation was that the Security Chief and his collaborators wanted a tougher policy towards the Kurds, a settlement of disputes with

Iran, Kuwait and Syria, and establishment of closer ties with Egypt and less dependence on Russia. However, one would expect such a move by a person whose power and resources had grown unchecked in the name of internal security and the protection of the party. His personal greed for power with his close associates might have pushed him to undertake such an adventure.

As a reaction to the unsuccessful coup, the Baath tried new methods to reestablish its stronghold in the country. The Baath invited the formation of a national front with Communists, Kurds, and Arab Nationalists. This came about as a realization by the Baath that Iraq is a political mosaic in which the other elements exist and have influence on the political scene. So in its desire to gain wider support, the Baath was then ready to share responsibility with the others without losing too much of its own power. This is well seen in Table V. The other way the Baath used to encourage tranquillity at home was its announcement that by 1974, the Kurdish autonomy would be fully realized.

The realization of the Kurdish hopes did not occur in 1974, and, as a result, hostilities were renewed in the second half of the year. Cruel and fierce fighting continued.<sup>77</sup> However, during the detente which lasted from 1970 to 1974, the Baath party cleverly coopted the urban elements of the Kurdish National Party against the tribal leadership of Barzani.<sup>78</sup> At the same time, Barzani invited military assistance from the U.S.A. and Israel in addition to Iran, and declared that he would offer in the proposed Kurdish state,

favorable terms to any power that would support him in his struggle against the central government.<sup>79</sup> This move antagonized the urban, pro-leftist intelligentsia of the Kurdish party who aim to achieve victory through class struggle in contrast to Barzani's dubious means. Thus the Baath was able to coopt five of their members into the government. In the cabinet of November 1974, however, the Kurdish participation dropped to two members. Such a departure of two Kurdish ministers from the central government could only be explained as a protest against the government's means in dealing with their Kurdish fellows in northern Iraq--even if it was against Barzani and his followers.

A dramatic development took place in March and April of 1975 between Iran and Iraq which led to the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. Iran sealed off its borders against the Kurds and withdrew its military support, therefore clearing the way for the Iraqi army to crush the rebels. The new development came as a tremendous boost to the Baath regime.

In summary, the Baath has, since 1968, controlled all the politically strategic ministerial positions except for the ministry of Finance. Also, the Baath share of cabinets since 1968 never fell below two-thirds of any cabinet. It dismissed foes and suspected elements from sensitive positions in the military, air force, and even the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the regional leadership of the party will remain in the hands of the political elites who come from an area located between Baghdad, Tikrit,

Ramadi, and Rawa. The Baath party today permeates organizations such as trade unions, student unions, professional associations, and the public bureaucracy.

#### 3.4. Summary and Conclusion

In reviewing the various regimes since 1958, it is observed that throughout the Qasim regime there were a total number of five cabinets. The ministers who were recruited in these cabinets amounted to thirty-one different personalities who shared eighty-four positions during the fifty-six months. Throughout the same period, the regime provided each minister with opportunity to be recruited 2.7 times. An average duration of 11.2 months per cabinet and an average tenure of 21.4 per minister were characteristic. The regime gave the Sunnites a leading majority in cabinets with 50 percent of all positions over their Shiite and Kurdish partners who occupied 30 and 18 percent of ministerial appointments respectively. In terms of social origin and professional orientations, the regime was overshadowed by urban and civilian elements who formed 63 and 67 percent respectively as compared with provincial and military members whose shares were 36 and 33 percent respectively. According to their qualifications, the elite were drawn from groups whose ranks in terms of importance were: military, lawyers, professors, engineers and bureaucrats, physicians, and businessmen. However, the real authority lay in the hands of Qasim who decided what, when and how. Also,



his associates had clear control over key cabinet appointments, possessed the characteristics of being Sunnite, urban, and military, and received education and training outside Iraq.

In contrast to Qasim's era, the regimes of Abd al-Salam Arif and Abd al-Rahman Arif comprised a total of 105 different ministers who shared 244 positions in eleven cabinets within sixty-five months. Each minister could have been recruited 2.3 times; average duration per cabinet became 5.9 months; and the average tenure per minister was thirteen months. The average age per minister was 43.7 years. During the regime, there were eleven premierships shared by six personalities: Tahir Yahya headed four cabinets; al-Bakr and al-Bazzaz headed two cabinets each; and Abd al-Razzaq, Naji Talib, and Abd al-Rahman Arif headed one cabinet each. Cabinet duration ranged from nine days to a maximum of one year. The Arif regimes indicated, generally, much more turnover and less stability than Qasim cabinets. Furthermore, the ethnic and religious strength of the Arab Sunnites continued to grow during the Arif regimes. However, other elite characteristics became more observable than before and became important to the political style of governing the country. These were a sharp rise in the rural elements in cabinet membership which averaged 63 percent. Similarly, the military became the main source of recruitment for cabinet positions with an average of 30 percent followed by professors, civil servants, lawyers, physicians, and engineers who held 26, 17, 15, 7, and 4 percent respectively. The most important feature of the Arif regimes which distinguished them from both their

predecessor or successor was--except for the first nine months-- a complete absence of representation of political parties.

The al-Bakr regime differs from previous regimes in its pattern and style of running cabinet politics. The regime comprised a total of seventy-nine ministers who shared 170 positions in six cabinets within ninety months. Each minister could have been recruited 2.1 times. There were a duration of 14.8 months per cabinet, a tenure of thirty months per minister, and an average age of 42.5 years per minister. With the exception of the thirteen days duration of the premiership of Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, there was only one Prime Minister, Ahmad al-Bakr, who headed all cabinets since 1968. The al-Bakr regime publicly concentrated power within the Arab Baath Socialist Party. As the access to cabinet followed a policy of selection based on partisan ground, the dichotomy of civilain-military relations gradually eroded. As a result of this policy, the major sources of recruitment to cabinets became the military, the university, and the bureaucracy whose shares amounted to an average of 25, 24, and 22 percent respectively. In addition, the number of ministers with provincial origin prevailed with a share of 75 percent as compared with urban appointees who held 25 percent of cabinet appointments. This policy has reduced the regime's emphasis--in later stages and since 1972--on ethnic and religious background. An outstanding development has prevailed throughout the regime which is reflected in a complete control of strategic ministries by Baath ministers. Also, ministers of military background,

although noticeably reduced in number, are only appointed to the cabinet on the basis of their ideological commitment to the Baath party. Therefore, a typical minister in the al-Bakr regime is expected to be a civilian-Baathist or pro-Baathist, Arab-Sunnite (with about 1/4 probability as Shiite), university-degree holder, rural in origin, and has an equal chance of being educated at home or abroad. The al-Bakr regime has shown, since 1972, a steadily progressive rule with more integrative political policies and more prosperous economic policies which have fostered political stability and economic growth.

In terms of the Prime Ministership, Table VII indicates that the power distribution was disproportionately in favor of the Arab Sunnite. All prime ministers throughout the republican era were Sunnite except Naji Talib, a Shiite, who headed one cabinet for nine months from September 9, 1966, to May 10, 1967. Qasim held the position of prime minister for fifty-six months, Yahya for 35 months, al-Bazzaz for eleven months, and al-Bakr for ninety-eight months. The length of time can be regarded as an indication of the strength of elite. All of the prime ministers but one, were military. Again, only two prime ministers were urban, while the rest came from provincial areas. None of the prime ministers belonged officially to a party except al-Bakr.

In general, republican regimes tend to follow a two-step process in their selection of cabinet members. The first step is the inclusion of various political groups to give the impression of

Table 101  
Prime Ministry, Background Characteristics, 1958-1976

No.	Prime Minister	Birth Date	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Age at Appointment	Prime Ministry Origin	Religious Affiliation	Education	Profession	Political Orientation	Duration of Term in Months
1	Major-General Nasser, Abd.	1/15/22	1922	Bahari	44	Arab	Sunnite	Military & Staff College, Iraq	Officer	Pro-Sect	11
2	Brigadier Ali Saad, Ahmad	8/2/41	1941	Tinai	51	Arab	Sunnite	Military College, Iraq	Officer	Arab Sect Socialist	3
3	Brigadier Ali Saad, Ahmad	5/13/41	1941	Tinai	51	Arab	Sunnite	Military College, Iraq	Officer	Arab Sect Socialist	6
4	Lt. General Nayif, Tahir	11/20/43	1943	Tinai	51	Arab	Sunnite	"	Officer	Nationalist	-
5	Lt. General Nayif, Tahir	6/17/46	1946	Tinai	51	Arab	Sunnite	"	Officer	Nationalist	12
6	Lt. General Nayif, Tahir	7/12/49	1949	Tinai	52	Arab	Sunnite	"	Officer	Nationalist	3
7	Brigadier Abd al-Salam, Aziz	9/6/45	1945	Ramadi	41	Arab	Sunnite	Military & Staff College, Iraq	Officer	Pro-Sect	6 days
8	Al-Battal, Abd al-Ramzi	9/21/45	1945	Baqdad	51	Arab	Sunnite	Law School Iraq & England	Professor	Nationalist	-
9	Al-Sayid, Abd al-Ramzi	4/18/46	1946	Baqdad	53	Arab	Sunnite	"	Professor	Nationalist	-
10	Major General Tahir, Nayif	8/9/46	1946	Rasayyah	51	Arab	Sunnite	Military & Staff College, Iraq	Officer	Nationalist	3
11	Lt. General Ali Saad, Ahmad	8/10/47	1947	Baqdad	51	Arab	Sunnite	Military & Staff College, Iraq	Officer	Nationalist	3
12	Lt. General Nayif, Tahir	11/12/47	1947	Tinai	51	Arab	Sunnite	"	Officer	Nationalist	11
13	Lt. General Ali Saad, Ahmad	7/18/48	1948	Ramadi	54	Arab	Sunnite	Military & Staff College, Iraq & England	Officer	Nationalist	11 days
14	Major General Ali Saad, Ahmad	7/12/48	1948	Tinai	57	Arab	Sunnite	Military College, Iraq	Officer	Arab Sect Socialist	9

a fairly-representative government for the sake of enhancing the legitimacy of the regime. The second step is the consolidation of power and the emergence of a "minority-controlled" cabinet (single elite) in the form of one strong personality, clique, faction, group, or party. A personal rule emerged during the Qasim era; a military clique ruled during the Arif I regime; a military-civilian group controlled the Arif II regime; and a political party ruled during the al-Bakr regime.

All background characteristics, in various degrees, influence elite recruitment to cabinets. However, one or more of these variables becomes more or less important according to circumstances. For example, a personal ruler without a certain ideology prefers to choose from close family and associates. Attributes such as strong personality, tribal connections, identical religious affiliations, and occupational similiarity become more important than political, and professional considerations. The more threats and rivalries that face the regime, the more influential these personal criteria and the narrower the base of power and the tighter the power grip of the elite. Conversely, the fewer the challenges that face a regime, the looser the criteria of elite recruitment, and the wider the power base becomes to embrace relatively more participants. Such behavior was clearly demonstrated by Qasim's cabinets throughout the regime. The Arif brothers as well as the al-Bakr regimes, when threats and challenged increased, also exhibited similar trends. However, a personal rule

or a military junta are more inclined to abide by such trends than a political party or a coalition of groups or parties. In such circumstances, the criteria become political commitment first and professional orientation second, with less emphasis on ethnic, religious, and other personal aspects. This trend has been clearly evidenced by the al-Bakr regime, which represented a shift from a conspicuously military-dominated cabinet to an increasingly civilian-controlled regime.

To summarize, we have tried to underline the most important background characteristics that influence the interpersonal relationships between and among elite members and how such attributes influence and shape the political style of the regime. But background variables are not the whole picture. The type of public policy initiated as well as the extent of its success also determines the continuity of those who decide it, namely, the political elite. The following chapter will address the types of policies decided upon by the political elite of the republican regimes and how such policies contributed to the survival or replacement of the elite.

Chapter III  
 ANALYSIS OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF  
 POLITICAL ELITES AND THE DYNAMICS  
 OF THE POWER STRUGGLE IN POST-1958  
 IRAQ

<sup>1</sup>Ghalib, Qissat Thawrat, pp. 74-75.

<sup>2</sup>Abd al-Karim al-Jiddah, Thawrat al-Zaim al Munkidh--The Revolution of the Leader, the Saviour (Baghdad: 1960), pp. 60-61.

<sup>3</sup>Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 152. According to Dann, the signature of Muhammad Kubba continued to appear on republican decrees until the death of his associate al-Naqshabandi on November 27, 1961.

<sup>5</sup>Republic of Iraq, Thawrat Arbataash Tammuz Fi Amiha al-Awwal--14th of July Revolution in Its First Year (Baghdad: Government Press, 1959), pp. 7-8.

<sup>6</sup>The urban-provincial dichotomy is based on the size of population in urban and provincial areas as indicated by the General Population Census of 1957. The arbitrary figure of population size of 200,000 is the dividing number. As a result the cities of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra are regarded as urban centers; while the remaining areas are rural.

However, in some cases, a person may be borne in a rural area but lives in an urban center and therefore is regarded as urban rather than rural.

For full details of the General Population Census fo 1957, see Qubain, Reconstruction of Iraq, p. 263.

<sup>7</sup>Dann, Iraq under Qassem, pp. 13-16.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 108-111.

- <sup>10</sup> Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 100.
- <sup>11</sup> Inaam al-Jundi, Ela Aina Yasir al-Shiyyean Bil Iraq?--Where Are the Com-unists Leading Iraq? (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr al-Arabiyya, 1959), p. 121. See also: Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 23.
- <sup>12</sup> Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 120-125.
- <sup>13</sup> Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 153-154.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 212-221.
- <sup>15</sup> Khaldun al-Husary, Thawrat Arbataash Tammuz Wahaqiqat al-Shiyyean Fi al-Iraq--The 14th of July Revolution and the Reality of Communists in Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1963), pp. 124-127.
- <sup>16</sup> Muhammad Baqir Shirri, al-Iraq al-Thair--Revolutionary Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1963), p. 111.
- <sup>17</sup> The Kurdish movement is dealt with in detail in Chapter IV.
- <sup>18</sup> Al-Husary, Thawrat Arbataash Tammuz, pp. 134-138.
- <sup>19</sup> Shakir Mustafa Saleem, Mahkamat Hasan al-Raggá--The Court of Hasan al-Raggá and Other Events from the Records of the Communists and Opportunists in Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1960), pp. 11-40.
- <sup>20</sup> Hilal Naji, Hatta La Nansa: Fusool Min Majzarat al-Mosul--So That We Do Not Forget: Chapters of the Mosul Massacre (Cairo: Dar al-Kurnek, 1962), pp. 6-213.
- <sup>21</sup> Al-Husary, Thawrat Arbataash Tammuz, p. 136.
- <sup>22</sup> Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule, p. 121.
- <sup>23</sup> "Oil and Self-Assertion," in The Economist, August 6, 1960, pp. 563-564.
- <sup>24</sup> The Economist, July 15, 1961, p. 226.
- <sup>25</sup> Nidal al-Baath, VII (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1965), pp. 325-32.
- <sup>26</sup> Al-Nuri, Jumhuriyat al-Iraq al-Fatiyya, pp. 18-19. According to al-Nuri, the casualty figures of the July 14, 1958 Revolution were thirty only. It included the King, the Regent, the Prime Minister and seventeen members and servants of the Royal family; three traitors,



three Jordanian ministers, three artists, a French, English and Israeli; and one suspected Iraqi who turned up to be a mistake. The casualty figure of the 1963 coup was estimated to be between 1000 and 5000 persons. See, Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule, p. 124.

<sup>27</sup> Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 363.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 363.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Iraqi Government, Al-Munharifoon--The Deviants (Baghdad: Government Press, 1964), p. 218.

<sup>31</sup> Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 365.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 366.

<sup>33</sup> For full details of the circular, see Ministry of Guidance, Al-Kitab al-Aswad: I'tirafat al-Shuyyeen--The Black Book: Confessions of the Communists (Baghdad: Ministry of Guidance Press, 1963), p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> Iraqi Times, March 13, 1963.

<sup>35</sup> Government Press, Al-Munharifoon, p. 227.

<sup>36</sup> Kerr, Arab Cold War, pp. 64-75.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>38</sup> Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 85.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>40</sup> Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 199.

<sup>41</sup> The five "left-wing" members included Deputy Premier and Minister of Guidance, Ali Salih al-Saadi; Minister of Social Affairs, Hamdi Abd al-Majid; and Muhsin al-Sheik Radi; Hani al-Fikayki; and Abu Talib al-Hashimi. The two "right-wing" members were the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talib Shabib and the Minister of State, Hazim Jawad. See Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 213.

<sup>42</sup> Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (3rd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 94.

<sup>43</sup> Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 213.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Government Press, Al-Munharifoon, pp. 220-221.

<sup>46</sup> A.B.S.P., Revolutionary Iraq, pp. 58-59.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., pp. 59-60.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Abu Jaber, Arab Ba'th, p. 81, p. 84.

<sup>52</sup> Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 219.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 254-255.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 264.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 241.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 264.

<sup>57</sup> During the election battle, three solutions to the struggle were suggested. First, the military suggested that two candidates from among their ranks be nominated. The civilians, under the leadership of Premier al-Bazzaz rejected this proposal and suggested that one civilian and one military officer should be nominated. A third alternative was then introduced by the military which proposed a three-men Presidential Council (two military men and one civilian). But, this idea was rejected because of the difficulties it would raise in terms of ethnic and sectarian representation in addition to the fact that the constitution provided for a single president. At the end, the second solution was adopted whereby there would be a choice between a military candidate and a civilian candidate for president. But the Iraqi nationalists and the pan-Arab elements of the army could not agree on one candidate. Finally, they nominated two of their men, Brigadier Abd al-Aziz al-Uqayli and Brigadier Abd al-Rahman Arif (the deceased's brother) who represented the two camps respectively, to run against al-Bazzaz, who was the undisputed leader of the civilian faction. None of the three candidates received the required majority on the first ballot, and on the second ballot the civilian elements rallied behind Abd al-Rahman Arif, giving him the chance to assume

leadership. There were several interpretations of how Arif II came to power, such as pressures from Cairo, threats of Arif I's strong men, the sentiments and emotions for the recent death of his brother, and the support of the pan-Arabs who preferred the best of the two evils (al-Uqayli was known for his views of putting Iraqi unity before Arab unity as well as holding some disagreements with Nasir). Arif II soon recognized the value of cooperating with the civilian elements in the cabinet because of the improvements and relative stability they had achieved during the previous cabinet. Therefore, to help keep the army out of politics, as well as to prevent a potential rival from the military from presiding over the cabinet, Arif entrusted the premiership to al-Bazzaz. Thus the whole drama ended peacefully with the first Iraqi presidency chosen through near-democratic rather than violent means. See Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 264-265.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp. 282-283.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 288.

<sup>61</sup> ABSP, Revolutionary Iraq, pp. 31-32.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp. 37-40.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., pp. 38-39.

<sup>65</sup> Who Is Who in the Arab World, (Beirut: 1971 - 1972), p. 382.

<sup>66</sup> In 1969, two amendments to the constitution were introduced which were approved by the RCC. First, it made the president of the republic the supreme commander of the Armed Forces as well as president of the RCC. Second, the membership of the RCC could be increased to more than five at the president's discretion, which became fifteen in April 1970. The membership of the RCC is the sole prerogative of the Baath party, and since the RCC is the highest authority, it turned the cabinet to a rubber-stamp. No less important is the fact that most members of the RCC hold dual posts in the RCC as well as in the cabinet.

<sup>67</sup> Who Is Who in the Arab World, , pp. 381-382.

<sup>68</sup> The new membership of the RCC consisted of nine civilian and four military. The civilians, all of whom are Baath party

members, included Saddam Husain, Abd al-Karim al-Shaikhly, Abdallah Salloum al-Samarai, Izzat Mustafa, Shafiq al-Kamali, Abd al-Khaliq al-Samarai, Salah Omar al-Ali, Izzat al-Duri, Murtada al-Hadithi, and Taha al-Jazrawi. See Who Is Who in the Arab World 1971-72, pp. 384-385.

<sup>69</sup>ABSP, Revolutionary Iraq, p. 44.

<sup>70</sup>Europa Publications, The Middle East and North Africa (17th ed.) (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1970-71), p. 318. See also the 1968 Provisional Constitution of the Iraqi Republic.

<sup>71</sup>For full details of the 1970 Kurdish settlement, see the "Historic Statement of the Revolutionary Command Council on the Peaceful Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Issue," The Ministry of Culture and Information, Directorate General of Information, Baghdad, 1970, pp. 1-22.

<sup>72</sup>ABSP, Revolutionary Iraq, pp. 200-202.

<sup>73</sup>"Oil and Amity," Time, April 24, 1972, New York, p. 38.

<sup>74</sup>The rank "Maj. Gen." was granted to him as an honorary title.

<sup>75</sup>The Economist, October 6, 1973, p. 44.

<sup>76</sup>The Economist, July 7, 1973, p. 30. Also see, The Middle East Economist Digest, November 15, 1975, Vol. 18, No. 46, p. 1375.

<sup>77</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1974; The New York Times, April 16, 1974; and The Economist, September 7, 1974. See also: Simon Head, "The Kurdish Tragedy," The New York Review, July 18, 1974, pp. 28-30.

<sup>78</sup>See Al-Barzani: Thalithat al-Athani--Barzani, the Shah of Iran, and Golda Meir (Baghdad: 1974), p. 6.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

## Chapter IV

### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELITES AND PUBLIC POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

Despite the absence of well-defined political institutions, parties, pressure groups, or even self-conscious social classes, many important public policies have been formulated and adapted during the republican era. Various authoritarian and revolutionary regimes undertook political and economic decisions under conditions of personalism, regionalism, and attendant confusion. Their policies resulted from circumstances which ranged from political compromise on a specific solution to new development without any problem in mind.

The process of national development is complex and multifaceted and has political, economic, administrative, social, and cultural dimensions. Whether the developmental change takes place "from above" by means of reforms or "from below" through mass-movements, policies which are decided by the political leadership cannot change one feature of society without consequently affecting others.

The most important public policy issues which have confronted all republican regimes in Iraq at the national level include the Kurdish-Arab integration policy, in turn affecting the issue

of Arab unity, and the issue of national economic prosperity as represented by the sectoral policies of agriculture, industry, and oil. Other policies such as those of education, foreign policy, and foreign trade should also be mentioned. These policies in particular seem to change in form or content (for example, continuation, modification, or replacement) according to the formation and composition of the political elite.

In this chapter, we will deal with the most pressing public policy issues which faced the various republican regimes, namely, national integration and economic development. To deal with other public policy issues simply exceeds the scope and temporal dimension of this research. Therefore, our efforts will attempt to relate the background that shapes the attitudes towards the specific public policies which were adopted to manage certain national crises. The method of analysis of this chapter is to explicate shifts in policies caused by change and continuity in the array of leadership attributes during the republican regimes. Although the quantification of political decisions, political structures, and policy implementations is statistically not feasible, the relationship of leadership characteristics to eventual, and related, political outcomes will be explored rather than assumed.

#### 4.1. National Integration Policy: The Kurdish Case

Peoples of developing countries have come to realize that in ousting the colonial powers, they have only eliminated one link in a long chain of problems. In reality, they are just beginning to

realize their ideal of nationhood. Their struggle--once directed against the foreign powers--is now supplemented by a continual strife towards creating an efficient and stable political society.

Differences in outlook and rivalry for control among the various religious, ethnic and social groups lay dormant in the combat against the common foreign oppressor but became very apparent after independence. Suddenly, those in charge of the political machinery saw that they had been under the illusion of believing that they would be responsible for the destiny and welfare of a uniform group. Instead, they found that they were dealing with a heterogenous society.

The struggle for national identity has been expressed in a number of ways, two of particular political significance. The first, which has had the most violent repercussions, is to be found among those groups which have refused to submit to the authority of the central government. Such ethnic, religious, or tribal groups insist on independence or--at the very least--autonomy, as has taken place in African, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and Asian countries. The second expression of the phenomenon is found among those who want not complete independence or autonomy, but special constitutional guarantees of certain minority rights. Those seeking these guarantees are often groups which have been unsuccessful in gaining their primary goals through open warfare or who might not have the military power necessary to attempt secession.

With special reference to the republican era, the Kurdish

issue has occupied the forefront of national problems confronting Iraqi "revolutionary" regimes since 1961 (Table VIII). The inability of the various regimes to understand the issue, or a lack of genuine desire on the part of those regimes to tackle the issue and suggest sound solutions to it, has led to violence for a number of years. Since 1961, an intermittent rebellion among the Kurds in Iraq has been a major source of difficulty for each successive government. Government policy usually has alternated between conciliation and military repression. The first ran up against deep-seated Kurdish distrust, the second into the natural barriers of the mountain terrain which favored the tribesmen.

Since 1958, republican regimes have recognized the Kurds as a national minority within the Iraqi nation and, in seeming contradiction, the Iraqi nation as part of the Arab nation. But since Kurds are not Arabs, the Iraqi government has been prepared to grant them autonomy on their own terms with the condition that the Kurds continue to be part of Iraq and without the right or the power of secession. However, the Kurdish answer to this has been that they would rather have independence, but are ready to accept a wider autonomy on Kurdish terms. Violence has been used as a means to this end. As a method of implementing domestic politics as well as providing an extreme solution for cultural pluralism, such attitudes have led the Kurds to respond with violent protest against the central authority. Such expression of identity is manifested in their continuous uprisings.



Table VIII

## Kurdish Uprisings in Iraq Against the Republican Regimes

Date	Leader	Place	Objective	Adversary	Result	
1961-1963	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Military dictatorship of General Qasim	Losses for both sides	Military action by government. Guerilla war by Kurds. No victory for either side.
1963	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Iraqi regime under Baath Arab Socialist Party	No gains	First cease-fire negotiation, then renewal of war.
1964-1965	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Fan-Arab military government under A.S. Arif	No gains	Second cease-fire in Feb. 1964. Promises not achieved, renewal of war. No victory for either side.
1965	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Fan-Arab civil government under A.S. Arif & al-Bazzaz	Truce	Third cease-fire.
1966	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Militant government under A.R. Arif (brother of ex-president)	Failure	Promises not achieved. Renewal of conflict.
1968-1970	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Baath Arab Socialist Party backed by military	No gains	Continuation of conflict and negotiations until a fourth cease-fire agreement of 3/11/70 with gains to the Kurds.
1974	Mulla Mustafa Barzani	Northern Iraq	Kurdish home-rule	Baath Arab Socialist Party backed by military	No gains	Promises not achieved by Central Government. Kurdish efforts to form their own government.

Sources: Jalal al-Talabani, *Kurdistan wa al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya al-Kirdiyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1971), pp. 349-383; Derek Kinnane, *The Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 59-81; Hassan Arfa, *The Kurds* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 129-154.

The Kurdish movement has sought to change the status quo of the Kurds and therefore opposes "outside" domination. Their opposition ranges from skirmished to full-scale civil war. Expressions of Kurdish alienation and resentment to central authority include emphasis on cultural differences, demands for constitutional guarantees of Kurdish rights, at the beginning of each new regime, and demands for political participation as national groups with a role in determining public policy. When Kurdish demands have not been fulfilled by the central government, paramilitary revolts have taken place in response to negligence of their demands. Kurdish aspirations were encouraged by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points as well as by other Allied promises which stipulated autonomy to non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire. In the case of the Kurds this was given concrete form in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 "which provided for the recognition or creation of-a Kurdistan."<sup>1</sup>

The replacement of the Treaty of Sevres by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 was a serious blow to the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds. Such a change indicated, in some ways, a lack of organized Kurdish politics and its consequent failure to fulfill Kurdish demands for the formation of a national state.<sup>2</sup>

Before 1914, the Kurds lived in only two countries, Turkey and Iran. Afterwards, they were divided between five different countries: Turkey, Persia and Iraq with a quite important minority in Syria and a smaller one in Soviet Armenia. This partition of Kurdistan was not accepted by Kurdish patriots, and periodic risings

took place which threatened the very existence of the "occupying" governments (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, U.S.S.R.).

A more recent development of a sense of ethnic identity among the Kurds may be seen as a reaction to the same phenomenon on the part of the Arabs exemplified by the emergence of the idea of pan-Arabism. Like Arab nationalism, Kurdish nationalist aspirations transcend the political boundaries of each of the States in which they reside, just as Kurdish nationalism predates the formation of these States. Thus a pan-Kurdish movement developed as an answer to Arab exclusion of the Kurds.

It is worthwhile to observe that cultural and ideological aspects of Kurdish nationalism have been reinforced by intervention of foreign powers in the determination of statehood in the area.<sup>3</sup> The Russians, British and Americans have all shown their interest in the Kurds. The Russians penetrated Kurdistan during the First and Second World Wars and withdrew later on both occasions. The Russians, in order to spread their influence throughout the Ottoman Empire, recognized the importance of the Kurds, and towards the end of the nineteenth century, invited Kurdish leaders to visit Russia. In 1908, the revolt of the Young Turks raised Kurdish hopes for independence. Adamson spoke of "renewed contacts, this time between Russian agents and the chiefs in Southern Kurdistan."<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, the British, with their stake in Middle Eastern oil and appreciation of the strategic importance of Mesopotamia to their communications with India, were also becoming interested in

the Kurds. Adamson's work states that "...the British entered southern Kurdistan in 1918 and found a territory whose life had been disrupted by two years of pillaging and murder by Russian troops."<sup>5</sup> As late as December 1922, the Kurds were still told that "His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq recognizes the right of the Kurds living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish Government within those boundaries."<sup>6</sup> The Kurds' great difficulty was that they did not have a generally acceptable leader. The League of Nations' commission found in 1925 that the best solution for the Kurds was to place them under British trusteeship along with the rest of Iraq. Consequently, the British mandate gave Iraq to the Arab majority in 1932. This met with continuous resentment and mutiny by the Kurds. In 1945 a Kurdish revolt led by nationalists was crushed by the British Air Force "bombing the villages and the tribesmen and by the intervention of the Barzani's greatest enemies, the Zibaris,"<sup>7</sup> Kurdish tribes.

Shortly after the proclamation of the Soviet sponsored Republic of Mahabad on January 22, 1946, in the northern part of Iran, Iranian Kurds began serious contacts with their compatriots in Iraqi Kurdistan for the purpose of creating an Iraqi counterpart to the Iranian Democratic Party of Kurdistan. On August 16, 1946, a meeting was held at which the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was founded.<sup>8</sup> Mulla Mustafa Barzani was elected as president of the new organization. Since then and until 1975, the KDP, headed by Barzani, has been the defender of Kurdish nationalism and has supported the establishment of a Kurdish national state.

American interest in the Kurdish problem became known during the 1950s. By the early 1960s, both the British and Americans were uneasy when the Kurdish revolt in Iraq grew from its tribal origins into a movement characterized as urban and nationalistic with much stronger political coloring. In this connection, Adamson explains:

The main Central Treaty Organization defense line ran along the mountains of Kurdistan, and the Americans in particular (although they are not members of CENTO) saw the revolt as a threat to the region's safety. If a Kurdish state were formed, then it would be unstable and unworkable, a potential subject for Russian influence.<sup>9</sup>

New factors appearing since the 1960s have played an important role in helping the Kurdish movement in Iraq. Among these is the support of Iran and Israel who contributed material and moral support to the Kurds.<sup>10</sup>

The fall of the monarchial regime, in 1958, to which the Kurds contributed, and the proclamation of the Iraqi Republic was to open a new era in Arab-Kurdish relations. Article number 3 of the provisional constitution stated: "The Arabs and the Kurds are associated in this nation. The Constitution guarantees their natural rights as an integral element of the national being." Further, a decree on September 2, 1958, amnestied Barzani and permitted him to return to Iraq. It is known that Gen. Qasim (1958-1963), in failing to implement this article of the constitution, provoked an armed conflict in September 1961, which contributed to his fall.<sup>11</sup>

Leaders of the 1958 revolution introduced and carried out

numerous programs in an attempt to establish its legitimacy. Some of the new policies included mass mobilizations, freedom of political parties, expansion in education, social reforms, land reforms, new economic policy, revision of oil policy, revision of foreign policy, establishment of new organizations and group interests, more alliance with Arabs than before the revolution and several other political and social measures.<sup>12</sup>

After 1958, the Kurds gained much in terms of participation, nationalist feeling, and reorganization as a political power. The composition of the Council of Sovereignty, like that of the Cabinet, was determined by Qasim. From Qasim's point of view his choices were admirable. The president of the Government Council was a Sunni Arab who had Kurdish and Shiite associates. This was a "progressive" distribution of seats which as yet did no violence to traditional Sunni preeminence. Two other cabinet ministers were also Kurdish.<sup>13</sup>

The concept of national unity also obsessed Qasim's attitude towards the minority groups. He offered complete equality of rights: but under Iraqi conditions, and on his own interpretation, equality stood for assimilation of the varying groups—the Kurds "were an indivisible part of the Iraqi people." Qasim announced that "Our Kurdish brothers have lived with us for thousands of years, our blood was mixed in this pure land fighting together against the foreigner, Kurds and Arabs have intermarried."<sup>14</sup> Such reasoning was interpreted as a denial of Kurdish nationhood. Qasim invited Barzani

to return and share in the general harmony. Qasim though did not mention anything about solving the grievances, the political, administrative, economic, and educational problems, or realizing the aspirations of the Kurds. Barzani was impressed and well received by Qasim. The improvement of relations with the KDP and the Central government continued. The KDP had been persuaded to show remarkable restraint in its demands on the government, so that there had not as yet been occasion for serious disappointment. The Kurdish press flourished in reasonable freedom, and so did the party after lifting of the ban on it in April 1959. The Kurdish detribalized society seems "to have enjoyed a sense of deliverance which it had never experienced before."<sup>15</sup>

The period between 1958 and March 1959 saw the consolidation of the alliance between the KDP and the Iraqi Communist Party. The Iraqi Communist Party tacitly recognized the KDP's claim to speak for Kurdish interests and paid general tribute to the inalienable right of the Kurds in Iraq to develop their ethnic attributes in equal "partnership" with the Arabs, short of self determination with its implied right of secession and independence. This last point was not ignored, but would have to wait till the final defeat of "imperialism" in the area.<sup>16</sup>

On March 8, 1959, a mutiny led by Gen. al-Shawwaf and field officers at Mosul, aided by the United Arab Republic and directed against Qasim and the left, moved the Kurdish tribesmen, led by Barzani, in self-defense against Arab chauvinism.<sup>17</sup> The failure of

the mutiny strengthened the relations between the Iraqi Communist Party and the loyalty to the Iraqi government.

The Qasim regime did little to improve economic and social conditions of the Kurds or Arabs. It did allow the Kurdish nationalists to voice their demands through a Kurdish Press and to legally organize political parties, including the Kurdish Democratic Party. But Qasim started playing Kurdish tribes against each other. He succeeded temporarily. Then, in June 1961, a delegation of Kurdish nationalists petitioned Qasim for an end to grievances including attempts to settle Arabs on land used by Kurdish tribes. Qasim refused to see the delegation.<sup>18</sup> Following this rebuff, Abbas Muhammad Agha, tribe leader, formed a military coalition among tribes centered in Sulaymaniya. This resistance required government military movement into the Kurdish area to suppress it. This appears to have been the first major confrontation between the government and Kurds in what later developed into a decade-long war.<sup>19</sup>

It was observed that Qasim's regime presented itself as the inaugurator of a new era which was to represent a total break with the past. It was considered a "liberated" regime, marking the emancipation from imperialism and feudalism. It had from the outset undertaken to speak for a single Iraqi people, composed of varying nationalities and itself an inseparable part of the Arab nation. However, no attempt was made to unravel the contradictions involved in these statements.

The new government of Col. Abd al-Salam Arif which took power



in February 1963, was dominated by the Baath Party, a pan-Arab nationalist movement, secular, and socialist in outlook, whose national guard took violent measures against Kurds, Communists, and other leftists.<sup>20</sup> A cease-fire was later established between the new government and the Kurds. Both sides put forward proposals for resolving the conflict. The government called their proposal "decentralization."<sup>21</sup> Not surprisingly, it was rejected by the Kurds who in turn presented to the Baghdad Government their terms for settlement. These included: Iraq was to be a unified state comprised of two nationalities, Arabs and Kurds, with equal rights; the vice-president of Iraq was to be a Kurd elected by the Kurds and the assistant-chief-of-staff was to be a Kurd. Kurdistan was to be an area comprising the provinces of Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk, Arbil and the Kurdish districts of Mosul and Diyala provinces, administered by its own executive council with its own legislature. Kurds were to belong to the National Council of the Revolution (then the government of Iraq) in proportion to the percentage of Kurds in the Iraqi population. Oil revenues and customs dues were to be shared on the same proportional basis, and Kurds were to be proportionately appointed to positions in the central government, the civil service, and the student body of the University of Baghdad.<sup>22</sup>

In fact the Government of Baghdad, following Arab nationalist policy, could not afford to grant the Kurdish demands. To do so would have compromised itself. The Baath were committed to advancing Arab interests, not moderating them. And, although the Kurdish war

was then in its second year, the Baath and the Iraqi army felt that a campaign more vigorously pursued than Qasim's could impose a military solution. The Baath offered an ID 10,000 dinar\* reward for Mulla Mustafa Barzani, dead or alive, and launched an offensive that far surpassed the previous regime's in ferocity and thoroughness.

A declaration in 1963 by the Kurdish leader, Barzani, stated that the "Kurds are those who feel that they are Kurds, exactly as the French, or Germans, or Iranians are those who feel themselves to belong to those nationalities."<sup>23</sup> However, in contrast to this attitude and during the first cabinet of Arif I, the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the representative of the ruling Baath Party to the United Nations, Talib Shabib, declared in London in 1963, "How can we give the Kurds what they demand? We might as well create an independent state for them. It would not be a federal state."<sup>24</sup> The new regime faced the same basic three problems which had confronted the former 1958-1963 regime: relations between officers and the civilian party leaders, relations between Iraq and Egypt, and relations between the Arabs and Kurds.<sup>25</sup> Later in the year, the army overthrew the Baath Party and established a nationalist pro-Nasir regime under President Arif.

A new government was formed on September 21, 1965. It was the first civilian government since 1958 and was headed by Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz, although it included several portfolios for

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\*Iraqi Dinar equals approximately U.S. \$3.

officers. The new Prime Minister's objectives were to assure Iraqi stability, avoid extremism in either direction (left or right), bring about domestic peace between Arabs and Kurds, and tone down any disputes with the Iraqi Petroleum Company. He also hoped to get the military out of politics but by gradual and quiet means.<sup>26</sup>

The President was killed in April 1966, in a helicopter accident. His brother, chief-of-staff Maj. Gen. Abd al-Rahman Arif, was chosen as President. In June 1966, Prime Minister al-Bazzaz broadcast a twelve-point program which seriously attempted to satisfy Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and intended once and for all to put an end to the debilitating war in the North.<sup>27</sup> But al-Bazzaz did not remain in office long, as the military resumed power in August of the same year resulting in the resignation of al-Bazzaz and the formation of a new government under the premiership of an ex-army officer Naji Talib. The resignation explicitly stated that al-Bazzaz retired from office solely in accordance with the President's wishes.<sup>28</sup> In other words, the officer corps no longer agreed to allow a civilian to be a prime minister.<sup>29</sup>

In July 1968, another military-civilian coup d'etat took place, instigated by the Baath Arab Socialist Party and backed by officers. The party did not want to involve itself with internal military conflicts, so in order to strengthen its power, it tried to achieve a solution to the Kurdish problem. Through negotiations between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, an agreement called "the 11th of March 1970 Historical Manifesto" was

made.<sup>30</sup> Briefly, the agreement gives recognition to the lawful presence of the Kurdish nationality and approves the establishment of a Kurdish University in Suleimaniyah using Kurdish as the language of instruction. A daily newspaper and a monthly magazine are to be published in Kurdish in addition to a radio and television station using the Kurdish language. The agreement promised that the Kurds shall share public offices including sensitive and important posts in the state such as cabinet portfolios and army command in a ratio of their population. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents, and the Kurdish people shall share the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population in Iraq.<sup>31</sup>

For a society to achieve cultural plurality, it is not that one community should dominate itself over the others<sup>32</sup> but rather that all communities be equal. In examining Table IX, we deduce that Arabs predominated in government, while the Kurds were under-represented. A further observation is that Kurdish representation during the various republican regimes also varied according to their times of strength or weakness. It is tempting to put all the blame for the decline in Kurdish participation on the rupture between the Kurds and the central government in 1961 and the continuing civil war ever since. Nevertheless, Kurdish participation does not decline sharply throughout the republican era.

It may also be observed that the Kurds never occupied any top cabinet positions and sensitive military posts during the republican regimes. One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is

Table IX  
Kurdish Representation in Cabinets, 1958-1976

Regime	Cabinet Date	Number of Kurdish Ministers	Percentage of Total Members of Each Cabinet
Qasim 1958- 1963	7/14/1958	3	22
	9/30/1958	3	20
	2/7/1959	3	20
	7/13/1959	3	16
	5/3/1960	3	14
Arif 1963- 1968	2/8/1963	2	9
	5/13/1963	2	9
	11/20/1963	1	4
	6/17/1964	1	5
	7/10/1965	3	14
	9/6/1965	1	5
	9/21/1965	1	4
	4/18/1966	1	4
	6/9/1966	3	15
	5/10/1967	4	15
7/10/1967	2	9	
al-Bakr 1968- 1975	7/18/1968	4	15
	7/31/1968	3	12
	12/31/1969	2	7
	3/29/1970	5	18
	5/14/1972	7	24
	11/11/1974	6	18

Figures are based on data collected in the research.

the increased orientation toward pan-Arabism of most Iraqi governments. In this regard, the group known as the Free Officers Movement, which brought about the revolutions of 1968 and 1963, was led by men whose primary motivation was Arab unity. Thus, there was rarely a Kurd among its membership, and hence, Kurds were naturally at a disadvantage in the subsequent distribution of political power. Such pan-Arab governments tried to deny the Kurds many of their demands, but every time the Kurds expressed their dissatisfaction with force, they were able to obtain extra concessions from the central government.

Since becoming a republic in 1958, and because of internal conflicts and external threats, the central government became more and more militarized by gradual replacement of many of the civilians by military personnel. The regime which came to power in 1968 realized that military solutions to the Kurdish problem had failed in the past, and therefore tried to offer autonomy to the Kurds. This decision allowed the Kurds to stop fighting as they waited to test the seriousness of the new regime in achieving the terms stipulated in the new agreement.

Under this cooperation over the following four years, the Kurds had been represented by five ministers in the cabinet.<sup>33</sup> Though this may sound impressive, it may not in fact be so. There are several reasons why not. First, Kurdish ministers did not occupy strategic cabinet positions. Second, the average number of cabinets had increased from fifteen to thirty ministerial posts which

reduced the relative importance of the four Kurdish positions. Third, some of the Kurdish ministers were coopted to their positions and therefore pledged alliance with the central government rather than independence. Finally, even if the Kurds occupy ministerial posts proportional or in excess to their population percentage, it would not determine their increased representation and participation in national affairs, since top national decisions are taken within the six-member National Revolutionary Council. This organization still does not include a single Kurd. The Revolutionary Command Council's power is so absolute that it leaves the cabinet ministers practically powerless.

After the cease-fire of 1970, the Kurds watched the policy of the central government very closely. According to the Kurds, several of the terms of the 1970 peaceful settlement were not honored, creating an atmosphere of distrust. Although the Iraqi plan of 1970 offered the Kurds their own autonomous region, locally-elected authority exercising extensive powers of local self-government, and the use of the Kurdish language in administration and schools, the Iraqi solution followed the classic pattern of reasonable demands being initially rejected and then, after violent struggle, being conceded when they had become too little and too late.

Mutual distrust continued due to rights and wrongs on both sides. The central government believed that each concession made to the Kurds would lead to one step nearer to their ultimate goal of

independence. On the other hand, Kurdish mistrust continued, since the implementation of the autonomy scheme—agreed upon in 1970—had been very slow.

During the five-year period which followed the 1970 settlement, there were important events which influenced the relationship between the leadership of both Arabs and Kurds. Such events were expressed by attitudes and accusations directed at each other by the communities' political organizations, the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party. Such attitudes are important to explain the breakdown of the agreement and the resumption of hostilities in 1974.

In August 1972, an article supporting the Kurdish position published by the KDP in its political publication, al Kadir, discussed the issue of self-rule by stating that:

The central objective of our KDP and the Liberation Movement of our Kurdish people, at the present phase, is the realization and practicing of self-rule. The March Agreement specified certain measures and steps to draw the landmarks of the road leading to self-rule. But neither the substance nor the general guidelines of self-rule were spelled out in the agreement.

Self-rule is not a substitute for the Kurdish people's right to self-determination. But the objective realities of the development of the Kurdish Liberation Movement, together with the circumstances and conditions surrounding the Movement, necessitate raising the self-rule slogan, so as to enforce the common struggle against the enemies of the two nationalities.<sup>34</sup>

To the Kurds, it became gradually apparent that the implementation of autonomy was working slowly but not surely. The Kurds



claimed that during 1971-1972, the central government was avoiding the issue, and was actually assuming a tightening-control over land reform and irrigation, defense, police, and courts. The Kurds felt they were further restricted by a presidential prerogative to nominate the chairman of the Kurdish executive council and its members, who could in turn also dissolve the Kurdish assembly.

The counterclaims which were launched in September 1972 by the ABSP against KDP leadership claimed that the KDP saw the March 1970 agreement from a tactical and transitional outlook with the aim of securing the maximum possible positions and gains pending any suitable opportunity for raising further demands. Generally, the ABSP leadership charged the KDP with having acted in collusion with the internal and external, imperialist, reactionary and suspect forces to spin plots against the revolutionary regime.<sup>35</sup> The central government could not tolerate the issue of unconditional Kurdish participation in the national decision-making arena during a time where there was "the Zionist enemy's threat, with full and violent imperialist backing...; the fierce battle raging between the Iraqi people and Revolution on the one hand and the oil monopolies and imperialist states on the other...; the scores of basic tasks confronting the Revolution in fields of consolidating political and economic independence..."<sup>36</sup>

The deterioration of the alliance between the ABSP and the KDP followed a steadily provocative and explosive course of events. Leadership of both sides capitalized on weaknesses and strengths to

reinforce their positions to the extent that both sought the military and diplomatic backing of foreign powers. Iraq signed a long term friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R., while Barzani sought the help of the United States, Iran and Israel.<sup>37</sup>

The contending parties became more polarized as time went on, as indicated in public statements by Arab and Kurdish representatives. Barzani protested against the effort of the central government in January 1971 to "expel Kurds and repatriate Arab tribes instead."<sup>38</sup> Later, in July 1971, Barzani's forces clashed with Iraqi army units, countered by an assassination attempt by an Iraqi Intelligence Unit on September 29, 1971.<sup>39</sup> Later, the KDP and its leader refused to accept an ABSP invitation to accept the National Action Charter<sup>40</sup> of November 15, 1971, and to form a broad alliance or national coalition that would also embrace the Iraqi Communist party. This scheme finally materialized in June 1973 when the Progressive National Front was formed without the KDP.<sup>41</sup> This caused a split within the KDP's political leadership and resulted in protest by key members of the KDP who opposed Barzani's tribal and paternal leadership.<sup>42</sup> The new anti-Barzani faction favored a concept of autonomy with fewer demands than those of Barzani. In addition, the central government appointed a Kurdish vice-President<sup>43</sup> of its own choice, while rejecting the KDP nominee, Habib Muhammad Karim. The objection by the Baath leadership of Barzani's choice was explained by the fact that Habib was Iranian and not Iraqi.<sup>44</sup> The same issue contributed significantly to the division which took place between Barzani, who

insisted on the appointment, and other members of the KDP. Still another major dispute between Barzani and the central government was the inclusion of the oil-rich town of Kirkuk<sup>45</sup> into the Kurdish autonomous area which could supply him with badly needed revenues to develop the region.

Leadership of both nationalities continued to have a contrasting view of each other. The typical Arab view is that expressed by Saddam who stated in one interview that:

Iraq is within the map of the Arab homeland. When we say so, it is because this does not clash with the national minorities existing in the Arab homeland who must be given their rights. If a land is delineated to these minorities, this shall mean that they want separation from the Arab homelands and this we cannot tolerate.<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, in another interview, the Vice-Chairman of the RCC distinguished between a political and democratic solution of the Kurdish issue and a military one. The former was within the framework of the Iraqi state which was followed by the government, while the latter had been adopted by Barzani and his allies--Israelis, Iranians, and even another Arab country (Syria).<sup>47</sup> Similarly, Michael Aflaq, the founder of the ABSP, explains why the Kurds feel threatened by Arab nationalism. He attributes such apprehension to imperialist propaganda of fifty years ago, when the British and French penetrated the Arab world. Before such time, the Kurds lived with the Arabs for hundreds of years even to the extent that the Kurds defended Arab land.<sup>48</sup>

The opposing attitude of Barzani reflected a tone of violence

and bitterness toward his Arab countrymen. He declared that, "the Kurds were struggling not only for their freedom but also for that of everyone in Iraq. The Baath Government in Baghdad was the Kurds' only foe. We want nothing more than an autonomous Kurdistan within a democratic Iraq. We are used to the hardships of war. We will continue to fight until the very last Kurd."<sup>49</sup> In the same interview, the leader of the KDP appealed to foreign powers for help and intervention by stating, "If only someone like America would give us weapons to fight in the plains, we would know how to use them. Many Kurds have served in the Iraqi armed forces--they can drive tanks and handle missiles. We need antitank artillery and antiaircraft missiles. It is in the United States' interest to help us. We have oil...you need it."<sup>50</sup>

It was no secret that the Kurds were receiving financial and material aid from abroad. It was possible for the KDP Chief of Finance to declare that he received \$8 million monthly, and that Iran was one of those sources. However he stated that he could not name other sources.<sup>51</sup> An American source declared later that Israel had given Barzani \$50,000 a month.<sup>52</sup> The presence of Israeli experts in the Kurdish area was confirmed by Ubaydallah al-Barzani, son of the leader of the KDP.<sup>53</sup> It was also stated that during the resumption of war in Northern Iraq, the American Central Intelligence Agency purchased \$20 million in armaments from Eastern Europe: these were reportedly ready to be dispatched to Barzani forces, but the Iraqi-Iranian Agreement changed the destination of the military

supplies to Lebanon instead.<sup>54</sup>

The collapse of the detente between the Iraqi government and Barzani became imminent when the former acted unilaterally and appointed five Kurdish ministers without Barzani's consent in 1974. At the same time, there had not been a Kurdish vice-President or a population census of the Kurds in order to define the area of their proposed autonomy. Instead, the Iraqi government "attempted to alter the demographic balance by bringing Arab settlers into Kurdish areas, especially into the vital oilfield region around Kirkuk." Furthermore, General Barzani stated that there had been

...several Baathist plots since 1970 to murder himself and his son, Idris Barzani, including his seemingly miraculous escape when several (disguised) Iraqi sheikhs (religious leaders) with explosive-stuffed radios taped to their bodies were killed by a remote-triggered blast intended for General Barzani.<sup>55</sup>

The central government staged a strong military campaign against Barzani in an attempt to crush his challenge--especially after the leftists had come to disassociate themselves from Barzani, and even condemned the tribal leader.<sup>56</sup> In 1975 the Iraqis deployed seven divisions and 200 bombers which inflicted heavy casualties on the Iranian-backed Kurds. In a single month of fighting, 1,100 Kurdish civilians were killed, 3,000 injured, villages and towns bombed, crops and livestock were destroyed, and 80,000 refugees forced into Iran.<sup>57</sup> Added to all this, Kurdish officials stated that:

...the Iraqi Government plans to execute 11 members of General Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic

Party on false charges. They also say that 83 Kurdish party members have disappeared in Baghdad during the last two years and are believed dead.<sup>58</sup>

Thus continued failure to meet Kurdish aspirations and persistent tension and distrust culminated in the renewal of fighting and the establishment of a Kurdish government. In this regard, a report stated that an eighteen-member executive council had been set up,<sup>59</sup> headed by Barzani, who--with his 50,000 strong guerrilla army--was planning to declare independence. This signified that Barzani and his political party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, rejected the autonomy plan proclaimed in 1970 and again in 1974. Iraq has been frustrated in its efforts to defeat the Kurds. But far less can the Kurds defeat Iraq, even though they can weaken the central government to the point of collapse. Moreover, no Iraqi regime would surrender its control of the oil-producing areas, which the Kurds claim, or accept an independent Kurdish state. This state of affairs carried on until Iran withdrew its support and shifted the battle in favor of the Iraqi central authority. The outcome was beneficial to both the Iraqis and the Iranians but it destroyed the Kurdish resistance dramatically, perhaps forever.

This critical development, which took place during March and April of 1975, resulted in the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. The cooperation was initiated on March 6, 1975 in Algiers between the Shah of Iran and the Vice Chairman of the Iraqi RCC when both were representing their respective countries at the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Conference. The Shah and Saddam Husain concluded an eighty-page treaty which was signed formally on June 13, 1975, in Baghdad.<sup>60</sup> The Algiers agreement signified the end of the activities in the Kurdish movement and the implementation of a settlement in accordance with Baghdad's unilaterally-formulated Kurdish Autonomy Law of March 11, 1974. This new law deviated from the previous understanding of March 11, 1970, in several important respects--all in favor of the central government which dictates terms from now on.

In reviewing the policy of national integration followed by the central government, the evidence of the 15-year old Kurdish rebellion suggested that all past Iraqi regimes, whether nationalist or pan-Arab, civilian or military, leftist or rightist, had worked against Kurdish separatist demands. Simultaneously, the Kurds believed that the longer they could involve the Iraqi army in their struggle in the mountainous region, the more likely the regime would be overthrown by a rival clique in the party or army with the hope that such a change would strengthen the Kurds in dealing with a new and perhaps more accomodating regime.

Further evidence of the past failure of national integration policy existed in the wide discrepancy between the two communities in terms of literary rate, income per capita, political power, and elite concensus. Kurdish demands for an equal share in political leadership, local autonomy, oil revenues, positions in the army and bureaucracy were neither granted nor guaranteed by the central

government.

Political ideologies widened the cleavages in the Iraqi society. Their orientation was regional and ethnic. Government was viewed not by itself but by what each political party could do through it. Since the two communities were so galvanized, it was clear that upward allegiance did not extend beyond regional parties except in a nominal way. Therefore, efforts of national governments at vertical integration were prohibited. In addition, it was claimed that Barzani looked at each regime discriminately.<sup>61</sup> Barzani never trusted the ABSP while he did take a more favorable view of Qasim, Abd al-Salam Arif, and al-Bazzaz.

The channels of political communications through which Kurdish demands were conveyed, essential to the promotion of vertical integration, were informal channels. The effectiveness of informal communication is a function of the extent of access to important elites. The degree to which the elites of mobilized groups are consulted and brought into government will weigh heavily on the success or failure of the Iraqi government to integrate Iraqis. Given the tribal, religious, and regional cleavages, groups alienated from the government caused tensions, a sense of illegitimacy, and intense competition that brought down the monarchical regime in 1958, the Qasim regime in 1963, the Baathist regime in 1964 and Arif's regime in 1968. Therefore, communication with the Kurdish leadership is important.

The present government has followed some serious steps



towards a peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem, but it is still early to say that the goal of an integrated political community through the narrowing of vertical-horizontal gaps has in fact occurred. At least the approach of the present government is different from its predecessors. The leadership of the revolution and the ABSP have followed a responsible and a committed policy, in line with its ideological principles, to solve the Kurdish issue. Their long-term strategies have followed a balanced plan to improve the economic, social, political and cultural conditions of the Kurds.<sup>62</sup> The outcome has been noticeable accomplishments in industrial, agricultural, and cultural development. Industrial projects included factories for sugar, cigarettes, cement, petrochemicals, textiles, electrification of rural areas. Agricultural projects covered a wide range of activities such as cooperatives, peasant housing, irrigation schemes, and land redistribution. Other achievements are seen in the sectors of tourism, communications, public health, and education. In the political sector, the regime granted the Kurds the right to form their executive and legislative councils (see Appendix XXIII).

However, achievements do not eliminate the possibility of renewed ethnic hostility. Iraq must develop national leadership that can transcend ethnic considerations, and political development cannot advance far without the growth of a profound sense of identification of the ruled (his loyalty and national pride) with the ruler. Again, efficient and honest execution of government policy can gain greater confidence from the Kurds toward the central government. The Iraqi

government must develop legitimacy in the eyes of all Iraqi groups, especially in the minds of the Kurds. To this extent, political communication, formal and informal, becomes of paramount importance.

In the future, the central government will have to develop its political institutions and methods of formal and informal political communications. If these cannot be created, the traditional pattern of several years of exhausting war followed by rare years of mistrustful peace will continue indefinitely. Also, in a heterogenous society such as Iraq, the goal of Arab nationalism and unity must be used prudentially to minimize suspicion and fear of national minorities concerning their position and security. During the Arif regimes, the principle of Arab nationalism was used with much demagoguery to demand ethnic groups to assimilate and disappear or subordinate themselves to it. Such a policy failed to win the trust and support of minorities, and Arab nationalism was transformed from a potentially stimulating, uniting element into a divisive one. In contrast, the Baath leadership has successfully used its ideological principles to grant and guarantee the national rights of the Kurds as well as other national minorities within the framework of the Iraqi unity.

#### 4.2. Economic Development Policy

A regime's ability to reduce the gap between goals and performances depends on a complex matrix of political motives, administrative capacity, and adequacy of financial resources. The

political aspects have been accounted for in detail in the last chapter; while the institutional aspect, public policy and bureaucracy, will be dealt with in the remainder of this chapter and the one which follows. In this section, we will attempt to relate the political order to economic conditions. Can a new political regime continue with the former structure and policies, or must its new commitments necessitate a basic revision of the old institutions and programs? Although the roles of political leadership and institutions are important, other significant factors such as natural resources and economic infrastructure operate beyond the leadership's control. Therefore, the question becomes not who determines the course of events, but how do elites, given their political traditions and situational facilities, pursue specific economic policies, and at what costs to their regime?

For a regime to remain in power and to initiate economic development, it must develop institutional competence and decision-making capabilities. Given the generally weak conditions of the private sector and private entrepreneurship in Iraq, only the government remains in a position to foster basic economic modernization. Such intentional change required decision makers at the national level to define the societal goals and policies; at the same time, power must be concentrated and resources mobilized in order to meet such goals. Government effectiveness becomes the ability of the political system to carry out the required changes through the general public policy. Here, it is important to understand that

governmental effectiveness and legitimacy are closely related to economic performance.

A well-planned economy plays an important role in promoting the process of nation building. The achievement of national development depends on how well the various sectors of the economy are managed. Since 1958, the trend of Iraqi governments has been to adopt the spirit and philosophy of socialism. This has led to the enactment of many nationalization acts covering industrial and financial concerns and accompanied by agrarian reforms.

The general economic policy of Iraq since 1958 has worked toward several goals: first, to eradicate the corrupt, exploitative, and inefficient monarchical economic structure; second, to introduce socialism to eliminate rigid economic classes and to promote systematic equality; third, to utilize public enterprises to achieve economic development; and fourth, to mobilize human and material resources to accomplish the developmental goals. While government policies provide economic outlines, programs, and procedures, institutions are essential to translate them into realities. As will be observed later in this section, frequent shifts in power and continuous political instability have sabotaged the implementation of economic plans.

Since 1958, the ideal of every republican regime has been to emphasize national development and to raise the standard of living of the people. In evaluating the economic programs and their success, we shall apply a sectoral approach where we examine the

effectiveness of more specific policies which illustrate the success or failure of governments in achieving sectoral growth. The policy areas chosen in this study include agricultural reform, industrial growth and the development of the oil economy.

#### 4.2.1. Agricultural Policy

In the earliest days of the revolution, the republican regime recognized the declining economic conditions of the peasants and the need to improve the situation. Conditions which required the hurriedly enacted agrarian policies included such symptoms as (1) high degree of concentration of land ownership in Iraq,<sup>63</sup> (2) low percentage of crop-sharing for peasants, (3) distinct social classification represented by the superior class of sheikhs at the top and peasants at the bottom, and (4) low standard of living conditions for the peasants<sup>64</sup> accompanied by widespread illiteracy and scarce medical facilities. Such conditions encouraged the peasants to migrate from rural areas to the main cities.

The Agrarian Reform Law was promulgated on September 39, 1958. The law aimed to (1) destroy the power concentrated in the hands of the Sheikhs, (2) raise the standard of living of the masses, and (3) promote agricultural cooperative societies which would promote scientific and technical production methods.<sup>65</sup> The main provisions of the law may be summarized as follows:<sup>66</sup>

Section I. The size of arable land possessed by one person shall not exceed 1,000 donums (1 donum equals 0.62 acre) or 2,000 donums in non-irrigated areas. Agricultural holdings in excess of these limits shall be confiscated within five years following

the enactment of the law. Redistribution will be that new holders receive a maximum of 60 donums arable land or 120 donums of non-arable, and a minimum of not less than 30 donums arable and 60 donums non-arable. The beneficiaries of the distribution shall be practicing farmers of Iraqi origin and priority is given to those living nearest to the distributed land. The expropriation of excess land starts with the largest holdings, meanwhile, owners of such agricultural lands may exploit their estates until seizure takes place. Compensation for the expropriated lands would be paid by valuation committees in government bonds within 20 years. A Higher Committee of Agrarian Reform is established, with the Prime Minister as its chairman, to interpret the law. The new owners were required to cultivate the land themselves within five years, otherwise uncultivated land will be confiscated. The process of seizure and redistribution under the law is to be completed within five years.

Section II. Agrarian cooperative societies are to be established with the aim of raising the scientific and technical methods of production. All farmers who are provided land under the new law must become members of these cooperatives. The services provided by an agrarian cooperative society include (1) providing loans to members; (2) supplying seeds, fertilizers, machines and transportation; (3) marketing crops and; (4) providing other agricultural and social services needed by members.

Section III. The law regulates the relationship between the landowner and the agricultural work. The landowner is responsible for the management and for supplying the worker with land, seeds and water facilities, while the worker provides the methods needed from planting to harvesting the crops. Crop distribution was fixed in details. However, a deviation from the specified percentage distribution of crop shares in favor of the peasant is permissible.

Section IV. This section deals with the rights and conditions of the agricultural worker. Minimum wages for various agricultural regions are fixed by a committee appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. The committee is to be composed of equal representation of landowners and agricultural workers. Agricultural workers are permitted to form unions to express their interests.

The policies outlined above guided the implementation of the Agrarian Law throughout the Qasim period. The results of the agrarian policy were manifested in the changes which took place during the five years that followed. As of May 31, 1964, the total area of expropriated lands was 7,020,123 donums of which only 2,022,035 donums (28.8 percent) were distributed to 38,766 peasants.<sup>67</sup> The implementation of the Agrarian Law during the Qasim regime was confronted by numerous obstacles. Among the underlying reasons for the relative failure of the program were the following: (1) inadequate development of agrarian cooperatives, (2) uncertainties of political continuity of the regime, (3) bureaucratic inefficiencies, (4) lack of qualified personnel, (5) high illiteracy rate among peasants, and (6) political rivalry within the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. According to Simmons, the delays in agrarian reform were attributed to:

...disagreement within the Ministry of Agrarian Reform between the liberal reformers who wanted peasant ownership of the land, and the left-wing Marxists who preferred state ownership of the land.... Although the influence of Communist ideology is impossible to determine, many of the upper echelon administrators in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Ministry of Agriculture were frank in their devotion to Marxian economic ideals.<sup>68</sup>

In a later article, Simmons admitted that while the agrarian reform "accomplished its political goal of removing the landlords, there has hardly been any progress toward the social and economic goals.... Political indecision and administrative naiveté that followed the Agrarian Reform Law initiated an uncontrollable decline in

agricultural production."<sup>69</sup>

There is no doubt that agrarian reform during the five years of the Qasim rule suffered several setbacks. As indicated in the tables below, agricultural production fell below pre-revolution levels. In 1963, agricultural crops which were imported in large quantities could have been grown locally. The removal of the landlords and sheikhs from managing the land caused confusion at the production level. Theoretical debates between the communist and non-communist factions on the issue of collective farming or redistribution of land caused further delays at the policy level. The adoption of the Egyptian model of agrarian reform--in spite of the vast differences in the conditions of both countries--indicated the inexperience of the Iraqi policy makers which contributed to failure in meeting the developmental targets set by the political leaders of the country. Unlike Egypt, Iraq needed capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive policy. Furthermore, the Iraqis should have aimed at the expansion of cultivable areas rather than the redistribution of land.

The collapse of the Qasim regime and the assumption of power by the Arif regime for the next five years did little to change the agricultural conditions. The first ten months of Baath dominance in managing the economic affairs of the nation did not relieve the agricultural sector from the illnesses prevalent during the previous regime. As previous analysis indicated, conflicts among personalities and policies within the Baath party on the one hand, and between



the party and the military on the other hand resulted in political struggles for power, thus diverting the party's attention from economic development to political survival.

During the ten-month period of the predominantly Baath cabinet, the government announced its serious intention to apply agricultural policies in accordance with the Baath constitution. The party's view is that "ownership of agricultural land will be so limited as to be in proportion to the means of the proprietor to exploit all his lands without exploitation of the efforts of others. This will be under the control of the state...."<sup>70</sup> The regime reemphasized the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 which intended to achieve significant changes in the distribution of land as well as in the status of income of landowners. Nothing new was introduced except their accusation of the Qasim regime for being slow and unsuccessful in the implementation of the Agrarian Law.<sup>71</sup> Despite the radical and ambitious new agrarian announcements, the regime soon became weakened by factional disputes over ends and means of the Party's ideology to achieve economic development. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in spite of the criticisms levelled against the previous regime, the new regime followed similar administration in the confiscation and distribution of land by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, while entrusting the production and marketing activities to the Ministry of Agriculture.<sup>72</sup> In addition to the political instability, administrative difficulties in coordinating agricultural production also contributed to the failure of the

regime to improve the conditions of peasants as well as crops.

Within the month duration of the Baath-dominated cabinets, there were (as seen in the detailed composition of cabinets in the same period) differences of opinion on policy which impeded coordination and affected decisions concerning specific issues. In addition to personal rivalries and jealousies, there were ideological splits in the cabinets. For example, while the Deputy Premier and the Minister of Interior, Ali Salih al-Saadi, advocated his Marxist goals in the decisions of national policies (such as collective farms and closer friendship with the Socialist camp),<sup>73</sup> his moderate colleagues in the cabinet advocated a less radical program to be implemented according to a stage-by-stage approach. Furthermore, the split widened later and took the form of a Marxist group who looked to the socialist camp and a moderate nationalist group who leaned towards closer cooperation with Nasir.<sup>74</sup> Between these two groups were the conservative religious elements in the cabinet who believed in the material and spiritual values of Islam and opposed socialism.

The Baath party's radical economic policies,<sup>75</sup> in addition to its National Guard's rivalry to the army, formed a threat to Arif and the military control of the country. In collaboration with anti-socialist army officers, Arif outmaneuvered the Baath for the next four years and gave way to the establishment of a military-dominated regime. This regime pursued a more reactionary policy in agricultural programs.

Judging from the data available and the provisions of the

Constitution where the aims of the Revolution of November 1963 were stated, the Arif regime did not introduce drastic changes in the agricultural sector, but maintained the Agrarian Law of 1958 with many amendments. They realized that statistics of previous regimes were inaccurate and misleading. In 1963, it was observed that, "the greater part of land confiscated since 1958 has been, in fact, under the control of former landowners or their agents,...a total of 8.2 million masharas was subject to seizure under the 1958 law, that just over 6 million masharas had been confiscated."<sup>76</sup> These facts compelled the government to re-examine its ambitious plans in 1964.

Such a concern was expressed by Langley who wrote that:

Members of President Arif's government have a better understanding of the complexities of the process of economic development and, at the official level, there appears to be an appreciation of the difficulties of implementation of development policies. Foreign technical assistance is acknowledged to be indispensable for many projects, but Iraqis are beginning to understand that they must learn to use foreign advisers. Experience with both Western and Soviet experts has convinced government officials that foreign experts frequently have ulterior motives.

...The raising of agricultural productivity is acknowledged to be a long-term and difficult task and, although more optimism is expressed about industrial development, government officials seem to be aware of Iraq's main problems.<sup>77</sup>

During the period 1965-1968, agriculture did not grow at a rate to accommodate both the increase in population and the rise in the standard of living. The Agricultural sector contributed 35 percent to Gross Domestic Product, while 70 percent of the population depended for their livelihood on this sector. According to one

study, there were minor reductions in the contribution of the agricultural sector between 1966 and 1969.<sup>78</sup> Responsibility for the failure of agricultural sector to grow in real terms was attributed "either to government ownership or to its extensive control." According to one study, "agriculture continued to be disorganized, as a result of the uncompleted agrarian reform of 1958 and the diversion of economic resources from agriculture to defense and security."<sup>79</sup> It was also clear from the frequent changes in cabinets caused frequent shifts in agricultural policy and subsequently accumulated delays, confusion, and inefficiency in the execution of agricultural programs. The insufficiency of agricultural production forced an accelerated importation of foodstuffs. The seriousness of the situation was indicated by a continuous trend of agricultural insufficiency as represented by government statistics below:

Table X

## IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFF FOR THE PERIOD 1965 - 1968

Year	Value in ID 1000s	Percentage of Total Imports
1965	29,429	18.2
1966	26,013	14.7
1967	24,273	16.0
1968	26,129	18.0

Source: Al-Tatawur Al-Iqtisadi Fi Al-Iraq -- Economic Development in Iraq (Baghdad: Al-Thawra Publications, 1972), p. 33.

It is significant to note that all regimes recognized the importance of the agricultural sector and invested heavily in it. No government dared consider a policy of retreat from implementing the programs of agrarian reform.

The Baath government of 1968 decided that, in view of the serious loopholes in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 the time was ripe to review the ordinance. Several modifications were made to help deal with the issues of land redistribution and compensation until a more comprehensive law was enacted in 1970.<sup>80</sup> The new law ended the principle of compensation, and stipulated that land was to be distributed to peasants without charge; it also aimed at undermining the position of owners of large holdings who had resisted the proper implementation of agrarian reform laws. Finally, it encouraged a cooperative system among peasants and sought to simplify the administrative procedures of executing agrarian reform. The following table illustrates the extent of implementation of the main agricultural reform laws of the republican regimes since 1958:

Table XI

EVALUATION OF REGIME PERFORMANCE THROUGH  
AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS

Agrarian Law	Area Acquired (in 1000 donums)	Area Distri- buted (in 1000 donums)	Number of Beneficiary Families
Law No. 30 of 1958 (until May 1970)	4190	3629	66,792
Law No. 117 of 1970 (until May 1973)	9650	3500	121,000

Sources: Jawad Hashim, Development Planning in Iraq: Historical Perspective and New Directions (Baghdad: Government Press, 1975), p. 7. Iraq Today, January 15, 1976, p. 15.

The above table shows impressive changes in the impact of influence of the al-Bakr regime in three years as compared with the performance of Qasim and Arif's regimes in twelve years. The impact of political conditions greatly influenced the al-Bakr regime in establishing policies to deal with national issues. Between 1968 and 1970, the major tenets of the regime called for: development of the agrarian reform of 1958, development of the oil national resources under the Iraqi National Oil Company and independently of the world oil cartels, and development of the public sector establishment. Much of the agricultural development implicit in the regime's policy "had to be postponed until after the government had firmly established itself, after the Kurdish revolt had been resolved, and after foreign relations issues had been resolved. These problems were only satisfactorily settled in 1970."<sup>81</sup> Two main reasons seem plausible to explain this expansion. First, there was the economic recognition that the cornerstone of Iraq is agriculture rather than industry. Second, the Baath regime found it necessary to reexamine its policy commitment and to frankly reassess the regime. Such a commitment has been reemphasized by the party's political programs. In 1971, the National Action Charter was proclaimed by the Baath party which evaluated agriculture as follows:

The revolution is responsible for undertaking a radical change in the agricultural sector owing to the sufferings

from [sic] the miserable and backward conditions of its constituents. The rural areas in Iraq need transforming change to eliminate undesirable economic relationships between the peasants and landowners, and tribal and sectarian values inherited from past feudal system. The revolution should not only eliminate the feudal lords and redistribute the land and provide farmers with seeds, fertilizers, machines, loans, irrigation and drainage projects; but to provide political enlightenment and material incentives to minimize migration from the rural areas to the cities, to educate farmers by conducting illiteracy campaigns and spreading agricultural schools, institutes, increasing state-owned farms, encouraging cooperative farms, and fostering popular participation from the community to assist the rural areas.<sup>82</sup>

Four years later, the Baath government indicated that the agricultural sector had undergone significant changes in terms of the relationship between the peasants and the land. They asserted that there was no feudal influence in the country except in the north (the Kurdish area). Furthermore, the Revolution of 1968 achieved significant progress in establishing 1400 new cooperatives with a membership of 196,266 farmers.<sup>83</sup> The rural situation in Iraq, however, failed to resemble a socialist model. More collective and cooperative farms are still needed. There was apparently still a large number of landless farmers who worked for small or medium-size owners for small wages. The same report stated that during the following five years (1975-1979), agricultural production must rely heavily on state farms first, then collectives and, finally cooperative farms.<sup>84</sup>

Agricultural development during the republican era (1958-1973) seemed to indicate that (1) there had been a shift from

agriculture to industry (illustrated by figures in Table XIV), (2) agricultural production fell during the initial years of each regime (shown in Appendix XV), and (3) Appendix XVI shows a declining share in the contribution of the agricultural sector throughout the republican era while the manufacturing and oil sectors increased noticeably.

#### 4.4.2. Industrial Policy

The premise that Iraq with its natural resources of land and water has always been recognized as primarily an agricultural country does not exclude the possibility of developing basic industries to utilize the country's raw materials and to employ its sizable labor force.

Before 1958, Iraq had neglected its industrial development in favor of agriculture. This trend was largely in line with economic surveys carried out by foreign experts, of such studies as prepared by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1952, the Danish economists' report under the leadership of Professor Carl Iverson carried out during 1952-53, Lord Salter's study in 1955, the report by Arthur D. Little in 1956, and finally Kathleen Langley's study during 1953-1957, all but the last two emphasized agricultural rather than industrial development. According to Langley, "The building up of the country's government administration and social overhead capital, and the modernization of its agriculture were therefore prerequisite to the growth of industry..."<sup>85</sup> Neglect of industrialization in Iraq is sometimes explained by the argument that



the ruling elite believed that industrialization might lead to the growth of a strong working class susceptible to Communist ideology. During the period 1951-1956, the Development Board invested IDm 53.4 or 34 percent of the total funds in agriculture as compared with IDm 31.3 or 20 percent in industry. The Development Board put less emphasis on industry during the period 1955-1959 when it allotted IDm 107.9 or 35 percent in agriculture compared with IDm 43.6 or 14 percent in industry.<sup>86</sup>

Industrial development in Iraq during the monarchical regime was established by a few local investors who possessed economic as well as political power, by the state, and by foreign entrepreneurs who provided technical expertise. During the same era, the Development Board's industrial policy was arbitrary. It suffered severely from two limitations: (1) the Board's preoccupation with flood control and irrigation, and (2) inadequate consideration of the role of indigenous private entrepreneurs.<sup>87</sup> Major industrial projects were not completed until 1960-1961, a decade after the Development Board was created. The monarchical regime implemented only 17 percent (or spent IDm 2.5 out of an original allocation of IDm 14.0) of the projects for the period 1951-1954.<sup>88</sup> Later, the government allocated only 14.3 percent of the development funds for the industrial sector during the period 1955-1959 as compared with 35.5 percent for agriculture. Such sluggish industrial development gave rise indirectly to social unrest and political instability which were accentuated by increasing unemployment, low income per capita, and an increase in

imports from abroad.<sup>89</sup>

Comparative analysis of overall industrial development during the republican era reveals wide differences between pre- and post-1958 as well as within the republican regimes. The industrial sector after 1958 showed speedy growth. As Tables XII and XIII indicate, actual expenditure of industrial plans rose continually from IDm 11.9 in 1958 to IDm 52.6 in 1973. Likewise, the rate of implementation of planned industries rose from 25.8 percent in 1959 of the allocated funds, to 38.4 percent in 1964, 83.8 percent in 1969, and 87.6 percent in 1973. Also, there was a rise in the overall number of large industrial establishments, whose employees nearly doubled during the period 1960-1972.

During Qasim's regime, there was an obvious shift from agriculture to industry. Such deliberate policy had two goals: (1) to establish, as fast as possible, a broad urban working class to support the regime, and (2) to reduce the employment problem. Qasim followed such a policy intentionally, partly because he was aware of the need of the country for an industrial base and partly to achieve political success with every new industrial project completed. Qasim was further encouraged by an economic treaty with the Soviet Union in 1959 and a revised version of the treaty in 1960.<sup>90</sup> The treaty assisted Iraq in building its industrial sector by providing factories, technicians, and training facilities.

After Arif eliminated the Baath control of the cabinet following the coup of November 1963, his regime continued a program

TABLE XII

Sectoral Allocations, Actual Expenditure, and Rates of  
Financial Execution in the Central Governmental  
Sector of Industry under Investment  
Programs for 1956-1974 Fiscal Years  
(in million Iraqi Dinars)

Year	Allocations	Expenditure	Financial Execution (Percentage)
1956	17.0	5.0	29.6
1957	16.0	8.6	53.7
1958	11.0	11.9	108.0
1959	15.8	4.9	25.8
1960	12.6	5.7	45.2
1961	24.9	7.2	28.4
1962	24.7	10.3	41.9
1963	39.6	9.5	24.1
1964	43.0	16.5	38.4
1965	32.1	15.1	47.1
1966	42.6	29.3	68.8
1967	39.8	23.7	59.5
1968	39.5	18.2	46.2
1969	21.0	17.6	83.6
1970	28.0	21.1	75.3
1971	50.0	35.9	71.1
1972	28.0	22.2	79.3
1973	60.0	52.6	87.6
1974	225.0	—	—

Source: Jawad Hashim, Development Planning in Iraq (Baghdad: 1975), pp. 72-75;  
Al-Thawra (Baghdad) July 16, 1975, p. 3.

Table XIII

Number of Large Industrial Establishments (Manufacturing and Extracting Industries) and Their Employees, 1960-1972

Year	Number of Establishments	Number of Employees
1960	971	67,220
1961	1,162	73,255
1962	1,186	77,690
1963	1,131	75,798
1964	1,202	80,066
1965	1,243	83,343
1966	1,326	87,518
1967	1,386	89,041
1968	1,432	90,027
1969	1,248	84,995
1970	1,289	91,993
1971	1,330	103,909
1972	1,319	121,409

Sources: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, 1960-1970, Kitab Al-Jayb Al-Insái--Statistical Pocket Book, Baghdad, 1972, pp. 97-99.

Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Statistical Pocket Book, 1974, Baghdad, 1974, p. 51.

which was initiated by the Baath during the previous nine months. The new rule nationalized major private industries and banks and reorganized many other firms into joint stock companies. These measures became a serious challenge which confronted the pro-Nasir cabinets until 1965. It was known that the Nasirite group supported socialism for internal rather than ideological reasons.<sup>91</sup> The Nasirite elements (mainly military) opposed strongly the radical socialist measures of previous cabinets under al-Bakr premiership; but as pan Arabists, they had to support such policy in order to prepare Iraq for closer economic and political conditions with Egypt by following an Egyptian style economy.

The displacement of the Nasirite group from power in the cabinet (the Baath influence already eliminated), a new outlook was adopted by the new cabinet headed by al-Bazzaz. The new premier called for "prudent" rather than a Nasir-model socialism.<sup>92</sup> The new approach to the management of the economy called for public control of major industries and banks but disfavored the stifling of private enterprise. The al-Bazzaz government realized the adversities of nationalization, such as the outflow of capital and the decline in production. Consequently, al-Bazzaz, once in power (although known to be a Nasirite), called for modification in the nationalization measures which were too radical and which had an adverse effect on the Iraqi internal conditions. The new policy of the civilian-oriented regime gained popularity as a result of improving the economy (Appendix XVII). This aroused the jealousy of the military. Pressures, intervention,

and challenges by the military exasperated al-Bazzaz into resigning in protest. In the following two years, the political scene was dominated by the military. After al-Bazzaz, all premiers were recruited from the military and the governments followed a less socialist economic policy than those of previous cabinets.

Serious crises faced the military cabinets, ranging from the internal problems of a financial shortage and a Kurdish uprising to national problems of weak leadership and participation in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In addition to all those difficulties which existed in severely divided cabinets, the regime was poorly managing the national affairs of the country. It had neither public support nor an organized party or group of followers. The situation created a power vacuum. The style of day-to-day management of crises became acute so that it diverted the regime's efforts from developmental purposes to regime survival. Such a state of confusion ended in a loss of power to the well-organized civilian-military Baath party who, in alliance with regime dissenters, conducted the first bloodless coup since 1958.

For the first eighteen months, the Baath regime was occupied by political rather than economic issues. The atmosphere of uncertainty created by the regime's emphasis on reorganizing the economy in accordance with the Baath ideology introduced uncertainties and political upheavals associated with various individuals (military and civilian) of the party. Since 1970, the Baath has consolidated its leadership, reorganized the party, settled its problem with the Kurds,

and established closer economic relations with the Communist countries. In contrast with the previous regimes, the al-Bakr regime seemed to have designed better development plans and increased its revenues manifoldly. Investment in industry jumped from IDm 28 in 1970, IDm 50 in 1971, IDm 60 in 1972, IDn 45 in 1973 to IDm 225 in 1974 and IDm 392 in 1975.<sup>93</sup>

In examining the industrial expansion and performance shown in Tables XIV and XV during the decade which followed the revolution of 1958, we find a noticeable, but slow, rate of growth. A similar trend is observed in the percentage of contribution of the industrial sector to the gross domestic product between 1953 and 1974. The Baath regime since 1968 regards industry as a fundamental base for progress and transition to socialism. The philosophy of the Baath party states that the colonial powers and their local allies (i.e., the ruling elites before 1958) attempted to hinder the establishment of an active and powerful national industrial sector for two main reasons: (1) to maintain the underdeveloped characteristics of the national economy to secure the industrialized nations a permanent market for their manufacturing industries, and (2) to prevent the formation of a large working class which will provide a base for large national industries with the possibility of competing with them.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, the same philosophy recognizes the need to build a wide and varied industrial base in order to eliminate economic dependency and to promote the development of mining and petrochemical industries as well as those industries which derive their raw

**TABLE XIV**  
**Sectoral Allocations, Actual Expenditure,**  
**and Implementation, 1951-1975**  
**(in million Iraqi Dinars)**

Plan and Duration	Economic Sector	Allocations	Actual Expenditure	Rate of Implementation (Percent)
The Second Investment Program 1955-1959	Agriculture	138.4	51.5	44.4
	Industry	57.1	32.2	56.5
The Provincial Economic Plan 1959-1961	Agriculture	43.9	22.4	51.1
	Industry	32.7	11.9	36.3
The Detailed Economic Plan 1961-1965	Agriculture	77.4	17.9	22.7
	Industry	121.7	38.3	31.5
The Five-Year Economic Plan 1965-1969	Agriculture	173.5	56.2	32.4
	Industry	137.2	103.3	74.9
The National Development Plan 1969-1973	Agriculture	198.2	156.3	78.3
	Industry	137.0	155.0	112.3
Revised National Plan, 1970	Agriculture	28.1	14.0	50.0
	Industry	25.0	21.1	84.5
Revised National Plan, 1971	Agriculture	50.0	49.3	98.6
	Industry	50.0	35.9	71.8
Revised National Plan, 1972	Agriculture	23.2	29.2	125.8
	Industry	28.0	22.2	79.3
Revised National Plan, 1973	Agriculture	53.0	—	—
	Industry	50.0	—	—
The Investment Program 1974	Agriculture	190.0	—	—
	Industry	225.0	—	—
The Investment Program 1975	Agriculture	185.5	—	—
	Industry	192.0	—	—

Sources: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Economic Department, Development of Investment (Baghdad: 1972), pp. 16-17.

Jawad Hashim, Development Planning in Iraq (Baghdad: 1973), p. 75.

Ministry of Planning, Development of Investment (Baghdad: 1969), p. 23.

Al-Thawra (Baghdad), July 16, 1975, p. 3.

Al-Thawra (Baghdad), July 17, 1976, Special edition, p. 5.



materials from oil, minerals, and agriculture.

This evaluation of industrial development policy points out that industrializing Iraq serves not only to increase income contribution in the plan, but it also complements agricultural development. Industrial expansion increases demand for agricultural raw materials as well as helps solve the problem of agricultural unemployment. However, it is essential for a plan to be well conceived and implemented fully. Just as plan formulation is important, so is its implementation; the latter in fact determines the size and growth of production and income. Tables XIV and XV indicate that since 1959, both the rate of implementation as well as the percentage of allocation of the industrial sector has increased steadily. For example, the general rate of implementation of economic plans rose from 33.5 percent in 1959 to 78.5 percent in 1973. Similarly, the share of allocation to industries increased from 9.8 percent in 1959 to 21.4 percent in 1974 and to 41.6 percent in 1975.

Throughout the republican era, all governments showed deep concern for the industrialization process and seriously pursued investment programs supported by financial facilities, tax-exemption, and protection policies. All republican regimes realized that economic development was a crucial aspect of public policy and of public concern. The developmental process was accompanied by many obstacles to slow down and thwart economic growth, and there existed different strategies to accelerate the achievement of revolutionary goals and objectives.

#### 4.2.3. Oil Policy

All republican regimes saw oil as the main source of financing their developmental plans. An analogy describes oil as the bloodvein of the Iraqi economy. Its impact has been both economic and political. As one observer notes:

...the most important thing in Iraq, whether economic or political, is the oil question, that is, the control by oil companies of the economy and politics of Iraq. Oil represents about 80% of the direct and indirect resources of the government budget. It also represents about a quarter to a third of the national income and, because of that, it is the real problem facing Iraq, and the government of Iraq actually is the oil companies. They are a state within a state. They are the forces behind the coups d'etat and the general changes of governments....<sup>95</sup>

After the 1958 revolution took place, oil became important not only in terms of economics but also as a focus of the struggle for national independence and power--learning from the past experiences of Musaddiq in Iran. Both nationalist and radical leaders used the oil issue to assert their authority and legitimacy, and to support their political decisions to modernize.

Despite their opposition to the pre-1958 government and their expected opposition to foreign companies, the new revolutionary leaders initially exhibited lenient tendencies.<sup>96</sup> Although the Free Officers discussed the oil issue while they were planning to overthrow the monarchy, they seemed to prefer a policy of production increase to nationalization, because they realized the need for revenues to finance national development. Therefore, when the 1958 revolution took place, the new regime declared that it would respect

oil agreements. Qasim proclaimed that "his Government wished to continue the production and export of oil to world markets and that it would uphold its obligations to all concerned."<sup>97</sup>

With the passage of time, Qasim embarked on ambitious programs and internal reforms which needed more revenue than that spent before the coup. This trend pushed Qasim to derive more benefits from the country's principal source of wealth. During the first two years of his regime, Qasim stood by his early promises to respect oil agreements. The relations with the oil companies were first seriously affected in July 1960 when the government abrogated an agreement which exempted oil from port duties at Basra. As a result, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC)<sup>98</sup> threatened to reduce production at the Basra oil fields from twelve to three million tons a year. Qasim regarded this as a direct challenge to his regime and confronted the company; if the latter cut its production, he would restrict the companies' areas of operations to their oil fields at the time.

With no further exposition, negotiations on various issues started formally between the Iraqi government and the oil companies on August 15, 1960, extended over a year, and finally broke down on October 11, 1961. From August through December 1960, the Iraqi team was headed by the Minister of Planning Tal'at Al-Shaybani; then from August through October 1961, Qasim took over assisted by his Minister of Finance Muhammad Hadid.

The main issues as outlined by the statement of the Ministry of Oil on April 10, 1961 included: (1) the government's share of net

profits, (2) government participation in the companies' share of capital, (3) the government restriction of concession areas not under actual exploitation, (4) royalty rates, (5) appointment of Iraqi directors to the companies' boards, and (6) gradual Iraqization of the companies' personnel.<sup>99</sup>

One evaluation of Qasim's role in oil affairs has stated that:

Qassem showed himself a most unpleasant partner to the negotiations, grasping, verbose, inconsistent, and completely unpredictable. He finally broke off the talks after he had put forward a last-minute proposal which he did not give the other side time to study.<sup>100</sup>

Another report supported the above opinion by stating that:

...At the end of 1959 the Premier reported that the Company offered to relinquish 90,000 square kilometers, but that the Iraqi Government refused the offer and asked for a 60% relinquishment. However, when the Company agreed to the 60% figure, Iraq demanded 75%; when the Company acceded to that percentage, the Iraqi negotiators demanded the entire area with the exception of the sections under actual operation.<sup>101</sup>

Iraq maintained active consultations with other oil exporting countries. The situation in Iraq during 1959 and 1960 worked as a catalyst in the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC) in 1960. The Iraqi government invited representation from the large oil-exporting countries of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to convene in Baghdad. A meeting among the five countries took place during 10-14 September 1960, and announced the formation of OPEC.<sup>102</sup> The principal aim of OPEC is "the coordination and

unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively."<sup>103</sup> Another objective of OPEC was that members should not remain indifferent to price modifications by the oil companies, and the latter should maintain their prices steady and free from all unnecessary fluctuations.<sup>104</sup>

The prolonged negotiations of the Iraqi government and the oil companies were emotionally bitter and finally broke down when the latter unilaterally reduced oil production and prices. This caused the Iraqis to promulgate Law No. 80 on December 11, 1961. It comprised six articles<sup>105</sup> which restricted the area of operations of oil companies to their producing oilfields, equivalent to less than 0.5 percent of their previous area. The Iraqi government gave the oil companies three months to submit to the terms of the new law, or the companies would be responsible for any losses caused by further delay. The oil companies protested to the new law and demanded arbitration. Meanwhile the British and United States governments' support of the companies' position caused public resentment. Prime Minister Qasim described it as interference from outside "under the threat of military concentration and naval movements."<sup>106</sup> However, the Iraqi government ignored such threats, while oil companies began to increase production and consequently revenue.

A general evaluation of the events indicates that the oil companies did not intend to stop a profitable business; Qasim's capriciousness connoted no sudden danger for the companies.

Nevertheless "his handling of the oil negotiations and their aftermath did Qassem great damage with the West.... as a Communist takeover was no longer an imminent danger, Qassem had shown himself viciously ill-disposed to the West."<sup>107</sup> Later, in September 1962, a draft of the formation of a national oil company was published in the national newspapers with the aim of exploiting acquired areas of foreign countries.<sup>108</sup> The promulgation of the national oil company was scheduled for February 1963, but Qasim and his regime collapsed before they saw the establishment of their own national oil company.

It must be pointed out that after the promulgation of Law No. 80, 1961, the companies threatened to reduce production, prices, and investment (Tables XV and XVI ). Such pressures were obviously used to force the Iraqis to yield to the companies' preferences and to impede economic development. For example, investment funds amounted to IDm 22.8 in 1960, IDm 4.7 in 1962, and IDm 1.2 in 1963. Similarly, oil revenues did not increase during the same period and remained at IDm 95.1.

The 1963 revolution ended the Qasim regime and brought to power Arif, who seemed to offer better opportunities to improve government-company relations. On February 27, 1964, the cabinet empowered the Ministry of Oil to negotiate with the oil companies. The new regime adopted a softer line with the oil companies than had its predecessor. Both parties reviewed all points of dispute between May 1964 and June 1965 during 400 hours in 115 formal sessions and reached a compromise. It can be summarized in three points: (1) It

TABLE XV

Oil Production, Revenue, and Share in National Plans in Iraq, 1958-1974

Year	Barrels (1000,000)	Oil Revenues <sup>c</sup> (millions of Iraqi Dinars)	Percentage of Oil Contribution in the National Plans
1958	266.9 <sup>a</sup>	79.8 <sup>d</sup>	98
1959	305.5 <sup>b</sup>	86.6 <sup>d</sup>	99
1960	355.7 <sup>b</sup>	95.1 <sup>d</sup>	100
1961	367.5 <sup>b</sup>	94.1 <sup>d</sup>	87
1962	366.5 <sup>b</sup>	95.1 <sup>d</sup>	72
1963	424.0 <sup>a</sup>	110.0 <sup>d</sup>	85
1964	459.4 <sup>a</sup>	126.0 <sup>d</sup>	85
1965	479.0 <sup>a</sup>	134.0 <sup>d</sup>	90
1966	508.1 <sup>a</sup>	140.7 <sup>c</sup>	86
1967	448.2 <sup>a</sup>	128.9 <sup>c</sup>	93
1968	550.2 <sup>a</sup>	170.0 <sup>c</sup>	96
1969	555.2 <sup>a</sup>	172.5 <sup>c</sup>	79
1970	564.3 <sup>a</sup>	186.0 <sup>c</sup>	—
1971	618.3 <sup>a</sup>	121.4 <sup>c</sup>	Not available
1972	536.5 <sup>a</sup>	205.3 <sup>c</sup>	Not available
1973	736.5 <sup>a</sup>	535.7 <sup>c</sup>	Not available
1974	700.0 <sup>c</sup>	2,322.5 <sup>c</sup>	Not available

Sources: <sup>a</sup>Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book (Baghdad: 1974), p. 63.

<sup>b</sup>Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 269.

<sup>c</sup>Europa Publications, The Middle East and North Africa (London: Staples Printers, 1957-1975), pp. 387-388.

<sup>d</sup>Ferhang Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, p. 11.  
Na'eeb Najm Al-Dean, Musahamat Al-Naft Fi Al-Iqtisad Al-Watani--  
The Contribution of Oil in the National Economy (Baghdad: Maktab  
Al-'Ilam Wal-Nashr, 1974), pp. 6, 10, 13.

Table XVI  
Annual Investments of Oil Companies of Iraq, Basrah  
and Mosul, and Their Profits for  
1957-1969 (current prices)

Year	Total annual fixed investments	Company profits after payment of Iraqi government's shares	Rate of investment to company profits
1957	46655100		
1958	5565600	84562000	6.6%
1959	14648100	91020000	16.3%
1960	22814000	99463000	22.0%
1961	22477700	100061500	22.5%
1962	4210500	100061500	4.7%
1963	1295000	115628000	1.1%
1964	500000	131414000	0.38%
1965	600000	136482500	0.42%
1966	576500	145225000	0.40%
1967	560000	113826500	0.48%
1968	656400	157516500	0.42%
1969	500000	159881000	0.31%

Source: International Conference for Solidarity with the Iraqi People in Oil Nationalization, The History of Oil Monopolies in Iraq (Baghdad: 1972), p. 51.



was agreed that the oil companies would restrict their rights of exploration and production to 3,873 square kilometers (0.44 percent) of the total producing area in the country. This was one of the disputed issues demanded by Qasim. (2) An additional 32,000 square kilometers were assigned to a joint venture of the oil companies, the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC), and the Iraqi government, with the INOC as the biggest shareholder with 33.3 percent of the interest.

(3) It was agreed that the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) would pay port duties to the Iraqi government.<sup>109</sup>

Later in November 1965, President Arif declared that a law would be issued which would exempt oil and other large companies from nationalization. In 1966, the President was killed and the Syrians seized IPC's pipeline which crosses the country and stopped the oil which flowed to the Mediterranean. Further interruptions took place as a result of the 1967 six-day war. It would have altered the position of the Iraqi government if economic retaliation had not been taken against foreign oil companies of the Western powers who assisted Israel. Consequently, Law No. 97 was promulgated on August 6, 1967.<sup>110</sup> It signified a change in the government's oil policy by empowering the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) as the government oil company formed in 1964, to exploit rights over all areas except those in operation by IPC under Law 80. INOC was allowed to operate jointly in association with foreign companies--as long as no concession was awarded. As a result, a contract was signed between INOC and Enterprise de Recherches et d'Activites Petrolieres (ERAP), a French

state-owned oil company to drill for oil in areas where oil had not been discovered. All oil would belong to INOC which was to contribute financially to the venture only if oil was found. The French company could buy shares at a privileged price.

Although the law achieved noticeable gains for the Iraqis, it was strongly criticized later. The negotiations of 1964 and 1965 were less strict than those which produced Law No. 97 of 1967. Previous negotiations had come under heavy attack by most national and radical forces. Both the Chairman of the National Democratic Party, Mr. Kamil Al-Chaderchi, in two memoranda (September 27, 1964 and May 22, 1965), and Mr. Abdullah Al-Turaiki in his study (August 8, 1965) warned against and condemned the Arif regime's attempts to undermine and thwart the popular law of 1961 which gave Iraq almost full sovereignty over its mineral wealth. Furthermore, the Arif regime was accused of allowing the oil companies to reap their profits at the expense of the Iraqi people. The same argument described the secret oil negotiations from February 5, 1964 to June 3, 1965 as a negative achievement in the struggle of the Iraqi people to liberate their economic resources. The 1967 law was similarly criticized.<sup>111</sup>

There could not be final settlement of government-oil company relations as long as major issues remained unsatisfied. The advent of a new regime in 1968 did not contribute to a more positive understanding between the disputing parties. The al-Bakr regime was encouraged by two events which added to past squabbles with the oil companies. The first was on December 11, 1970 when the Minister of

Oil and Minerals announced Law No. 24 of 1970 which abrogated an article in Law No. 80 and provided for "the implementation of the national oil policy adopted by the revolutionary government towards restricting direct exploitation of oil resources to the Iraqi National Oil Company."<sup>112</sup> The second event was the participation of Iraq in Tehran's negotiations when Iran and Arab Gulf producing nations with sixteen Western companies met to discuss oil issues and subsequently agreed to a 35 cent increase per barrel (with a further increase of 8.5 percent in price in January 1972) and a 55 percent tax rate on the oil companies' profits.

Two main factors helped to increase Iraq's bargaining position with the foreign oil companies. First was the signing of two agreements between the U.S.S.R. and Iraq; one provided IDm 28 million of aid to INOC to develop its oilfields, and another (signed in Moscow) complemented the previous one by strengthening Iraq's position in the management of oil production. Second, the hostility between the Kurds and the Central government ceased in March 1970.

Instead of improving their relations with the government, the oil companies reduced their production, reviving bitterness between the parties and negated all previous negotiations. On May 17, 1972, the Iraqi government gave IPC a two-week ultimatum to meet the government's demands or face the consequences.<sup>113</sup> The ultimatum ended on June 1, 1972, with a nationwide broadcast which nationalized the IPC. Neither the Mosul Petroleum Company nor the Basra Petroleum Company were nationalized. This measure was followed, on June 9, 1972,

by a resolution of OPEC to pledge to support Iraq by not allowing companies to make up for their loss in Iraqi output. In addition, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) loaned IDm 53 to Iraq to compensate for any loss in revenue.

The completion of the nationalization process was carried out over the next three years by successive decisions in a step-by-step approach. In an agreement signed on March 1, 1973 the Mosul Petroleum Company was passed over to the Iraqi Government by the IPC. Eight months later, as a reaction to the October 1973 Arab war with Israel, the Iraqi Government nationalized the American share of 23.75 percent in Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) on October 21, 1973. Two months later, another decision was made by the RCC to nationalize the share of the Royal Dutch Company in BPC. This amounted to 60 percent of the Shell Oil Company and Gulbenkian's five percent share in BPC. The outcome of those nationalization decisions was that the total Iraqi Government's share in BPC increased to 43 percent. A final decision of the RCC to nationalize the remaining public shares of PBC was enacted in Law No. 200,<sup>114</sup> on December 8, 1975, transferring these shares to the Iraqi government (23.75 percent of the French Oil Company, 9.5 percent of Shell, and 23.75 percent of British Petroleum).

Judging from figures representing oil production, revenues, and investment (Tables XV and XVI), we may observe conflicting policies followed by Iraqi governments and the foreign oil companies since the 1958 revolution. The Qasim regime provided a major breakthrough. Consciously or unconsciously, Qasim capitalized on the oil

issue because of its popularity among the people. In his many public announcements, Qasim described such demands as those of a revolutionary regime which could not be surrendered at the cost of the people's rights. He believed that if such demands could be met then he would claim to have achieved one of the most important objectives of the 1958 revolution.

The nationalization decision of 1972 was taken after fourteen years of diplomatic negotiations influenced by political and economic events. Each side in the negotiations presented uncompromising arguments with the assumption that conditions at that time justified their particular case. The Iraqis approached the disputed issues from a national point of view in which foreign companies were regarded as foreign exploiters of Iraqi national resources. Their activities were also regarded as monopolistic, opportunistic, and discriminatory. In contrast, the oil companies viewed their business with a commercial and contractual mentality, therefore, ignoring the demands of the people of Iraq.

As reflected in Tables XV , and XVI , the oil companies, before nationalization, attempted to exercise pressure by reducing production, prices, and investment. For examples, in 1960 investment amounted to IDm 22.8, then dropped to IDm 0.5 or 0.3 percent of the companies' total profit of IDm 159.8. Furthermore, it was clear that the companies pursued a policy of changing production and price levels to alter revenues desperately needed for national development. Illustration of such a trend is seen by the fact that growth in oil

production for the years 1952-1961 averaged an 11.1 percent increase annually, whereas it dropped to 4.7 percent for the period 1962-1971 as compared with a 10 percent increase in international trade.

#### 4.3. Summary of Development Policies and Conclusion

The republican era experienced major reforms in agriculture, industry and oil sectors of the economy. Such reforms were directed to improve the people's conditions. As time passed, the government became more and more directly involved in the management and control of agricultural and industrial enterprises. The new direction of government policy showed that each successive stage of government participation entrenched the public sector deeper into taking over privately-run concerns. The shift in the role of government from the maintenance of the status quo to planned economic and social development became irreversible. In spite of temporary setbacks in various economic sectors, republican Iraq achieved faster economic progress than the previous monarchical regime largely because of the greater political significance of development policy and the higher revenues resulting from increased oil production.

All developmental plans relied heavily on oil revenues and increased this reliance in coming years as shown in Table XV . Decisions on the formulation and implementation of economic projects affected the priority of projects in accordance with availability of oil funds. One major indicator of regime performance has been the rate of policy and execution. The economic and administrative performance in various economic sectors indicates (Table XIV) that until

1969 the rate of plan implementation amounted to about 50 percent of the planned targets. In terms of sectoral performance, the rate of performance in agriculture fell much lower than that of industry. The period 1969-1972 did not show higher rates of performance. Since 1972, however, the country has witnessed much higher implementation rates--namely 82 percent of planned expenditures.

Two major factors affected economic development negatively: the instability of the political situation, exhibited by the frequent changes in plans and ministers of planning, and vague and non-rational goals, policies, and policy instruments. In spite of such retarding factors, economic development scored impressive gains in the direction of the socialist ideals of the various republican regimes and brought about rapid improvement in the living conditions of the masses. Some of those gains are indicated by the rise in per capita income, literacy rate, employment, investment, oil production, industrial output, and by the mobilization of the people and their integration into the political process. It also seems that the regime that started first suffered most. Those which came last suffered fewer difficulties because of the incremental effect of policies which start to pay off only after several years in process. This explains why Qasim's regime faced difficulties in its pioneering policies in agricultural reforms, industrial programs, and oil exploitation. Not only was the regime inexperienced; it also suffered from a lack of financial sources later, after 1972, became abundant.

The political climate had great impact on the determination

and continuity of public policies. Instability, as manifested by frequent changes of cabinets and regimes differing sharply in political orientation, contributed to the confusions and failures of policy execution. Although the immediate cause of regime overthrow seems to be political, it can also be indirectly attributed to the governments' failures in development policies, often falling short of rising expectations. This was amply illustrated by the numerous accusations by each regime of its predecessor for following unrealistic public policies in the various economic sectors. This attitude was evident as each cabinet discontinued its predecessor's program and introduced a new program, later to be modified, if not cancelled, by its successor. As clearly manifested in Chapter III, the underlying reasons for such a situation are mainly found in the political system.

Politics did not transcend personal rivalries, cabinet ministers were often chosen on a personal basis. The resulting instability slowed the rate of development. The republican era may be divided in terms of public policy patterns into two main categories. The first stage was marked by a policy designed to change the power structure and to redistribute income. Although this goal was intended to be achieved during the transitional stage of post-revolutionary Iraq, its achievement was delayed well past the time it was expected. This step represented the complete displacement of the traditional elite, followed by the inauguration of political, social, and economic reforms to provide more benefits to the masses. The second



stage was designed to lay foundations for the national economy. This occurred in the nationalization of oil and the industrialization of the country.

There has not been a single government (personalistic, military, dictatorship, or one-party) which displayed full competence in managing the economy. Once a government seized power, rather than compromise, it resorted to force to impose policies and which galvanized interest groups. This aggressive result might have been reduced through the development of mediating institutions with the aim of broadening the effective political and economic participation of various pressure groups. Otherwise, there can be little distinction between politics and policies. The outcome of a public policy was determined by the interaction of political and economic motives. In fact, the components which determined Iraqi oil policy were specifically the economic objective of development, which demanded higher revenues, and the political objective of sovereign control over oil.

Republican regimes in Iraq followed a socialist policy in conducting economic activities where the government undertook a major role in major industrial, agricultural and financial enterprises and institutions. Within the general framework of republican politics, there were differences among the various regimes as well as within each of them. Strong and competent leadership was needed to manage the complex process of political, economic, social, and administrative transformation. The importance of leadership personality has increased as a result of the absence of legitimately recognized

institutions. Consequently, as we have seen, certain policy issues become associated with personalities with particular views. The political elite becomes divided along such policy issues and goals. Therefore, we can hypothesize that changes of public policy have a profound relationship with changes in elite members. When a certain public policy is adopted by a governing elite, the latter's continuity or displacement is determined—among other things—by the merit and popularity of that public policy.

So far, we have examined the personal aspects of elites and how they influence the quality of public policy in certain areas of development. We also noticed that a public policy may not proceed beyond the pronouncement stage. In Iraq, like other developing countries, a complementary variable, namely, the public bureaucracy, has become the regime's central focus to narrow the gap between elite promises and policy implementation. The capacity and responsiveness of the public bureaucracy are essential to the success or failure of the public policies which are determined by the political elite. In the next chapter, we will investigate the growth, capacity, and importance of the Iraqi public bureaucracy as both "contributor" and "receptor" in the processes of political and economic development.

## Chapter IV

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELITES AND PUBLIC POLICY: A CASE STUDY  
OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

<sup>1</sup>Jalal Talabani, Kirdistan Wa al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya al-Kurdiyya--Kurdistan and the Kurdish National Movement (2nd ed., Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1971) pp. 96-97.

<sup>2</sup>For more details, see Louka Zodo, Khafaya Wa Mulabasat al-Masala al-Kurdiyya--Secrets and Complexities of the Kurdish Issue: The Kurdish History Indict Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani with High Treason (Beirut: Lithograph Press, 1974) pp. 27-33.

<sup>3</sup>For full details, see Talabani, Kirdistan, pp. 197-250.

<sup>4</sup>David Adamson, The Kurdish War (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964), p. 18.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Zodo, Khafaya wa Mulabasat, p. 42.

<sup>9</sup>Adamson, Kurdish War, p. 22.

<sup>10</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, March 20, 1974; also, see The Economist, March 23, 1974, p. 38.

<sup>11</sup>Thomas Bois, The Kurds, translated from French by Professor M. W. Welland (Beirut: Khayyat Bookshop, 1966), p. 153.

<sup>12</sup>The Higher Committee for the Celebration of the 14th July Revolution, The Iraqi Revolution: One Year of Progress and Achievement (Times Press, Baghdad, 1959), pp. 22-90.

<sup>13</sup>Dann, Iraq under Qassem, pp. 42-43.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 138.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 139.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 172-174.
- <sup>18</sup> Derk Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 64.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 64-65.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 72.
- <sup>21</sup> Adamson, Kurdish War, pp. 208-211.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 211-212.
- <sup>23</sup> Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: A Historical and Political Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 4.
- <sup>24</sup> Adamson, Kurdish War, p. 205.
- <sup>25</sup> Eliezer Beerli, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970) p. 204.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 206-207.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 207.
- <sup>28</sup> Al-Hayat, Beirut, July 2, 1966.
- <sup>29</sup> Beerli, Army Officers, p. 209.
- <sup>30</sup> For full details of the Manifesto, see The Ministry of Culture and Information, The Historic Statement of the Revolutionary Command Council on the Peaceful Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Issue (Baghdad: General Establishment for Press and Printing, 1970).
- <sup>31</sup> Talabani, Kirdistan, pp. 352-359.
- <sup>32</sup> Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960) p. 330.
- <sup>33</sup> See the fourth cabinet of al-Bakr regime. Also, see The Ministry of Culture and Information, The 17th July Revolution in Two Years (Baghdad: Government Press, 1970) p. 7.

<sup>34</sup>"What Is Self-Rule?" al-Kadir, Periodical issued by the KDP, Issues Nos. 14, 15, July and August, 1972, quoted by: al-thawra Publications, Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq: Discussion and Documents on the Peaceful and Democratic Settlement of the Problem (Baghdad: Ath-thawra House, 1975) pp. 40-41.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., pp. 182-183.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 53. More specifically, the ABSP issued a strong memorandum to the KDP on September 23, 1972 which contained sixty-three serious violations of the 1972 peace settlement. The following are representative examples:

- An approximate number of the crimes committed by followers of your Party [KDP]: murder 379; kidnapping 219, with 566 victims (comprising 499 civilians, 47 military men and government officials and 20 Iranian militant patriots); assault 419; extortion 157; robbery 29. ...11 acts against railways and locomotives, 6 against electric installations, 3 against bridges, dams and roads and 25 miscellaneous acts were committed.
- The attempts to blow up the oil pipe lines during the ultimatum served to the oil companies in May 1972.
- The attempts to explode certain air bases.
- The attempts against the life of administrative officials.
- The assaults on security and intelligence organizations.
- The kidnappings, torture and the murder of citizens whom your Party suspects as sympathizing with the revolutionary government.
- The large scale raping acts committed by Peshmirga members against Kurds within the areas controlled by you.
- The throwing of explosives and grenades into the houses of certain Kurdish elements who do not obey your orders.
- The flow of Iranian arms, in substantial quantities, into the northern area, particularly during the escalation of the intensity of strife between the revolution and the Iranian reactionary government.
- The communication of military information concerning the Iraqi army by certain elements in your party with

connections to Iran.

- The complicity with the Iranian armed forces in certain frontier clashes. Indeed this collaboration reached the extent of enabling certain Iranian armed forces to occupy part of Iraqi territory in the Khanaqin area.
- The reception, protecting and support (inside Iraqi land) by known political and armed members of your Party of members of the Iranian intelligence service.
- The entry into the northern area of contraband Iranian and Israeli goods, creating a very strong Iranian economic influence.
- The circulation of counterfeit Iraqi currency printed by Iranian intelligence with the aim of destroying the Iraqi currency.
- The admission of foreigners into the northern area, through Iran.
- The handing over to the Shah's government of Iranian patriots fleeing from the Iranian reactionary rule, in addition to imprisoning and killing some of them.
- The arrest and imprisonment of citizens and their execution.
- The establishment of prisons.
- The imposition of taxes.
- The hindering of the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Act.

See Ibid., pp. 123-150.

<sup>37</sup> al-Thawra, al-Mesala al-Kurdiyya, al-Wad'al-Rahin, wa Afaq al-Mustaqbal--The Kurdish Issue, The Present Situation, and Future Prospects (Baghdad: Munshurāt, al-Thawra, 1974) p. 29.

<sup>38</sup> Zodo, Khafaya Wa Mulabasat, pp. 146-147.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ministry of Information, The National Action Charter Declared by President al-Bakr's Speech on November 15, 1971 (Baghdad: al-Jumhuriyya Press, 1971) pp. 28-32.

<sup>41</sup>Zodo, Khafaya wa Mulabasat, p. 147.

<sup>42</sup>They included three members of the KDP Central Committee: Ismail Mulla Aziz, Hashim Akrawi, and Aziz Akrawi. The three Kurdish personalities were joined by Barazani's son, Ubaidullah al-Barazani, and Abd al-Sattar Tahir Sharif. All five ministers occupied cabinet posts since April 7, 1974 replacing the outgoing 5 Kurdish ministers who were approved by Barazani on July 31, 1968 and August 16, 1973. See Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 190.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 313.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>46</sup>An interview with al-Nahar Newspaper of Beirut and Le Monde of Paris. Quoted in Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq, op. cit., p. 173. Also see Government Press, Khutab wa Tasrihat al-Sayyid Saddam Husain--Speeches and Statements of Mr. Saddam Husain (Baghdad: Dar al-Hurriya Publishers, 1972), pp. 5-6.

<sup>47</sup>Saddam Husain, al-Thawra: Sirat al-Hadir wa al-Mostaqbal--The Revolution: Present and Future Path (Beirut: al-Muassasa al-Arabiyya Le al-Buhuth wa al-Nashr, 1975) pp. 20-22.

<sup>48</sup>Cultural Office of the National Leadership of the ABSP, al-Baath wa al-Mogif min al-Aqaliyat al-Qawmiya--Baath Position on National Minorities (Baghdad: Dar al-Thawra, 1974) p. 21.

<sup>49</sup>Le Roy Woodson, Jr., "We Who Face Death," Journal of the National Geographic Society, Washington, D. C., March 1975, p. 386.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 384.

<sup>52</sup>Zodo, Khafaya wa Mulabasat, pp. 125-126.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>54</sup>Muhammad Hsasnain Haikal, in al-Anwar Newspaper, (Cairo), December 1975, p. 5.

<sup>55</sup>The Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, March 20, 1974.

<sup>56</sup>Ali Hashim, al-Akrad Ba'd al-Hukm al-Dhati--The Kurds after Self-rule (Beirut: al-Nahar Publications, No. 80, February 28, 1975) p. 22.

<sup>57</sup>The New York Review, July 18, 1974, pp. 29-30.

<sup>58</sup>The New York Times, April 16, 1974.

<sup>59</sup>The New York Times, April 19 and 28, 1974. Also The Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1974.

<sup>60</sup>The Middle East Monitor, Vol. V, No. 11, June 1, 1975, p. 4.  
The main points of the agreement were:

1. Iran would close its borders against the Kurds.
2. The border of the two countries would be drawn down the center of the Shatt al-Arab dividing it equally between their two countries.
3. 670 disputed positions along the land border would be delineated.
4. There would be agreement to prevent infiltration from either state to the other through cooperative security.

See The Middle East Intelligence Survey, April 1, 1975, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 7.

<sup>61</sup>Nadim Ahmad al-Yasin, al-Mesa'la al-Kurdiyya: Mawaqif wa Munjazat--The Kurdish Issue: Strategies and Performances (Baghdad: Dar al-Huriya Li al-Tiba'h, 1975) pp. 15-20; pp. 33-34.

<sup>62</sup>For full details, see Iraq Today, March 15, 1976, pp. 13-16. Also, see Special Supplement, Baghdad Observer, March 11, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>63</sup>Hasan, Dirasat, p. 37.

<sup>64</sup>Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali, Al-Iraq al-Hadith--Modern Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1969) p. 56.

<sup>65</sup>Hasan, Dirasat, p. 69.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 383-404.

<sup>67</sup>Fuad Baali, "Agrarian Reform in Iraq: Some Socioeconomic Aspects," The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 28 (January 1969), 71.

<sup>68</sup>John L. Simmons, "Iraq: Problems of Agrarian Reform," Middle East Forum (November 1963), 13.

<sup>69</sup>John L. Simmons, "Agricultural Development in Iraq: Planning



and Management Failures," Middle East Journal, 19 (Spring 1964), 186.

<sup>70</sup>Sylvia G. Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962) p. 238.

<sup>71</sup>For further details on policies concerning peasants and agriculture, see Al-Fallahun wa al-Thawra fi al-Rif--The Peasants and the Revolution in the Countryside (Beirut: Dar al-Taleea, 1974).

<sup>72</sup>The American University, Area Handbook for Iraq (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971) pp. 259-260.

<sup>73</sup>For full details of the Marxist influence on the Party's ideology, see "Decisions of the Six National Convention of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, 1963" in Abu Jaber, Arab Ba'th, pp. 157-165.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-85; p. 87.

<sup>75</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 202.

<sup>76</sup>Kathleen M. Langley, "Iraq: Some Aspects of the Economic Scene," Middle East Journal, 18 (Spring 1964), 186.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>78</sup>The American University, Area Handbook for Iraq, pp. xxvi-xxvii.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>For full details of the Agrarian Reform Law, No. 117 of 1970, see the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda, Qanun al-Islah al-Zira'y--Law of Agrarian Reform (Baghdad: Government Press, 1970) pp. 3-70. Also, for a brief description of the same law, see Anwar Sabri, al-Masala al-Zira'yya--The Agrarian Reform Issue (Baghdad: Mutba't Muassasat al-Thaqafa al-Ummaliya, 1975) pp. 21-36.

<sup>81</sup>The American University, Area Handbook for Iraq, p. xxvii.

<sup>82</sup>Ministry of Information, Mithaq al-Amal al-Watani--The National Action Charter (Baghdad: Matba't al-Jumhuriyya, 1971) pp. 37-38. For full details of the Charter, see Ibid., pp. 3-56.

<sup>83</sup>Iraq Today, January 15, 1976, p. 15.

<sup>84</sup>ABSP, Revolutionary Iraq, pp. 140-143.

<sup>85</sup>Kathleen M. Langley, The Industrialization of Iraq (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961) p. iii.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 235.

<sup>88</sup>Al-Thawra Publications, al-Tatawur Al-Iqtisadi Fi al-Iraq, p. 17.

<sup>89</sup>Hasan, Dirasat, p. 232.

<sup>90</sup>For full details of both agreements, see Ibid., pp. 417-440.

<sup>91</sup>Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) p. 169.

<sup>92</sup>For full details on "prudent Arab socialism" see Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 255-261.

<sup>93</sup>Al-Thawra Supplement, July 17, 1975, p. 5.

<sup>94</sup>Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Information, Saddam Husain Speaks of Long-Term Development Strategy (Baghdad: Al-Huriya Printing Press, 1975) p. 13.

<sup>95</sup>The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Oil, Oppression and Resistance in Iraq (London: The Partisan Press Ltd., 1970) p. 1.

<sup>96</sup>For full details of historical development of oil explorations and production until 1958, see Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973) pp. 195-267; Abd al-Hamid al-Alawchi and Khdayir Abbas al-Lami, Al-Usool Al-Tarikhiya Li al-Naft al-Iraqi--The Historical Origin of Iraqi Oil (Baghdad: Dar Al-Hurriya, 1975) pp. 1-436; International Conference for Solidarity with the Iraqi People in Oil Nationalization, The History of Oil Monopolies in Iraq (Baghdad: Government Press, 1972) pp. 3-11; and Muhsen al-Mosawi, Iraq's Oil: The People's Struggle Against Oil Companies' Covets (Baghdad: Al-Hurriya Printing House, 1973) pp. 3-89.

<sup>97</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 161.

<sup>98</sup>IPC represents a consortium of British, Dutch, French and American oil companies together with the Gulbenkian interest.

<sup>99</sup>For a twelve-point official statement of Iraqi demands, see

al-Mosawi, Iraq's Oil, pp. 94-97; also see The Iraqi Times Newspaper, April 11, 1961.

<sup>100</sup>Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 354.

<sup>101</sup>Shwadran, Middle East Oil, p. 274.

<sup>102</sup>In addition to the five founding members of OPEC in 1960, the membership increased to thirteen states which "control over two-thirds of the world oil resources." They include, in chronological order of affiliation, Qatar 1961, the Libyan Arab Republic 1961, Indonesia 1962, the United Arab Emirates 1967, Algeria 1969, Nigeria 1971, Ecuador 1973, and Gabon 1973 (Associate Member). See Simpson Thacher and Bartlett, Analysis of OPEC's Status Under the United States Antitrust Laws, Report to the Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice, New York, July 22, 1975, p. 1. For full details, see Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, The Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Vienna: OPEC, N. D.). Also, see Mana Saeed al-Otaibi, OPEC and the Petroleum Industry (New York: Halsted Press, 1975).

<sup>103</sup>OPEC, Statute of OPEC, p. 3.

<sup>104</sup>Al-Otaibi, OPEC and Petroleum, p. 58.

<sup>105</sup>For a six-point statement of Law No. 80, 1961, see al-Mosawi, Iraq's Oil, pp. 98-100.

<sup>106</sup>Shwadran, Middle East Oil, p. 274.

<sup>107</sup>Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 355.

<sup>108</sup>The High Committee for the Celebrations of the 14th July, The Iraqi Revolution in Its Fourth Year (Baghdad: The Time Press, 1962) p. 664.

<sup>109</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 238-239.

<sup>110</sup>For a five-point statement of Law No. 97, 1967, see al-Mosawi, Iraq's Oil, p. 113.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., pp. 105-106; pp. 111-112; 114-115. Also see al-Tatwur al-Iqtisadi fi Al-Iraq, pp. 42-43.

<sup>112</sup>Iraqi Government, Al-Mufawadat wa al-Ta'meem--The Negotiations and the Nationalization (Baghdad: Dar al-Thawra, 1972) p. 186.

<sup>113</sup>For full details of the nine meetings between the Iraqi Government and the IPC for the period December 15, 1962-May 31, 1972,

see Ibid., pp. 15-163; for the ultimatum, see Ibid., pp. 170-172; for the proclamation of the decision of nationalization, see Ibid., pp. 9-14; and for Nationalization Law No. 69, 1972, see Ibid., pp. 175-178.

<sup>114</sup> Al-Jamhuriya, March 1, 1976, p. 3. For further details and specifically for the ten-point official statement of Law 200, 1975, see Baghdad Observer, Vol. 5, No. 2383, December 10, 1975, p. 5.

## Chapter V

### ADMINISTRATIONS AND SHIFTS OF POWER WITHIN AND AMONG REPUBLICAN REGIMES

In most developing countries, it can be observed that owing to the political direction of the governing elite and the economic philosophy which frequently restricts the growth of the private sector, the role of the public bureaucracy has become increasingly important in the management of development and change. On the one hand, agricultural and industrial policies rely heavily on the government apparatus to implement them. On the other hand, changes in elite composition modify goals and policy contents. In all circumstances, the public bureaucracy is expected, by the governing elite, to translate plans and programs into actions and accomplishments. However, the success or failure of policy formulation and execution will mainly depend upon a working relationship between commitment to the political elite, the availability of resources, and the responsiveness of the public bureaucracy.

Most studies of developing countries emphasize the importance of public bureaucracy as a variable that greatly influences the social, economic, and political transformation.<sup>1</sup> The same studies recognize the relationships (reciprocal or competitive) which exist between bureaucracy and the political system whose

shifts in political power will be reflected in a balance of power within bureaucracies (civil and military) and between political leaders and bureaucrats. But a major concern remains which revolves around the accumulation and exercise of power within and among the political elite, the military officers, the political party, and the bureaucracy. Such a concern is reflected by the possibility that the public bureaucracy can become "the most coherent power center ... where, in addition, the major decisions regarding national development are likely to involve authoritative rule making and rule application...."<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Riggs acknowledges that in developing societies there is a "lack of balance between political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures."<sup>3</sup> The significance of the phenomenon of unbalanced political or administrative growth is that it will increase the power of one side while weakening its counterpart, and this will threaten political development and administrative effectiveness. Furthermore, it has been pointed out by Lucian Pye that modernizing nations face the problem of "relating the administrative and authoritative structures of government to political forces...."<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, other views encourage the development of one or another institution as long as it endeavors to speed up the process of nation-building.<sup>5</sup> However, it is our view that whatever approach and strategy are adopted, the fact remains that administration does not operate in a vacuum; it interacts with political, social, and economic forces. Just as members of the political elite seek allies

in the bureaucracy, the bureaucrats also--through their functions--influence the power shifts of the political elite.

The administrative systems of the developing societies, civil and military, are regarded as instruments which are manipulated by the governing elites in order to translate economic and social policies into operating programs that eventually touch the general public. This view has encouraged governing elites to direct and control bureaucracies according to the elite's needs, means, and ends. At the same time, the political leadership has found in bureaucracy a source of elite recruitment, a force to enhance the leaders' positions by securing its support, and a center to train administrators and other experts.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will examine the role, make-up, and performance of the Iraqi bureaucracy and its reciprocal relationship with governing elites of the various regimes. In doing this, we hope to ascertain the extent to which the political style of each regime has effected as well as has been affected by the bureaucracy.

#### 5.1. The Role, Growth, and Organization of Public Bureaucracy

The trend of Iraqi republican governments has been to undertake a steadily increasing number of welfare functions. The concept of the positive state has been gradually accelerated since the 1960s. The governments have programmed large-scale projects in the areas of economic and social development, have assigned the public sector to

manage the human and material resources. In order to understand the degree of success or failure accomplished in these programs, we need to ask a number of questions: To what degree has the bureaucracy carried out its new responsibilities toward the state? How far has the bureaucracy moved in a direction consistent with the kind of society Iraq wants to build for itself? What promises have the various governments made to the people? What expectations do the new generations have of the bureaucracy? How responsive has the bureaucracy proven itself to be? It has been stated that the extent of change a bureaucracy can introduce is conditioned by the kind of the political system, the economic conditions, and the level of technological and social development of the whole society, accompanied by the attitudes of governmental bureaucrats themselves and their receptivity to change in governmental policy.<sup>6</sup>

Generally speaking, the national goals of central governments aim at building a society which conforms to the aspirations of the people. We find that both conservative and revolutionary regimes claim such goals, but the important difference lies in their implementation. Some reforms positively go beyond the frame of reference of traditional governmental activities and eventually upset the existing patterns of the public bureaucracy. Most of the developing countries are rapidly expanding their public bureaucracies as they undertake additional public services. Milton Esman remarks: "indeed, many of them are relying primarily and even exclusively on the administrative system to maintain links between



government and society and to carry out action programs."<sup>7</sup> Another explanation states:

...the governments in these countries are the primary agents of change in societies in which large numbers of people are resisting change. That governments play this role is not so much a matter of ideology as it is a matter of necessity. The politician and the bureaucrat in these countries are very literally leaders as well as rulers; they are taking the lead in trying to adapt to modern economic life ancient traditions which have been rendered tragically inadequate by the passage of time.<sup>8</sup>

For developing countries, the state means everything. Governments have to develop the means of production and to improve economic and social conditions of the citizens.

In Iraq, the state is undertaking a substantial part of the task of modernizing the country. Therefore, its public bureaucracy has had to increase the number of technicians and administrators in order to transform the country from a rural agricultural one to an urban-industrial society. Moreover, because the civil service is one of the few outlets for the educated, it has also been a focus of much political struggle. As will be discussed later, the national bureaucracy has been, at certain times and in connection with specific issues, an instrument in the hands of political elite and political parties. Yet, at other times, it remained independent and did not become identified with one or more rival power groups who sought to exercise control over broad policy issues of government.

Since 1958, regimes with different political ideologies have ruled the country. These regimes have given highest priority to political problems and have been primarily concerned with winning the struggle for control of power. By 1964, Gulick states that while heads of states and responsible ministers had been frequently changed, and various new economic, social and educational policies had been inaugurated, little had been done to modernize the structure and procedure of the administrative units of the government.<sup>9</sup> The impact of these political movements affected the administration whereby each regime attempted to strengthen its foothold by staffing the administration with as many new appointees as it could recruit from its own followers and sympathisers.<sup>10</sup> This unsatisfactory state of affairs had been further aggravated by the intervention of the army in running some of the main civil posts at the very time when newly-trained professionals with specialized qualifications were needed in such positions. Few of the army personnel placed in such positions had the necessary training.

Many reports and studies have emphasized, in addition to the above, the interrelation between the development of the economic sector and the administration. One such study, concluded in Iraq by Booz Allen and Hamilton, indicated that the country's nationalized industry had suffered from a shortage of professional managers and skilled personnel because the government neglected to train and develop managers.<sup>11</sup> Another study, which discussed the nature of the relationship between economic development and the administrative

machinery, asserted that existing bottlenecks in Iraq's economic development were due to the weakness of the administration.<sup>12</sup>

Yet despite such statements as these, significant changes have occurred in Iraqi economic and social structure over the past eighteen years. This has been a consequence of the formation of a "national development policy which aims at ensuring welfare and prosperity for the citizens."<sup>13</sup> In this context, Iraq's public bureaucracy has also undergone much change (see Appendix XVIII). Between 1960-1967, the number of state employees increased by 60 percent, and expenditures by 45 percent. Between 1967 and 1971, the size of the civil service grew another 56.7 percent and its expenditures 61 percent.<sup>14</sup> As further financial resources became available, more projects were undertaken and more personnel were recruited. For example, Law number 103 issued on February 7, 1974, added 10,000 graduates of local universities and higher institutes.<sup>15</sup> Also, Law number 154 of 1974, proclaimed by the Revolutionary Command Council in October 1974, was intended to reverse the migration of Iraqi scientists abroad, and at the same time successfully solicited the recruitment of qualified Arabs and other foreigners by offering them attractive employment benefits.

In general, the republican regimes sought to modernize Iraqi society by concentrating on the social and economic aspects, while neglecting the political arena. Public policy issues were introduced, debated, and decided in cabinet meetings, whereas their implementation was entrusted to the appropriate ministries. With the

increasing load of functions and responsibilities, ministers recruited new professionals and technicians, and created new departments and agencies. Semi-autonomous and autonomous establishments, attached to the office of the Prime Minister or the appropriate minister, were formed to reduce the volume of work of the central ministries and to bypass the obstacles and bottlenecks created by regular ministries. Since 1958, the state has increased its regulation of, and participation in, economic activities. Drastic and comprehensive measures of nationalization took place in 1964 and 1972: the first subjected major industries and financial institutions to government ownership; the second nationalized the oil industry. Both measures represented a major impact on the public bureaucracy increasing public employment and reorganizing government structure. Since 1973, oil income has trebled and quadrupled, an increase accompanied by leaping expansion of governmental expenditures, services, and employment. This trend has shown the need for competent and acclerative administrative development in order to cope with the desired changes.

The structure of the central administration in Iraq basically consists of the ministries and the semi-autonomous agencies attached to them. While individual ministries vary in size from few hundred employees to several tens of thousands of employees, they all conform to a uniform pattern of organization. Each ministry was headed by a minister and a deputy minister appointed by the Prime Minister, but both have become presidential

appointees since 1970. Their responsibilities include the administration and the application of all laws and regulations pertaining to the ministry. Below the minister and his deputy, each ministry consists of directorates general headed by directors general, normally career civil servants, who advise the minister on all matters relating to the work of the ministry. The major administrative subdivisions in the ministry are the directorates general which in turn are subdivided into departments, sections and branches. They constitute the formal ministerial hierarchy and are staffed by permanent civil servants. This organizational structure is typical of all ministries, and variations occur only in the number of subdivisions, depending on the size and scope of each ministry.

The influence of the Ottoman and French administrative practices in Iraq can easily be discerned. The administration is highly centralized and marked by concentration of authority to such a degree that all decisions, even routine ones, are made at the highest organizational level in the administrative machinery. The philosophy of centralization arises mostly from the desire to foster more uniformity and standardization across the nation. Yet, one cannot overlook some of the obvious problems when centralization is carried to an extreme. Top administrators, such as the minister and directors general, are constantly overburdened with unnecessary minute details which result in their distraction from more serious tasks. It is not uncommon to have petty matters referred to the minister concerned, or to have these discussed at the cabinet

level before a final decision can be reached. To make things worse, the lack of properly qualified and trained personnel in Iraqi administration has impeded efforts to delegate authority.

#### 5.2. The Need to Reorganize and Control the Public Bureaucracy

The need for administrative change has been largely attributed to inefficiency and corruption in existing administrative practice. Ferrel Heady remarks that "Mid-East personnel administration, despite widespread incorporation of Westernized features, is still dominated by the heritage of the past and ill prepared for demands of the present or the future."<sup>16</sup> He further suggests that if such demands are to be met, they must occur through local initiative and leadership which not only makes skillful and selective use of foreign experience and technique, but which also will adapt them to regional realities shaped by history, tradition, and emerging nationalism.

In 1965 this need for change in Middle Eastern administrative systems was voiced by the Iraqi Delegation to the Arab League Conference on Administrative Sciences. The Delegation complained of organization, personnel, financial, and value problems which continue to face the public service.<sup>17</sup> A few years later, in 1971, the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Inter-regional Seminar on "Major Administrative Reforms to Developing Countries" once again expressed its main concern that "major administrative reforms have not yet taken place in Iraq."<sup>18</sup> Further complaints were

voiced in 1976 by the Minister of Planning who attributed failures of national policy execution mainly to administrative inefficiencies.<sup>19</sup>

In a context where change is the order of the day, it is important that attention be given to the careful selection of transformation strategy most relevant to the case at hand and to the timing of its inauguration. As Lawrence Graham writes:

...We continue to be faced with the question of how to convert national development goals and economic policies designed to effect such objectives into concrete, visible programs which are to be implemented largely by agencies of the state. In dealing with issues of this nature, consciousness of the timing factor is crucial in mapping out which particular strategy of change is to be pursued in the bureaucratic arena.<sup>20</sup>

Experience shows that planning for change may range from war-time to normal-time planning, from local or regional to national planning, from project-by-project to sectoral or, still on a wider scale, to comprehensive or totalitarian planning, and from laissez faire to guided or directed planning.<sup>21</sup> Narrowing the choice of strategies, Graham mentions reform or revolution, centralization or decentralization, civil or military, structural or institutional, incremental or sudden and total change.<sup>22</sup>

On taking power, new leaders in developing countries often start by promising people reforms and sometimes radical changes. Frequently they are convinced that the easiest and quickest way of demonstrating change is to commence new policies and then to assign responsibility for their implementation to existing bureaucratic

apparatuses. Newly appointed leaders are rarely perceptive of the difficulties and challenges--varying in scope and importance and depending on the relationship between the political and administrative sub-systems of the state--which must be faced during reform periods. National leaders have repeatedly promised administrative reform and pledged their commitment to improving public administration.

The new leadership of the 1958 revolution aimed to raise the standard of administrative reform, declaring that they "were cleansing the country of corruption, tyranny, and foreign influence."<sup>23</sup> The new regime entrusted the bureaucrats with responsibility for achieving the new objectives of higher rates of economic and social change and for implementing newly-prepared programs. Top administrators were encouraged to play a dynamic role in the formulation and policy-making stages of national planning. Public officials in general were asked to behave differently from the past and to offer, with good spirit, their services to the people rather than to act as their masters. The citizens, on the other hand, were also asked to communicate their needs and problems to the civil servants without fear or mistrust.

The phenomenon of the military as the administrators of development served as a training device for army personnel who were faced with great and unanticipated challenges in assuming responsibility for tasks they knew nothing about. They had to implement legislative and administrative reforms in order to satisfy the



expectations of impatient people eager for rapid results. This converted many of the army personnel into active politicians, making public speeches and taking up political and administrative posts, in addition to their military careers.

It is always the claim of new and/or revolutionary leaders that extensive changes in the top-level personnel of the ministries are necessary to carry out social and economic reform. Therefore, purging committees were formed in different ways and for various purposes under the comprehensive aims of maintaining an efficient, cooperative, loyal, and honest civil service. In other words, their aim was to undermine corrupt and self-serving administrations, and to eliminate potential enemies or political opponents.

A questionnaire was conducted among some members of the bureaucratic elite<sup>24</sup> to probe their attitudes regarding some administrative aspects. One issue was: what major problem confronted the country in its transitional stage? Two-thirds of the respondents mentioned the professional and technical personnel, while one-third regarded the socialistic transformation as the primary issue. Further eliciting their preference regarding the administrative behavior of their subordinates, two-thirds of the bureaucratic elite preferred public officials to use their talent to interpret the rules and regulations, but without breaking them, while one-third of the bureaucratic elite conditioned their preference by circumstances such as sincerity, benevolence, and intention of their subordinates. In a follow-up question concerning the extent of

contribution of the public bureaucracy to the execution of plans on national and local levels, 60 percent of the respondents agreed upon the bureaucracy's important role at both central and regional levels, while 40 percent expressed a negligible contribution of the public bureaucracy at central and local levels. A final question was asked as to the solution to the above problems and difficiencies: two-thirds agreed upon the preparation of a long-term plan which would aim at increasing the capacity of the public bureaucracy by training its employees; one-third voiced a solution of forming a party bureaucracy which would exist side-by-side with the official bureaucracy to supervise and control government administration. It is interesting to note that none of the respondents recommended the private sector to undertake any of the development programs.

### 5.3. Bureaucratic Adaptation and Responsiveness

The attitudes of government bureaucrats toward new regimes in the Third World vary widely from apathy and resentment to attempts to embarrass new governments or even to sabotage the policies which they seek to implement. The failure of many bureaucrats to respond positively to such changes arises from such factors as conservative influences, fear of change itself, and the bureaucrats' own need for security. Successful leaders may be able to convince bureaucrats that progress furnishes new opportunities to everyone. As a means of counteracting bureaucratic resistance to change, in-service training programs and the establishment of new

criteria for evaluating employees on the basis of achievement can be utilized to encourage innovation and adaptation in bureaucracy, as well as to eliminate fears and doubts among bureaucrats. As new development programs and social policies increase, they require a parallel increase in technical and professional skills in public bureaucracy.

At the same time, it is important to note that the spirit of governmental organization is largely a response to the norms of the surrounding society,<sup>25</sup> and that the action of individual bureaucrats is to a great extent conditioned by the values they carry with them into the administrative context.<sup>26</sup> Bureaucratic values and patterns of behavior in Iraq are predominately those of a traditional society. While present at all levels of the organization, they appear to be stronger among the lower echelons of bureaucratic hierarchy. It is the pervasiveness of these values and behavior patterns more than the lack of technical and managerial competence, that often accounts for impediments to greater efficiency and the repeated failure of new decrees to eradicate prevailing patterns of bureaucratic behavior. Moreover, it should be pointed out that cultural changes need time and effort and must be introduced into the society as a whole. Since culture in Iraq has not undergone basic change, innovations in the bureaucratic apparatus as a whole are bound to face resentment and opposition which will leave many administrative reforms ineffective. Usually the government's main concern is geared primarily to the higher levels of the service. In the elaboration

of new policies, there is rarely much thought devoted to give the people an understanding of the objectives and values in administrative reforms.

Any realistic effort to improve administrative practice must take into consideration the facts relative to politics, power, group dynamics, and personality.<sup>27</sup> This perspective, while developed primarily in the context of Western administration, is also used in examining administrative practices designed to maximize objectivity in governmental work in a variety of nation-states. Rationality in policy-making, establishment of Civil Service Boards, and training institutes of public administration, all constitute strategies designed to contribute to the creation of a more effective governmental bureaucracy.

As most governments respond to new levels of technology, they seek to develop public bureaucracies that will respond more and more to the criteria of economy and efficiency. As we have seen already, previous Iraqi governments have attempted to increase the number of experts and technicians in the professional cadre. At the same time the new regimes interfered politically in the activities of professional bureaucrats. Such developments as these tended to reduce the impact of these new professionals at the very time they were needed most. Paul Appleby's observations regarding the relationship between politics and bureaucracy deserves to be kept in mind here as we look at Iraqi experience:

...where or insofar as the more political officer

or body moves in, the expert moves out, where the more political official delegates or defers to the less political official, the experts's scope expands.<sup>28</sup>

Such has been the pattern in Iraq. There, as elsewhere, the debate between expert and political officer has been articulated in terms of the interference of politics in public administration. Iraqi experts have expressed the fear that "party loyalty has priority over efficiency in selection for recruitment...." and have argued that such criterion reduce "the efficiency and specialization of the administrative system."<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, as the army's share of positions in the administrative machinery has increased gradually, more and more key civilian posts have been assigned to military personnel.

In spite of such problems, there has been progress in some areas. All three regimes under study here took steps to establish national planning boards, central statistical departments, central personnel agencies, and training institutes. The improvements obtained as a result of establishing these institutions led many people, inside and outside of government, to realize the importance of scientific, technical, specialized, and professional knowledge in the work of government.

Through the process of professionalization, it is usually hoped that bureaucrats will internalize such Weberian values as political neutrality, personal integrity, performance orientation, economy and efficiency, and respect for the rule of law. According

to Esman, this can be achieved only by:

...Education to strengthen substantive knowledge of public affairs, improve operational and management skills, and inculcate analytical and problem solving methods and attitudes; the transfer of managerial control techniques such as performance budgeting, central procurement, position classification, methods analysis and other intermediate staff technologies; the emphasis on public service value--these were expected to increase the operational capabilities of these bureaucracies to perform their program activities and to discharge whatever are considered to be their appropriate political functions.<sup>30</sup>

The establishment of a central office of personnel administration is generally recognized as a first step in the initiation and operation of a modern career service.<sup>31</sup> In Iraq, when the need for a central personnel office was recognized, the government invited, in 1954, Browning, an American expert and then, in 1956, Welsh, a British expert, both of whom recommended a set of procedures for establishing a central personnel office.<sup>32</sup> Later in 1956, the government established a civil service commission under Civil Service Law Number 55.<sup>33</sup> This law remained in operation until 1960 when a new Civil Service Law (Number 24) was enacted. This later law, however, was basically the same as its predecessor and contained only minor modifications.

Tied to the creation of a central personnel office was a recognition of the need to provide for technical training and preparation of civil servants. As a consequence, special training courses and training institutes attached to the different ministries have been created as a means of improving the administrative

capabilities of government bureaucrats.<sup>34</sup> An important part of this over-all strategy has been the assignment of a share of the responsibility for such training to the University of Baghdad where the Institute of Public Administration, with the help of the Ford Foundation, was established in 1958. Initially, the Institute was entrusted with responsibility for training undergraduates for public service careers. Later, however, the Institute was granted a university college status and consequently was converted from a professional school into an academic one.

Two observations can be made about administrative development in Iraq. The first is that, unlike the West, where economic development generally preceded bureaucratic reforms, in Iraq, as well as in other parts of the Third World, administrative reform has been launched while basic economic and political change has been occurring. The second observation is that governments have constantly made broad claims to control all aspects of the lives of their people while in fact they have fallen far short of this ambition. For example, there is a great gap between the national goals set and promised by the government and actual accomplishments. While economic growth during the monarchical regime (1953-1958) was 6.7 percent annually, during the more ambitious republican regime (1958-1963), it amounted to only 6.2 percent.<sup>35</sup> The same frustrating results were obtained for plans during 1961-1964 and 1964/65-1969/70.

Another observation is that it seems that civilian

politicians lack the forcefulness to convince the army that its dual roles consist of a non-political guardian of public order and a reformer both in times of crisis and in normal times. In all these regimes, army leadership provided, to a certain extent, stability and ordered progress. One can pose the hypothesis that, in most Middle Eastern countries, "major" administrative reforms have little chance of success unless they are backed by some type of strong bureaucracy and are supported by the army.

#### 5.4. Public Bureaucracy: A Vehicle for Development

While government policies provide economic direction, the translation of policies into actions and the operationalization of the various programs and plans depend on existing institutions. Since 1958, the republican regimes that have come to power have given planning more attention than their predecessors. When a regime became pro-leftist, it followed plans drawn by Russian and Czechoslovakian economists; when the regime became nationalist, it followed Arab-socialist approaches such as the Egyptian model. But, on the whole, these various regimes, which were dominated by the military and lacked any clear philosophy for managing the economy, continued to stress in their development programs the importance of large infrastructure projects. Such projects, according to their way of thinking, represented a symbol of greatness for their regimes. More recently, industrialization of the country has become the central focus of the development programs for 1960-



1964, 1965-1969, and 1970-1974 (see Tables XIII and XIV). This sharp shift of emphasis toward industrialization at the expense of agriculture was accentuated with the signing of an economic aid agreement with the Soviet Union which promises both economic and technical aid towards the industrialization of the country. However, such emphasis was reversed during the Arif regime, then reversed again during the first five years (1968-73) of the al-Bakr regime, and finally reversed recently (1974-75) when emphasis has been placed on industry. In all three regimes, this commitment to national planning has meant an expanded role for public bureaucracy. Consequently it becomes important to consider the Iraqi experience with the implementation of national plans.

In order to create a climate for development, writes Paul Meadows, there is a need for "innovation, modification, and alteration of personal attitudes, organizational practices and institutions."<sup>36</sup> Involvement of public bureaucracy may range from direct control in one extreme of a continuum to indirect influence in the other extreme. In this connection, Riggs adds that "in virtually all governments the action arm, the main instrument for program implementation, is the public bureaucracy."<sup>37</sup> Hence the bureaucracy and its central planning machinery play the triple role of planning, creating a desirable atmosphere, and implementing the national plan. In this setting, the nature of public bureaucracy becomes an important determinant of outcomes. Where bureaucracy is weak, inefficient, and corrupt, the planning machinery will manifest

similar characteristics. Where environment influences dominant administrative processes, they also affect the planning process. In both cases, decision-making becomes enmeshed so intricately and so deeply in surrounding cultural patterns, that it cannot be treated as autonomous behavior.

Iraq realized as early as 1952 that the prevailing administrative machinery was too inefficient and corrupt to carry out the burden of development. The solution adopted to cure such administrative ills was the creation of the Development Board. It was first established on a temporary basis to supervise the spending of a loan advanced by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the purpose of executing some irrigation projects. This board continued in existence until 1958 when Qasim replaced it by an Economic Planning Board and a new Ministry of Planning. The task of the Ministry of Planning was, and still is, to draw up plans in the light of the general aims set by the Economic Planning Board, to coordinate the proposals of the various ministries, to study their projects, to prepare the annual development budget, and to supervise the execution of the plan, after its approval by the Economic Planning Board.<sup>38</sup>

Since the overthrow of the Qasim regime, some half a dozen different ministers have administered the Ministry of Planning. Although the organizational setup of the Economic Planning Board has remained unaltered, the constant change in the political leadership has certainly impeded whatever usefulness the Planning Board might

have had. Although both the Planning Board and the Ministry of Planning nominally function, the authority of decision-making remains in the firm grasp of the new leaders, the Revolutionary Command Council and members of the ruling party, thus by-passing the official administration which remains responsible for execution of the policies.

Since the nationalization of oil in 1972, accelerated growth and swift capital accumulation in Iraq has led to unprecedented modernization and prosperity for the country. The process of investing and distributing the huge proceeds from oil has created changes in the socio-economic structure. One of the changes was to reorganize the country's labor force. Its insufficient size and skill had led to an increased foreign labor force. In order to deal with the various problems and changes, the government has recently adopted an approach whereby it determines broad policies and objectives, leaving wide areas of activity for the private sector to exercise its initiative and entrepreneurship.

Regardless of the contributions which public bureaucracy can make to economic, social, and political development, bureaucracy may also serve as an impediment. S. N. Eisenstadt has noted that in many cases bureaucracies became stumbling-blocks on the road to political unification and continuous modernization and development.<sup>39</sup> Also, Michel Crozier has emphasized in his study, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy such

as slowness, ponderousness, routine, complication of procedures, and maladapted responses.<sup>40</sup> Drawing upon Eisenstadt's statement and using Crozier's study, several apparent administrative maladaptations are selected from the general literature to illustrate certain disfavorable correlations between bureaucracy and development which have occurred in Iraq. They include, among others, undue interference from politicians or powerful interest groups and corruption. A by-product of these stumbling blocks is the migration of higher-educated manpower, resulting in some loss of investment in education and training.

Conditions of bureaucracy in Iraq seem to substantiate part of Riggs' assertion that "...the weaker the outside political process, the more powerful the officials themselves become not on purpose, but by default."<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, Riggs states that this weakness has two consequences: first, a decline in the work output of administration, or in administrative efficiency and second, the politicization of the bureaucracy, a consequence of its members seeking to fortify their individual positions and to institute their individual policies. He also argues that "the crux of the problem of politics and administration is that the weaker the external political direction, the more the administrative processes themselves become politicized."<sup>42</sup> As to Riggs' assertion that "the greatest damage resulting from politics in administration is not so much the 'intervention' of politicians in administrative processes, as the conversion of administrators into quasi-politicians,"<sup>43</sup> such

a claim is disputed by the frequent behavior of most of the republican regimes. Each regime purged sensitive administrative posts, in addition to political positions, to reward them to loyalists and supporters. Evidences of such behavior are plentiful. For example, after a year in power, the Qasim regime carried out large-scale purges in the army and administration which involved hundreds of army officers and civil and diplomatic employees at all levels.<sup>44</sup> According to George Haddad, "in four and a half years, it is estimated that 2,000 officers were retired along with hundreds, if not thousands, of civil servants including important and experienced officials."<sup>45</sup> Most of those purged were known to be Nasirite and Baath followers and sympathizers who were anti-Qasimites. Similar vindictive measures were taken by the Baath-dominated government to the Communists and pro-Qasim elements during the first nine months of the Arif regime in 1963. As described by Haddad, the difference between the Baath and the Communists "was not so much in the aspects of economic policy and methods of rule as in the question of destiny and political ambition."<sup>46</sup> The Baath, like the Communists, would not tolerate the participation of another strong group in the rule of the country. The Baath, who brought Arif to power in 1963, after losing it in 1958, did not escape oppressive treatment and harassment. Throughout the remainder of the Arif regimes and until 1968, the military officers' corps, in collaboration with a number of civil servants, continued to wield strong political influence in determining and carrying on

government policies. As Arif instituted his pan-Arab supporters in top political posts, he and his supporters interfered in administrative appointments and reshuffles in key positions.<sup>47</sup> When the Baath returned to power in 1968, it released many of its members who had been in jail, reinstated some 700 retired Baath officers to the army,<sup>48</sup> and transferred non-Baath sympathizers from key military and administrative posts to less responsible positions.

In this context, the army, too, has influenced in a decisive way the course of development in Iraq. The military regime of 1958 inherited an administrative system largely committed to the interests of the ruling oligarchy and to limited social and economic objectives.<sup>49</sup> The Iraqi revolution, however, introduced new political-administrative patterns which required a change in such practices. Through the retirement of some personnel and the purges of many others,<sup>50</sup> ruling elites in successive regimes have attempted to clean out most of those higher-echelon administrators who were not politically reliable. Those who have replaced them and have occupied the top posts in the administrative hierarchy have had a clearly articulated political orientation and sense of political responsibility.

Despite these changes for the better, one of the consequences of the revolution was the perpetuation of a struggle for power in Iraq. This led to an increase in political instability. In turn, political instability within the government meant that there was little job security among the upper echelons of the

bureaucracy as each regime installed a new group of supporters to whom the jobs of administrative decision-making were entrusted. Political considerations, including personal relationships, often outweigh merit in obtaining a government job or advancing to a better position despite recent recognition that personalism is counter-productive. Various experts have complained that the bureaucracy is occupied by many unqualified employees whose standards of education and performance are low.

Such conditions as these still exist in the seventies-- although to a much less degree than in the sixties--in spite of massive efforts to modernize the administration of the country.<sup>51</sup> This situation is due to the parallel existence of modern and traditional values and attitudes. Political pressure and family ties exist if only implicitly and their influence penetrates to the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. Such administrative inefficiency has brought about the phenomenon of corruption and migration of scientific personnel abroad.

Corruption<sup>52</sup> and inefficiency are found among citizens of various educational levels, professions, and religious affiliation, the civil servants of various grades, and even the politicians and cabinet ministers. To combat corruption, the Iraqi governments established purging committees on several occasions. The first formal purge committee was established in 1956 on a one year basis to: (1) examine the personnel files of a large number of public officials, (2) receive complaints, and (3) launch such investigations

as it saw fit.<sup>53</sup> During the republican regimes, military leaders replaced top administrators after accusing them of being corrupt and reactionary as well as posing a threat to the survival of the revolution. Consequently, the notion of cleaning up the administration was adopted and a new law enacted authorizing the council of Ministers to fire all suspects from the service. Mr. Ellis estimated that 4,000 upper level bureaucrats were dismissed or retired by General Qasim's government during the first two years.<sup>54</sup> By 1965, about two-fifths of all the top level bureaucrats had been lost through purges and resignations.<sup>55</sup> This caused the loss of many administrators whose experience and skill were badly needed. At the same time, many corrupt officials for one reason or another were not even questioned by the committees established after the revolution.<sup>56</sup> The number of retired public officials increased from 18,785 in 1951 to more than 30,000 in 1966.<sup>57</sup>

The prevailing administrative environment in Iraq continues to support--to a large extent--the obedient, the cautious, and the precedent-ridden officials. The incentives and rewards built into this system aid little to stimulate responsible behavior. The style of the public service has not been significantly modified to encourage and protect administrative initiative or to gear such initiative to the needs of development. Politically-directed bureaucracy in Iraq sometimes leads to a reduction in professional capability and operational autonomy of the bureaucracy. It also alienates some trained academicians, intellectuals, and competent bureaucrats. A



by-product of these twin phenomena--politicization of the administration and corruption--has been the scientific migration of academic professionals and technicians abroad (Appendix XIX) during the period 1956-1967. The trend is known to have continued until 1974 when the phenomenon caught the attention of the political leaders. Since 1974, the al-Bakr regime provided a contrasting example to the Qasim and Arif regimes. It has been successful not only at discouraging the brain drain but has been pooling qualified competent personnel from other Arab countries. This is probably due to such factors as political stability, working facilities, and great material rewards. The Law of Qualified Personnel No. 154 of 1974, granted considerable financial and material benefits to those with M.S. and Ph.D. degree holders who were working outside and wished to return to Iraq. Statistics showed that between the time of inauguration and until June 22, 1975, there were 1200 applicants divided into 383 with Ph.D., 387 with M.S., and 400 with B.S. and lower degrees. The Selection Committee admitted 514 applicants of whom there were 300 Ph.D. and M.S. degree holders.<sup>58</sup> The law was the sole decision of the political leadership who desired to involve the qualified personnel needed to participate in the execution of developmental programs.

Checks and controls on the bureaucracy fluctuated with the strength and weakness of each regime as reflected in the presence or disappearance of responsible cabinets, political parties, legislative bodies, impartial legal system, and free press. As subsequent

events indicated, the various institutions required for effective and healthy political and administrative development remained weak and largely inefficient. Over the many years of revolutionary pronouncements, specialized, adaptable, autonomous, and coherent institutions have not proliferated fast enough to provide the national system with the required capabilities to manage, more effectively and systematically, the complex matrix of development.

#### 5.5. Summary and Conclusion

The position of public bureaucracy as an economic instrument is determined mainly by government contribution to the economy as a whole. Oil in Iraq contributes significantly to its gross national product (GNP). The magnitude of the ratio of the oil revenues to the GNP is one indicator of the financial importance the government possesses in relation to other sectors of the economy. This, in turn, provides the Iraqi bureaucracy with equally significant economic power derived from the management and allocation of all governmental resources. The government is also the principal employer. This means that the bureaucracy is the allocative sector whose organization, methods, and practice are of particular importance to the development of the economy.

The political history of Iraq is a record of continuing conflict and uncertainty marked by a struggle for power between the politicians, the military, and the civil bureaucracies, as well as

among the various political groups. An unfavorable environment marred by political instability and interference makes it very difficult to implement development plans when they are inextricably linked to political considerations, and when those concerned with implementation are chosen on the basis of their loyalty to the regime rather than on the basis of their qualifications and technical skills. Furthermore, when the military occupies a position of primacy, it forces the civil bureaucracy into a secondary place. If this practice continues, then the country will always be faced with the problem of substantial under-implementation, unless there is a major change in the political reasoning of the leaders.

In the long run, there is a need for building up a public administration of competent achievement-oriented and politically responsive individuals. This is particularly true since military professionals lack training in civilian positions and lack interest in economic planning and the administration of civilian programs. The general trend indicates that the bureaucracy over the years has acquired three main characteristics: (a) public administration is imitative rather than indigenous, (b) the formal organization of bureaucracy has been moving toward professionalism, although the internal and informal behavioral patterns are still traditional, and (c) despite the preceding two points, indications are that bureaucracy during each of the three regimes became more competent and effective in overcoming the first two characteristics and that it has been, to a certain degree, more responsive to the political

leadership. A growing professionalism seems to be slowly altering work habits and codes of conduct among middle management officials. When the leadership of a country commits itself to shaping the future through deliberate actions, the public bureaucracy (civil and military) is then justified to take the initiative and power to establish preconditions, fix certain general or specific objectives, and insure that the society diverts enough of its resources into growth-producing sectors for economic development. Furthermore, we can also conclude that the propensity of an economy to grow and develop will be greater when the activities of the public bureaucracy, the military bureaucracy, and the political elite complement each other rather than conflict with one another. Furthermore, where administrative and economic development precede political development, the transfer of power from one government to its successor through non-violent means becomes less certain. Hence, force or the threat of force plays a major role in many developing nations. Under such conditions, the seizure of power by the military, or rather by a clique of military officers, becomes habitual: they appoint themselves to positions of authority over the public bureaucracy and name one or another of their members as temporary or permanent leader. After each coup, military leaders are assigned to run civilian departments, but gradually become captives of their own subordinates, and are converted from officers to officials. For such a leader and his junta (or one political party) who comes to power by "extra-legal" means, it is possible to argue that a

bureaucracy based on merit or seniority would not be functional, and for the new regime, loyalty rather than merit or seniority becomes the rule rather than the exception in making key appointments. Consequently, this policy will breed dissatisfaction, instability, inefficiency, and corruption. However, in the long-run, the criteria of merit and training become more desirable and crucial in the administration of the goals and policies of the state.

In Iraq, it was observed that while the military distrusted political parties, which resulted in the disappearance of the politicians from all levels of government, the bureaucrats applied their administrative-technical quality, and the politicians (after 1972) eliminated military officers from influential positions. The various republican regimes exhibited short-lived cabinets which did not serve as an effective coordinating instrument. Frequent changes in cabinets did not afford the ministers the opportunities to administer their policies. Intrigues, purges, and even violence within and outside the government apparatus diverted the political elite's attention from administering economic and social programs to such goals as the maintenance of personal position and power. The more power is fractured among elite members and the more the elite factions, the shorter is the cabinet duration, the higher the political instability, and the stronger is the position of the bureaucracy.

The political leaders of the various regimes employed

different styles and means in running the country. Both Qasim and Arif did not show any inclination to rely on political parties. In contrast, al-Bakr put his political party in complete charge of the state. Again, Qasim followed a divide-and-rule policy by playing off one political party against another to rule the country; the Arif brothers dissolved political parties and relied on associate officers and civil servants for support. In contrast, the al-Bakr regime, after solidifying its power base, followed an integrative-developmental policy by allowing other political parties to share the political power but keeping the ABSP in commanding positions.

In conclusion, the various regimes attempted to bring the bureaucracy under control by appointing large numbers of their followers to administrative positions. To a certain extent, these regimes were successful in their effort. However, such conversion efforts frequently resulted in ineffective bureaucracy. Rather than being based on the need for and the quality of recruits to implement development policies, the bureaucracy became not a chief policy executor but a last resort of provide employment. Therefore we can state that there is a strong relationship between the regime factor and public bureaucracy. The relationship varies according to the strength or weakness of one or another and it also depends upon their resources and capabilities. A parallel development of both administrative and political institutions is more desirable than the growth of one without the other. An unbalanced approach may

result in the subordination of one institution to the domination of the other. The relationship can be seen as more creative when it establishes a style of a partnership between the political elite and the military and civil bureaucracies.

## Chapter V

ADMINISTRATIONS AND SHIFTS OF POWER  
WITHIN AND AMONG REPUBLICAN REGIMES

<sup>1</sup>This consensus is found in the writings of Apter, Politics of Allocation; Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ralph Braibanti, Political and Administrative Development (Durham, N.D.: Duke University Press, 1969); George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, Reformed Administration in Lebanon (Beirut: The Catholic Press, 1964); Heady, Public Administration; Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971); Joseph La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (2nd ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); E. Philip Morgan, ed., The Administration of Change in Africa (New York: The Dunellen Publishing Company, 1974); John D. Montgomery, Technology and Civic Life: Making and Implementing Development Decisions (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1974); John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin, eds., Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966); Nimrod Raphaeli, ed., Readings in Comparative Public Administration (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967); Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964); Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration; Irving Swerdlow, ed., Development Administration: Concepts and Problems (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966); Clarence Thurber and Lawrence S. Graham, eds., Development Administration in Latin America (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973); Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965); Edward W. Weidner, ed., Development Administration in Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970); Weiner, ed., Modernization; and Gary Wynia, Politics and Planners (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).

<sup>2</sup>Joseph La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, p. 15.



<sup>3</sup>Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development," in Ibid., p. 120. Also, see Fred W. Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," in Weidner, Development Administration in Asia, pp. 48-58.

<sup>4</sup>Lucian W. Pye, "The Political Context of National Development," in Swerdlow, Development Administration, p. 31. Also see, Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," in Montgomery and Siffin, Approaches to Development, pp. 71-112.

<sup>5</sup>This view is expressed in the writings of Clarence E. Thurber, "Islands of Development: A Political and Social Approach to Development Administration in Latin America," in Thurber and Graham, Development Administration in Latin America, pp. 15-46; Milton J. Esman, "Administrative Doctrine and Developmental Needs," in Morgan, Administration of Change in Africa, pp. 3-26; and Julius Waiguchu, "The Politics of Nation-Building in Kenya: A Study of Bureaucratic Elitism," in Ibid., pp. 189-220.

<sup>6</sup>See footnote 1 above.

<sup>7</sup>Milton Esman, "Continuity of Modernization and Development of Administration: Preliminary Statement of the Problem," CAG Occasional Papers (Bloomington, Indiana, 1964), p. 24.

<sup>8</sup>Eugene R. Black, The Diplomacy of Economic Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 12.

<sup>9</sup>Luther Gulick, "Next Steps Toward Eliminating Red Tape and Improving the Machinery of Government for the Republic of Iraq," Baghdad, 1964, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

<sup>10</sup>The Iraqi Delegation, "Administrative Problems and Their Remedy in Iraq" (paper submitted to the 3rd Conference for Administrative Science of the Arab League, Cairo, October 23, 1965), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Dhiaa Azzu, "The Iraqi Nationalized Textile Industry Performance and Appraisal 1964-1968" (unpublished M.A. thesis, The American University of Beirut, 1970), p. 181.

<sup>12</sup>Al-Samarrai, Al-Tatawur Al-Iqtisadi, p. 119.

<sup>13</sup>See, for example: Hamid Hummadi, "Outline of Proposed Plan for Management Development in Iraq" (paper delivered at the U.N. Inter-regional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries, Brighton, England: 1971), p. 1.

- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> Al-Thawra, Special Edition (Baghdad), July 17, 1975, p. 21.
- <sup>16</sup> Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration in the Middle East," Public Personnel Review, xx (January 1959), p. 55.
- <sup>17</sup> Iraqi Delegation, "Administrative Problems," pp. 2-4.
- <sup>18</sup> Hummadi, "Development in Iraq," p. 1.
- <sup>19</sup> Baghdad Observer, March 3, 1976, p. 3. Also see Al-Thawra, May 27, 1976.
- <sup>20</sup> Lawrence Graham, "Administrative Reform in the Latin American Context," a lecture delivered at the Development Administrators' Training Program, The University of Connecticut, Hartford, August 7, 1970, p. 24.
- <sup>21</sup> Waterston, Development Planning, pp. 8-27.
- <sup>22</sup> Graham, "Administrative Reform," p. 24.
- <sup>23</sup> Amer Al-Kubaisy, "Theory and Practice of Administrative Development in New Nations with Reference to the Case of Iraq," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1971), p. 264.
- <sup>24</sup> A survey of twenty Iraqi directors general in the central administration. It was conducted in August 1975 in Baghdad. Only fifteen members of the bureaucratic elite responded.
- <sup>25</sup> Paul H. Appleby, Policy and Administration (Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 97.
- <sup>26</sup> Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 73-75.
- <sup>27</sup> Emmett Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 200.
- <sup>28</sup> Appleby, Policy and Administration, p. 62.
- <sup>29</sup> The Iraqi Delegation, "Administrative Problems," p. 62.

<sup>30</sup>Milton Esman, "The Study of Public Administration: An Appraisal," in Comparative Administration Group Occasional Papers (Bloomington, Indiana, 1964), pp. 30-31.

<sup>31</sup>United Nations, Development of Economic and Social Affairs, A Handbook of Public Administration (ST/TAO/M/16) (New York, 1961), p. 53.

<sup>32</sup>Abdul Razzaq Al-Shaikhly, "Selection of Officials and the Civil Service Commission," Journal of Public Administration, I, Baghdad, 1968, 83.

<sup>33</sup>The Civil Service Commission, First Annual Report of 1957 (Baghdad: 1958), p. 5.

<sup>34</sup>The Iraqi Delegation, "Administrative Problems," p. 6.

<sup>35</sup>Al-Kubaisy, "Administrative Development," pp. 392-93.

<sup>36</sup>Paul Meadows, "Motivation for Change and Development Administration," in Swerdlow, Development Administration, p. 86; pp. 110-111.

<sup>37</sup>Riggs, "The Context of Development Administration," in Riggs, Frontiers of Development Administration, p. 78.

<sup>38</sup>Mohammad Salman Al-Hasan, "Towards a Revolutionary Economic Machinery in Iraq," Middle East Economic Papers 1960, pp. 44-54. Also Law No. 87 of 1965 in the Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, no. 48, December 1, 1965, pp. 1-5.

<sup>39</sup>S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, p. 113.

<sup>40</sup>Crozier, Bureaucratic Phenomenon, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup>Fred Riggs, "Political Interference: Theory and Practice," in Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 4, (October, 1960), p. 320. Also see Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development," in La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development, p. 129.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 181-82; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 85.

<sup>45</sup>Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule, p. 121.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>47</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 220; pp. 242-43.

<sup>48</sup>Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule, p. 161.

<sup>49</sup>Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 5; p. 8.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-46; p. 356; p. 377.

<sup>51</sup>Interview with Mr. Taha al-Jazrawi, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Member of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and Minister of Industry and Minerals, Baghdad Observer, March 3, 1976, p. 3. Also, see Al-Thawra (Baghdad), January 21, 1976, p. 3; May 27, 1976, p. 3; August 25, 1976, p. 6; September 9, 1976, p. 5; September 12, 1976, p. 5; September 13, 1976, p. 5; September 16, 1976, p. 3; September 23, 1976, p. 3; October 8, 1976, p. 3; and October 19, 1976, p. 3; also, see Sahib al-Simawi, Al-Jihaz al-Idari wa Muhimmat al-Taghier--The Administrative Apparatus and the Assignments of Change (Baghdad: Dar al-Thawra, 1974), p. 27; p. 38.

<sup>52</sup>J. S. Nye provides us with an operational definition of the phenomenon of corruption stating:

Behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to prevent the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).

See J. S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 566-67. Also see James Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (London: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 4-5.

Another definition that might better serve our purposes is furnished by Bill and Leiden in the following:

...Corruption (in the public service) as any activity by any positional occupant for private purposes rather than public, although the private interest involved need not necessarily be his own. ...He may simply accept bribes. But it is corruption whenever the public interest is subverted to private gain, although this gain need not always be expressed in money terms.

See Bill and Leiden, The Middle East, pp. 179-180.

<sup>53</sup>Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration," p. 54. Also see Mohammed Salman Hassan, "Towards a Revolutionary Economic Machinery in Iraq," in the Middle East Economic Papers (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1960), pp. 44-45.

<sup>54</sup>H. B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influence and American Policy (New York: The Ronald Press, 1960), p. 147.

<sup>55</sup>Phebe Ann Marr, "Iraq's Leadership Dilemma: A Study in Leadership Trends," Middle East Journal, 24 (Summer, 1970), 296.

<sup>56</sup>A former Iraqi Minister who served after the revolution later acknowledged that the administration lost many efficient officials but still had many corrupt ones. See Salman, Dirasat, p. 227.

<sup>57</sup>Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1966 (Baghdad: Government Press, 1967), p. 224.

<sup>58</sup>Personal interview with the Secretary of the Committee for the Recruitment of Qualified Personnel, July, 1975.

## Chapter VI

### THE REPUBLICAN REGIMES IN COMPARISON

Two main features characterized the political environment throughout the republican era. First, there was the lack of public instruments for policy-making. Second, there was the absence of institutional checks on the exercise of power. For such prevailing conditions, the governments offered various justifications such as the vagaries of transitional politics, national conflicts, weak socioeconomic institutions, personal irrationalities of Qasim, the orthodoxy of Arif, zealously of the Baath, foreign plots. None of the leaders conceded to any failure of his regime, nor did they concede such failure to factional power struggles, inefficient and incompetent personnel, or simply unwieldy public policy.

This chapter focuses on the general comparative patterns of the republican regimes in terms of personal and institutional aspects as they relate to the process of national development. It presents, (1) a summation of the political and social characteristics of the governing elite as the former determine the latter's composition and changes, (2) the leaders' attitudes and behavior, and (3) the politico-administrative relationship as it influences the process of policy-making and policy execution.

### 6.1. Elite Recruitment and Circulation

As we observed in the previous chapters, intra-elite conflicts, elite-mass linkages, and policy-issue commitments determine the extent of cohesion and continuity of elite and the success or failure of program implementation. Thus, elite formation reflects as well as affects society through determining the type and degree of political participation, shaping the kind of policies that will touch the life of the citizen, and influencing the stability of the political system. Shifts in economic policies, permission or prohibition of political parties and associations, and the degree of citizen mobilization into the system can be traced to elites' characteristics and policy preferences.

General comparative trends in elite recruitment were measured in terms of such indicators of ministerial backgrounds as: ethnic and sectarian origins, professional and military background, place of education and geographic origin, and, duration in office and elite survival.

Ethnic and Sectarian Origins of Political Elites. The emergent ethnic and sectarian backgrounds of political elites show the disproportionate predominance of the Arabs over their Kurdish co-partners. The Kurds throughout the Republican era have been decidedly underrepresented. Their highest percentage of participation was during the Qasim regime where they composed 18 percent of cabinet membership. Their representation declined significantly to

11 percent during the pan-Arab regimes of Arif I and Arif II. The Kurdish under-representation continues today when they only occupy an average of 16 percent of the minor ministerial positions. This has been one of the main points of dispute presented by Barzani to the central government. He constantly demanded proportional representation of the Kurds in the cabinet as well as in the Revolutionary Command Council.

Cabinet composition during the republican era reflected a definite bias towards the Sunnites, whose share has increased from 51 percent during Qasim's regime to 57 percent during that of the Arifs' and to 62 percent since 1968. Christians and other minorities have completely disappeared from the political picture except during the civilian-oriented cabinet of al-Bazzaz, when there were two minority members, and the al-Bakr regime which, since 1974, has included one Christian minister (Table XVII below).

Representation of the Shiites showed a continuous decline from 30 percent during the Qasim period to 29 percent during that of Arif I and then to 35 percent during the rule of Arif II. Since 1968, the Shiites have occupied an average of 21 percent. Such a decline in the representation of both the Kurds and the Shiites can only be explained by the fact that Arab nationalism attracted fewer Kurds in addition to the long and deliberate exclusion of the Shiites from the military and bureaucracy during the Ottoman Empire. Both of the sectors have been dominated by the Sunnites, while the Shiites have engaged in



Table XVII  
Comparative Analysis of Cabinet Ministers According to Background Variables Within and Among Republican Regimes

Background Variables	1959-61 Regime		1963-66 Regime		1966-68 Regime		1968-76 Regime	
	Total Posts of 84 Breakdown	Strategic Posts of 55 (5x1) Breakdown	Total Posts of 122 Breakdown	Strategic Posts of 49 (4x1) Breakdown	Total Posts of 211 Breakdown	Strategic Posts of 20 (2x1) Breakdown	Total Posts of 170 Breakdown	Strategic Posts of 12 (1x1) Breakdown
1. Religion, Sect., & Ethnicity:								
Arab Christian	43	20	96	33	47	17	106	36
Arab Muslim	25	6	45	15	32	10	36	5
Kurds	15	0	11	0	10	1	27	0
Christians	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1
Turkmen	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Unknown	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2. Occupation before Appointment:								
Military	28	18	47	24	28	11	43	17
Lawyers	18	4	20	1	19	2	11	0
Professors	8	3	45	18	22	11	40	8
Engineers	8	0	7	6	2	0	3	0
Civil Servants	8	5	26	4	15	6	38	11
Businessmen	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medical Doctors	1	0	0	0	7	0	17	1
Students	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	2
Self-employed	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	4
Teachers	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1
Others	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	1
3. Place of Education:								
Iraq only	54	12	74	23	40	11	98	25
Iraq &/or Abroad	39	22	70	52	45	17	81	17
Unknown	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
4. Family Origin:								
Urban	53	30	54	9	36	10	41	16
Rural	30	4	60	40	35	18	127	26
Unknown	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
5. Political Orientation:								
Liberal	2	0	26	13	1	0	110	16
Arab Nationalist	5	5	14	7	10	2	2	0
B.N.P.	13	0	10	0	9	1	21	0
Army: Ideology	11	11	17	8	26	11	4	0
Non-Parliament	28	18	35	12	14	0	6	2
Communist	14	2	0	0	0	0	5	1
Nationalist	0	0	65	42	51	25	20	5
B.N.P.	21	9	26	0	0	0	0	0
Others	1	1	3	2	0	0	5	0

The base numbers are used only for illustration and therefore are not included in calculations.

commercial activities. It is also to be noted that the Shiites had only three out of fifteen members in the pan-Arab oriented Officers' Movement, which dominated the political scene in Iraq during the 1958-1970 period. Since 1970, a new civil middle class Baath party affiliated with pan-Arab and socialistic orientations has dominated elite positions.

Civil versus Military Background of Political Elites. Two main sources have provided the regimes' recruitment of cabinet personnel. First, of course, is the military which has displayed a slight decline over the years but has never been below 25 percent of the cabinets. The second is Baghdad University which has recently become a place from which qualified men with all kinds of ideologies, ranging from dedicated Marxists to conservative Moslems, have been recruited. Recently, the Baath has intelligently adopted this strategy of recruiting a large percentage of academic professionals into cabinet politics because of their expertise and their preventable threat or opposition to the regime. Although a minister remains an important policy maker, he has become, since 1970, more of a policy administrator--as the general policy is formulated by the ruling party, and the real authority resides in the RCC.

Another important observation is the significant continuous decline in the percentage of lawyers and businessmen from 18 percent and 6 percent during Qasim rule to 11 percent and cessation in the present regime. At the same time, a new trend is manifested in the

inclusion of non-occupational personnel (i.e. full-time party members) and primary school teachers which did not exist before 1968. These two categories now occupy 6 percent and 4 percent of the cabinet respectively. Such recruits are appointed on the basis of their loyalty rather than merits. They provide strong personalities to carry out reforms and follow tough policy against counter-revolutionary forces at all governmental levels. Naturally, the ruling party has as one of its incentives the tendency to give ministerial positions to those loyalists who dedicate their lives to institute and maintain the party in power.

A new phenomenon which has shown itself clearly since 1968 is not only that cabinets have been increasingly demilitarized but also that there has been the emergence of an ideological army. This has been a goal as well as a means to stay in power, and can only lead to the entrenchment of the military in politics, which will give rise to an indoctrinated army. According to the data, one can discern that while the military occupied ministerial posts in the past, and became pro-left or pro pan-Arab, they never identified themselves as members of a particular party. Such ideological military men, all of whom are Baathists, have occupied an average of 36 percent of cabinet posts since 1968.

The emergence of the ideological elites (military and civilian) may be attributed to the fragmentation of the army, the weakness of the government and its disorganized programs and supporters, and Arif's diminishing legitimacy within the country. The

new elites, mainly Baathists, embraced nationalist, radical, and rural elements. With the party's superior organization, zealous members monopolized power and later purged their military partners. This changed the character of the ruling elite from military to civilian and from nonpolitical moderates to ideological radicals. Furthermore, the ruling elite has a predominantly rural origin and anti-Western outlook. More important, recruitment and promotion of the political elite depended on political beliefs and loyalty to the party rather than on professional competence. The party, rather than the military, came to be regarded as the vanguard of social change as well as the protector of the regime.

#### Place of Education and Geographic Origin of Political

Elites. The number of ministers educated abroad has been maintained at an average of 47 percent to 52 percent throughout the republican era. This indicates that those educated in Baghdad, amounting to an average of 48 to 53 percent, have an equal or slightly better chance of controlling the government. However, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of rural elements as opposed to urban in the cabinet, rising from 36 percent in the Qasim regime to 63 percent during the Arif rule to 75 percent since 1968.

It must be pointed out that ministers educated in the West usually occupy a non-political ministry, while the more important ministries are held by military men who are most likely to be rural and locally educated. Nevertheless, regimes have always relied on the professionally-equipped ministers for the development planning

and program-implementation upon which the legitimacy of the regime depends. Furthermore, as the country becomes more economically and politically developed, the regime will inevitably and increasingly rely on highly trained technocrats, scientists, and politicians whose expertise supercedes the officer class or even party membership. This trend has already materialized as shown in the data collected which reveals that during the al-Bakr regime, contrary to the case in previous regimes, the largest occupational source of elite recruitment was from the academic field rather than the military. The new competent recruits have not only occupied the majority of key posts in the power structure but have also dominated the field of policy formation.

Political Elite Survival and Rate of Change. During the republican period, it may be noted that the regime leaders have spent an average of 8 months in office. Over a period of 18 years, there were 498 cabinet positions filled by 215 individuals. This means that the overall pattern showed that the rate of access to cabinet positions has been 2.3 times for each position.

However, the republican regimes can be further broken down to those cabinets identified more with the personal or political attitudes of the President of the Republic. There were 84 cabinet positions during the Qasim regime served by only 31 individuals (an approximate proportion of 3 posts to each minister), and during the al-Bakr regime 159 positions were occupied by 74 individuals (2 posts to each minister). These figures also indicate that the higher the

post held by each minister, the more power he wields within the cabinet. This correlates with the amount of power concentrated within the hands of such important ministers. Events indicate that due to the powerful positions these ministers held, they remained in power until they were removed by the ascendancy of another powerful group. The critical point seems to be that, since 1958, there have been four distinct changes of regimes, all representing a sharp discontinuity with those which preceded. It is these changes in regime ruling philosophy, and not necessarily the cabinet duration, which are responsible for the obvious discontinuity in ministerial personnel. Another important observation is that while ministers survive in cabinets within each regime, the probability that they would continue on to the next regime is very slim. This is indicated by the fact that the Qasim regime represented in 1958 a total break with the past. In 1963, only two ministers--and only because they were Kurds and opposed to Qasim's political views--survived the Qasim era to serve in the Baath government. The same pattern followed during the Arifs' regimes when only three ministers who served during the Qasim regime re-occupied cabinet posts (because they were either Kurds or independent) and six members from the Baath government of 1963. The Baath regime of 1968 incorporated four survivals from 1963 cabinets. Until 1972, it has excluded almost all other political parties and opposing groups.

In comparative terms, the data presented in Table XVIII indicate that elite change is more pronounced and frequent during the Arif

Table XVIII  
Elite Change in Republican Iraq, 1958-1975

Cabinet	Prime Minister	Size of Cabinet	Duration (Months)	Dimension of Change in Cabinets						Methods of Change
				Incoming Ministers		Departing Ministers		Ministers Retained From Ex-Regime		
				N	%	N	%	N	%	
7/14/58	Qasbi	14	3	14	100	-	-	-	-	Coup
9/30/58	"	15	5	1	7	1	14	-	-	Purge
2/7/59	"	15	5	8	53	6	40	-	-	Resignation
7/13/59	"	19	10	4	21	2	10	-	-	Modification
5/3/60	"	21	33	4	19	4	19	-	-	Resignation/ Cooptation
2/8/63	al-Bakr	21	3	19	90	19	90	2	10	Coup
5/13/63	"	22	6	3	14	2	9	-	-	Adjustment
11/20/63	Yahya	22	7	13	59	12	54	-	-	Coup
6/17/64	"	21	12	9	43	12	57	-	-	Modification
7/10/65	"	22	2	10	45	8	36	-	-	Resignation
9/6/65	Abdul-Razzaq	22	9 days	13	59	6	27	-	-	Modification
9/21/65	al-Bazzaz	23	7	9	39	4	17	-	-	Modification/ Cooptation
4/18/66	"	22	4	5	23	4	18	-	-	Adjustment/ Cooptation
5/9/66	Talib	20	9	11	75	17	85	-	-	Modification
5/10/67	Araf Il	27	1	14	52	9	33	-	-	Cooptation
7/10/67	Yahya	22	15	9	41	12	54	-	-	Cooptation
7/19/68	al-Nayif	26	12 days	22	85	21	81	4	15	Coup
7/11/68	al-Bakr	26	17	16	61	17	65	-	-	Coup
12/31/69	"	28	3	5	18	4	14	-	-	Expansion
3/29/70	"	26	25	8	31	10	38	-	-	Purge
5/14/72	"	29	30	5	17	3	10	-	-	Adjustment/ Cooptation
11/11/74	"	33	14	15	45	13	39	-	-	Modification

Types of Elites Circulation:

Coup: Full or partial elite transfer including the leadership. A coup may or may not be accompanied by violence.

Purge: Partial but forceful transfer of elite without change in the leadership.

Modification: A deliberate substitution of one group by another.

Resignation: Formal withdrawal from cabinet positions.

Cooptation: Access to ministerial positions as a result of offers and concessions by ruling and non-ruling elites.

Adjustment: Expanding or contracting cabinet membership without change in cabinet composition and orientation.

regimes than those regimes of Qasim or al-Bakr. This might be attributed to the outbreak of personal rivalries and vague policies of the government. After 1968, a clear shift in the power contest among political elite members took place. The pre-1968 conflicts were among the military only and no civilian could take part without having been backed by the force of the officers. In contrast, the post-1968 power struggle shifted from tensions among the military to a confrontation between the military and the civilian Baath political party. Such friction ended in the triumphant civilian takeover and the curtailment of the military role and authority to run the regime. However, the indoctrinated officers who supported the 1968 coup remained in the background. During the Baath rule the cohesion and harmony of cabinet membership are clear. The typical member of the political elite is in his middle age, Baath, Sunnite, and university educated, and is not a member of the original Free Officers Movement, nor had he been a minister before 1968. Therefore, there is a complete replacement of the original military and politically neutral elite by a new civilian ideological, but secondary, elite.

## 6.2. The Decision-Making Process and the Administration

An appraisal and evaluation of the impact of elite characteristics on the quality of public issues needs to examine the structure of decision-making channels in the hope of determining the degree of authoritarianism or participation, the extent of




objectivity or subjectivity, and the politicization of administrative inputs into the decision-making process. These reveal, at least formally, the framework within which political authority at the cabinet and presidential level was exercised, and exposes obstacles to purposeful national transformation.

Because of the absence of representative bodies and the restriction of party politics and activities, the political system has lent itself to executive dominance and centralized decision-making. Thus the formal structure, including the president, the cabinet, the RCC, and the bureaucracy, becomes important in defining the decision-making channels and boundaries. Lack of adequate information on the operational style of public policy decision-making makes it difficult to point out the differences between formal prescriptions and actual policy-making behavior.

The relative power of these formal institutions reveals drastic changes over the years. This absence of well-defined relationships reflects alternations in governmental positions occupied by a particular leader of a particular faction or party. Additionally, some ministries even shifted their priorities of importance as regimes changed. The structure and relationship of major decision-making bodies are illustrated in the following diagrams.

Diagram I


STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN THE QASIM REGIME



Key: ——— Executive line  
 - - - - - Administrative Line  
 ..... Non-existing

Diagram II

STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN 1964 (BAATH-DOMINATED PERIOD OF THE ARIF I REGIME)



Key: ——— Executive line  
 - - - - - Administrative line  
 ..... Non-existing

Diagram III

STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND  
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN THE ARIF II REGIME

1964-1968





Diagram IV

STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND  
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN THE AL-BAKR REGIME



The above diagrams indicate that several important differences exist among the various regimes. For example, Qasim maintained the office of the Prime Minister as the highest position and subordinated to him both the Sovereignty Council and the cabinet appointees. Since Qasim never granted political parties the freedom to operate or hold election, the cabinet under his leadership performed both executive and legislative functions. This fostered personal leadership and led to the undermining of other political institutions such as the Sovereignty Council.

The overthrow of Qasim's personal rule gave way to a collective and ideological elite where the political institutions at the top were enlarged to include the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the National Council of the Revolutionary Command, and the President--all jointly shared the process of decision-making. Such decisions followed the chain of command from the top and, in turn, passed to the bureaucracy for implementation. Alongside the bureaucracy existed the ruling party political apparatus which operated as a watchdog. Such a hierarchial structure lasted less than one year, only to be replaced by a military junta under Arif which for four years excluded progressive political parties from power and even failed to establish an Egyptian-model Arab Socialist Union in 1964 in Iraq. Similar to the Qasim era, the President's view prevailed over the rest of the executive members, and only the President's men occupied strategic posts. Nevertheless, Arif's regime, like that of Qasim, failed to provide representative

institutions to absorb and respond to public demands as well as to initiate public policy.

The return of the Baath in 1968 renewed its early efforts to substitute personal leadership by collective command and to promote its political program of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. With better organization and discipline than before, the Baath reintroduced the RCC as well as their National and Regional Commands. Besides dominating such institutions, the Baath also controlled the cabinet, the army, and, to a lesser degree, the public bureaucracy. Several attempts were made to form a political alliance with other parties to increase political participation. Yet, the reality is that the real power was concentrated in the ABSP Regional Command and the Baath members of the RCC who made policy decisions at the national level. Also, the Baath did not intend to share its power with any other political partner. However, the most important change which took place in the political structure is the abolishment of the office of the Prime Minister and the change which made cabinet ministers directly responsible to the President of the Republic who assigns their duties as he sees relevant.<sup>1</sup> This move deprived cabinet ministers--except those who are members in the ABSP--of their executive authority, thus rendering them essentially powerless.

Both institutional and personal factors influenced in the decision-making process. In examining the decision-making channels at the national level during the Qasim

regime as shown below in Table XX and Diagram V, one can deduce that he separated the Sovereignty Council from the Cabinet, maintained a superiority of the cabinet which he presided over, and retained a controllable small representation of two supporting political parties.


Table XIX

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BODIES  
AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE PERIOD  
MAY 1960 - FEBRUARY 1963

Members of the Sovereignty Council	Cabinet Ministers	Political Parties
3	21	8

Diagram V

POWER INTERRELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL DECISION MAKING  
INSTITUTIONS DURING THE PERIOD 1958-1963



Source: Based on data presented in Table XIX.



Common membership and overlapping functions.

Therefore, after the first few months of the 1958 revolution, Qasim narrowed his cabinet ministers to friends and associates whom he trusted and regarded as temperamentally congenial. As his power increased, he added more supporters, not only at the cabinet level, but also to the public bureaucracy and the unions.

Qasim was known for erratic behavior during his reign.

One source described his attitude as:

During the last months of 1959 Qassem's publicized pronouncements on a wide range of subjects struck a note which can only be regarded as evidence of deteriorating faculties. His words and actions were not merely politically unwise, impracticable and ultimately futile but to the observer convey a feeling of eeriness beyond their rational shortcomings, as if the adviser had after all crossed the dividing line between eccentricity and derangement.<sup>2</sup>

During the last two-and-a-half years of his rule, Qasim was labelled as "the divider of Iraq." In the description of Kerr, Qasim presided over "a strange regime that drifted in a twilight zone between Communism and a shapeless, anarchic radicalism," having no visible organized support and "held together largely by the bafflement of all potential challengers of the 'Faithful Leader' in seeking an appropriate ground on which to confront him."<sup>3</sup> He lacked support of any political party, and encouraged the political passions and strife which occasionally ravaged the country. This trend was clearly represented in his cabinets. It was only in his fourth cabinet that Qasim eliminated his rivals who

had failed to be obedient and, instead, recruited supporters. Qasim's personality dominated cabinet meetings which he managed with ease. Furthermore, Qasim was described as behaving in such a way that:

...He often issued orders to subordinate officials over the heads of departments. Several [cabinet] members tendered their resignations on grounds of health, but none dared protest against Qasim's personal rule or his interference in departmental work. The remaining ministers became virtual cyphers carrying out Qasim's orders. Fortunate was the minister if he could secure Qasim's approval to relieve him of the seals of office.<sup>4</sup>

Such erratic decision-making behavior was confirmed by close friends of Qasim later.<sup>5</sup> Numerous instances further illustrate his unpredictable behavior. One instance was the occasion when a cabinet meeting was held to approve the national emblem. As the cabinet discussed the different symbols to make up the emblem, it was proposed that the agricultural sector was to be represented by a wheat spike with fourteen kernels, representing the country's fourteen districts. Qasim insisted on thirteen kernels, but was opposed by some ministers who could not understand the reason behind the odd number. The meeting ended without an agreement and the opponents were convinced later as they were told that the numeral '13' represents the number of letters in Qasim's name.<sup>6</sup>

Another example of this unpredictability is cited in another source which states that Qasim was known to repeat the same phrase in his speeches. The specific example given was one speech



which Qasim practiced on many elementary and high school classes he visited, then delivered it at the Arab Lawyers Convention, and repeated it nine months later.<sup>7</sup> His dominant personality in the cabinet is illustrated by one occasion when Qasim kept all his cabinet ministers waiting three hours during a regular meeting, because he changed his mind a few minutes before it convened to see an unknown Lebanese journalist.<sup>8</sup> Finally, Qasim was accused of accepting British support which provided him with intelligence surveys of internal conspiracies and plots. This was done through the liasion of Communist members close to both Qasim and the British Embassy in Baghdad and Kuwait.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, it was reported that British and U.S. intelligence services had known of the February 8, 1963, coup which ended Qasim and his regime without telling him.<sup>10</sup> One overlooked fact was the role of the leader's associates and staff. It is important to notice that the leader's decision depends on the information which he receives from his aides. It seemed, from the various instances of arbitrary behavior, that Qasim's associates had deliberately selected and emphasized what they thought would please him and withheld what they did not want him to hear.

The year that followed Qasim's downfall witnessed both institutional and personal conflict, disrupting the decision-making apparatus. This conflict was attributed to the inexperienced newcomers of the Baath and Nationalists and the tensions between the conservative moderate military officers, and the radical

civilian ideologists. The intricacies, compared to the previous regime, may be seen in Diagram VI below. The power structure shows almost equal participation of different executive and legislative institutions with members of different backgrounds. The inevitable failure to carry out functions properly could be expected from such a situation where orders and instructions--even conflicting--could be passed from different superiors such as the President, the ABSP Command, the NCRC, and the Prime Minister. The NCRC was expected to serve as a link between the cabinet and the Baath party, and the ABSP Regional Command worked to carry out its policies through the party's members. The President of the Republic, a non-Baathist, presided over the NCRC meetings. The NCRC was entrusted with the powers to legislate and decide policy on a national level. The problem remained whether the cabinet should merely implement decisions taken by the NCRC or whether it should have the power to make decisions independently. The ABSP Regional Command members who also headed cabinet posts found it difficult to coordinate their dual roles. The Baath officers resented their civilian but radical comrades who ignored them. This led to the withdrawal of the military backing for the 'young' revolution which collapsed after nine months. Differences of opinion on policy prevented elite unity. A few instances help illustrate the loss of control by the regime. For example, there were three factions in the ABSP--left, right, and moderates all made up of civilian and military personnel. In addition, some ministers in


the cabinet outmaneuvered one another just as a power struggle erupted among Baath leaders which resulted in soliciting supporters on the basis of strength rather than policy issues and activities. The intensity of the struggle engulfed the National and Regional Commands of the ABSP which created a crisis of a legitimate authority and provided a vacuum in leadership to be filled by the more organized and stronger army officers.

Arif and his associates displaced civilian control of the country and resumed a military rule. The reaction to the previous regime can be seen in the resulting rearrangement of the structure of power and the interaction between the various decision-making bodies (see Diagram VII). The most important feature became the separation between the NRC and the cabinet with the President's superior hand in both. Another development was the creation of a fixed number of offices to be filled by the President with the personalities whom he thinks fit to become members of the NRC. Constitutionally, and in terms of power, the NRC became the highest office of authority. All recruits of the NRC were officers and this provided a military oligarchy with Arif at the top.

However, there was no doubt that the regime with its successive coalitions in cabinets of officers and civilians left much room for disagreement on policy. The frequent divisions and disagreements which arose among the officers in the political-military crises during Arif's regime were kept hidden from the public. In order to maintain the image of unity and preserve

Diagram VI

POWER INTERRELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING INSTITUTIONS  
DURING THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 8, 1963 - NOVEMBER 18, 1963



Source: Based on data presented in Appendix XI.

<sup>a</sup>Members of the ABSP Regional Command who are also cabinet ministers.

<sup>b</sup>Members of the ABSP Regional Command who do not occupy cabinet posts but are members of the RCRC.


<sup>c</sup>Members of the ABSP, but have not reached the rank of Regional Command, who are counted as part of the Baath party and also occupy cabinet posts.



Common membership and overlapping functions.

Diagram VII

POWER INTERRELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING INSTITUTIONS  
DURING THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1963 - APRIL 1966




Source: Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 264.



Common membership and overlapping functions.

Diagram VIII

POWER INTERRELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING INSTITUTIONS  
DURING THE PERIOD APRIL 1966 - JULY 1968



Source: Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

<sup>a</sup>The RCRC is abolished.



Common membership and overlapping functions.

discipline, personal feuds were submerged in the final policy adopted by the higher command. Attempts were made to convey any attacks or disagreements on policies to private channels of contact between officers and civilian leaders--unless events got out of control.

Despite internal difficulties, cabinet members continued to exhibit ideological differences. Factionalism in the army surfaced publicly and was the motivation for Arif to coopt rival officers. Furthermore, Arif's personal interferences reached such a point of intolerance that according to one observation:

Arif used to interfere in administrative matters by directly issuing orders to subordinate officials over the head of ministers..and sought to reduce their influence by appointing officers loyal to him in key positions and by transferring Nasirites to less responsible posts. Arif's conduct, Colonels Hamid and Farhan held, betrayed his desire to emulate Qasim's rule which was repugnant to all.


...It was now Tahir Yayha's [Arif's Prime Minister] turn to be eliminated. Arif's maneuver was to rally a coterie of nationalist officers sympathetic to Arab unity but opposed to the Nasirites. These may be called the Arif group, to whom key positions had been recently entrusted.<sup>11</sup>

After Arif's death in 1965, this style of politics was continued by his brother's rule for three more years, but with deeper divisions and more factions. The relatively weaker personality of Arif II opened the opportunity for many high-ranking officers to form cliques possessing bargaining power and created a potential threat to the regime. To illustrate this factionalism, the military was openly divided into two opposite factions and each faction was


subdivided into three groups, left, right, and center.<sup>12</sup>

The return of the Baath in 1968 gave them the opportunity to learn from their past mistakes of 1963. As shown in Diagram IX, the party elite were in complete control of the highest national offices, namely the RCC and the cabinet. An initial struggle for power developed in the early stages of the regime and ended triumphantly with the Baath civilian leaders achieving their successful purge of the military wing from the party command, the RCC and the cabinet. The extreme authoritarianism applied by al-Bakr's regime was justified as necessary, because the Baath leadership believed that the country would not, in the short run, achieve economic and social change under an open political system. The ruling party possessed better organizational capability and discipline than during its previous term of office. Though decisions were formulated by the party's regional command and enacted by the RCC, this structure allowed for formalistic participatory decision-making. But because of the monopoly of decision-making by the Baath, the exact line-up of personal views, debates of government policy, and factions within the Party remained known only to the high-level circles. The Baath party, until 1973, was determined to prevent any access to power by rival political groups. Since 1972, other ideological parties have been given a number of seats in the cabinet. However, the Baath maintain a tight domination over both the RCC and the cabinet.<sup>13</sup> The party has become the institution through which opinions are expressed and

Diagram IX  
 INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RULING BAATH PARTY, THE RCC, AND  
 THE CABINET IN TERMS OF POWER, DECISION-MAKING,  
 AND DECISION-MAKING IMPLEMENTATION



Source: Based on data presented in Appendix XIII.

 Common membership and overlapping of functions.

<sup>a</sup> Members of the ABSP Regional Command and members in the RCC.

<sup>b</sup> Members of the ABSP but not members of the Regional Command Leadership.

<sup>c</sup> Members of the ABSP Regional Command and also Cabinet Ministers.

<sup>d</sup> Members of the ABSP but not in the Regional Command leadership that hold ministerial positions.



policy decisions are made. Furthermore, the Baath control extends to all institutions of the state--namely, the military and the public bureaucracy. It is the intention of the Baath leadership to maintain complete control over the RCC, to keep the cabinet accessible for ideological allies, and to delegate some of its legislative functions to the newly-proposed National Legislative Council.<sup>14</sup>

In a speech delivered by al-Bakr in 1971, it was stated that, "within the next few days, the National Assembly will be fully constituted to assume legislative powers and control over the executive branch in accordance with the promulgated law."<sup>15</sup> The need for such an institution was still expressed three-and-a-half years later by the Vice Chairman of the RCC.<sup>16</sup> The law has been enacted but the institutions have not been put into operation.<sup>17</sup> What took place was the establishment of People's Councils.<sup>18</sup> These councils operate as links between the masses and state authorities, on the one hand, and integrate the masses into the plans of comprehensive development and reconstruction on the other.

Despite the proliferation of institutions and organizations, either at the national leadership or people's level, the grip over the power structure continues to be the prerogative of the ABSP. In a personal interview with the Minister of Justice in 1975, he commented:

...Why are you regarding me as a member of the political elite? I am only an administrator who receives orders from the top and carries them out. I have no real power, but am just an appointee.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast, a member of the ABSP Regional Command confidently and proudly stated that important decisions are made by the party and are enacted by the RCC, but authority is delegated to ministers and top bureaucrats to manage them according to their views.<sup>20</sup>

Another minister, a Kurd and a Communist, expressed his view in the following manner:

...We are in the National Progressive Front where we [the Communists and Kurds] participate in debating issues and proposing policies. We can be very critical and disagreeable in the debates; however, it is up to the political leadership of the ABSP and RCC to take the final decision.<sup>21</sup>

The pragmatic way outlined above was confirmed by Mr. Saddam Husain, the country's vice President, the vice Chairman of the RCC, and the Deputy Secretary General of the ruling Baath party. Husain's informed explanation of the decision-making process is outlined in the following summary:

...The political goals are decided by the leadership, but the operational goals and details are prepared and decided by the experts and specialists. The political leadership must depend, when taking a specific decision, on the views of the relevant experts and scientists and their judgement. A decision starts as a goal, then information, then conclusion, then a decision. If the political leadership arrives at conclusions, it is incapable of doing so in isolation from the analysis of the related experts; and if the political leadership was capable of the tasks of deciding or concluding, it is not possible that it becomes a substitute to the experts and scientists in their fields of specialization and information.<sup>22</sup>

In another speech, Mr. Husain declared that the ruling ABSP did not belong to its affiliates only, but to the rest of Iraqis as well. The party was not only for the Arabs alone but also for

the Kurds and all other minorities.<sup>23</sup> The leadership, according to Husain, did not differentiate between members and non-members of the party. It did, however, differentiate between supporters and non-supporters of the revolution. But in the army the ruling party spokesman made clear that, "there is no place for other political parties or groups in the armed forces other than the ABSP."<sup>24</sup> As for the institution of the RCC, its vice Chairman clearly stated that it had no connection with other political organizations except the Baath.<sup>25</sup> But one might well ask here where the rest of the political forces are represented? According to Mr. Husain, they were represented in some of the ministries, the National Council, and other popular organizations. Nevertheless, Husain recognized the absence of a legislative branch whose functions have been performed by the RCC. Consequently, he acknowledged the instant need to create a national legislative council to represent the people and to supervise the functions of government. Such an achievement will broaden and deepen the popular democratic rule and at the same time will promote the characteristics of being efficient, effective, socialist, and revolutionary government.<sup>26</sup> The Baath's tight grip over the access to power centers has made it possible to achieve political stability. It does not tolerate opposing ideological groups nor hostile rhetoric. This domination introduced new continuity and coherence in policy and consequently opened the opportunity for alliances rather than confrontations.

It seems, therefore, that the decision-making process and

the outcome of public policy are both determined by formal as well as informal forces. Also, the behavior of political elites is affected by features inherent in their personal traits, positions they occupy, political organizations, bureaucratic structure, and interaction with local as well as foreign audiences. When a country has never established a recognized and legitimate path to power, it is only natural for the governing elite to be suspicious of the conspiratorial aspect of politics. Excessive suspicion creates more personalism in the institutional structure of the political system which consequently conceals the real distribution of political power. This characteristic of informal politics, based on personal traits, becomes a critical explanatory variable which accounts for the abrupt changes in public policies and the act of mixing politics with policies. Such trends lead to the disappearance, or at least the weakening, of checks and balances in the exercise of power.

### 6.3. Present Political and Administrative Elites' Attitudes Towards Specific Issues

A questionnaire, containing the same questions, was distributed among both political and administrative elites.<sup>27</sup> The aim of the survey was to discern similarities and differences, if any, among elites in their attitudes towards certain problems and issues. Before stating the results of the analysis, it must be mentioned that only fifteen of the twenty administrators and only six of the twelve politicians responded to the five questions.

Table XI  
COMPARATIVE VIEWS OF PRESENT POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ELITES

Questionnaire	Percent				
	Administrative Elite (A sample of 15 interviewees)		Political Elite (A sample of 6 interviewees)		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
1	What is the most serious problem which faces the country:				
	(a) Professional and Technical.	10	66	2	33
	(b) Confrontation with imperialist forces.	-	-	3	50
	(c) Socialist transformation.	5	33	1	17
	(d) Material resources.	-	-	-	-
	(e) all of the above.	-	-	-	-
2	How would you describe the contribution of the public bureaucracy in planning and executing developmental policies:				
	(a) large at central level.	-	-	3	50
	(b) small at central level.	-	-	3	50
	(c) large at local level.	-	-	-	-
	(d) small at local level.	-	-	-	-
	(e) large at central and local levels.	6	53	-	-
	(f) small at central and local levels.	7	47	-	-
3	What is the best method to cure the administrative ailments and bureaucratic under-performance:				
	(a) Politicization of bureaucracy through party supervision.	5	33	3	50
	(b) long-term planning and training programs.	10	66	3	50
	(c) encourage the private sector to expand its role in public affairs.	-	-	-	-
4	Who is the public official that you like to have work for you:				
	(a) one who acts literally according to the rules and regulations without using any personal judgment.	-	-	-	-
	(b) one who acts according to his situation.	-	-	-	-
	(c) one who acts with some personal initiative and at the same time, accepts responsibility.	11	66	4	66
	(d) it depends on the circumstances.	4	33	2	33
5	What are the priorities which you would follow to develop the economic sectors.				
	(a) the agricultural sector.	3	20	3	50
	(b) the industrial sector.	1	7	-	-
	(c) the oil sector.	2	13	-	-
	(d) a balanced developmental approach for all sectors.	8	52	3	50
	(e) the general services sector which provides the infrastructure for other sectors.	1	17	-	-

The first question asked for the "most serious problem which faces the country." The two groups manifested significant variation in their answers. While two-thirds of the administrative elite agreed to the lack of professional and technical personnel and one-third indicated their concern for the socialist transformation of the country, half of the political elite expressed the struggle against imperialist powers and foreign intervention in internal affairs as their major problem, leaving one-third to be preoccupied with the general lack of professional and technical expertise, and one-sixth spoke of the socialist transformation. These answers show the influence of circumstances and past experiences and training. The complete dismissal by bureaucrats of the issue of threats of foreign powers in contrast to the great emphasis which the political elite attributes to the same issue may illuminate the nature of the political task as compared with that of the administrator.

The second question solicited elites' appraisal of the role and contribution of public bureaucracy at both national and local levels. The majority of administrative elite (53 percent) stressed the positive role of bureaucracy at both central and local levels. In contrast, half of the political elite agreed upon the important role of public bureaucracy at both levels, while the other half directed attention to the bureaucracy's small and even negative role in national and local affairs. Such answers may imply that the political elite are more involved in national affairs

than bureaucrats are. Also, they may illustrate the extent to which the political elite are dissatisfied with, and frustrated by, the bureaucratic performance.

Elites' responses to the third question involved their disposition to use measures which they see fit to reduce bureaucratic inadequacies. The political elite were evenly divided between a strategy of more comprehensive planning and training and an alternative strategy of political control and supervision of the bureaucracy. In the case of the administrators, their selection patterns indicated less enthusiasm towards the politicization of the bureaucracy; only two-thirds of them opted for better planning and training. Surprisingly, neither administrator nor political elite desired to give the private sector a greater role to play in developmental activities to alleviate the bureaucracy of some of its excessive commitments.

The fourth question probed elites' attitudes in their expectations of public officials' behavior in conducting their jobs. There was a striking similarity in their replies. The majority (two-thirds) of both administrative and political elites preferred officials who acted and applied the working rules and procedures with responsibility, while the remainder felt that it all depended upon the circumstances. None of the elite members cared for either extreme--a rigid or liberal interpretation of the administrative code.

Elites' replies to the fifth and final question related to

their priorities of the main economic sectors. The majority of administrative elite (52 percent) stressed a balanced approach in sectoral development, 20 percent of them emphasized the agricultural sector, 13 percent underlined the oil sector, 7 percent suggested the industrial sector, and another 7 percent mentioned the general services sector. As for the political responses, half of them gave attention to a balanced approach of sectoral development, while the other half attached significance to the agricultural sector only. Surprisingly, none of the political elite emphasized the industrial sector. Such replies indicate that the political elite believe that if the country intends to pursue its present policy of heavy industrialization, then the agricultural sector should become its main supplier of raw materials. In comparison to the political elite, administrators showed a more dispersed emphasis on the economic sectors. This may imply that bureaucrats are more pragmatic than the political elite, because the latter are more involved in decision-making, while the former concentrate on careful programming and detailed execution of national policy.

On the whole, half of each group demonstrated similar attitudes towards the specific issues in the study. Here it must be mentioned that some members of the administrative elite have moved into political status through ideological commitment and political appointment. For example, 22 percent of the overall cabinet posts during the al-Bakr regime have been occupied by persons with bureaucratic background. The percentage of their



occupation of strategic posts throughout the same regime increases to 26 percent. As to the remaining half of the political and administrative elites, their attitudes showed important differences in connection with the rest of the issues (see Table XX). However, the small number of respondents makes any conclusion highly speculative and tentative at best.

#### 6.4. The Regime Factor and Performance in Modernization and Political Development

In evaluating the contributions of the Qasim regime in the process of modernization and political development, we have to examine the gap between the regime's promises and achievements. The new government emphasized the pressing need for national development in terms of improvement in the social and economic life of the people. In terms of the measures of modernization, one of the significant advances which the regime scored was the vast increase in elementary and secondary school enrollment. There was also a great expansion in university capacity as well as foreign technicians from Western and Eastern countries. The aim was to create as rapidly as possible the needed corps of technicians who would implement Iraqi economic plans.

Economic planning was introduced, and social investment in housing, health and the expansion of education received more attention than in the development programs of the monarchical regime. Although in terms of percentage the budget share of

irrigation and agriculture was reduced (in real terms it was not reduced) the transport and housing sectors received a higher share of the total expenditure. There was an under-implementation in agriculture and industry. The four-year provisional plan had run for less than two years when it was suspended after the change of regime. Furthermore, land reform and the creation of peasant cooperatives did not progress rapidly. The landowners and members of the upper class lost their political power but were allowed to retain a large share of their properties and businesses. Although they suffered temporary setbacks, their power was not uprooted nor were they destroyed as a class. The regime, however, gave greater opportunity to the mobilization of the middle, lower-middle class, peasants, and workers.

One of the main factors that slowed down the modernizing efforts of the regime was the fact that Qasim became so involved in consolidating his leadership and keeping checks and balances among the competing political groups. This led him to neglect the economic, social, and technological reforms which he promised. The conduct of national affairs was something like a one-man show, where Qasim was the "jack of all trades but master of none." He dealt with the political problems both domestic and foreign; he negotiated oil affairs; he inspected roads and parks; and he visited hospitals and schools. Added to this, Qasim made the mistake of neither relying on one political party nor creating a new one of his own. Furthermore, he failed to achieve national

unity in Iraq. Anyone living in the country during the Qasim regime could not deny the divisive political, ethnic, and even religious lines that cut across the society. There was a vicious war against the Kurds as well as a verbal war with pro-Nasir elements who were powerful enough to undermine the regime within a short time. Qasim's behavior led him to a complete isolation at local, regional, and international levels. His claim over Kuwait, his disputes with the oil companies, his threats to Iran, and his unfavorable attitude towards Arab unity led to his isolation both internally and externally which deprived him of popular support. During the last two years of his regime, Qasim severed relations with the U.A.R., Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Great Britain, the United States, and West Germany.

Political development, therefore, suffered a setback from Qasim's personal rule, the absence of political institutions, the postponement of establishing a constitutional government, and the prevalence of violence. But, on the positive side, the regime definitely increased political consciousness among the Iraqi citizens, as well as embarking on a good start at land reform, light industries, and trade and educational expansion which ultimately promoted some political development.

The achievements of Arif's regime in terms of modernization and political development can be evaluated only by breaking down the overall five years into four sub-periods: (a) the Baath domination from February 1963-November 1963, (b) Arif I's

consolidation of personal power from November 1963-September 1965, (c) the emphasis on civilian politics and the establishment of a civilian cabinet from September 1965-August 1966, and (d) the military resumption of power from August 1966-July 1968.

In the initial stage, the regime's pledges and programs included national unity, Arab-Kurdish fraternity, anti-imperialist policy, respect for international obligations, realization of Arab union, economic and social improvement, and a return of democratic elections. It is to be noted that there were remarkable similarities between Qasim's and the new regime's goals. However, the Baath Party involved itself in internal problems with an intensity worse than in Qasim's time. After taking revenge on Qasim's followers and the presence of Communists in the army and bureaucracy, the Baathists turned to the Nasirites and Kurds. Furthermore, the internal split within the Baath party dragged Iraq into a state of chaos which prevailed until the moderate military forces took over in November 1963. During that period of ten months, the Party was so involved in its internal problems that virtually nothing constructive was achieved. The problems which faced Qasim were not solved by the Baath, so when the military toppled them in November 1963, the leader of the new government, Arif, was faced with the same issues concerning the Kurds, Shiites, oil disputes, Kuwait and Arab unity.

The second stage of Arif's regime was spent in consolidating his personal leadership and in establishing closer links with

Egypt. Apart from the enhancement of his leadership and the restoration of law and order to the country, the new government had little chance to turn its attention to the social and economic modernization, especially while the ravaging war with the Kurds continued.

The third stage of Arif's regime was the civilian interlude under the premiership of al-Bazzaz, who headed two cabinets, one under Arif I and the other under Arif II. Numerous social measures and nationalizations took place during this period. In addition, there was a cease-fire with the Kurds. Comprehensive economic programs were introduced and after stability was established there were signs of economic improvement. Moreover, al-Bazzaz showed tremendous tact in foreign affairs by settling disputes with Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and at the same time maintaining close ties with Nasir. As the government started to reap the benefits of its prudent policies, it proved that a civilian regime could successfully manage national affairs. This jealousy and competition between civil and military factions led eventually to the fall of the popular civilian cabinet. Such a change represented a peaceful coup by the military through its threats to use force against al-Bazzaz.

The fourth stage of Arif's regime involved a weak coalition government which attempted in vain to carry out the programs instituted by the previous governments. The same regime used its pseudo-involvement in the June war of 1967 as a legitimate excuse

for its domestic hardships and mistakes. The policy of muddling through, the state of institutional weakness (no organized political support), and the infiltration of the bureaucracy and the army by incompetent and corrupt personnel contributed to the decline of the regime's integrity and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This state of affairs enhanced the opportunity for a more militant and organized political group to take over through the non-violent coup on July 17, 1968.

Therefore, we can state that though the Arifs' rule went through a long period of readjustment and consolidation, its record in terms of modernization is not as impressive as one would expect. Even less impressive were its contributions to political development. However, al-Bazzaz's cabinets (1965-1966) did stand out as by far the most successful in these terms. It was the first cabinet to put a stop to the national disintegration that tore the country into Kurdish-Arab regions. In addition, it showed promising signs of a return to civilian politics, and it provided the first non-violent succession of leadership when Arif died in 1966.

In facing the challenge of modernization and political development, the Baath undertook four major steps during its rule. First, it sought to achieve peace with the Kurds in 1970; second, it attempted to expand its political support by inviting other political parties to participate in the government; third, it intended to increase its income from oil by breaking the foreign

companies' monopoly over production; and fourth, it worked to establish comprehensive developmental plans to absorb the expanding working population and to meet the pressures of public demands and expectations.

The first settlement with the Kurds in 1970, lasting four years, was badly needed by the government for economic reasons. Forty percent of the budget was spent on national defense which was mainly exhausted by the war. Yet, while the Baath settlement with the Kurds remained dubious, its effort to increase its income from oil revenues has materialized. This has had a very positive and far-reaching effect on the implementation of the country's policies of modernization. Iraq's economic advance is working according to a carefully worked out plan. Throughout Iraq, a rapidly growing number of factories have been and continue to be built;<sup>28</sup> land reclamation and irrigation have been developing rapidly; enrollment in education has expanded significantly in addition to the new large-scale programs of scholarships to study abroad for higher education, and the anti brain-drain law initiated by the government to encourage most Iraqis working abroad to return home; oil revenues have more than tripled, amounting to \$10,550 million in 1974;<sup>29</sup> and per capita income has jumped from \$324 in 1969 to \$456 in 1974--an increase of 41 percent.<sup>30</sup>

One can deduce from the above policies that the Baath has finally realized that it should balance its political grip with its economic affluence. Furthermore, in 1975, the regime gained

tremendous economic and political boosts. By finally solving the Kurdish problem, such settlement put an end to the costly full-scale hostilities which ravaged the country's human and material resources. Its effect had been felt by both sides, Arabs and Kurds, in political and economic gains. Furthermore, the exchange of threats and hostilities between Iraq and Iran has also been solved in a cordial manner to the satisfaction and advantage of both countries. These steps contributed greatly to the confidence, strength, and legitimacy of the Baathist regime.

To summarize one can say that there has been a trend of gradual replacement of the old generation of military rulers by a younger, lower-class, civilian elite, university educated, and ideologically indoctrinated. In addition, the monopolistic personal leadership of the military has been replaced by collective civilian leadership. Promotion to important positions has changed from personal considerations to a combination of professional qualifications and political loyalty to the ruling party. One result is the disappearance of older politicians and also of most of the members of the Free Officers Movement which changed the country into a republican regime. Furthermore, the general policy of the military regimes before the Baath rule was based on the principle of divide-and-rule. In contrast, and especially since 1974, a new policy has been adopted by the Baath which emphasizes the principle of unite, rule, and develop. The Baath philosophy seems to have shifted from idealistic to more realistic--a policy which



takes social, political, economic, and international circumstances into consideration.

In conclusion, it can be stated that, in addition to technology and natural resources, there is a significant interrelationship between political elite, public bureaucracy, and policy performance, all of which influence the quality and magnitude of the transformation processes.

## Footnotes

## THE REPUBLICAN REGIMES IN COMPARISON

<sup>1</sup>Law No. 224, 1969 published in Al-Waqai Al-Iraqiyya--Iraqi Events, No. 1819, December 24, 1969, p. 19. This was an amendment to Law of the Executive No. 50, 1964 published in Al-Waqai Al-Iraqiyya, No. 940, April 20, 1964, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 259.

<sup>3</sup>Kerr, Arab Cold War, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 100.

<sup>5</sup>Ibrahim Kubbah, Hadha Huwa Tariq Arbaat-Ashar Tammuz--This Is the Path of July 14 (Beirut: Daar al-Talee'a, 1969), pp. 15-28.

<sup>6</sup>Ahmed Fouzi, Qissat Abd al-Karim Qasim Kamila--The Story of Qasim (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi bi-Masr, 1963), p. 73.

<sup>7</sup>Adnan Al-Rawi, Min Al-Qahira Ila Mutaqal Qasim--From Cairo to Qasim's Jail (Beirut: Dar al-Adaab, 1963), p. 188.

<sup>8</sup>Muhammad Baqir Shirri, Al-Iraq Al-Thair--Iraq, The Revolutionary (Beirut: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi, 1963), pp. 68-69.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>10</sup>L'Express, February 21, 1963, as reported in Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 359.

<sup>11</sup>Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 242-243.

<sup>12</sup>For full details of such factions and groups, see Ibid., pp. 284-296.

<sup>13</sup>See Appendix XIII.

<sup>14</sup>Saddam Husain, Al-Thawra: Siraat al-Hazir wa al-Mustaqbal --The Revolution: Challenges of the Present and Future (Beirut: al-Muassasa al-Arabiya Lil Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1975), pp. 16-17.

The National Legislative Council or the "National Assembly" is planned to consist of peoples' representatives in the political, economic, and social sectors. The National Assembly convenes two ordinary sessions annually. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council is entitled to call the Assembly for an extraordinary meeting whenever required. The National Assembly shall consider the draft laws proposed by the Revolutionary Command Council within a period of fifteen days from the date of their arrival to the office of the President of the National Assembly. If the Assembly approves the draft, it shall be submitted to the President of the republic for promulgation. But if the Revolutionary Command Council insists on its opinion in the second reading, the draft shall be returned to the National Assembly to be discussed in a joint meeting between the Revolutionary Command Council and the National Assembly. The decision issued by the majority of two-thirds will prevail. In addition, the National Assembly shall consider the draft laws submitted by one quarter of its members in affairs other than military, financial, and public security affairs. For details, see The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq and its Amendments, Art. 46-Art. 55 (1974).

<sup>15</sup>Ministry of Information, Speech Delivered by President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr on the Occasion of the 3rd Anniversary of the Progressive July 17 Revolution (Baghdad: Al-Hurria House for Printing, 1971), p. 27.

<sup>16</sup>Husain, Al-Thawra, p. 17.

<sup>17</sup>See Appendices XXI and XXII.

<sup>18</sup>Baghdad Observer, March 25, 1976, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup>Interview with the Minister of Justice, July 25, 1975.

<sup>20</sup>Personal interview with Mr. Adnan al-Hamdani, Secretary General of the Vice-Presidential Office and Member of the Regional Command of the ABSP and, since May 12, 1976, Minister of Planning.

<sup>21</sup>Personal interview with Dr. Mukarram al-Talabani, Minister of Agrarian Reform, August 20, 1975.

<sup>22</sup>Al-Thawra, May 29, 1975, pp. 1, 7.

<sup>23</sup>Baghdad Observer, March 5, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup>Government Press, Khutab Wa-Tassreahat Al-Sayyid Saddam Husain--Speeches and Statements of Mr. Saddam Husain (Baghdad: Dar al-Huriyya Press, 1972), p. 47.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>26</sup>Husain, Al-Thawra: Siraat, p. 17.

<sup>27</sup>Personal interviews and questionnaires containing objective questions were conducted among eight ministers who represent the sample of political elite; and twenty bureaucrats, in director-general positions, who represent the administrative elite. The interviews and questionnaires were administered in August 1975.

<sup>28</sup>See Ministry of Planning, Al-Ahdaf Al-Iqtisadiyya Lil Khutta Baeedat Al-Mada--Economic Goals of Long-Term Plan, 1971-1995, pp. 4-82.

<sup>29</sup>Lecture delivered by Dr. Fakhri Qadouri, head of the Economic Affairs Bureau to the Revolutionary Command Council, to the Third Baghdad International Seminar held on June 1, 1976 as reported by the Baghdad Observer, June 15, 1976, p. 3.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

## Chapter VII

### CONCLUDING ANALYSIS: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC

In this study, we have examined the major characteristics of the political elites in post-1958 Iraq. It is one of our assumptions that such background characteristics differentially determine the access/exit dynamics of the governing elites. The same characteristics also influence intra-elite unity, elite relationships with the public bureaucracy, and the choice of national goals and public policy in the process of modernization and political development.

In this chapter, we will re-examine the hypotheses stated in the introductory chapter with the intention of confirming, modifying, or rejecting their contents. It is hoped that this study's contribution provides us with generalizations that help explain the Iraqi system in particular and other Arab revolutionary systems more generally. Even though demographic, ideological, and professional elite attributes do not precisely predict future political events, they do help explicate the dynamics of change which would otherwise remain unrecognized. The analysis based on the data collected projects a number of general observations within the Iraqi context.

#### 7.1. Hypotheses Re-examined

The first hypothesis referred to the relationship between the early stages of a regime and the presence of a higher number of

cabinet members chosen on the grounds of support and loyalty rather than professionalism. The available evidence, reflected in the trends of elite recruitment, does not substantiate this hypothesis. In Qasim's first cabinet, members represented a balanced mixture of various political forces in the country who were replaced by Qasim's supporters as the regime became more vulnerable to political opposition. A similar trend took place in Arif's first cabinet of February 1963, which after ten months became packed with pro-Arif supporters. Later Arif II formed his first cabinet of April 1966, where several groups with different political orientations shared the cabinet posts. But Arif, subsequently, had to reduce the broad-based cabinet to a more acquiescent one in which his own supporters dominated. Finally, al-Bakr's first cabinet of July 1968, had more groups represented than his second cabinet. Such moves were taken by each regime in order to solidify its control over the management of national affairs. The wider and more intense the political opposition, the narrower was the base of elite recruitment. Ascriptive considerations progressively became the dominant ones.

The crystallization of uniform regime control that developed with the life of the particular regime occurred for a number of reasons. First, each regime seeks to utilize a certain amount of elite circulation as an example of its democratic style. Second, elite divisiveness inevitably gives way to solidarity for survival. This occurs when one or another faction assumes control

of the cabinet. Such political practices, however, seriously damage any chances for the establishment of recognized procedures for effective control of policy formulation and implementation. This style estranges other political and social forces who do not share the same beliefs; it also encourages the identification of public policies with personalities rather than institutions or principles. Eventually such a personal approach to the management of national affairs may undermine the institutionalization process and retard development.

A secondary and more specific hypothesis flows from the above generalization. Elite recruitment in the early stages of regime rule tends to amalgamate several political groups where domination by one is obvious but not decisive. At a later stage, and in the absence of elite consensus, the stronger group is able to exclude the other factions from the decision-making process. As the victorious group gains in power and receives wider acceptability in society, it begins to seek extra-elite support. This is usually manifested by an attempt to build political alliances with professional groups and other party factions.

The second hypothesis proposes that personalism and factionalism slow the process of modernization and political development. The political reality is one of frequent cabinet change, instability, and military intervention. The absence of political institutions and legitimate procedures is replaced by decision by personal whim. The office always fluctuates in

importance depending upon the person who occupies it. As a result, the political structure is built around dominant personalities who individually dominate the policy-making process. This is seen by the close association of certain public policies with particular personalities. For example, whether in the field of oil, agriculture, industry, or education, Qasim's preferences always prevailed. Iraqi policy was Qasim's policy. The case was the same with respect to the Arif brothers and al-Bakr. Regime change, therefore, always produced a corresponding change in top personnel, philosophy, and to a lesser extent, policy.

In this kind of system, the shallow reservoir of qualified public servants is very rapidly depleted, policy is discontinuous and programs are prematurely truncated. In such a situation, developmental processes are inevitably retarded.

Our third hypothesis states that other things being equal, a unified elite promotes more development than a divided one. The empirical evidence of this study indicates that this proposition can only be partially true. A united elite in Iraq means the emergence of a single dominant political leader. Such a personality can unilaterally compel the rest of the elite members to adopt his views and to champion unified action. Thus, it would appear that after 1959 Qasim became the strongman of the regime and subsequently carried out more positive action through his more harmonious cabinets than the previous heterogeneous ones. Elite consensus on policy prevailed at the top national level. Formal opportunities



for elite dissention were restricted. Informal opposition, however, did materialize in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy and in other orgnaizations. In this situation, the power structure becomes vulnerable unless the dominant elite broadens its control and gains wider commitment.


The fourth hypothesis suggests successful planning and developmental achievements if a combination of devotion and professionalism exists among the governing elite. Various methods have been employed to concentrate power in fewer hands. An extremely important one involves the distribution of positions among loyalists ranging from the family and enlarging the structure to kin, tribe, sect, associates, group, and party. The higher the absence of effective and legitimately institutionalized procedures of leadership succession and elite circulation, the more likely political conflict involves ascriptive rather than professional attributes of the political elite. Such behavior provides an insight which explains the motive to concentrate power. There are several examples of such behavior. Qasim concentrated power in his own hands, yet he did not recognize or rely on any organized structure, whether group or political party, to sustain his authority. Throughout his regime, Qasim pursued a policy of divide-and-rule, maintaining a balanced tension between political forces, while placing trusted subordinates in cabinet posts. He never developed his own political institutions or parties. Qasim lacked three basic characteristics associated with a charismatic leader:

the ability to inspire, to organize, and lead.<sup>1</sup> As a result, conspiracies, coups, counter-coups, and rebellions became the order of the day. Instability reigned. Similar conditions of instability marked the presidency of Abd al-Rahman Arif but in quite a different context. Besides the important fact that the President had a weak personality, his cabinets were clearly divided among factions and groups. It was relatively easy to topple Qasim and Arif because neither of them established any apparatus to elicit mass support or to institute national policy.

In contrast, the al-Bakr regime recognized the problem and, therefore, utilized the political party as the main organ of political development and control. As long as the top leadership of the party remained unified, the regime showed a stability unprecedented in the Republican period. A political party in charge of the country and backed by its affiliated officers enjoys longer tenure than a government dominated by a few personalities and factions. As can be observed from the chart below, it is clear that Qasim faced fewer coups during 1959-1961, when he informally supported the Communist party, than when he disclaimed any ties with it as before 1959 or after 1961. As for the al-Bakr regime, more coups and disturbances were witnessed during a divided leadership of the party between 1968-1973 than during the more cohesive leadership of the post-1973 period.

The fifth hypothesis proposes adversity between the military and the political parties. In other words, one would

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES



Graph 1 Composite Representation of Five Background and Major Political Changes in Iraq, 1958-1976

propose that the weaker the political institutions, the more likely military dominance. Samuel Huntington argues that:

Initially, the legitimacy of a modernizing military regime comes from the promise it offers for the future....If the regime does not develop a political structure which institutionalizes some principle of legitimacy the result can only be a military oligarchy in which power is passed among the oligarchs by means of coups d'etat, and which also stands in danger of revolutionary overthrow by new social forces which it does not possess the institutional mechanics for assimilating.<sup>2</sup>

As politics in Iraq lacks "autonomy, complexity, coherence and adaptability,"<sup>3</sup> the military plays the role of the politician with force at its disposal; the rest of the institutions--political, economic, social and religious--become subordinate to and supportive of the military. It must be realized that in the case of Iraq, most leaders have been backed by political parties but later lost this support, e.g., Qasim by the Communists, Arif I by the Baath in 1963, Arif II by the Nationalists in 1966, and al-Bakr by the Baath in 1968.

It seems that once in power, military leaders often lack the political skills necessary for the administration of modernization and development. One such required political skill is compatibility. Military leaders often downgrade the need for effective political parties and thereby limit their own ability to promote and control political participation. Such a leadership often possesses the physical power to force economic reforms at the expense of political development. Their chance of sustaining

themselves in power is slim unless they also confront successfully the critical issues of social and political development. One of the important means of discouraging military intervention is through the institutionalization of political and administrative organizations which have the capacity to cope with the imbalances and stresses that result from rapid social change. Their absence encourages frustrations of the people that are expressed in mass riots, general strikes, and continuous acts of rebellion. This provokes the military to intervene with force.

When the military regime attempts to eliminate political parties, it is eventually forced paradoxically to introduce them. The existence of informal channels of political communications in Iraq based on kinship associations, factions, and paternalism have been evidently inadequate to cope with the issues of modernization and political development. On their own, informal channels have failed to mediate and resolve tensions without threatening national identity. Their significant, yet insufficient, role in mediating the demands of economic development with those of social and individual stability must be complemented by formal institutions. Without formal channels of political communications between the ruling elite and the various elements of the political community, the basis of the regime's support will eventually erode.

Within the Iraqi context, the control or even absence of political institutions such as legislative bodies, political parties, and a free press has characterized the military regimes of

July 1958, February 1963, November 1963, April 1966, and July 1968. This did not mean that the military did not cooperate with certain political forces. Each group, not possessing enough public support to rule, resorted to violence to dominate the other groups. Dissension and rivalry led to the elimination of each group by another until one of them, headed by a strong leader, managed to control the army and impose its will over the country. As a result, the mechanisms of participation and accountability disappear. Such conditions work in favor of the military junta who stay in power until they are removed by another counter-force. This argument is supported by Almond and Powell who write that:

This  $\int$  transfer of the power of government from one set of leaders to another  $\int$  may occur either between parties or within a single party. But if the level of personal trust is low, if the political process is viewed as a life-and-death conflict... it will be very difficult for the incumbent elites to relinquish their roles in the political process and step aside for a new group of political actors. The stakes will seem too high; the opposition will seem too dangerous.<sup>4</sup>

The above conditions as manifested in Iraq did not occur only between parties (e.g., Baath in 1963, 1973) but also among politicized military leaders (e.g., Pro-Nasirites in 1965, 1966). If we examine the succession of power from one leader or political group to another, we find that force and violence have been the rule rather than the exception, e.g., on all occasions when there was a change of regime or leader, it was achieved through a violent coup of some sort.

In examining the "militarization" of cabinets in the post-1958 era, it is observed that all regimes maintained a minimum share of 25 percent of cabinet posts for military officers. The only exception was al-Bazzaz's two cabinets in 1965 and 1966 which dropped below the minimum rate of the military. Although the rate of military representation in al-Bakr's regime in 1974 fell close to 20 percent, its military appearance had been mellowed by the substitution of civilians and the popular militia for the military. The regime of 1968 reflected a different type of military personnel in the sense that most of them did not belong to the original Free Officers Movement. The original military elite has been outmaneuvered by civilian forces of the Baath who are backed by ideological officers. What helped to strengthen the dominance of the Baath party was the continuous clashes among the Free Officers who, until 1970, represented a major recruitment source for leadership. By 1970, the new Baath regime sought to develop a different kind of leadership. Their choice was to recruit professionally-qualified ministers of their own political party or allies of similarly-oriented political groups and parties. This broadening of the power-base does not mean the sharing of top authority. The new forces are offered secondary political positions which do not change the decision-making power of the dominant group. The new civilian elite integrates various ideological groups, while the real power resides within the ruling party.

The sixth hypothesis proposes that a higher rate of

instability and violent disturbance has adverse effects on the nation's domestic prosperity and international relations. As we have seen in previous chapters, changes in heads of state and their supporters are usually accompanied by cancellation of programs which were initiated by the ousted elite. Although such attempts represent a desire for basic revisions, they do not separate politics from policy. Therefore, frequently changing cabinets and the short tenure of ministers causes delays, changes, and even discontinuity in the implementation of long-range policy. Often, new ministers deliberately oppose policies associated with their predecessors and institute new ones identified with their own ideas. Such policy is promoted more by personal interest and jealousy than by professional evaluation. Ousted ministers then tend to strike back by engaging in underground political activities which often threaten the group in power. This forces the latter to invest valuable energy and resources in the development of defensive politics.

Political survival is positively related to policy continuity. The economic plans and policies initially took the form of piecemeal projects and investment plans rather than well-controlled and feasibly-tested comprehensive plans. Stability of the current regime during the years 1972-1976 has provided a favorable economic atmosphere to plan more feasibly and scientifically. While the Kurdish rebellion was threatening the country, both economic and political resources were diverted from productive use to military



purposes. Similarly, when the political elite in 1963-1964 was divided over the type of policies to be implemented, all economic indicators (agriculture, industry, oil) showed stagnation and even regression as expressed in increased imports and reduction of exports. Since 1972, impressive achievements have been made in the development policy. This, in turn, has been accompanied by a more stable political leadership.

Furthermore, this sixth hypothesis assumes that dramatic changes in leadership do not necessarily produce impressive developmental growth. On the contrary, in the short run, a country may have regressive economic trends such as those which took place during the first stages of Qasim's era and during the regimes of Arif and al-Bakr. Nevertheless, political and social modernization can, to a certain extent, flourish through the formation and proliferation of unions, professional associations, and national movements which result in popular enlightenment and help mobilize the citizens in certain participatory capacities.

The next and seventh hypothesis proposes a conflicting relation between the political system and the bureaucracy. In this case, one can see that revolutionary ideological parties such as the Baath attempted twice (in 1963 and 1968-1976) to politicize the bureaucracy by placing party affiliates in key positions. On both occasions, the subordination of the public bureaucracy to political control has been partially, though not completely, successful. Two reasons were given by a prominent political

official for this failure to dominate completely. First, the abuse of authority by some party members may seriously harm the party's reputation, and second, there are not enough qualified party members at present to undertake complete supervision of the public bureaucracy.<sup>5</sup>

In spite of the revolutionary fever of the various regimes, it seems that none of them have been able to radicalize the administrative decision-making to meet the urgency of the revolution. Up-to-date research and publications indicate clearly a bureaucratic strategy of pleasing political leaders which has often led to ineffective policy formulation and implementation. Such strategy will prevent the accountability of political appointees and their clientele as well as the transformation of the existing patterns of behavior. In a recent statement a prominent member of the political leadership acknowledged publicly that:

In fact many of the resolutions passed by the Revolutionary leadership fall short of accomplishing their positive results due to mal-implementation and the shortcomings in administrative mentality...I believe that among the most outstanding defects of the administrative system is bureaucracy, which unfortunately exists even at the lowest level of administration. Once an official sits behind his desk he develops an irrational and bureaucratic conduct in dealing with others...Our administrative system has been suffering greatly from redtape, lack of initiative, and persistence of unnecessary handicaps. In many of our departments, formalities are conducted today in the same manner as they were 30 years ago....Persistence of these defects has resulted in the emergence of seriously passive social and economic shortcomings....Another defect of the administrative system is the indifference, lack of the sense of responsibility and the

adoption of classical traditions.<sup>6</sup>

From the foregoing description of the administrative process, it is apparent that the public bureaucracy in Iraq resembles in many ways the main features of the "sala model" (formalism, nepotism, poly-communalism, overlapping, heterogeneity, and poly-normativism). Relationships in Iraqi society are based more on the family than on the individual. The social value system revolves around the loyalty and devotion of the family member to the interests of his extended family. Consequently, bureaucrats, as members of a communal system, are bound to cling to the society's values and customs in the performance of their duties. The bureaucratic characteristics (structural, such as formalism, overcentralization, overlapping, overstaffing, vagueness of rules and, procedures, and behavioral, such as nepotism, favoritism, corruption, and parochialism) are influenced by their interaction with the environment. This environment includes historical, social, economic, and political forces which impose pressures on the structural and behavioral characteristics of the public bureaucracy. Thus, we can hypothesize that if structural and behavioral characteristics are strong and rigid, the process of transition from a traditional society to a dynamic industrial one will be a slower and more difficult one. In discussing the problems of decision-making in the Middle East, Halpern stated that in those societies, built largely on a face-to-face relationship, there was the need to follow the requirements of the principles of common purpose, public interest, and national duty.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, the economies of such societies lacked the entrepreneurial and administrative-technological skills.<sup>8</sup> One explanation is that cultural, religious, and educational values fostered some prejudice against technology, while encouraging administrative and legal positions.<sup>9</sup> But to industrialize a country needs an industrial bureaucracy beside the administrative bureaucracy. In Caiden's words, "the downgrading of technological and administrative skills is an obstacle to administrative reform, whose prospects are tied to a transformation of social attitude."<sup>10</sup> What is desired is an adaptive social environment to accommodate newly emerging needs and new relationships among individuals.

The eighth and final hypothesis emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between elite, bureaucracy, and policy. This is a continuous relationship, since there is a bargaining process between the political leaders' demands on the public bureaucracy and the resources needed by the bureaucracy to implement the assigned programs. Such interactions determine the quality and quantity of policy execution.<sup>11</sup> In some cases, the bureaucracy is subjected to more political pressure than in other cases. This trend was clearly manifested throughout the republican regimes; it proved to have adverse effects on the implementation of national plans. For example, during the Qasim rule, the Ministry of Planning changed its head three times. Between 1963 and 1968 Iraq had six Ministers of Planning. From 1968 to 1974 four Ministers directed the Ministry of Planning. Such changes were even more frequent in

the plan-implementation machinery. Similarly, between 1964 and 1968 there were eight Ministers of Industry and Transport and seven Ministers of Public Works. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform changed its head six times during the same period. The period between 1968 and 1974 did not reflect much more enduring leadership in such ministries as Industry, Agriculture or Transport.

In general, the republican regimes have attempted to infuse revolutionary spirit into the bureaucracy. In particular, ruling political parties impose their own ideology onto the bureaucracy. Such policy statements by the government, however, are not an indication of performance. As we saw in early chapters, all republican regimes stated more goals and objectives than they subsequently realized. The gap between promises and achievements depends on means of control, the state of technology, available resources, and political leadership. The utilization of the available resources depends to a large extent on the leadership's intention and commitment. During the period 1958-1973, the republican regimes witnessed numerous opposition groups who frequently contested the rule at the time. In general, these elite factions attempted explicitly (during the Qasim and al-Bakr regimes) or implicitly (during the Arif regimes) to gain more control over bureaucracy in order to consolidate and better execute development policies. No single regime has been successful in achieving this although there have been partial successes. The trend to politicize the bureaucracy in order to achieve increased performance can be

dysfunctional. It often leads to overcentralization, overstaffing, reduction of accountability, and other inefficiencies. Such symptoms will only induce the leadership to return to the principles of professionalism and competence in the long-term as a solution to increase the regime's capacity and responsiveness to meet the citizen's demands.

We can hypothesize here that, within the Iraqi context, continuity of government is positively correlated with the stability of policy implementation. As the political elites attempt--depending on their control mechanism and capacity--to initiate required reforms, the success of the changes will be limited by the degree of bureaucratic commitment to the regime's goals and ideology. Therefore, during the republican era, leaders of the various regimes declared social, economic, and administrative programs which they subsequently failed to carry out. Without the administrative commitment, the intentions of the ruling elite can be very ambitious, and still be for naught. An imposing obstacle to the achievement of goals and promises is, therefore, the lack of bureaucratic cooperation. When political elite instability (indicated by attempted coups, assassinations, conspiracies, demonstrations, and organized political opposition) became evident, the regime shifted towards more authoritarian rule and resorted to more repressive control, more ascriptive recruitment, and more restrictive decision-making. Conversely, greater stability encourages the governing elite to broaden its structure as well as

to make its decision-making process more participatory. At this point, we realize that, apart from material resources, the process of development relies on a motivating political system, a dynamic bureaucracy, and a suitable social environment.

#### 7.2. Final Observations: The Iraqi Political System

The republican regimes in Iraq have not been successful in establishing the political structures and procedures needed to resolve differences among competing elite factions or in providing appropriate avenues for policy-making and implementation. The consequences have been that the political sphere is not clearly differentiated from the spheres of social and personal relations. The political relationships among the elite actors who dominate national policies are largely determined by individualized social and personal linkages. The inevitable result is that the political struggle tends to revolve around issues of prestige, influence, and personality rather than alternative courses of policy action.<sup>12</sup> Even national political parties were strongly shaped by personal, regional, ethnic, and religious considerations. Such considerations were clearly manifested in the mutually exclusive nationalistic feelings of Kurdish and Arab sentiments at the expense of the Iraqi nationhood. Furthermore, Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism are related, yet conflicting, concepts. Arab nationalism was used by all revolutionaries and coup leaders to legitimize their initial seizure of power. The Arab-Kurdish

coalition and promises to the Kurds were evidenced in all official announcements and the interim constitutions of the republican regimes of Qasim, the Arifs, and al-Bakr. However, these promises seemed to dissipate in later stages of rule as Arab identity superseded Kurdish identity. Yet, at the Arab level, national Iraqi interests took precedence over pan-Arab unity. This cordial attitude toward the Kurds was expressed by all leaders of the republican regimes when they seized power. It later turned to unpleasant military confrontation with the Kurds.

As indicated in previous chapters, all Iraqi leaders advocated Arab unity in the initial stages of the coup, later becoming even less involved with it than the previous regime. This was true with Qasim, the Arifs, and al-Bakr regimes in their relations with Egypt and Syria. With the passage of time, such indications reflected a decline in pan-Arabism and an upsurge in localism. There are two explanations for this state of affairs. First, there are those who prefer to see Iraq playing a major role in Arab affairs with special regard to the Palestinian problem. Second, there are others who like Iraq to concentrate on its domestic problems and its relations with its neighboring states only.

Utilizing background characteristics, one can predict that goals a leader or political elite may stand for. A military elite denigrates political parties and even eliminates their existence. This increases the tendency for informal channels of political



communications to exist. As the country occupies itself with the modernization process, the role of informal communication alone is significant, yet insufficient, to mediate the demands of economic, social, and political development. In the long run formal channels of political communications between the governing elite and the various elements of the political community must be institutionalized for development to continue.

It becomes clear, therefore, that in analyzing political behavior, elite policy decisions are determined by a combination of the elite's formal role, the personal background of its members, its interaction with supporters, followers, and society, the existing political organizations and opposition, the bureaucratic structure, and even foreign interventions. Background characteristics become more important in explaining and predicting intra-elite conflicts, policy issues, and stability in the absence of formal structures and procedures of conflict-solving and decision-making matters.

If a politically developed society were to be defined in terms of whether an alternation in power took place via peaceful means, Iraq would not qualify. As we have observed, during the entire republican period a leader or a party in power never lost office by means of election. Power alternated by violent means and conspiracy even from within the same clan, group, or political party. Until 1973, the elite had always been divided, and the internecine competition among its members often had been based upon

ethnic, religious, or regional divisions rather than policy differences. An elite, to be effective, must possess internal unity and also have a sense of mission. The absence of unity resulted in mutual mistrust and fostered splits among various elite personalities and factions. This situation brought about counter-modernizing influences that affected adversely identity, stability, and Iraqi modernization.

The Iraqi political system has not witnessed any basic and long-range reforms. There has not been a fundamental move towards genuine political competition and participation. The nation's political leadership has not been selected outside the field of force or the threat thereof. There have not been new and recognized criteria of selection which may be operative, nor new political institutions and instruments adaptable for the new era. This shortcoming questions the legitimacy of any regime and puts its political stability, continuity, and unity in continual doubt. The republican elites have chosen to substitute directed democracy for freedom and political survival for political modernization. Authoritarianism results; intrigues and behind-the-scene activities are practiced; opposition is stifled; rational decision-making is obstructed; political development is retarded. Such characteristics have been dominant since 1958. The political process may be viewed as rule by trial and error and government by crisis management. The republican era precipitated a style of personal, military, one-party, collective leadership. All the republican

regimes may be viewed as a preparation for the following stage in which the creation of new structures and functions will make rapid modernization and political development a reality rather than an illusion.

The most significant feature of the post-1958 regimes is the emergence of new leaders born and raised in a rural environment. This trend (36 percent during Qasim's regime, 60 percent during the Arifs' regimes and 75 percent during al-Bakr's regime) is likely to remain dominant for the following two reasons. First, the army has become a school mainly for middle and lower class individuals who come primarily from the rural areas because they cannot afford the educational and living expenses of the University. Second, the conspiratorial nature of politics in Baghdad has weakened the civilian forces and encouraged instead emergent leaders who recruit their adherents on the basis of kinship and paternalism.

As long as civilian leadership remains divided, the military will maintain its dominant role in Iraqi politics. Similarly, if the military becomes divided into factions, there might emerge a strong group or political party that will impose its own type of civilian authoritarianism and entrust power to a civilian form of government, e.g., a political party, which could conceivably put an end to military rule. A civilian government, however, could only emerge if it were to be supported by a well-organized and cohesive group or political party backed by military affiliates.

In the light of this analysis, it is likely that the nature

and composition of the Iraqi political elite will be overwhelmingly dominated by pan-Arab rural Sunnites. Kurds and Shiites will be underrepresented. Likewise, the occupants of ministerial posts of political significance will be men stronger and more militant than the rest of the cabinet members. History has taught that no regime dare neglect to entrust the ministries of Defense and Interior to others than its strongest and most trusted personalities. When there has been loose control over these two ministries, the regime has lost its power. Secondary ministries are often entrusted to professionals or technocrats with fairly good education at home or abroad, while ministers occupying the key ministries have less practical experience in administration or politics.

In terms of developmental strategies, the behavior of the political leadership during the pre-1973 republican era revealed a style of divide and rule. Since 1973, a more positive developmental strategy has been pursued. Political integration, for example, has been an important area of positive activity. The integrative policy advocated the inclusion of other political forces in the ruling elite through coalitions, force, alliances, and even cooptation. One can conclude that economic and social modernization may exist alongside much less impressive political development. Since 1972, huge increases in oil revenues have been appreciably utilized to initiate numerous agricultural, industrial, and social programs, all intended by the elite to result in more popular

support. At the same time, the Baath regime has provided the masses with a doctrine of integrative symbols and ambitious policies that transcends the geographical, ethnic, and political cleavages which have traditionally divided the society. Al-Bakr's leadership has demonstrated the ability to organize, lead, and inspire. The regime has recognized the difference between the authority to make decisions from the ability to do so. This has assisted the regime to direct and implement policies and programs, while at the same time inviting other political forces to participate in the preparation of developmental plans and programs. Hence, the present republican regime has broadened the base of elite recruitment, increased the use of rational-technical criteria in elite recruitment at the secondary level, and eroded the significance of the military elite who carried out the revolution of 1958 and formed an important former source of recruitment in the Revolutionary Command Council. The new regime has come to realize that in order to survive it must allow for the emergence of both charismatic leadership and political institutions, both of which are necessary to promote the legitimacy and capacity of the regime to cope with the challenges of modernization and political development.

Given a few more years of stability, one may anticipate that Iraq can well be the most genuinely prosperous of all the Arab countries. Unlike the Arab Gulf States, it has an abundance of land and natural resources; unlike Saudi Arabia and Libya, it is not

sparsely populated; unlike Egypt, it is not overpopulated or bordered by Israel; and unlike Algeria, it has a large professional and technical cadre, coupled with long experience in planning.

## Chapter VII

## CONCLUDING ANALYSIS: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC

<sup>1</sup>Oles M. Smolansky, "Qasim and the Iraqi Communist Party: A Study in Arab Politics," in Jacob M. Landau, ed., Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 172.

<sup>2</sup>Huntington, Political Order, p. 242.

<sup>3</sup>The four concepts are adopted from ibid., p. 12.

<sup>4</sup>Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 56.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with Mr. Adnan Al-Handani, Member of the Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, in August 1975.

<sup>6</sup>Baghdad Observer, March 3, 1976, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>Halpern, Politics of Social Change in the Middle East, p. 353.

<sup>8</sup>Berger, Arab World, p. 404.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 404-405.

<sup>10</sup>Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Reform (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), p. 173.

<sup>11</sup>This conclusion agrees with, in addition to several other writers, the writings of Appleby, Policy and Administration, p. 121; Caiden, Administrative Reform, p. 70; Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy-making Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 198; Heady, Public Administration, pp. 73-110; and Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 6.

<sup>12</sup>Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 16.

## APPENDICES



## Appendix I

## ARABIC TRANSLITERATION

(The Library of Congress-Processing Department, Bulletin 49,  
November, 1958, Washington, D. C.)

<u>Alphabet</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Alphabet</u>	<u>Value</u>
ا (أ)	a, (')	ق	q
ب	b	ط	t
ت	t	ظ	z
ث	th	ع	'
ج	j	غ	gh
ح	h	ف	f
خ	kh	ق	q
د	d	ك	k
ذ	dh	ل	l
ر	r	م	m
ز	z	ن	n
س	s	هـ	h
ش	sh	و	w
ص	ṣ	ي	y

## Vowels and Diphtongs:

ا	a	أ	ā	او	aw
و	u	و	ū	أ	ay
ي	i	ي	ī		

## Appendix II

## ABBREVIATIONS OF IRAQI OFFICER RANKS

<u>Iraqi Title</u>	<u>Equivalent Rank</u>	<u>Abbreviation</u>
Mulazim Thani	Second-Lieutenant	Sec. Lieut.
Mulazim	Lieutenant	Lieut.
Naqib	Captain	Cap.
Raid	Major	Maj.
Muqaddam	Lieutenant-Colonel	Lieut-Col
Aqid	Colonel	Col
Amid	Brigadier	Brig
Liva	Major-General	Maj-Gen
Fariq	Lieutenant-General	Lieut-Gen
Fariq Awval	General	Gen
Mushir	Marshal	--

## Other Abbreviations:

NDP	National Democratic Party
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
ABSP	Arab Baath Socialist Party
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
IDm	Iraqi Dinars in millions
GNP	Gross National Product
-	Information is not available
1 Feddan = 4 Dunams = 1.038 Acre	
1 Dunam = 0.25 Hectar = 0.61 Acre = 1,000 Square Meters	
1 Iraqi Dinar (ID) = \$3.00	

Appendix III

Table II

MAJOR CABINET POSITIONS AND THEIR OCCUPANTS ACCORDING TO  
BACKGROUND FOR THE PERIOD 1920 - 1958

Background of Ministers Occupying Major Positions <sup>(a)</sup>	Number of Times a Major Position Held <sup>a</sup>	Number of People Holding a Major Position	Percent of Times a Major Position Held	Percent of People Holding a Major Posi- tion
<u>Religion</u>				
Sunnite	297	62	82.3	78.4
Shi'ite	52	15	14.4	19.0
Christian	5	1	1.4	1.3
Jewish	7	1	1.4	1.3
<u>Ethnic Origin</u>				
Arab	321	67	88.9	84.8
Kurd	23	8	6.4	10.1
Turkoman	17	4	4.7	5.1
<u>Occupation</u>				
Army Officer	151	21	41.9	26.6
Lawyer	131	28	36.3	35.5
Civil Servant	42	17	11.6	21.5
Businessman	14	4	3.9	5.1
Landowner	3	2	0.8	2.5
Religious Leader	4	2	1.1	2.5
Physician	7	3	2.5	3.8
Engineer	9	2	1.9	2.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>361 positions</b>	<b>79 persons</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>a</sup>The five major positions include the Prime Minister and the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance.

Source: Nazar Al-Ilasso, "Administrative Politics in the Middle East: The Case of Monarchical Iraq, 1920-1958 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1976) pp. 122-23; p. 130.

Appendix IV

Table III

DISTRIBUTION OF PREMIERSHIP POSITIONS ACCORDING TO SOCIAL  
BACKGROUND FACTORS FOR THE PERIOD 1920 - 1958

Background of Prime Ministers	Number of times a Prime Minister Position Held	Number of People Holding a Prime Minister Position	Percent of Times Holding Position	Percent of People Holding Position
<u>Religion</u>				
Sunnite	53	19	91.4	82.6
Shi'ite	5	4	8.6	17.4
Other	--	--	----	----
<u>Ethnic Origin</u>				
Arab	55	20	94.8	87.0
Kurd	2	2	3.5	8.7
Turkoman	1	1	1.7	4.3
TOTAL	58	23	100	100

Source: Nazar Al-Hasso, "Administrative Politics in the Middle East: The Case of Monarchical Iraq, 1920-1958" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1976), p. 124.

Appendices V, VI, VII

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF IRAQI CABINET MINISTERS DURING  
THE REPUBLICAN ERA, 1958 - 1976

(Al-Thawra (Baghdad), 1968-1976; The Iraqi Ministry of Information - The Iraqi News Agency; Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); The Middle East Journal, XXII (Autumn, 1958)-XXX (Summer, 1976); Who's Who in The Arab World (Beirut), 1st ed., 1965-66, pp. 145-185; 2nd ed., 1967-68, pp. 275-357; 3rd ed., 1971-72, pp. 375-416).

## Appendix V

## The Qasim Regime, 1958-1961

## Cabinet I: July 1958 - September 1958

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Note	Place					
Prime Minister	Qasim, A. K.	1914	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Brigadier	Baghdad, England	Free Officer Pro-left
Defense	Qasim, A. K. (Acting)	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Interior	Arif, A. S. (Acting)	1918	"	"	"	Colonel	"	Free Officer Pan-Arab
Foreign Affairs	al-Juwaid, A.	1909	Musul	"	North	Civil Servant	Ph.D., Law, Sorbonne	Arab-Nationalist
Finance	Hadid, Muhammad	-	"	"	"	Economist & businessman	B.S., England	National Democratic Party (N.D.P.)
Education	Umar, Jabir	-	"	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., Germany	Arab-Nationalist
Economics	Kubbah, Ibrahim	-	-	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Sorbonne	Communist
Social Affairs	Talib, Najj	1917	Nasirya	"	"	Colonel	Baghdad, England	Non-Partisan Free officer
Communications & Public Works	Ali, Baba	-	-	Sunnite	Kurd	Engineer	B.S., Baghdad, England	Kurd Nationalist (K.N.D.P.)
Development	al-Rikabi, Fued	1913	-	Shiite	South	"	Baghdad	Beath
Health	Muhamad, M. Salih	-	-	Sunnite	Kurd	Medical Doctor	"	K.N.D.P.
Agriculture	Hamad, Hadhab A.	1918	Qadisiya	Shiite	Baghdad	Landowner, Lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	N.D.P.
Guidance	Shamsal, Studdiq	N.A.	Musul	Sunnite	North	Lawyer	LLB, France	Nationalist (Istiqlal Party)
Justice	Ali, Mustafa	1900	Baghdad	"	Kurd	"	LLB, Baghdad	K.N.D.P.

Cabinet 2: September 1946 - February 1959

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Qasim, A. K.	1914	Baghdad	Sunni	Baghdad	Brigadier	Baghdad, England	Free Officer Pro-left
Defense Interior	Qasim, A. K. Yaliya, Ahmad M.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Foreign Affairs	al-Jumard, A.	1909	Mosul	"	North	Free Officer CIVIL Servant	Baghdad	Free Officer Pro-Qasim Arab-Nationalist
Finance	Hadi, Muhammad	-	"	"	"	Economist, businessman	Ph.D., Law, France	M.D.P.
Education	Humud, H.	1918	Qadisiya	Shiite	Baghdad	Landowner, Lawyer	B.S., England LLB, Baghdad	"
Economics	Kubbah, I.	-	-	"	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Communist
Social Affairs	Talib, Najj	1917	Nasriya	"	"	Colonel	Baghdad, England	Free Officer
Communications & Public Works Development	Ali, Baba Hadi, Muhammad	-	-	Sunni	Kurd	Engineer	B.S., Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Health	Majid, Muhammad	-	Mosul	"	North	Economist, businessman	B.S., England	N.D.P.
Agriculture	Majid, M.S.	-	-	"	Kurd	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Guidance	Humud, Hudaib	1918	Qadisiya	Shiite	Baghdad	Landowner, Lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	N.D.P.
Justice	Shamsal, Siddiq Ali, Mustafa	-	Mosul	Sunni	North	Lawyer	LLB, France	Nationalist
Minister of State (first time)	al-Rikabi, Fuad	1913	Baghdad	"	Kurd	Lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
		1913	-	Shiite	South	Engineer	Baghdad	Baath

Cabinet 3: February 1959 - July 1959

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Qasim, A. K.	1914	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	brigadier	Baghdad, England	Free Officer Pro-left
Defense	Qasim, A. K.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Interior	Yahya, Ahmad	-	-	"	"	"	Baghdad	Free Officer Pro-Qasim
Foreign Affairs	Jawad, Hashim	1911	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	B.A., Baghdad, England	Pro-N.D.P.
Finance	Hadid, M.	-	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Economist, businessman	B.S., England	N.D.P.
Education	Abd al-Hamid, Muhi	-	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	brigadier	Baghdad	Pro-left (free officer)
Economics	Kubbah, I.	-	-	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Communist
Social Affairs	Amin, Abd al-Wahhab	-	-	Sunnite	Baghdad	Colonel	Military College, Iraq	Conservative, Pro-Islamic, Anti-Arif
Communications & Public Works	al-Talabani, Hasan	-	-	"	Kurd	landowner, lawyer	I.L.B, Baghdad	N.D.P.
Development	al-Shaitani, Talat	1917	Dyala	Shiite	South	Engineer	Ph.D., U.S.A.	N.D.P.
Health	al-Shawwat, A. Malik	-	Basra	Sunnite	South	Doctor and Maj-General	Baghdad, England	Pro-left
Agriculture	Humad, H.	1918	Qadisiya	Shiite	Baghdad	landowner, lawyer	B.A., Baghdad	N.D.P.
Guidance	Jamil, Husain (Arif, F. from Feb. 14, 1959)	1908	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	N.D.P.
Justice	Ali, Mustafa	1900	"	Sunnite	Kurd	"	B.A., Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Minister w/o Portfolio	Arif, Fud	1912	Sulaymaniya	"	"	brigadier	Military, Baghdad	K.N.D.P.



Cabinet 4: July 1959 - May 1960

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Qasim, A. K.	1914	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Maj-General	Baghdad, England	Free Officer Pro-left
Defense	Qasim, A. K.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Interior	Yahya, A.	-	-	"	"	Brigadier	Baghdad	Free Officer Pro-Qasim
Foreign Affairs	Jawad, Hashim	1911	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Baghdad; England	Pro-N.D.P.
Finance	Hadid, M. (until May 3, 1960)	-	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Economist, businessman	B.S., England	N.D.P.
Education	Abd al-Hamid, M. (transferred to industry on May 3, 1960)	-	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Brigadier	Baghdad	Free Officer Pro-left
Social Affairs	Amin, Abd Mahhub	-	"	"	"	Colonel	"	Conservative Pro-Islamic Aref's enemy
Communications & Public Works	al-Talabani, Hasan	-	-	"	Kurd	Landowner, lawyer	"	N.D.P.
Health	al-Shawwal A.M.	-	Basra	"	South	Medical Doctor, Maj-General	Baghdad; England	Pro-left
Agriculture	Humud, H. (until Jun. 7, 1960. Amin took over)	1918	Qadisiya	Shiite	Baghdad	Landowner, Lawyer	B.A., Baghdad	N.D.P.

Cabinet 4 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Guidance	al-Samir, Faisal	1922	Basra	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Pro-left
Justice	Ali, Mustafa	1900	Baghdad	Sunni	Kurd	Lawyer	Baghdad	K.M.D.P.
Agrarian Reform	Kubba, I. (until Feb. 16, 1960, Yalya took over)	-	-	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Communist
Works and Housing	Yusif, Awni	1908	Arbil	Sunni	Kurd	Lawyer, Judge	Baghdad	K.M.D.P.
Planning	Shaibani, Y.	1917	Dyala	Shiite	South	Engineer	Ph.D., U.S.A.	M.D.P.
Commerce	al-Shawar' Abd L.	1921	Basra	Sunni	"	Civil Servant	B.A., Com., Iraq	Pro-left
Industry	Hadi, M. (Acting) (until May 3, 1960)	-	Mosul	"	North	Businessman, economist	B.S., England	M.D.P.
Oil Affairs	Kubba, I. (Acting) (until Feb. 16, 1960, Shaibani took over)	-	-	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Communist
Municipal Affairs	al-Dulaimi, M.	-	Dubayn	Sunni	Baghdad	Doctor of Medicine	Baghdad	Communist

Cabinet 5: May 1960 - February 1961

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Qasim, A. K.	1914	Baghdad	Sunni	Baghdad	Maj-General	Baghdad; England	Free Officer Pro-left
Defense	Qasim, A. K.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Interior	Yahya, A.	-	"	"	"	"	Baghdad	Free Officer Pro-Qasim
Foreign Affairs	Juwad, H.	1911	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	B.S., Baghdad	Pro-M.D.P.
Finance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Education	Artif, Ismail	-	Baghdad	Sunni	Baghdad	Brigadier	Baghdad	Anti-Communist Pro-Qasim
Social Affairs	Amin, Abd Wahid (resigned Oct. 20, 1960)	-	Baghdad	"	"	"	"	Conservative Pro-Islamic Free Officer
Communications & Public Works	Muhammad, Hasan Hibat (11/14/60)	-	-	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	Baghdad; U.S.A.	K.W.D.P.
	al-Falubani, H.	-	-	"	"	Lawyer	U.S., Baghdad	M.D.P.
	al-Shuwaf A.M.	-	Basra	"	South	Doctor of Medicine, Maj- General	Baghdad; England	Pro-left
Agriculture	Awad, Abu Muthab	-	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Brigadier	Baghdad	Free Officer

Cabinet 5 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Guidance	al-Samir, P. (until May 14, 1961, Arif, Ismail took over)	1922	Basra	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Pro-left
Justice	Ali, M. (resigned on May 14, 1961)	1900	Baghdad	Sunnite	Kurd	Lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Agrarian Reform Works & Housing	Yahya, A. Yusif, Anni (until Nov. 15, 1960)	-	-	"	Baghdad	Brigadier	Baghdad	Free Officer
Planning	Shu'ibani, T.	-	-	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	B.A., Baghdad	Pro-left
Commerce	al-Shawwal A.L. Zaki, Shukri	1921	Basra	Sunnite	"	"	"	"
Industry	Abd al-Hamid,	-	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Teacher, Lawyer	B.A., Law, Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Oil Affairs	Abd al-Hamid,	-	Baghdad	"	"	Brigadier	Baghdad	Pro-left
Oil Affairs	al-Shaibani,	1917	Diyala	Shiite	South	Engineer	Ph.D., U.S.A.	M.D.P.
Municipal Affairs	al-Maldawi, A. (resigned May 14, 1961)	1918	Baghdad	"	North	Civil Servant	B.A., Baghdad	Anti-Communist
Minister w/o Portfolio	al-Dulaimi, N. (until Nov. 15, 1960)	-	Dulayn	Sunnite	Baghdad	Doctor of Medicine	B.S., Baghdad	Communist
Minister w/o Portfolio	Arif, Fuad (left on Oct. 1, 1961 because of Kurdish War)	1912	Sulaymanya	"	Kurd	Brigadier	"	K.N.D.P.

Appendix VI

The Arif Regime, 1963-1968

Cabinet I: February 1963 - November 1963

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Brigadier	Military College, Iraq	Baath
Defense	Amash, Salih	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Military, Colonel	"	"
Interior	al-Sadi, Ali S. (until May 13, 1963)	1928	Dyala	"	"	Civil Servant	Baghdad College of Arts, Iraq	"
Foreign Affairs	Shabib, Talib	1934	Hilla	Shiite	South	Engineer	B.S., England	"
Finance	Kubbat, Salih (until May 13, 1963, replaced by al-Ubusi, M.J.)	1911	Baghdad	"	"	Civil Servant	College of Commerce, Iraq, B.A. Economics, U.S.A.	Non-Partisan
Education	al-Jawari, Ahmad	1924	"	Sunnite	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Social Affairs	Khikhal, Hamid	1932	Hindiya	Shiite	South	Teacher	Teachers Inst. Iraq	Pro-Baathist
Communications & Public Works	Abd ul-Latif, Sattar	1926	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Military, Colonel	Iraq	Free Officer Nationalist
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Doctor of Medicine	Syria	Baath
Agriculture	Ali, Babu	-	-	"	Kurd	Lawyer	L.L.B., Baghdad	K.N.D.P.

Cabinet 1 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Guidance	al-Hawi, Masri (until May 13, 1961, replaced by Sadi, Ali)	1927	Nawa	Sunite	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Baath
Justice	al-D lai, Mehdi	1925	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Civil Servant	LLB, Iraq	Non-Partisan
Agrarian Reform	Husnadi Sadun	1930	Karbala	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Baath
Works & Housing	al-Husain, Abd S.A.	1924	Basra	Sunite	Baghdad	Lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	Nationalist
Planning	al-All, Abd al-Karim	1925	Mosul	"	North	Engineer	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Non-Partisan
Commerce	Zaki, Shukri	1919	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	Baghdad	Nationalist
Industry	Talib, Nuji	1917	Nasirya	Shiite	South	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad, England	Free Officer
Oil Affairs	al-Wattari, A.	1930	Mosul	Sunite	North (Mosul)	Civil Servant	M.A., Engineer., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Municipalities	Khattab, Mahmud	1919	"	"	"	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	"
Minister of State	Arif, Fuad	1912	Sulaymanya	"	Kurd	"	"	K.N.D.P.
Minister of State	Javad, Hazim	-	-	Shiite	South	Teacher, secondary school	B.A., English, Iraq	Baath

Cabinet 2: May 1961 - November 1961

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	brigadier	Military College, Baghdad	Baath
Defense	Amash, Salih	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Lieut-Colonel	"	"
Interior	Jawad, Hakim	-	-	Shiite	South	Teacher	B.A., Iraq	"
Foreign Affairs	Shabib, Talib	1934	Hilla	"	"	Engineer	B.S., England	"
Finance	al-Ubusi, M.	1924	Baghdad	"	"	Civil Servant, Professor	B.A., Law, Iraq, Ph.D. France	Non-Partisan
Education	al-Jawari, A.S.	1924	"	Sunnite	West	Professor	Teachers Inst., Iraq, Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Social Affairs	Khilkhal, A.H.	1932	Hindiya	Shiite	South	Teacher	Teachers Inst., Iraq	Non-Partisan
Communications & Public Works	Abd al-Latif, A.S.	1926	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Lieut-Colonel	Military College, Iraq	Pro-Arif
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Kamadi	"	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria, 1950	Baath
Agriculture	Ali, Baba	-	-	"	Kurd	Lawyer	B.A., Law, Iraq	K.N.D.P.

## Cabinet 2 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Guidance	al-Sadi, Ali S.	1928	Diyala	Sunite	North	Civil Servant	B.A., Commerce, Iraq	Baath
Justice	al-Jalibi, Mahdi	1925	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer, Civil Servant	B.A., Law, Iraq	Non-Partisan
Agrarian Reform	Humaidi, Sadun	1930	Karbala	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Ph.D., Agricul., U.S.A.	Baath
Works & Housing	Abd al-Majid, R.	1921	Ann	Sunite	Northwest	Brigadier	B.S., Engineer., Military College, Iraq	Pro-Arif
Planning	al-Ali, Abd K.	1925	Mosul	"	North	Professor	Ph.D., Engineer., U.S.A.	Pro-Baath
Commerce	Zaki, Shukri	1919	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer, Civil Servant	B.A., Law, Iraq	Non-Partisan Pro-Arif
Industry	Talib, Naaji	1917	Basirya	Shiite	South	Brigadier	Military College, Iraq, England	Non-Partisan
Oil Affairs	al-Wattari, Abd A.	1930	Mosul	Sunite	North	Civil Servant	M.A., Engineer., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Municipalities	Khattab, M.	1919	"	"	"	Brigadier	Military College, Iraq	Pro-Baath
Union Affairs	al-Hawi, Msari	1927	Hawa	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Education, U.S.A.	Baath
Waqf (Religious Property)	Arif, Fuad	1912	Sulaymanya	"	Kurd	Brigadier	Military College, Iraq	K.N.D.P.
Deputy Prime Minister	al-Sadi, Ali S.	1928	Diyala	"	North	Civil Servant	B.A., Commerce, Iraq	Baath



Cabinet 3: November 1963 - June 1964

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Yahya, Tahir	1913	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Lieut-General	Military College, Iraq	Nationalist
Defense	al-Tikriti Hardan (until Mar. 1, 1964)	1925	"	"	"	Military, Brigadier	Military College, Iraq; England	"
Interior	Muslih, Rashid	1917	"	"	"	"	Military College, Iraq	Nationalist Moslem Brotherhood
Foreign Affairs	Abd al-Hamid, Subhi	1924	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Military, Lieut-Colonel	Military College, Iraq; England	Nasirite
Finance	al-Ubaidi, Mahmud	1924	"	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Economics, France	Non-Partisan
Education	al-Jawari, Ahmad	1924	"	Sunnite	Northwest	"	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	Hani, Abd K.	1928	"	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Nasirite
Communications	al-Latif, Abd S.	1926	"	"	"	Military, Lieut-Colonel	"	Nationalist
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Rasadi	"	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria	Baath
Agriculture	Abd al-Razzaz, Arif	1924	Kubaysa	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	Nasirite

Cabinet 3 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Guidance	Farhan, Abd al-Karim	1922	Kut	Shiite	South	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	Nasirite
Justice	al-Khatib, Kamil	1913	Baghdad	Sunnite	Northwest	Lawyer	I.I.B., Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Agrarian Reform	Alwan, Abd S.	1926	"	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Public Works & Housing	al-Ahwal, Abd P.	1925	Alus	Sunnite	Northwest	Civil Servant and Professor	Ph.D., France	Nasirite
	Abd al-Majid, Rijab			"	"	Brigadier	B.S., Engineer., England	Nationalist
Planning	Ali, Abd al-Karim	1925	Mosul	"	North	Engineer	Ph.D., England	Non-Partisan
Industry	Kannana, Abd al-Karim	1913	-	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Ph.D., Switzerland, M.S., Engineer., U.S.A.	"
Oil Affairs	al-Wattari, A.A.	1930	Mosul	Sunnite	North	"	M.S., Engineer., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Municipal Affairs	Khattab, M.S.	1919	"	"	"	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	"
Economics	al-Halizi, Abd A.	1925	-	Shiite	South	Professor	Chartered A/C, M.A., Econ., England	Nasirite
Union Affairs	al-Samarrai, Shamil	1921	Baghdad	Sunnite	North	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Nationalist
Minister of State	al-Naqshabandi M.	1920	al-Isadiyan	"	Kurd	Lawyer	"	K.N.P.K.

Cabinet 4: June 1964 - July 1965

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Yahya, Tahir	1913	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Lieut-General	Baghdad	Nationalist Free Officer
Defense	Yahya, Tahir	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Interior	Maslih, Rashid	1917	"	"	"	Military, Brigadier	"	Nationalist Pro-Islam
Foreign Affairs	Abd al-Rusid, Subhi	1924	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Military, Lieut-Colonel	"	Nasirite Pan-Arab
Finance	al-Ubusi, M.	1924	"	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Econ., France	Non-Partisan
Education	Said, Abi al-Majid	1920	"	Sunnite	Baghdad	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	Nationalist
Labor & Social Affairs	Hani, Abd K.	1928	"	"	"	Medical Doctor	"	Nasirite Pan-Arab
Communications	al-Habib, Mahsin H.	1918	Shatra	Shiite	South	Military, Brigadier	"	Nationalist
Health	al-Samarrai, S. (instead of Mustafa since Jan. 31)	1921	Baghdad	Sunnite	North	Medical Doctor	Syria	"
Agriculture	al-Rawi, Abd al-Ghani	1921	Rawa	"	Northwest	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	Nationalist Pro-Islam

Cabinet 4 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Guidance	Farhan, Abd al K.	1922	Kut	Shiite	South	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	Nasirite Pan-Arab
Justice	al-Husain, A.S.	1924	Ramadi	Sunnite	Northwest	Lawyer	I.L.B. Baghdad	Nationalist
Agrarian Reform	Alwan, Abd al S.	1926	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Non-Partisan
Public Works & Housing	Alusi, Abd F.	1925	Alusa	Sunnite	Northwest	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Planning	al-Ubaidi, M.	1924	Baghdad	Shiite	South	"	Ph.D., Econ., France	Non-Partisan
Industry	al-Jadir, A.	1922	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Civil Servant	M.S., Engineer, U.S.A.	Nationalist
Oil Affairs	al-Muttari, A.A.	1930	"	"	"	"	"	"
Municipal Affairs	Mustafa, Ismail	1911	Baquba	"	Baghdad	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Minister of State	Muhammad, Masud	1920	Koysunjak	"	Kurd	Lawyer	"	K.N.D.P.
Union Affairs	Muhyi al-Din, A.R.	1910	Najaf	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Nationalist
Economy	al-Hafez, Aziz	1925	-	"	"	Professor	Chartered Accountant, England	Nasirite Pan-Arab

Cabinet 5: July 1965 - September 1965

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Yahya, Tahir	1913	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Lieut-General	Baghdad	Nationalist
Defense	al-Nabib, Muhsin	1918	Shatra	Shiite	South	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad, England	"
Interior	Abd al-Hamid, Subhi	1924	Baghdad	Sunnite	Northwest	Military, Lieut-Colonel	Baghdad	Pan-Arab Nasirite
Foreign Affairs	Talib, Najib	1917	Masiryah	Shiite	South	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad, England	Nationalist
Finance	al-Ubaidi, M.	1924	Baghdad	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., Econ., France	Non-Partisan
Education	al-Ghafar, Khidr	1913	Ans	Sunnite	Northwest	"	M.A., Educ., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Labor and Social Affairs	Hani, Abd K.	1928	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Pan-Arab Nasirite
Communications	Said, Abd Majid	1920	"	"	"	Military, Brigadier	"	Nationalist
Health	al-Samarrai, S	1921	"	"	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria	"
Agriculture	al-Rawi, Abd al Ghani	1921	Rawa	"	"	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad, England	Nationalist Pro-Islam
Guidance and Culture	Qaisi, Abd al-Rahman	1920	Rosadi	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist

Cabinet 5 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Justice	al-Khatib, Kamil	1913	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Lawyer	LL.B., Iraq	Non-Partisan
Agrarian Reform	al-Naqshabandi M.	1920	al-Imadiyah	"	Kurd	"	"	K.N.D.P.
Public Works and Housing	Alusi, Abu F.	1925	Alus	"	North	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Planning	Zalzala, A. H.	1926	Qasra	Shiite	South	"	Ph.D., Econ., U.S.A.	Non-Partisan
Industry	Mataku, Jamil	1921	Baghdad	"	"	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Oil Affairs	al-Mattari, Abd A.	1930	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Civil Servant	M.S., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Municipal Affairs	al-Habibi, Abd H.	1931	Rajaf	Shiite	South	Lawyer	Law, Cairo	Non-Partisan
Economics	al-Hafiz, A. A.	1925	-	"	"	Professor	Baghdad, England	Nationalist
Union Affairs	Muhyi al-Din, A.	1910	Rajaf	"	"	"	Ph.D., Cairo	"
Maaf (Religious Property)	al-Naqshabandi M.	1920	al-Imadiyah	Sunnite	Kurd	Lawyer	LL.B., Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
State for Northern Affairs	Mirzwan, Masud	1920	Koysunjak	"	"	Civil Servant	LL.B., Baghdad	"

Cabinet 6: September 6, 1965 - September 20, 1965

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Abd al-Razzaq, Arif	1924	Kubaysa	Sunniite	Northwest	Military, brigadier	Baghdad, England	Fan-Arab Masirite
Defense Interior	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Foreign Affairs	Darraji, Abd al L.	1913	Ramadi	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	Nationalist
Finance	al-Bazzaz, Abd al-Rahman	1913	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Baghdad, England	"
Education	al-Awad, Salman A.	1918	"	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Chafur, Khair	1913	Ana	Sunniite	Northwest	Professor	M.A., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Communications	Muzal, Jamal Umar	1914	Baghdad	Turkoman	Baghdad	Civil Servant	B.A., Pol. Sc., Beirut	"
Health	Mustafa, Ismail	1911	Baquba	Sunniite	"	Military, Major-General	Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Agriculture	al-Badri, Abd al Latif	1902	Samarra	"	North	Medical Doctor, Professor	Cairo, U.S.A.	Beath
Guidance and Culture	al-Jaf, Akrom	1908	Salaymanya	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	Ph.D., U.S.A.	K.S.D.P.
Justice	Masir, Muhammad	1911	Basra	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist
	al-Sad, Husain M.	1910	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	LLB, Iraq	"

Cabinet 6 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agrarian Reform	al-Qaisi, Abd al-Rahman	1920	Ramadi	Sunnite	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Public Works and Housing	Alawi, Jafar	1915	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Engin., England	Non-Partisan
Planning	Abdallah, Mustafa	-	-	Sunnite	North	Engineer	M.S., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Industry	"	-	-	"	"	"	"	"
Oil Affairs	al-Bazzaz, Abd al-Rahman	1913	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Baghdad, England	"
Municipal Affairs	Mustafa, Ismail	1911	Baquba	"	"	Military, Major-General	Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Economics	Zaki, Shukri	1919	Baghdad	"	"	Lawyer	Baghdad	Nationalist
Union Affairs	Mahyi al-Din,	1910	Najaf	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	"
Ministry of Waqf	al-Qaisi, A.R.	1920	Ramadi	Sunnite	Northwest	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Minister of State	al-Sarvani, Salman	-	Saudi Arabia	Shiite	Saudi Arabia	Journalist, Civil Servant	Iraq	Non-Partisan



Cabinet 7: September 1965 - April 1966

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bazzaz, Abd R.	1913	Baghdad	Sunni	Baghdad	Professor	Baghdad, England	Nationalist
Defense	al-Uqayli, Abd A.	1920	Mosul	"	North	Military, Maj. General	"	"
Interior	al-Barradj, Abd L.	1913	Ramadi	"	West	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	"
Foreign Affairs	al-Bazzaz, Abd H.	1913	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Baghdad, England	"
Finance	Zaki, Shukri S.	1919	"	"	"	Lawyer	Baghdad	"
Education	al-Chatur, Khidr	1911	Ana	"	N. West	Professor	MA, USA	"
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Hasan, Faris N.	1920	Basra	Shiite	South	Officer, Lawyer	Iraq	"
Communications	Hariz, Ahmad Ahmad	1909	Mosul	Sunni	North	Civil Servant	Engin., Iraq	"
Health	al-Badri, A.L.	1922	Samara	"	North	Dr. of Med., Professor	Cairo	Baath
Agriculture	al-Jaf, Akram (until Dec. 11, 65 replaced by Dr. Thamer H.)	1928	Sulaymaniyah	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	PhD, USA	K.N.D.P.
Culture and Guidance	Nadir, Muhammad	1911	Basra	Shiite	South	Professor	PhD, USA	Nationalist
Justice	al-Nawaf, Kazim	1916	Baghdad	Sunni	Baghdad	Lawyer	Baghdad	"

Cabinet 7 continued

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agrarian Reform	al-Hasan, Faris M. (until Dec 11, 65 replaced by Jimah, M. Hasan)	1920	Basra	Shiite	South	Officer, Lawyer	Baghdad	Nationalist
Public Works and Housing	Mustafa, Ismail	1911	Baquba	Sunnite	Baghdad	Military, Maj. General	Baghdad	Non Partisan
Planning	al-Aswad, Sulman, A.	1918	Baghdad	Shiite	"	Civil Servant	"	"
Industry	Abdalla, Mustafa	-	-	Sunnite	North	Engineer	MS, USA	Nationalist
Oil Affairs	Zaki, Shukri S.	1919	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	Baghdad	"
Municipal Affairs	Mustafa, Ismail (until Dec. 11, 65 replaced by Dr. Thumir, H.)	1911	Baquba	"	"	Military, Maj. General	"	Non Partisan
Economics	al-Hilali, A.H.	1915	Basra	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	PhD, Germany	Nationalist
Union Affairs	Muhyi al Din,	1910	Najaf	"	South	Professor	PhD, Cairo	"
Ministry of Waqf	al-Ghafur, K.	1913	Ana	Sunnite	N. West	"	MA, USA	"
Minister of State	Salvani, Salwan	-	Saudi Arabia	Shiite	Saudi Arabia	Journalist, Civil Servant	Iraq	Non Partisan
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs	al-Pachachi, Adnan	1923	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Civil Servant	PhD, USA	Nationalist

Cabinet 8: April 1966 - August 1966

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bazzaz, Abd K.	1913	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Professor	Baghdad, England	Nationalist
Defense	Shukri, Shakir	1917	Hilla	Shiite	South	Military, Maj. General	Baghdad	"
Interior	al-Bazzaz, Abd	1913	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Professor	Baghdad, England	"
Foreign Affairs	al-Fachachi, Atman	1923	"	Shiite	"	Civil Servant	PhD, USA (Pol. Sc.)	"
Finance	Zaki, Shukri S.	1919	"	Sunnite	"	Lawyer	Baghdad	Pro-Arif, Nationalist
Education	al-Chafar, Khidr	1913	Ane	"	N. West	Professor	MA, USA (Math)	Nationalist
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Abta, Muhammad	1923	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	Baghdad; Cairo	"
Communications	Hafiz, Atman A.	1909	Musul	"	North	Engineer	Baghdad	"
Health	al-Badri, Abd L.	1922	Samara	"	North	Dr. of Med., Professor	Cairo, USA	Baath
Agriculture	Jimah, Mahmud	1912	Baghdad	Shiite	Baghdad	Civil Servant	MS, USA	Non Partisan
Culture and Guidance	Nasir, Muhammad	1911	Basra	"	South	Professor	PhD, USA	Pro-Arif, Nationalist
Justice	al-Bawaf, Q.	1916	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Lawyer	Baghdad	Pro-Arif, Nationalist

Cabinet &amp; continued

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agrarian Reform	Jimab, M.H.	1912	Baghdad	Shiite	Baghdad	Civil Servant	MS, USA	Non Partisan
Planning	al-Aswad, Salim	1918	"	"	Baghdad	Civil Servant	Baghdad	Nationalist
Industry	Jalal, Sadiq	1911	"	Sunnite	Kurd	Engineer	Diploma, Cairo; Switz.	K.N.D.P.
Oil Affairs	Zaki, Shukri	1919	"	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	Baghdad	Nationalist
Municipal	Thamir, Husan	1920	Najaf	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	PhD, USA	Non Partisan
Economics	al-Hilali, Abd	1915	Beira	"	South	Civil Servant	PhD, Germany	Nationalist
Union Affairs	Muhyi al-Din	1910	Najaf	"	South	Professor	PhD, Cairo	"
Ministry of Waqf	al-Ghafur, K.	1913	Ane	"	N. West	Professor	MA, USA	Pro-Arif, Nationalist
Minister of State	Safwan, Salim	-	Saudi Arabia	"	Saudi Arabia	Journalist, Civil Servant	Iraq	Non Partisan
Minister of State	al-Ikhan, Paris	1920	Basto	"	South	Officer, Lawyer	Iraq	Nationalist

Cabinet 9: August 1966 - May 1967

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Talib, Muji	1917	Nasirya	Shiite	South	Military, Maj. General	Baghdad; England	Nationalist
Defense	Shukri, Shakir	1917	Hilla	"	South	Military, Maj. General	Baghdad	"
Interior	Abd al-Majid, Hijab	1921	Ana	Sunniite	N. West	Military, Colonel	"	"
Foreign Affairs	al-Pachachi, A.	1923	Baghdad	Shiite	Baghdad	Civil Servant	PhD, USA (Pol Sc.)	"
Finance	al-Naqshabandi, Abdallah	1924	Arbil	Sunniite	Kurd	Civil Servant	PhD Law, England	K.N.D.P.
Education	al-Qaisi, Abd al Rahman	1920	Ramadi	"	N. West	Professor	PhD, USA	Nationalist
Labor and Social Affairs	Fityan, Farid	1925	-	Christian	North	Lawyer	LLB, Iraq	"
Communications	Mustafa, Ismail	1911	Baquba	Sunniite	Baghdad	Military, Maj. General	Baghdad	Non Partisan
Health	Chail, Fuad Hasan	1926	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Professor	BS Med. Iraq; Scotland	"
Agriculture	al-Dejaji, Ahmad M.	1924	Samara	"	North	Civil Servant	BS, PhD, Cairo; London	"
Culture and Guidance	al-Damalaji, D.	1919	Mosul	Sunniite	North	Military	Iraq	Nationalist
Justice	al-Naqshabandi, Huslib	1920	al-Imadiyah	"	Kurd	Lawyer	LLB, Iraq	K.N.D.P.

Cabinet 9 continued

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agrarian Reform	al-Dejaili, Ahmad M.	1924	Samara	Shiite	North	Civil Servant	PhD, London	Non Partisan
Planning	al-Saidi, Muhammad Y.	1921	Shatra	"	South	Professor	PhD, France	"
Industry	al-Shawi, Khalid	1930	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Professor	PhD, USA	Nationalist
Oil Affairs	Talib, Najj	1917	Masryah	Shiite	South	Military, Maj. General	Baghdad, England	"
Municipality	Sarsam, Dawud	1920	Mosul	Christian	North	Military	Iraq	Non Partisan
Economics	Abd al-Hamid, Kazim	-	-	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Iraq	"
Union Affairs	Ahmad, Cherbi al-Haj	1923	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Lawyer	Baghdad	Nationalist
North Reconstruction	Qadir, Ahmad Kamal	1912	Kirkuk	"	Kurd	Military	India, England	K.M.D.P.

Cabinet 10: May 1967 - July 1967

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Arif, Abd al-Rahman	1916	Baghdad	Sunnite	North	Military, Lieut-General	Baghdad	Nationalist
Defense	Shukri, Shakir M.	1917	Hilla	Shiite	South	Military, Maj-General	"	"
Interior	Abd al-Jatir, Abd S.	1926	Baghdad	Sunnite	Northwest	Military, Brigadier	"	"
Foreign Affairs	al-Pachachi, Adnan	1933	"	Shiite	Baghdad	Civil Servant	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Finance	al-Habib, Abd al-Rahman	1925	Ana	Sunnite	Northwest	Professor	"	Nationalist
Education	al-Qaisi, Abd al-Rahman	1920	Ramadi	"	Baghdad	"	"	"
Labor and Social Affairs	Hani, Abd al K.	1928	Baghdad	"	"	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Arab-Nationalist
Communications	al-Hakim, Fadil Munsir	1919	"	Shiite	South	Military, Lawyer	"	Nationalist
Health	Hani, Abd al K.	1928	"	Sunnite	North	Medical Doctor	"	Arab-Nationalist
Agriculture	al-Jumaili, Abu M.	1921	Falluja	"	Northwest	Lawyer	"	Nationalist
Culture & Guidance	Matiub, Ahmad	1936	Tikrit	"	North	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Arab-Nationalist
Justice	al-Naqshabandi Mullah	1920	al-Imadiyah	"	Kurd	Lawyer	LLB, Iraq	K.N.D.P.

Cabinet 10 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agrarian Reform	Farhan, Abd al-Karim	1927	Kut	Shiite	South	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	Arab-Nationalist
Planning	al-Saidi, Muhammad Yacub	1921	Shatra	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., France	Nationalist
Industry	al-Shawi, Khalid	1930	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Oil Affairs	al-Husaini, Abd S.	1924	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Lawyer	LLB, Baghdad	"
Municipality	Shirzad, Ihsan	1925	Arbil	"	Kurd	Professor	Engineer, U.S.A.	K.N.D.P.
Economics	Abd al-Hamid, Kazim	-	-	Shiite	Baghdad	Civil Servant	Iraq	Non-Partisan
Union Affairs	Muhyi al-Din, Abd al-Razzaq	1910	Najaf	"	South	Professor	Cairo	Nationalist
North Reconstruct.	Arif, Fuad	1912	Sulaymaniya	Sunnite	Kurd	Military, Major General	Iraq	K.N.D.P.
Vice-Premier	Yahya, Tahir	1913	Tikrit	"	North	Military, Lieut-General	"	Nationalist
Vice-Premier	al-Bawl, Abd al-Ghani	1921	Rawa	"	Northwest	Military, Brigadier	"	Nationalist Pro-Islam
Vice-Premier	Mustafa, Ismail	1911	Baquba	"	Baghdad	Military, Major-General	"	Non-Partisan
Vice-Premier	Arif, Fuad	1912	Sulaymaniya	"	Kurd	"	Iraq	K.N.D.P.
Youth & Federation of Labor	Khalil, Yusin	1934	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., West Germany	Nationalist
Minister of State	Almad, Charbi	1923	Mosul	"	North	Lawyer, Journalist	Iraq	"
Minister of State	Khairallah, Ismail	1929	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	"	"



Cabinet 11: July 1967 - July 1968

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	Yahya, Tahir	1913	Tikrit	Sunite	North	Military, Lieut-General	Baghdad	Nationalist
Defense	Shukri, Shakir	1917	Hilla	Shiite	South	Military, Maj-General	"	"
Interior	Yahya, T.	1913	Tikrit	Sunite	North	Military, Lieut-General	"	"
Foreign Affairs	Khairallah, Ismail	1929	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	"	"
Finance	al-Habib, Abd al Rahman	1925	Ana	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Education	al-Qaisi, Abd al-Rahman	1920	Ramadi	"	"	"	"	"
	Ilyas, Yaha (from Jan. 13, 1968)			"	North	Civil Servant	"	"
Labor and Social Affairs	Hani, Abd al Karim	1928	Baghdad	"		Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Arab-Nationalist
Communications	Jumaili, Abd al-Majid	1921	Falluja	"	Northwest	Lawyer	"	Nationalist
Health	al-Shamma, Ahmad	1917	Baghdad	Shiite	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	U.S.A.	Non-Partisan
	Hamdi, Jamal (from Jan. 13, 1968)			Sunite	"	"	"	"

Cabinet 13 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform	Furhan, Abd al Karim	1922	Kut	Shiite	South	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	Arab-Nationalist
	al-Hassan, Majid D.	1920	Hilla	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., France	"
Culture & Guidance	Muqshabandi, Wasih	1920	al-Imadiyah	Sunni	Kurd	Lawyer	Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
	Sajdi, Muhammad	1921	Shatra	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Nationalist
Industry	Ibrshim, Khalil	1922	Kut	Sunni	Baghdad	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	Pro-Arif Nationalist
	al-Musain, Abd S.	1924	Kamadi	"	Northwest	Lawyer	"	"
Oil Affairs	al-Hababi, Ahmad	1931	Majaf	Shiite	South	"	Diploma, Cairo	Non-Partisan
	al-Jadir, A.	1922	Musul	Sunni	North	Civil Servant	U.S.A.	Nationalist
Economics	Kannous (from Jan. 13, 1968)			Shiite	South	"	Ph.D., Switzerland	Non-Partisan
	al-Sumarra'i, S.	1921	Samarra	Sunni	North	Medical Doctor	"	Arab-Nationalist
Union Affairs	al-Shali, Abu al-Fattah	1918	Sulaymaniyah	"	Kurd	Military, Brigadier	Iraq, England	Nationalist

Cabinet 11 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Youth Affairs	al-Rawi, Abd H.	1921	Rawi	Sunnite	Northwest	Military, Brigadier	Iraq	Nationalist Pan-Islam
	Khalil, Yasin (from Jan. 13, 1968)			"	Baghdad	Professor	Germany	Arab-Nationalist
Minister of State	Muhyi al-Din, Abd al-Razzaq	1910	Najaf	Shiite	South	"	Cairo	"
	Iris, F. (from Jan. 13, 1968)			"	"	Military, Brigadier	Iraq	Nationalist
Minister of Presidential Affairs	Khairallah, Ismail	1929	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Lawyer	Iraq	"

## Appendix VII

## The al-Baqr Regime 1968-1975

## Cabinet I: July 17, 1968 - July 30, 1968

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Mayyif, Abd al-Hazraq	1934	Ramadi	Sunni	Northwest	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad, England	Nationalist
Defense	al-Dawud, Abd al-R.	1929	Hect	"	"	Military, Lieut-General	"	"
Interior	Amash, Salih	1924	Baghdad	"	"	"	Baghdad	Baath
Foreign Affairs	al-Hani, Masir	1920	-	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Ph.D., England	Nationalist
Finance	Kabbah, Salih	1911	Baghdad	"	"	"	B.S., Iraq; U.S.A.	"
Education	al-Jawari, Ahmad	1939	"	Sunni	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Hadithi, Awar	1936	Haditha	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	"
Communications	Khattab, Mahmud	1919	Musal	"	North	Military, Lieut-General	"	Free Officer Pro-Baath
Youth	al-Atawi, D.	1920	Tikrit	"	"	Military, Brigadier	"	Pro-Baath
Health	Mustafa, Izat	1925	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Medical Doctor	B.S., Syria	Baath
Agriculture	al-Qizwini,	1915	Najaf	Shiite	South	Civil Servant, Lawyer	Baghdad	Non-Partisan

Cabinet 1 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Culture & Guidance	Ilyas, Tuha al-Haj	1923	Musul	Sunnite	North	Civil Servant	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Non-Partisan
Justice	al-Naqshabandi Muslim	1920	al-Imadiyah	"	Kurd	Lawyer, Civil Servant	L.I.B., Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Planning	al-Saidi, Muhammad	1921	Basirya	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Nationalist
Industry	al-Hashimi, Khalid	1926	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	Baath
Oil & Minerals	Hantush, Mahdi	1921	Heet	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Nationalist
Municipalities	Mukhlis, Ghayib	1931	Tikrit	"	North	Medical Doctor	B.S., Switzerland	"
Economics	al-Naqshabandi A.	1924	Arbil	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	Ph.D., London	K.N.D.P.
Agrarian Reform	al-Jumali, Abd al M.	1921	Falluja	"	Northwest	Lawyer	B.A., Law, Iraq	Nationalist
Works & Housing	Shirzaat, Hasan	1925	Arbil	"	Kurd	Professor	Engineer, Baghdad, U.S.A.	K.N.D.P.
Warf	Zaidan, Abd al Karim	1917	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	"	Ph.D., Cairo	Nationalist

Cabinet 1 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Union Affairs	al-Azzawi, Jasim	1924	Khalis	Shiite	South	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad; England	Baath
Presidential Affairs	al-Rifai, Rashid	1929	al-Rifai	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
State	Khalaf, Najj Isa	1920	Najaf	"	"	"	Ph.D.	Pro-Baath
State	al-Mulla, Kuzim	1925	"	"	"	Lawyer	B.A., Law, Iraq	Nationalist
North Construction	Dizai, Muhsin	N.A.	Arbil	Sunnite	Kurd	Civil Servant	Law, Iraq	K.N.D.P.

Cabinet 2: July 30, 1968 - December 31, 1969

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	Baath
Defense	al-Tikriti, Hardan	1925	"	"	"	Military, General	Baghdad; England	Pro-Baath
Interior	Amash, Salih	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Military, Lieut-General	Baghdad	Baath
Foreign Affairs	al-Shaikhly, Abd al K.	1937	"	"	Baghdad	Student	Baghdad Medical College	"
Finance	Abd al-Karim, Amin	1921	"	"	"	Civil Servant	Law, Baghdad	Pro-Baath
Education	al-Jawari, Ahmad	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Hadithi, Anwar	1936	Haditha	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	"
Communications	Khattab, Mahmud	1919	Mosul	"	North	Military, Lieut-General	"	Nationalist
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria	Baath
Agriculture	al-Attiah, Abd al-Husain	1929	Divaniya	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., France	Pro-Baath

Cabinet 2 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Culture & Guidance	al-Samarrat, Abdalla S.	1932	Samara	Sunni	North	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Justice	al-Dulai, Mahdi	1925	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	LL.B., Baghdad	Nationalist
Planning	Nashim, Jawad	1938	Karbala	Shiite	"	Professor	Ph.D., England	Baath
Industry	al-Mushimi, Khalid	1926	Baghdad	Sunni	"	Military Lieut-General	Baghdad	"
Oil & Minerals	al-Rifai, Husaid	1929	al-Rifai	Shiite	South	Civil Servant, Engineer	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Municipalities	Makhlis, Qasib	1931	Tikrit	Sunni	North	Medical Doctor	B.S., Switzer-land	Nationalist
Economics	Qadduri, Fakiri Yasin	1932	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., Germany	Baath
Agriculture Reform	al-Duri, Izzat	-	Door	"	North	Self-employed	High School, Iraq	"
Works & Housing	Shirzad, Ihsan	1923	Arbil	"	Kurd	Engineer	Baghdad, U.S.A.	K.M.D.P.
Union Affairs	al-Khadar, Abdallah	1920	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Nationalist
Youth	al-Kamali, Shafiq	1939	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Professor	M.A., Cairo	Baath



Cabinet 2 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
North Construction	Dizai, M.	-	Arbil	Sunnite	Kurd	Civil Servant	Law, Iraq	K.N.D.P.
State	Sabri, Adnan	1925	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Military	Iraq	Baath
State	al-Juburi, H.	1930	Hilla	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	American Univ. of Beirut	"
State	Maruf, Taha	1924	-	Sunnite	Kurd	"	Iraq	K.N.D.P.
State	Kurbuli, Hamad D.	1924	Karbala	Shiite	South	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Pro-Baath

Cabinet 3: December 31, 1969 - March 29, 1970

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	Baath
Defense	al-Tikriti, Haidan	1925	"	"	"	Military, General	Baghdad; England	Pro-Baath
Interior	Amash, Salih	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Military, General	Baghdad	Baath
Foreign Affairs	al-Shaikhi, Abd al Karim	1937	"	"	Baghdad	Student	Baghdad College of Medicine	"
Finance	Abd al-Karim Amin	1921	"	"	"	Civil Servant	Baghdad	Pro-Baath
Education	al-Rawi, Saad	1930	Hawa	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Hadithi, Anwar	1936	Haditha	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	"
Communications	Khattab, Mahmud	1919	Mosul	"	North	Military, Lieut-General	"	Nationalist Pro-Baath
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria	Baath
Agriculture	Kamil, Mawlud	1934	Ana	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Culture & Guidance	al-Juburi, Humid	1930	Hilla	Shiite	Baghdad	Civil Servant	B.A., Beirut	"
Justice	Sharif, Aziz	1905	Ana	Sunnite	"	Lawyer	LLB, Iraq	Peoples Party Pro-left

Cabinet 3 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Planning	Hashim, Javad	1938	Karbala	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., England	Beath
Industry	al-Hashimi, Khalid	1926	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Military Lieutenant-General	Baghdad	"
Oil & Minerals	Humadi, Sadun	1930	Karbala	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Municipalities	Muhlis, Ghayib	1931	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Medical Doctor	B.S., Switzerland	Nationalist
Economics	Qadduri, F.Y.	1932	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., Germany	Beath
Agrarian Reform	al-Duri, Izzat	-	Door	"	North	Self-employed	High School, Iraq	"
Work & Housing	Shirzad, Husayn	1925	Arbil	"	Kurd	Engineer	Baghdad; U.S.A.	K.N.D.P.
Union Affairs	al-Khadair, Abdalla	1940	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	Baghdad	Nationalist
Youth	al-Kamali, Shafiq	1929	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Professor	M.A., Cairo	Beath
Higher Education	Isma'il, Saad	1928	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Presidential Affairs	al-Juburi, Hamid	1930	Hilla	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	American Univ. of Beirut	"

Cabinet 3 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
State	al-Rifai, Rashid	1929	al-Rifai	"	South	Civil Servant	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Baath
State	al-Samarrai, Abdalla	1932	Samara	Sunnite	North	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	"
State	al-Jawari, A.A.	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	"	"	"
State	Karballi, H.D.	1924	Karbala	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
State	Maruf, Muhyi al-Din	1924	-	Sunnite	Kurd	"	Law, Iraq	K.N.D.P.

Cabinet 4: March 29, 1970 - May 16, 1971

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	Baath
Defense	al-Tikriti, Harhan (until Oct. 15, 1970) replaced by Shihab, H.	1925	"	"	"	Military, General	Baghdad; England	Pro-Baath
Interior	Amash, Salih (until Sept. 1971) replaced by Ghaidan, S.	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	"	Baghdad	Baath
Foreign Affairs	al-Shaikhly, Abd al Karim (until Sept. 1971)	1931	"	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	"	"
Finance	Abd al-Karim, Amin	1921	"	"	"	Civil Servant	"	Non-Partisan Pro-Baath
Education	al-Bawi, Saud	1930	Hawa	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Hadithi, Murtada	1939	Haditha	"	"	Teacher	Teachers Inst., Baghdad	"
Communications	al-Izzi, Sauni Adnan	1925	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Military, Brigadier	Baghdad	"
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Ramadi	Sunnite	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria	"

Cabinet 4 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Agriculture	Huwazi, Nafiz Jalal (died July, 1972)	1923	Koyamjak	Sunnite	Kurd	Civil Servant	Iraq	K.N.D.P.
Culture & Guidance	al-Ali, Salah Umar (until Oct. 15, 1970) taken by al-Kamali	1939	Tikrit	"	North	Teacher	"	Baath
Justice	Sharif, Aziz	1905	Ana	Shiite	Baghdad	Lawyer	LLB, Iraq	Peoples Party
Planning	Hashim, Jawad (until Mar. 1971) taken by al-Rifai	1938	Karbala	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., England	Baath
Industry	al-Juzrawi, Faha (until Mar. 1971) Taken by al-Rifai	-	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Military, Captain	Military College, Iraq	"
Oil & Minerals	Hammadi, Sadun	1930	Karbala	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Municipalities	Shirzad, Ihsan	1925	Arbil	Sunnite	Kurd	Engineer	Baghdad, U.S.A.	K.N.D.P.
Economics	Qadduri, F.Y.	1932	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., Germany	Baath
Agrarian Reform	al-Duri, Izzat	-	Door	"	North	Self-employed	High School, Iraq	"

Cabinet 4 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Works & Housing	Shawish, Nuri	1922	Sulaymaniya	Sunnite	Kurd	Civil Servant	Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Union Affairs	al-Khalaf, Abdalla	1920	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	"	Nationalist
Youth	al-Juburi, Hamid	1930	Hilla	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	American Univ. of Beirut	Baath
Higher Education	Ismail, Saad K.	1928	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Presidential Affairs	al-Juburi, Hamid	1930	Hilla	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	American Univ. of Beirut	"
North Construction	Mahmud, Muhammad	1932	Sulaymaniya	Sunnite	Kurd	Medical Doctor	Iraq	K.N.D.P.
Transportation	al-Hadithi, Anwar A.	1936	Haditha	"	Northwest	Military, Colonel	"	Baath
Military Affairs	al-Hashimi, Khalid M. (until July, 1972)	1926	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Military, Lieut-General	"	"
State	al-Yusoffi, Salih	1918	al-Imadiyah	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	"	K.N.D.P.
State	al-Jawari, A.S.	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath

Cabinet 5: May 14, 1972 - November 11, 1974

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad H.	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	Baath
Defense	Shihab, Humad (assassinated July 1973) al-Rifai, R.M. Look over	1922	"	"	"	Military, Lieut-General	"	"
Interior	Ghaldan, Salim	-	-	"	Northwest	Military, Lieut General	"	"
Foreign Affairs	al-Hadithi, Murad (since Oct. 1971)	1939	Haditha	"	"	Teacher	Teachers Inst., Baghdad	"
Finance	Abd al-Karim, Amin	1921	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Civil Servant	Baghdad	Non-Partisan Pro-Baath
Education	al-Jawad, Ahmad	1924	"	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Radithi, Anwar	1936	Haditha	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	"
Communications	al-Rifai, Rashid Muhammad	1929	al-Rifai	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Health	Mustafa, Izzat	1925	Ramadi	Sunnite	Northwest	Medical Doctor	Syria	"
Agriculture	Hawsizi, Mufiz Jalal (died July 1972)	1923	Koysunjak	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	Iraq	K.N.D.P.



Cabinet 5 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Information & Guidance	al-Juburi, Hamid Alwan	1930	Hilla	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	Beirut	Baath
Justice	al-Safi, Husain M.	1924	Najaf	"	"	Lawyer	Baghdad	Non-Partisan
Planning	Hashim, Jawad	1938	Karbala	"	"	Professor	Ph.D., England	Baath
Industry	al-Jazrawi,	-	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Military, Major	Military College, Iraq	"
Oil & Minerals	Humandi, Sadun	1930	Karbala	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Municipalities	Shirzad, Ihsan	1925	Arbil	Sunnite	Kurd	Civil Servant	Baghdad, U.S.A.	K.N.D.P.
Economics	al-Azzawi, Hikmat (since June 1971)	1934	Baquba	"	North	"	Baghdad	Baath
Agriculture Reform	al-Duri, Izzat	-	Door	"	"	Self-employed	High School, Iraq	"
Works & Housing	Ghawish, Nuri	1922	Sulaymaniya	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	Baghdad	K.N.D.P.
Union Affairs	al-Khmir, Abdullah	1920	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Medical Doctor	"	Nationalist
Youth	al-Izzi, Adnan Sabri	1925	"	Shiite	South	Military	"	Baath
Presidential Affairs	al-Juburi, Hamid	1930	Hilla	"	"	Civil Servant	American Univ. of Beirut	"

Cabinet 5 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
North Construction	Mahmud, Muhammad	1932	Sulaymaniya	Sunnite	Kurd	Medical Doctor	Iraq	K.N.D.P.
Transportation	al-Hashimi, Khalid (until July 1972) replaced by al-Khaffaf,	1926	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Military, Lieut-General	Baghdad	Baath
State	Sharif, Aziz	1905	Ann	"	"	Lawyer	"	Peoples Party
State	Abdallah, Amir	1926	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Politician	Law, Iraq	Communist
State	al-Tabaqchali,	1934	Baghdad	"	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., France	Pan-Arab
Irrigation	al-Talabani, Mukram	1925	Kirkuk	"	Kurd	Lawyer, Civil Servant	Ph.D., Moscow	Communist

Cabinet 6: November 11, 1974 - 1976

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Prime Minister	al-Bakr, Ahmad	1912	Tikrit	Sunnite	North	Military, Maj-General	Baghdad	Baath
Defense	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Interior	al-Duri, Izzat	-	Door	"	"	Self-employed	High School, Iraq	"
Foreign Affairs	Humadi Sadun	1930	Karbala	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Finance	Ibrahim, Saadi (died Oct. 1975) replaced by al-Qaisi, Fawzi	1972	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	"	Ph.D., Paris	Communist
Education	Mahjub, Muhammad	-	-	"	Northwest	Teacher	B.S., Baghdad, Pol. Sci.	Baath
Labor and Social Affairs	al-Hadithi, Anwar (until May 1976)	1955	Haditha	"	"	Military, Colonel	Baghdad	"
Communications	Ghaidan, Sadun	-	-	"	"	Military, Lieut-General	"	"
Health	Mustafa, Izzat (until May '76)	1925	Ramadi	"	"	Medical Doctor	Syria	"
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform	Jimsh, Hasan	1937	Kut	Shiite	South	Professor	Ph.D., U.S.A.	Baath
Information and Guidance	Aziz, Tariq	1936	Mosul	Christian	North	Journalist	B.S., Baghdad, English lit.	"

Cabinet 6 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Justice	al-Shawi, Mandhur	1928	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Professor	Ph.D., Paris	Non-Partisan
Planning	al-Jazrawi, Taha (until May 1976)	-	Mosul	"	North	Military, Captain	Military College, Iraq	Baath
Industry	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Oil & Minerals	Abd al-Karim, Tahir (until May 1976)	-	-	"	Northwest	Teacher	B.A., Baghdad, English Lit.	"
Municipalities	Sharif, Abd al-Sattar (until May 1976)	1933	-	"	Kurd	"	Iraq	Kurdish Revolutionary Party
Economics	al-Azzawi, Hikmat	1934	Baquba	"	North	Civil Servant	Baghdad	Baath
Works & Housing	al-Rifai, Rashid (until May 1976)	1929	al-Rifai	Shiite	South	"	Ph.D., U.S.A.	"
Union Affairs	al-Khdair, Abdulla	1920	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Medical doctor	Baghdad	Nationalist
Youth	Haddad, Nuaim	-	-	Shiite	South	Teacher	Teachers Inst., Baghdad	Baath
Higher Education	Abd al-Jamil, Ghani	-	Mosul	Sunnite	North	Civil Servant	M.A., Baghdad, U.S.A.	"
Transportation	al-Izzi, Adnan A.S. (until May 1976)	1925	Baghdad	Shiite	South	Military	Baghdad	"

Cabinet 6 continued.

Ministerial Post	Name of Occupant	Date & Place of Birth		Religious Affiliation	Ethnic Origin	Occupation	Place of Education	Political Orientation
		Date	Place					
Irrigation	al-Talabani, Mukarram	1925	Kirkuk	Sunnite	Kurd	Lawyer, Civil Servant	Ph.D., Moscow	Communist
State	al-Jawari, Ahmad A.	1924	Baghdad	"	Northwest	Professor	Ph.D., Cairo	Baath
State	al-Juburi, Hamid	1930	Hilla	Shiite	South	Civil Servant	American Univ. of Beirut	"
State	al-Shawi, Hisham	1931	Baghdad	Sunnite	Baghdad	Professor	B.A., England	Pan-Arab
Foreign Trade	al-Azzawi, Hikmat (until May 1976)	1934	Bagdada	"	North	Civil Servant	B.A., Baghdad	Baath
State	Abdallah, Amir	1926	Ramadi	"	Northwest	Politician	Law, Baghdad	Communist
State	Akrawi, Hashim	1926	Akra	"	Kurd	Civil Servant	Teachers Inst., Iraq	K.N.D.P.
State	Akrawi, Aziz	1924	Akra	Sunnite	"	Military, Colonel	Iraq, England, U.S.S.R.	K.N.D.P.
State	al-Bazzani, Ubaidullah	1933	Barzan	"	"	Tribal leader	-----	K.N.D.P.
State	Ahmed, Abdallah Ismail	1927	Arbil	"	"	Politician	-----	Kurdish Revolutionary Party
State	Sharif, Aziz	1905	Amr	"	Baghdad	Lawyer	Iraq	Peoples Party

## Appendix VIII

CABINET CHANGES ON MAY 12, 1976  
(Al-Thawra (Baghdad), May 12 and 13, 1976)

On May 12, 1976 the same cabinet of November 11, 1974 continued with the following changes:

- (A) Four new ministers entered the cabinet for the first time who were:
- Minister of Planning, Mr. Aduan al-Hamdani
  - Minister of Industry and Minerals, Mr. Faleh Hasan al-Jasim
  - Minister of Health, Dr. Riad Ibrahim Husain
  - Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Hasan al-Amiri
- (B) Four reshuffles among incumbents who became:
- Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Dr. Izzat Mustafa
  - Minister of Works and Housing, Mr. Taka al-Jazrawi
  - Minister of Municipalities, Mr. Anwar al-Radithi
  - Minister of Transportation, Mr. Abd al-Sattar T. Sharif
- (C) One incumbent the Minister of Works and Housing, Dr. Rasnid al-Rifai, lost his cabinet post.
- (D) The replacement of the Ministry of Economics by the Ministry of Domestic Trade, and the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

## Appendix IX

Background Characteristics of the Members of the National Council  
For the Revolutionary Command, February 7, 1963.

Name of Member	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Religion	Profession	Political Orientation
1. Abd al-Salam Arif	1918	Ana	Sunnite	Military	Pan Arab
2. Ahm Hasan al-Bakr	1912	Tikrit	"	"	Baath
3. Salih Mehdi Ammesh	1924	Baghdad	"	"	"
4. Ali Salih al-Saadi	1928	Baquba	"	Civilian	"
5. Talib Shibib	1934	Hilla	Shiite	"	"
6. Hazim Jawad			"	"	"
7. Anwar Abd al Qadir	1936	Haditha	Sunnite	Military	"
8. Hani al-Fukayki	—	—	Shiite	Civilian	"
9. Hamid al-Khilkhal	1932	Hindiya	"	"	"
10. Tahir Yahya	1913	Tikrit	Sunnite	Military	Pro Baath
11. Hardan al Tikriti	1925	Tikrit	"	"	"
12. Diab el-Algawi	1920	Tikrit	"	"	"
13. Karim mustafa Nasrat	—	—	"	"	Baath
14. Mundhir al-Windawi	—	—	Shiite	"	"
15. Khalid al-Hashimi	1926	Baghdad	Sunnite	"	"
16. Abd al-Sattar Abd Latif	1926	"	"	"	Pro Baath
17. Muhsin Razi	—	—	"	"	"
18. Sadun Hummadi	1930	Kasbala	Shiite	Civilian	Baath
19. Hamdi Abd al-Majid	—	—	Sunnite	"	Pro Baath
20. Not Known	—	—	—	—	—

Source: Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 197.

## Appendix X

Summary of Background Characteristics of the National Council for the Revolutionary Command, February 7, 1963.

Variable	Number	Percentage
<b>1. Occupational Distribution</b>		
Military	12	60
Civilian	8	35
<b>2. Religious Affiliation</b>		
Sunnite	14	70
Shiite	6	30
<b>3. Political Orientation</b>		
Baath	13	65
Pro-Baath	6	30
Non-Baath	1	5
<b>4. Place of Birth</b>		
Baghdad	4	20
Tikrit	4	20
West Iraq	2	10
South Iraq	4	20
Kurdish Area	--	--
Others	6	30



## Appendix XI

The Power Web of Decision-Making: Interrelationship Between  
The Arab Baath Party, the National Council of the  
Revolutionary Command, and the Cabinet,  
February - November 1963

	Arab Baath Socialist Party Regional Command	National Council of the Revolutionary Command	Cabinet Ministers	Advanced Rank in Baath Party
1	Ahmad H. al-Bakr	x <sup>a</sup>	x	
2	Salih M. Ammash	x	x	
3	Ali S. al-Saadi	x	x	
4	Muhsin S. Radhi	x	x	
5	Hamdi Abd al-Majid	x	x	
6	Talib Shaqib	x	x	
7	Hazim Jawad	x	x	
8	Hani al-Fikaky	x		
9	Abu Talib al-Hashimi	x		
10	Abd al-Sattar Abd al-Latif <sup>b</sup>	x	x	
11		Abd al-Salam Arif		
12		Tahir Yahya		
13		Hardan al-Tikriti		
14		A. Mustafa Nasrat		
15		Dhiab al-Algawi		
16		K. M. al-Hashimi		x <sup>c</sup>
17		Mundhir al-Windawi		x
18		Sadun Humadi	x	x
19		Anwar al-Hadithi	x	x
20		A. Hamid Khilkhal	x	
21			Izzat Mustafa	x
22			A.S. al-Jawari	x
23			Muawi al-Rawi	x

Source: Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 196-197.

<sup>a</sup>The symbol 'x' means the same person holds another post.

<sup>b</sup>Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 94.

<sup>c</sup>Al-Munharifoon (Baghdad: Government Press, 1964), p. 214.

## Appendix XII

INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY  
COUNCIL AND THE CABINET,  
NOVEMBER 1963 - APRIL 1966

(Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford  
University Press, 1969), p. 217)

	National Revolutionary Council "Occupants of Position"	Cabinet Ministers	Number
1	President of the Republic		1
2	Vice-President		1
3	Prime Minister	X	1
4	Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces		1
5	Deputy Commander in Chief of Armed Forces		1
6	Minister of Defense	X	1
7	Chief of General Staff		1
8	Assistant Chief of General Staff		2
9	Commanders of Army Divisions		6
10	Commander of the Air Force		1
11	Military Governor General		1
12	Officers proposed and appointed by the Council		?

## Appendix XIII

The Interrelationship and Overlapping of Decision-Making  
Implementation Bodies at the National Level, 1968-1975

	Arab Baath Socialist Party Regional Com- mand Membership	National Revolu- tionary Command Council Member- ship	Cabinet Membership	Advanced Rank in Arab Baath Socialist Party Membership
1	A. H. al-Bakr (Secretary General)	x (Chairman)	x (President)	
2	S. Husain (Deputy Secretary General)	x (Vice Chairman)	x (Deputy of Bakr)	
3	I. al-Duri <sup>a</sup>	x	x	
4	I. Mustafa <sup>b</sup>	x	x	
5	J. A. al-Jalil <sup>c</sup>	-	x	
6	T. A. al-Karin <sup>d</sup>	-	x	
7	M. Manjub <sup>e</sup>	-	x	
8	N. Haddad <sup>f</sup>	-	x	
9	R. al-Ameri <sup>g</sup>	-	x <sup>i</sup>	
10	T. al-Ani <sup>h</sup>	-	-	
11	A. al-Hamdani <sup>i</sup>	-	x <sup>j</sup>	
12	A. P. al-Fasih <sup>5</sup>	-	-	
13	T. al-Jazrawi	x	x	x
14	-	3. Chaidan	x	x
15	-	-	T. Aziz <sup>h</sup>	x
16	-	-	H. al-Azzawi	x
17	-	-	A. al-Hadithi	x
18	-	-	S. Humadi	x
19	-	-	A. al-Itzi	x
20	-	-	A. al-Jawari	x
21	-	-	H. al-Juburi	x
22	-	-	H. Juma	x
23- 31	-	-	Other Ministers	-

<sup>a</sup>Al-Thawra, April 8, 1976, No. 2352, p. 4.<sup>b</sup>Ibid., p. 1.<sup>c</sup>Ibid., May 2, 1976, No. 2372, p. 1.<sup>d</sup>Ibid., April 8, 1976, No. 2352, p. 4.<sup>e</sup>Ibid., April 9, 1976, No. 2353, p. 7.<sup>f</sup>Ibid., April 8, 1975, No. 2352, p. 1.<sup>g</sup>Ibid., p. 4.<sup>h</sup>Ibid., p. 4.<sup>i</sup>Ibid., April 6, 1976, No. 2359, p. 4.<sup>j</sup>Ibid., May 12, 1976, p. 1.

Appendix XIV

Comparative Table of National Plans and Allocation of Expenditures and the Percentages of Various Sectors for the Period 1955-1975 (in Millions of Iraqi Dinars)  
(1 Iraqi dinar=\$3.3)

Years:	1955-1959		1959-1961		1961-1965		1965-1969		1970-1974 <sup>a</sup>		1975 <sup>d</sup>	
Plans:	Second Programs		Provincial Plan		Detailed Plan		Five-Year Plan		National Development Plan		Investment Program	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Sector:												
Agri-culture	168.1	33.6	47.9	12.2	112.9	20.3	173	25.9	413	21.7	276.7	19.2
Industry	67.1	13.4	38.7	9.8	166.8	29.9	187	28.1	408	21.4	597.3	41.6
Trans- port	124.4	24.9	100.8	25.7	136.4	24.5	110	16.5	227	11.9	221.3	15.4
Building	123.1	24.6	191.5	48.7	140.1	25.2	134	20.1	286	15.8	250.7	17.4
Defense <sup>b</sup> (not part of plans)	194.0		175.8		286.7		569		834		Not avail- able	
Others	17.3	3.5	14.9	3.6	0		62	9.3	586	29.7	88.7	6.1
Total	500	100	392.9	100	556.2	100	666	100	1900	100	1,434.7	100

Per capita Income = I.D. 48 in 1956<sup>c</sup>, I.D. 72 in 1962, I.D. 100 in 1968<sup>c</sup>, I.D. 108 in 1969, I.D. 120 in 1972<sup>c</sup>, and I.D. 236 in 1974<sup>c</sup>.

Sources: Ferhang Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, 1950-1965 (London: Frank Cass, 1972), pp. 33, 38.

<sup>a</sup>The Middle East Economic Digest, December 13, 1974.

<sup>b</sup>The figures from 1951-1964 are calculated from Ferhang Jalal, *op. cit.*, p. 74; for 1965-1969 from the Detailed National Plan, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>c</sup>Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 180.

<sup>d</sup>Al-Thawra Newspaper, July 15, 1975, p. 3.

<sup>e</sup>Sadam Husain, Al Thawra: Sirrat Al-Hadhir Wal Mustaqbal--The Revolution: Conflicts of Present and Future (Beirut: The Arab Establishment for Studies and Publications, 1975), p. 18.

## Appendix XV

Sectoral Allocations, Actual Expenditure, and Rates of  
Financial Execution in the Central Governmental  
Sector of Agriculture under Investment  
Programs for 1956-1973 Fiscal Years  
(in million Iraqi Dinars)

Year	Allocations	Expenditure	Financial Execution (Percentage)
1956	28.7	13.3	46.5
1957	31.1	14.1	45.3
1958	30.7	13.3	43.4
1959	47.3	10.3	22.7
1960	19.1	10.0	59.8
1961	31.2	11.3	36.2
1962	20.2	6.3	31.2
1963	22.8	4.5	19.8
1964	27.7	6.7	27.3
1965	25.1	6.0	23.9
1966	29.6	3.5	28.7
1967	29.7	11.0	37.0
1968	40.0	13.2	33.0
1969	22.0	17.5	79.5
1960	28.0	15.8	56.4
1971	60.0	49.3	82.2
1972	23.2	39.3	126.1
1973	65.0	34.5	53.1

Source: Jawad Hashim, Development Planning in Iraq (Baghdad: 1975), pp. 72, 75.

## Appendix XVI

## Contribution of Different Sectors to Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices

Sectors	1953 Percent	1964 Percent	1969 Percent	1971 Percent	1974 Percent
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	22.1	16.8	17.2	13.5 <sup>a</sup>	7.1 <sup>b</sup>
2. Mining and Quarrying	40.2	34.7	30.9	37.1 <sup>c</sup>	62.9 <sup>d</sup>
3. Manufacturing	6.1	8.0	9.3	9.7 <sup>e</sup>	4.7 <sup>f</sup>
4. Services and others	31.6	39.5	42.6	39.7	25.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Jawad Hashim, Development Planning in Iraq (Baghdad: Government Press, 1975) p. 28.

<sup>a</sup>The 13.5 percent represents I.D. 188 millions.

<sup>b</sup>The 7.1 percent represents I.D. 259 millions.

<sup>c</sup>The 37.1 percent represents I.D. 518 millions.

<sup>d</sup>The 62.9 percent represents I.D. 2,295 millions.

<sup>e</sup>The 9.7 percent represents I.D. 135 millions.

<sup>f</sup>The 4.7 percent represents I.D. 171 millions.

## Appendix XVII

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES BY NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES  
IN IRAQ, 1965-67

(The American University, *Area Handbook for Iraq*  
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing  
Office, 1971), p. 276.)

Commodity	Unit of Measure	Production (in thousands)		
		1965	1966	1967
Cement	tons	1,285.0	1,346.0	1,315.0
Bricks	units	42,416.0	43,874.0	43,253.0
Textiles	yards	16,294.0	17,844.0	16,148.0
Yarn	tons	3,537.0	3,426.0	891.0
Cigarettes	gross	9,287.0	8,828.0	7,617.0
Shoes	pairs	1,745.0	2,044.0	2,072.0
Vegetable oil	tons	49.4	48.1	54.0
Soap	tons	21.9	26.2	23.2
Carpets	square yards	25.8	38.7	51.6

## Appendix XVIII

## GROWTH OF BUREAUCRACY IN IRAQ, 1960-1972

(Sources: Republic of Iraq Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book 1960-1970, p. 223.

Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book (Baghdad: Ministry of Planning Press, 1974), p. 139.)

Year	Number of Government and Semi-Government Officials			Total Wages and Salaries Paid (Iraqi Dinar)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1960	191,000	16,966	207,966	47,508,569	5,643,467	53,152,036
1961	221,982	19,511	241,493	65,797,915	6,810,619	72,608,534
1962	223,237	20,701	243,938	66,532,220	8,021,325	74,553,545
1963	224,030	21,223	245,253	68,413,138	9,315,737	77,728,875
1964	254,673	24,759	279,432	82,685,448	11,585,285	94,270,733
1965	284,240	28,847	313,087	92,376,508	13,903,914	106,280,422
1966	281,049	30,805	311,854	98,250,480	15,194,177	113,444,657
1967	284,975	33,893	318,868	103,486,662	17,826,545	121,313,207
1972	337,851	48,127	385,978	-	-	-



Appendix XIX

Immigration of Iraqi Professionals to Some Western Countries, 1956 - 1967\*

Total Immigrants		Immigrants with Occupations		Professional Technical and Kindred Workers	Engineers			Natural Scientists			Physicians			Professional Nurses	Social Scientists			
U.S.	Canada	U.S.	Canada	U.S.	Canada	France	U.S.	Canada	France	U.S.	Canada	France	U.S.	Canada	U.S.			
2057	152	983	81	428	33		86	13	1	40	8	4	22	2	1	8	—	1

Source: A. B. Zahlan, "Migration of Scientists and the Development of Scientific Communities in the Arab World," Beirut, 1969, p. 37. (Mimeographed)

\*Data for the period 1968-1975 are not available.

## Appendix XX

## INCOME PER CAPITA AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME IN SELECTED YEARS

(Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 180; K. Hasub, The National Income of Iraq 1953-1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 16; Jawad Hashim, Development Planning (Baghdad: 1975), p. 17; Saddam Husain, Al-thawra (Beirut: 1975) p. 18; Al-Iqtisad, (Baghdad), No. 33 (September 1973), p. 90; Al-Iqtisad, (Baghdad), No. 45 (September 1974), p. 52; Ministry of Planning, al-Ahdaf Al-Iqtisadiyah L'al-Khuttah Ba'idat al-Mada, 1971-95 (Baghdad: 1973); Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1960-1970 (Baghdad: Government Press, 1972), pp. 37-42; Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1974 (Baghdad: Government Press, 1974), p. 79.

Year	Per Capita Income	National Income (Millions of Iraqi Dinar)
1956	48	334
1957	51	352
1958	51	378
1959	60	396
1960	63	449
1961	71	485
1963	69	536
1965	81	659
1966	84	705
1967	82	714
1968	100	749
1969	108	806
1970	100	962
1972	120	1,218
1974	312	3,176

## Appendix XXI

EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF IRAQ REGARDING THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL,  
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC AND, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

(Ministry of Information, al-Distur al-Muqqat wa-Ta'dilatahy--The Interim Constitution of the Republic of Iraq and Its Amendments, Baghdad, Dar al-Huriyyah, 1974.)

The Revolutionary Command Council

Articles 37 and 42

The RCC is the supreme body in the state and exercises, in general, the following jurisdictions:

- (a) to promulgate laws and resolutions which have the power of the law;
- (b) to issue required resolutions to implement its laws.

Article 43

By simple majority, the RCC shall exercise the following jurisdictions:

- (a) adopts resolutions and issues laws concerning the affairs of the Ministry of Defense and National Security;
- (b) declares national emergency, war, armistice, and peace;
- (c) approves the annual budget and the investment plans;
- (d) ratifies international treaties and agreements;
- (e) defines the internal structure, organization, payment and staff;
- (f) defines the procedures to deal with any legal actions if taken against its members;

(g) authorizes its Chairman or vice-Chairman some of its functions except legislative ones.

#### Article 38

The RCC shall exercise by a majority of two thirds of its members the following jurisdictions:

(a) Elect the Chairman from among its members and he shall be designated as the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council who shall, as a rule, be the President of the Republic.

(b) Elect the Vice Chairman from among its members who shall be designated as Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and shall take the place of the Chairman, as a rule, with his capacities defined in the previous paragraph in case of his official absence or his exercise of his constitutional jurisdictions becomes difficult or impossible, for any legal reasons.

(c) Select new members to the Council from among the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party provided that its members shall not exceed twelve.

(d) Decide on the resignation of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman or one of the Council's members.

(e) Release any of its members from the membership of the Council.

(f) Charge and send to trial the members of the Revolutionary Command Council, the Deputies of the President of the Republic and the Ministers.

#### The National Assembly

#### Article 46

The National Assembly shall consist of the representatives of the People in all its political, economic and social sectors. Its formation, manner of membership, process of work in it and its jurisdictions shall be defined by a special Law, namely, the National Assembly Law.

Article 47

The National Assembly must convene two ordinary sessions each year. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council is entitled to call the Assembly for an extra-ordinary meeting whenever required, and the meeting shall be confined to the subjects for which it is convened. Sessions of the National Assembly shall be convened and concluded by a Resolution issued by the Revolutionary Command Council.

Article 50

The National Assembly shall undertake to:

(a) Launch its internal Statute, specify its cadre, approve its balance and appoint its personnel. Remunerations and allowances of its President and Members shall be defined by a Law.

(b) Launch the rules for charging and trying its members in case of their committing one of the acts provided in Article 55 of this Constitution.

Article 51

The National Assembly shall consider the draft Laws proposed by the Revolutionary Command Council within a period of fifteen days from the date of their arrival to the bureau of the National Assembly's Presidency. If the Assembly approves the draft, it shall be submitted to the President of the Republic, to promulgate it. But if the Revolutionary Command Council insists on its opinion in the second reading, the draft shall be returned to the National Assembly to be presented in a joint sitting of the Council and the Assembly. The decision issued by the majority of two thirds shall be considered as final.

The President of the RepublicArticle 57

The President of the Republic shall exercise the following jurisdictions:

(a) Preserve the independence of the country and the integrity of its lands, protect its interior and exterior security and foster the rights and freedoms of all citizens.

(b) Declare full or partial emergency and terminate it in accordance with the Law.

(c) Appoint Deputies of the President of the Republic and the Ministers and release them from their posts.

(d) Appoint Judges, Qadhis (= Justices) and all civil and military officials of the State, promote them, terminate their services, retire them and grant medals and military ranks in accordance with the Law.

(e) Submit the draft of the general budget of the State and the independent and investment budgets annexed to it, accredit the final accounts of these budgets and refer them to the National Assembly for discussion.

(f) Submit the general plan of the State in all economic and social affairs, which are launched by the concerned Ministries, and refer it to the National Assembly.

(g) Conclude and grant loans and supervise organizing and administering currency and trust.

(h) Supervise all public utilities, official and semi-official institutions and the public sector organizations.

(i) Direct and supervise the work of the Ministries and State Organizations, and co-ordinate them.

(j) Hold negotiations and conclude international agreements and treaties.

(k) Accept diplomatic and international representatives in Iraq and demand their withdrawal.

(l) Appoint and accredit Iraqi diplomatic representatives to the Arab and foreign capitals and to international conferences and organizations.

(m) Issue special amnesty and ratify capital punishments.

(n) Supervise the good application of the Constitution, Laws, resolutions, judicial judgements and development projects all over the Republic of Iraq.

(o) Authorize one or more of his Deputies with some of his constitutional powers.

The Council of Ministers

Article 60

(a) The Council of Ministers shall consist of the Ministers and presided over by the President of the Republic.

(b) The President of the Republic shall call the Council of Ministers for meeting and undertake conducting its sessions.

Article 61

The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following jurisdictions:

(a) Organize draft laws and refer them to the concerned legislative authority.

(b) Issue administrative regulations and decisions in accordance with the Law.

(c) Appoint civil officials of the State, promote them, in accordance with the Law.

(d) Submit the general plan of the State.

(e) Submit the general budget of the State and the budgets annexed to it.

(f) Conclude and grant loans, and supervise organizing and administering currency.

(g) Declare full or partial emergency and terminate it in accordance with the Law.

(h) Supervise general utilities and official and semi-official institutions.

## Appendix XXII

## DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF PEOPLE'S COUNCILS

(Baghdad Observer, March 25, 1976)

People's Councils undertake the following tasks under the current period of social reconstruction:

1. Cooperation between the masses and the Government authorities in the diagnosis of social ailments, prior to their elimination and eradication.
2. Promotion of mass orientations among the masses for the protection of revolutionary achievements, on the one hand, and consolidation of confidence in the progressive political leadership, on the other.
3. Combatting all rancorous rumors circulated by imperialist quarters in Iraq.
4. Conveying mass demands to the authorities concerned and explaining revolutionary plans and objectives to the people.
5. Bolstering social relations between citizens through the organisation of seminars and symposia.

The responsibility of People's Councils in districts and sub-districts also covers the vital task of raising citizens' health, cultural and educational standards, notably as the revolutionary authority is fully devoted to the far-reaching objective of raising citizens' living standards, with special emphasis on the countryside, and achieving a comprehensive development.



## Appendix XXIII

TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT OF  
THE KURDISH ISSUE

(Ministry of Culture and Information, The Historic Statement of the Revolutionary Command Council on the Peaceful Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Issue, Baghdad, General Establishment for Press and Printing, 1970.)

The Revolutionary Command Council resolved the following fifteen-point declaration:

1. The Kurdish language shall be, alongside with the Arabic language, the official language in areas populated by a Kurdish majority. The Kurdish language shall be the language of instruction in these areas. Arabic language shall be taught in all schools, where the Kurdish language is the language of instruction while the Kurdish language shall be taught in schools throughout Iraq as a second language within the limits stipulated by law.

2. The sharing of our Kurdish brothers in government and non-discrimination between the Kurds and others in the assumption of public offices including sensitive and important posts in the state such as cabinet portfolios, army command, etc., have been and still remain among the important objectives which the Revolutionary Government seeks to achieve. The Revolutionary Government, in approving this principle, stresses the necessity of working for its fulfillment in an equitable ratio with due regard to the principle of efficiency, the proportionate distribution of inhabitants and the inequities which had befallen our Kurdish brothers in the past.

3. In view of the state of backwardness which in the past, afflicted the Kurdish nationality from the cultural and educational standpoints, a plan shall be worked out to make good that backwardness. This is to be achieved by:

A. Speeding up the implementation of the resolutions of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning the language and the cultural rights of the Kurdish people and placing under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information the task of preparing and steering radio and television

programmes concerning Kurdish national issues.

B. Reinstating all students who were dismissed or were compelled to leave the school on account of the circumstances of violence in the area regardless of their ages or producing a convenient remedy for their problem.

C. Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards of schooling and education and admitting, in just proportions, Kurdish students to universities, military colleges, educational missions and fellowships.

4. In the administrative units, populated by a Kurdish majority, officials shall be from among Kurds or from among persons well-versed in the Kurdish language provided the required number is available. Appointment shall be made of the principal officials-- Governor, Qaimaqam, Police Commandant, Security Director, etc. Work will promptly commence to develop state machineries in the area in consultation with the High Committee supervising the implementation of this statement in a manner assuring such implementation and cementing national unity and stability in the area.

5. The Government concedes to the Kurdish people its right to set up student, youth, women and teachers organisations of its own--such organisations to become affiliated in the corresponding national Iraqi organisations.

6. A. The operative period of paras (1) and (2) of the RCC's resolution No. 59 dated August 5, 1968, shall be extended right up to the date of the issuance of this statement and shall extend to all of those who took part in the acts of violence in the Kurdish area.

B. Workers, officials and employees--both civilian and military--shall return to service without this being affected by cadre restrictions. The civilians among them shall be put to use in the Kurdish area within the limits of its requirements.

7. A. A body of specialists shall be constituted to work for uplifting the Kurdish area in all spheres as quickly as possible and for compensating it for what has descended upon it in the past number of years. An adequate budget is to be set aside for this purpose. The body in question shall operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Northern Affairs.

B. The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way as to assure equal development to various parts of Iraq with due attention to the Kurdish area.

C. Pension salaries shall be made for the families of those who met either martyrdom in the regrettable circumstances of hostilities from among the members of the Kurdish armed movement and others as well as to the persons who became disabled or deformed as a result of those conditions. This is to be enacted by a special legislation on the pattern of other legislations in force.

D. Speedy efforts shall be made to provide relief to stricken and needy persons through the accomplishment of housing projects and others assuring work to the unemployed. Appropriate in kind and cash subsidies shall also be made available and reasonable compensation offered to those stricken persons who need help. This all is to be entrusted to the High Committee. Excluded from this shall be the persons covered by the above paras.

8. The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be restored to their former places in habitation. As to the villagers of areas where housing units cannot be set up and which are taken over by the Government for public utility purposes under law, they shall be resettled in neighbouring areas and duly compensated.

9. Speedy measures shall be taken to implement the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish area and amending it in such a manner as guarantees the liquidation of feudal relations and the acquisition by all peasants of appropriate plots of land side by side with waiving for them agricultural taxes accumulating over the years of unfortunate hostilities.

10. It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows:

A. The people of Iraq is made up of two principal nationalities; the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution confirms the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within the framework of Iraqi unity.

B. The following para shall be added to Article (4) of the Constitution: The Kurdish language shall, alongside with the Arabic language, be an official language in the Kurdish area.

C. The above shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution.

11. The broadcasting station and heavy weapons shall be returned to the government--this being tied up to the implementation of the final stages of the agreement.

12. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents.

13. The Governorates Law shall be amended in a manner

conforming with the substance of this statement.

14. Following the announcement of the statement, necessary measures shall be taken, in consultation with the High Committee supervising its implementation to unify the governorates and administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority in accordance with official census operations yet to be made. The state shall endeavor to develop this administrative unity and deeped and broaden the exercising by the Kurdish people therein of the sum of its national rights as a guarantee to its enjoyment of self-rule. Until this administrative unity is achieved, the Kurdish national affairs shall be coordinated through periodical meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As the self-rule is to be achieved within the framework of the Iraqi Republic, the exploitation of national riches in the area will naturally be under the jurisdiction of the authorities of this Republic.

15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population ratio in Iraq.

## Appendix XXIV

## BIOGRAPHY OF ABD AL-KARIM QASIM

Qasim was born on October 21, 1941, of an Arab Sunnite father and a Shi'ite mother, and was raised in Baghdad. He completed his primary and secondary education in Baghdad in 1927 and 1931 respectively. His teachers, according to Khadduri, described him as being shy and non-participative in discussions; one who sat at the back of the class, looked shabby, and attended school irregularly.

In the autumn of 1931, Qasim had a teaching appointment in a primary school in al-Shamiyyay, a small town in Southern Iraq. One of his students, Hudayb al-Haj Mumud, related that he was a mediocre teacher who was very authoritative when dealing with students. A year later, Qasim secured permission to quit his teaching job and enter the Military College in Baghdad where he spent approximately a period of four years. Although, he showed a great deal of interest and seriousness in military subjects offered, Qasim was aloof and made very few friends.

His graduation in 1936 coincided with the time of the first military coup d'etat in Iraq under the leadership of Bakr Sidqi. Qasim's family relations with Muhammad Ali Sidqi, Commander of the Air Force then, who in turn was a close friend of Bakr Sidqi brought Qasim into the latter's inner circle, thus allowing him to observe first hand the interplay between political forces and military discipline. Qasim was also influenced by the political ideas of the Sidqi group, who stressed Iraqi unity and cooperation between Arabs and Kurds.

In January of 1940, Qasim, who had acquired the rank of a captain, entered the Staff College in order to pursue further military training. During the two years of intermittent enrollment, Qasim is said to have demonstrated distinguished efficiency and great discipline that he was assigned leadership roles in the infantry that partook in the upsurge against the British in May of 1941. Upon graduation in December of the same year, Qasim was appointed to work under Col. Muhyi al-Din Muhammad who had his military training in Turkey and maintained liberal ideas.

Of greater importance to Qasim's career was his full participation in the Palestinian War of 1948-49 where he conducted successful missions against enemy headquarters in Ras al-Ratl, Bartal

al-Majammi, and Kishr. For such performance, he was awarded an official letter of thanks from the commander of the Iraqi forces to Palestine. Also in that war, Qasim became a close friend of Brig. Najib al-Rubayi, and both became dissatisfied with the course and conduct of the war.

There were other important experiences in which Qasim participated outside Iraq that were significant to his military career. In 1950, he attended a six-month training course at a military school for senior army officers in England. Then in 1955, after Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact, Qasim and al-Rubayi were sent to Turkey as members of a military mission. Later in 1956, Qasim was chosen to command the Iraqi forces dispatched to Jordan.

It is to be noted that while Qasim did not oppose Nuri al-Said's entire foreign policy, he totally disagreed with him on domestic policy, especially Nuri's support of the ruling oligarchy and his neglect of internal reforms. To Qasim, constructive reforms included improvement in the social conditions of the poor, building of houses for the military and civil bureaucrats, and the construction of streets, public squares, and canals.

On the eve of the 1958 successful revolution, Qasim became the Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and Deputy Defense Minister. He was promoted to Major-General on January 6, 1959, then was awarded the title Lieut-General on January 2, 1963. A month later a successful coup was staged by anti-Qasim forces (mainly Baath and Pan-Arabs) which ended his rule on February 2, 1963.

## Appendix XXV

## BIOGRAPHY OF AL-SALAM MUHAMMAD ARIF

Arif, like Qasim, came from a poor Sunni family of Arab descent. He was born in Baghdad in 1918 where his family had migrated after moving from its home village near the Syrian border called Ana, a semi-tribal area. Despite the physical settlement in Baghdad, Arif's family still maintained close tribal connections; and unlike Qasim's family, it hardly became urbanized. In addition, all members of Arif's family including himself were known to be conservative Moslems and held traditional views. Arif's father remained until 1958, a small shopkeeper. Arif took pride in his uncle, Sheik Dhari, a tribal chief, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for his assassination of a British official in protest against foreign control.

Arif's academic performance was far from being outstanding. According to Khadduri, he was barely an average student in primary and secondary schools. Similarly, the quality of his performance was not much distinct when he later enrolled in the Military College.

Much more conspicuous, however, were Arif's activities following his graduation in 1939. When stationed in Baghdad in 1942 to be in charge of a military prison where a number of anti-monarchy army officers were confined following the uprising of 1941, Arif helped these prisoners, and, when discovered, was transferred to Basra. In Basra, Arif met Qasim who was also stationed there; and they were in contact with each other until 1944 when they were transferred to different places. Moreover, Arif's participation in the Iraqi army that was dispatched for the Palestinian war of 1948 seemed important for his political career, especially that he had the chance once again to work closely with Qasim; hence, paving the way for their future co-operation against the existing political status quo. After the war ended, and upon returning to Baghdad, Arif was stationed in the army under the command of Qasim until 1958. Also, it was during the period between 1954 and 1958 that Arif and Qasim convincingly discussed their dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs as they collaborated through the membership of the Central Organization of Free Officers to overthrow the monarchial regime.

The period following the July 14 Revolution of 1958 markedly increased Arif's participation and prominence in Iraqi politics.

Two days after the inception of this Revolution, Arif was appointed by Qasim as an assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi armed forces, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Interior. However, he was relieved of all his positions two months later by Qasim himself. Subsequently, Arif was accused of conspiratorial activities for which he received a death penalty and was later reduced to life imprisonment. Consequently, he was confined in prison for a period that approximately exceeded two years.

Arif's lot took a better course after the downfall of Qasim. He was elected president of the Republic on February 8, 1963 by the National Command of the Revolutionary Council of the February Coup and simultaneously was bestowed the rank of 'Marshall'. A few months later, on November 18, Arif was promoted to the rank of General Commander of the Armed Forces, which is the highest rank in the Iraqi army.

Arif's activities, relating to the Arab political scene cannot be overlooked. Operating within the framework of fostering Arab Nationalism, Arif's activities included an invitation by Nasir for an official visit to the United Arab Republic (UAR) on August 21, 1963. He also visited the Syrian Arab Republic on August 26, 1963. On January 13, Arif headed the Iraqi delegation to the First Arab Summit meeting in Cairo at the end of which he revisited the UAR on January 19, 1964. A third visit to the UAR was to be present at the celebration of the completion of the first stage of the Aswan dam, and to sign an agreement establishing a Joint Presidential Council between Iraq and the UAR. On September 5, 1964 Arif also headed the Iraqi delegation to the second Arab Summit Meeting held in the UAR. On October 10, 1964, he signed officially the agreement which established a unified political command between Cairo and Baghdad. He also chaired the meetings of the unified political command of the UAR and the Iraqi Republic on May 18, 1965 in Cairo. Later Arif headed the Iraqi delegation to the third Arab Summit Meeting held in Casablanca, Morocco on September 13, 1965. His final visit was his appearance in Cairo on January 12, 1966 as chairman of the Iraqi delegation to the second meeting of the unified political command between the UAR and Iraq. Arif was killed in a helicopter crash on April 13, 1966 while visiting the southern part of Iraq.

Arif's visits to non-Arab countries included an official visit to Pakistan on March 20, 1964, followed by a state visit to India on March 26, 1964.



## Appendix XXVI

### BIOGRAPHY OF ABD AL-RAHMAN ARIF

Abd al-Rahman Arif was born in 1916 in Baghdad. Upon completing secondary education, he entered the military college in 1936. After his graduation on July 4, 1937, he became a Lieutenant, and he was gradually promoted until he became Major-General in 1964.

Abd al-Rahman Arif is the elder brother of Abd al-Salam Arif and shared his background. Differences did exist, however, between the two. While Abd al-Salam was known to be more courageous, extreme, outspoken and fluent in his behavior and speeches, Abd al-Rahman was quieter, more moderate and less emotional.

Besides his participation in the Arab war in Palestine, he also participated in the Free Officers' Movement before his brother, and played a role to help him in 1958. He was forced, however, to retire during Qasim's rule on August 21, 1962 and was returned to service on February 8, 1963, as Commander of a Division and in 1964 was also appointed as acting Chief of Staff although he never attended the Military Staff College.

Abd al-Rahman's distinguishing trait was that he was accepted by all shades of political groups of nationalist affiliation. He became president of the Republic of Iraq in 1966--not because he was qualified as a national leader but because the moderate elements of the military rallied behind him against other candidates who were thought of as being too arrogant; such as Uqayli who was more in favor of solidifying the Iraqi identity than attempting an Arab union with Egypt and Syria. The other factor which aided Abd al-Arif in succeeding his brother as President was the swing of public opinion behind him in sympathy for his lost brother.

## Appendix XXVII

## BIOGRAPHY OF AHMAD HASAN AL-BAKR

Born in 1912 in Tikrit where he attended his primary education. He attended the Teachers Institute in 1932 and, after graduation, taught in his birth place. In 1938, he joined the military college and graduated in 1941, al-Bakr participated in the Free Officers Movement but his rank was not in the fifteen-member central committee. However, he took part in the revolution of 1958. In the early days of the revolution, al-Bakr held a position as a member of the Martial Military Court. On October 20 of the same year, he was arrested by Qasim and was put on the retirement list of April 19, 1959.

Al-Bakr played a major role in the February 8, 1963 revolution when he was appointed as Prime Minister until November 18, 1963 when he was arrested by Arif. He was placed, after his release from prison, under house arrest. His political activities were restricted until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

During 1967 and 1968, al-Bakr headed many popular demonstrations in protest against Abd al-Rahman Arif's regime. On July 17, 1968, al-Bakr staged a bloodless coup and became, by a unanimous vote of the Revolutionary Command Council, the President of Iraq, the president of the Revolutionary Command Council, and in charge of the cabinet as of July 30, 1968 until the present time.

Al-Bakr hardly travels abroad except for his visit to Libya on June 19, 1970 to meet with Presidents Nasir of Egypt, Atasi of Syria and Qaddafi of Libya. Other official visits included the Soviet Union on September 14 and Turkey on September 19, 1972. On the domestic side, al-Bakr is usually the government figure to declare important decisions, such as the Kurdish Settlement of March 1970; the National Action Charter engineered by the Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP) on November 15, 1971; the declaration of the long term Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Treaty on April 9, 1972; and the nationalization of foreign oil companies on June 1, 1972.

Al-Bakr who is the Secretary General of the Regional Command of the ABSP commands high respect and undisputed leadership among the civilian as well as the military members of the ABSP. In his private life, he is known to be conservative, religious, and abides

traditional social values; yet in his official capacity, he is highly respected, possesses a unifying command in the ABSP, and provides a charismatic leadership to stay in the foreseen future.

## Appendix XXVIII

## BIOGRAPHY OF SADDAM HUSAIN

Saddam Husain was born in 1937 in Tikrit and was brought up in a poor, conservative, tribal environment. He attended primary school in Tikrit, moved to Baghdad where he attended Al-Karkh Secondary School but completed it in Egypt. He joined the Baath party in 1957. He was sentenced to death for attempted execution of Premier Qasim in 1959 but he escaped to Damascus, then Cairo, where he finished his secondary school education and part of his university degree. He resumed his partisan activities in Cairo. He then returned to Iraq in 1963 and was a member of the Fourth Regional Congress of the Baath Party, a member of the Sixth National Congress of the Baath Party and, a member of the Seventh National Congress of the Baath Party in 1964.

He was elected member of the National leadership of the party in 1965 and in that same year was arrested for plotting to overthrow President Arif in October. He was elected Deputy Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Baath during 1966-1968 and played a prominent role in the July 1968 coup. He became vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council since November 1969.


Mr. Husain has a dynamic personality and is known for his courageous political struggle throughout the republican era. He holds the positions of Vice-President, Vice-Secretary-General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. Mr. Husain earned a law degree in 1971, then he was awarded the Masters degree in Military Sciences in 1976. At the same time, he earned the military rank 'Marshall' and therefore became the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Saddam Husain has a very strong relationship with President al-Bakr. Both have two things in common: first, they are related; and second, they are ideologically committed to the same political philosophy and hold the highest ranks in the party's regional organization. Both personalities have provided strong and charismatic leadership so that they are regarded as the undisputed leaders of the civilian and military branches of the Baath party. Both leaders aspire to achieve peaceful and prosperous Iraq under the slogan of unity, freedom, and socialism.

Appendix XXIX

BAATH PARTY ORGANIZATION CHART

(Kamel Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'ith Socialist Party  
 (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,  
 1966), p. 145.)



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